


April-June 1968, Vol. VII, No. 2

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




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# AFRICA QUARTERLY

A Journal of African Affairs



7

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## Note to Contributors

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*The views expressed in the articles under the authors' names are not necessarily those held by the Council.*

# AFRICA QUARTERLY

(A Journal of African Affairs)

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# African History from Indian Sources

JOSEPH E. HARRIS

THE study of migrations and settlements abroad by any people is particularly challenging because it involves an investigation of the immigrants' original and adopted home. In the case of Africans migrating to India, the connecting link is a history enriched by the cultures along the routes of passage—Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Thus, the study of the African diaspora to India is a mosaic both revealing and exciting.

There seems to be no continent in the world where the African presence has not been felt; but scholarly studies on this dispersion and settlement hardly exist, except for the Negroes in the United States, Brazil, and to a lesser extent, England and France. Although the Atlantic slave trade has long attracted many scholars and popular writers, the Arab slave trade from East Africa has not received anything like the attention it deserves. An important reason for this is the fact that the Arab trade was much less a big business than its Atlantic counterpart. The Arabs usually transported only 10-20 slaves at a time in their dhows and seldom more than 75-100, some of whom were part of the crew. The disposal of these slaves was generally along various points in Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and India to individuals or small brokers. There does not appear to have been big slave brokers on the order of those who emerged in the United States during the Atlantic slave trade. This means that careful records of the Asian trade were not kept. The historian today is therefore left with only fragmentary documents on the subject. This problem is compounded by the fact that many of the Africans taken to Asia adopted Islam, Muslim names, and the Arabic language, thereby making it more difficult for the historian to identify them. A significant result of this has been the development of the widely prevalent myth that all Africans who migrated to Asia, voluntarily or involuntarily, were absorbed into the local societies. While it is obvious that Islam, under which banner the Asian slave trade flourished, did and still does provide greater freedom of social mobility for black people than the Christian societies, it is equally true that self-contained communities of African descent remain in parts of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India and other countries. These communities have remained separate primarily because of the general historical resistance of culture groups to accept fully any alien peoples; and the natural inclination of alien minorities to cluster in their own communities.

The study of these communities of African descent and the extent of their absorption into Asian societies will not only add to the growing body of literature on Negroes generally and to African and Asian (Indian) history, but will also shed needed light on culture contact in countries where the stigma of racial (Negro) inferiority is less pronounced than in western societies. At the same time a contribution will be made toward the elimination of the myth that black people had no history before their contact with Europeans, and therefore made no contribution to civilization.

India, with its multiplicity of ethnic and linguistic groups, is a fertile field for culture contact studies and is virtually unexplored in the area of the African diaspora which developed over many centuries. That indispensable Greek guidebook for sailors, *The Periplus*, which was written about 2000 years ago, suggests that trade between East Africa and India existed in ancient times, and slaves very likely were among the products. Centuries later that ubiquitous traveller and writer, Ibn Battuta, saw thousands of Africans in Indian armies and as servants; Ludovico di Varthema reported that a great number of slaves captured from the Abyssinian king, Prester John, by the Moors were exported to India and other places. Reginald Coupland described Arabs exchanging slaves for cloth, metals, and beads in India, Persia, and Arabia. Several other travellers have left similar accounts. But a good deal of information on this subject must still be buried in Arabic and Persian sources. Consequently, the diligent researcher prepared to investigate these sources should reap a good harvest by reexamining the documents at Aligarh University, particularly those pertaining to the Deccanis and Africans who united against the "foreigners" or "homeless" (Turks and Persians) for control over the Deccan.<sup>1</sup> It is virtually impossible to explain why the Africans were not regarded as foreigners, unless one accepts the view that they had already been in the Deccan much longer than the other groups. And if this view is accepted, the question of African migrations and settlements in India becomes an integral part of Indian history as well as a part of the dispersion of Africans into Asia.

By the Middle Ages Africans were at home in many parts of India. This helps explain the brief period of rule (1486-1493) in Bengal by the following Africans: Barbak Shah, Indil Khan (Sauf-ud-din-Firuz), and Siddi Badr. It also helps clarify the longer, more significant period of rule by that well-known African or Siddi<sup>2</sup>, Malik Ambar, who controlled a wide area of the Deccan from about 1604 to 1626. Malik Ambar rose from the position of an Abyssinian slave to Regent, imprisoned the king, received the cooperation of Deccanis and successfully repelled several Moghul attacks. The *Gazetteer of Aurangabad* (1884) states that it was under Malik Ambar's banner that Shahji, father of the great Sivaji, laid the "foundation of Mahratta greatness" (p. 172). Malik Ambar is also credited with founding the city of Kirki, known today as Aurangabad.

There are other examples of Africans who became prominent administrators and military commanders in Indian history, but the standard translations of the Persian documents, such as those at Aligarh Univer-

sity, are old and were written when African subjects were not as "important" and respected as they are today. Thus the need for a reinvestigation of those sources. There is also the real possibility that local Indian languages have recorded a mine of information. The Archives at Hyderabad contains stacks of military records and other materials in English and Urdu, mostly the latter, covering the nineteenth century and earlier. These materials should be especially productive of information pertaining to the use of African mercenaries in the Deccan. Also, a careful search for small books published in Indian languages, such as Sheikh Chand's *Malik Ambar* in Urdu, should be made.

In addition to collecting some data on the above subjects, this writer has focussed attention on African migrations and related them to the Siddis of Janjira, Hyderabad, and the area around Bombay during the abolition of the Arab slave trade in the nineteenth century.<sup>3</sup> The Siddis of Janjira Island, just south of Bombay, were prominent in Indian history during the great battles between the Mahrattas and Moghuls in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Realizing that the lack of a navy was one of their major weaknesses, the Moghuls allied themselves with the Janjira Siddis who successfully resisted all attempts of the great Mahratta leader, Sivaji, to conquer them. When the Portuguese, Dutch, and English sought to establish their hegemony along the western Indian coast, they also sought the support of these Siddis. The English, however, were the most successful not only in enlisting Siddi support but in ultimately incorporating them in their colonial empire as part of India.

Where the Janjira Siddis came from remains controversial, but it is clear that many of them emigrated from Ethiopia as traders, sailors, servants, and slaves. It also seems that when the Portuguese defeated the Arabs in the sixteenth century, the latter brought many Ethiopians with them to India, and some of these went to Janjira. Additional research into local languages, written and oral, should reveal valuable new information on this subject.

In the case of Hyderabad, Africans migrated from the Bombay area looking for employment. Others were brought as servants by Muslims returning from pilgrimages to Mecca. Still others appear to have been recruited for military service by several Nawabs in the Deccan. In 1863 the Nizam of Hyderabad organized his African Cavalry Guard (African Bodyguard) which was maintained until 1950. While some of the recruits seem to have come directly from Arabia, most of them were enlisted from among the African servants and their descendants in Hyderabad. Members of this bodyguard were known as Siddis and some of them became the Nizam's trusted confidants. Today they live in Siddi Risala (Siddi Regiment) where they were quartered during their service under the Nizam. Still known as Siddis, they are aware of their African origin and have some vague memories of Africa as related by their ancestors. They are also very much aware of their Negroid features but feel part of Hyderabad and have aspirations of progress like other citizens. The extent of their acculturation into Indian society, Muslim and Hindu, would make a remarkable sociological study.

Regarding the suppression of the slave trade in the nineteenth century and its resultant settlement of Africans around Bombay and other areas on the western Indian coast, documentation is more readily available and replete in the Foreign and Home Department Records, the Secret and Political Department Diaries, Public Department Diaries, Surat Factory Diaries, Bombay Police Records, missionary records, and the various Gazetteers.

Many Africans very likely were imported into India by the English East India Company, but the main catalogues to the Diaries (George W. Forrest, *Alphabetical Catalogue of the Contents of the Bombay Secretariat Records, 1630-1780*; and V. G. Dighe, *Descriptive Catalogue of the Secret and Political Department Series, 1755-1820*), as useful as they are, still are too general and inadequate for this subject. They seem to have been prepared from the subject headings listed in the margins of the daily entries in the Diaries, but a good deal of information about African slaves, the slave trade, and free Africans is available under different headings and in the general reports of various East India Company agents—customs and financial officers, military officers, and general inspectors. For example, The Paymaster's Disbursements in the Public Department Diaries for 7 August and 18 September 1759, No. 33, and 18 February 1772, No. 60, include entries "for provisions and necessaries for Madagascar slaves." An abstract of people who would be called to defend Bombay in case of attack included 754 Siddis, and many slaves (Public Department Diary, 7 August 1759). The customs records for March-September 1771 show that rupees were levied on imported slave boys. This same source, Public Department Diary for 1772, No. 60, discusses briefly the prohibition against "black people" repairing their houses in certain sections of Bombay because of the European demand for those areas. A careful examination of all these documents, making use of the Catalogues only as guides, should uncover valuable new data on Africans and their influence on India's west coast.

The several sources listed above contain many listings on Africans liberated from captured Arab dhows by the English and landed at Bombay in the charge of the Police Commissioner who placed them in Indian families, on experimental farms, and in missionary schools. Over 200 were placed in the African Asylum in Nasik, near Bombay, where they received Christian instruction and industrial training. Other liberated Africans were employed in the Bombay Navy and on the docks.

The question of the extent of Indian participation in the slave trade needs additional study. Foreign Department Records show that Banians from Cutch were banished from Zanzibar for slave dealing, and that the Rao warned his subjects against such activities. It is particularly significant, in this connection, that large numbers of African slaves were imported into Cutch and Kathiawar where large communities of African descent still reside. This area has also received African servants who accompanied Indians from East Africa. Several of these servants and their descendants now reside in Surat and in Bohras communities around Bombay.

Other subjects discussed in the Foreign Department Records include African migrations and their influence in Madras, Mysore, and the Malabar coast. In "Brief Histories of Certain Native States in the Bombay Presidency" (Foreign Department, Internal B, December 1907, No. 217) reference is made to the ruling family of Sachin as being of African descent. In Surat pensions were granted to descendants of an Abyssinian slave who was instrumental in the 1758-59 revolution which restored the Nawab to power (Foreign Department, 27 April 1855, Nos. 37-40). Similar references are scattered throughout these records.

Of the many publications concerning Indians in East Africa, none gives enough attention to the political ambitions of those immigrants. A significant point of reference in this connection would be an analysis of the early post-World War I period when Indians in India, East Africa, and London pressed to have the former German East African colony (Tanganyika) reserved for Indian colonization. Indians meeting in Nairobi in 1919 passed resolutions calling for the "colonization of German East Africa" by Indians. Hussein Sulieman Virjes of the Indian Association was chairman of the meeting held in Dar-es-Salaam, 17 November 1918, which resolved that German East Africa be "reserved for Indian colonization." The Muslim League in London called for the same area to be "reserved for the Indians." Kamini Kumar Chanda, M. P., proposed: "This Council recommends to the Governor-General in Council that His Majesty's Government be moved to secure German East Africa for colonization by Indians." These are bits of information that need to be brought into clearer focus, not only to discover the extent of Indian political aspirations in East Africa, but also to reveal the strength of the relationship, political as well as economic, between Indians in India, East Africa, and London. Some of the relevant sources which may be used as guides for this subject are: Secret-War, Despatch to Secretary of State, 29 September 1916, No. 85; Secret-War, October 1916, Nos. 467-472; Secret, March 1918, No. 1; Foreign Department, General B, February 1919, Nos. 1-6; Foreign and Political Department, General B, February 1920, Nos. 203-206. These sources are in the National Archives of India.

Another important source of materials on Indo-African relations is the Goa Archives. As headquarters for the Portuguese East African interests, Goa dispatched merchants, missionaries, and troops to various parts of East Africa for about five centuries. In addition, the Portuguese brought Africans to Goa as slaves and students. The Goa Archives would be the main source of documents on these subjects, but, again, there is no satisfactory index to the collection. Dr. P. S. Pissurlencar's *Roteiro dos Arquivos da India Portuguesa* (1955) is helpful as a beginning but it is much too general and vague in its listings. Some volumes are listed for the slave trade and for Mozambique, but there is no description of the subject matter of any volume. Thus, the task of the researcher would include tentative indexing of the subjects found. This would be one step toward a complete indexing of the whole collection, the achievement of which would be a creditable contribution to the researcher of Portugal's involvement in India and East Africa. Goa is

one of the few places where research on Portugal's colonialism can be conducted without political restrictions. By making the Goa Archives more helpful to the research scholar, therefore, India would become a major research centre on African history.

The objective of this short article was not to exhaust the possibilities of research on African migrations, settlements, and influence in Indian history, but to emphasize the relevance and importance of such a study and to present some of the primary sources pertaining to the problem. That India is a rich repository of records and peoples rooted in African history is without question; and the serious reconstruction of that heritage will add greatly to Indian, African, and world history, and to cross-cultural studies. These studies from Indian sources would complement works already available on Indians in East and South Africa. This and the indexing of relevant materials in Indian archives would appropriately enhance India's position as a research centre for African and Negro studies.

## REFERENCES

1. The following are a few of the important histories of India that refer to this problem: Eliot and Dowson, *History of India as Told by its own Historians*; Ferista (translated by Briggs), *History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India*; *Cambridge History of India*; and Gribble, *A History of the Deccan*.
2. Siddi and Habshi (Habashi, Hubshi, etc.) are terms commonly used to refer to Africans in Asian history. Siddi appears to be a corruption of "Sayyed," suggesting that it was not initially a derogatory term. Habshi is said by some to have derived from the Arabic word, Habash, meaning "mixed," referring to persons in South Arabia with African and Arab ancestors. The Ethiopianist, Professor Richard Pankhurst, holds that the term is derived from a South Arabian tribe named Habashat, which settled on the African coast during the seventh century. See: Pankhurst, *An Introduction to the Economic History of Ethiopia*. (London, 1961.) 55n. Both Siddi and Habshi have been used historically to refer to Africans in India and the Persian Gulf and are so used in this article.
3. A detailed study of this is in preparation.

# Mau Mau: A Case Study of Kenyan Nationalism

D.P. SINGH

THE Mau Mau is one of the most mysterious and perturbing political phenomena of contemporary African history. Ever since its outbreak, opinions have differed among students of Kenyan nationalism as to the precise purpose and nature of this movement and its impact on the course of subsequent political developments in Kenya. Few mass movements in Africa have attracted more controversial comment than what has been called Mau Mau<sup>1</sup>. The views differ not only about the nature of its origin and aims but also about the meaning of the term Mau Mau itself. The staggering variety of contradictory opinions and non-availability of reliable sources of information considerably complicate the task of formulating any definite conclusions about this important development in Kenyan history.

The aim of this paper is not to narrate the events and incidents during this phase of Kenyan nationalism, but to identify the nature of Mau Mau and to study it in the overall context of Kenyan politics during this period. Questions come crowding. What is Mau Mau? How was it that the Kikuyu tribe had to take recourse to such violent methods of political action? Where lay the real responsibility? Who was behind the movement? What was the relationship of Mau Mau with other African political organisations? Did Mau Mau constitute an essential part of the struggle against colonial rulers to achieve independence? What was the position of Jomo Kenyatta vis-a-vis Mau Mau? Was Mau Mau an "apotheosis of unreason" and a "barbarous, atavistic and anti-European tribal cult" or did it constitute an "integral part of the nationalist movement" in Kenya? What was the role of Mau Mau in the independence movement of Kenya? Why did it fail to spread beyond the frontiers of Central Kenya?

It is unfortunate that the meaning of the term Mau Mau itself has become a matter of acute controversy. Numerous interpretations have been advanced by scholars. (When asked about its meaning during the course of his trial at Kapenguria, Jomo Kenyatta replied that "Mau Mau are simply words and have no meaning"<sup>2</sup> whereas a native witness in Naivasha court said, "Mau Mau is a Kikuyu word meaning you want to do something very much and very quickly"<sup>3</sup>. C. T. Stoneham believes that Mau Mau has some particular meaning connected with the early religion and traditions of the tribe and that in some form the society has existed since long before the first white man was seen in Kikuyu land<sup>4</sup>. Another



author holds that "it was a code word,"<sup>5</sup> based on a secret language game Kikuyu boys used to play at the time of circumcision. Josiah Mwangi Kariuki attributed the use of the term to the enemies of the movement who used it as a term of abuse.<sup>6</sup> L.S.B. Leaky has also failed to give any explanation of the origin of the term<sup>7</sup>.)

An interesting interpretation has been given by D. H. Rawcliffe. At the religious gatherings of the *Watu Wa Mungu*<sup>8</sup> or the 'People of God', the 'arathi' (Kikuyu word for the 'prophets') during the course of the prayers used to work themselves into a state of frenzy accompanied by violent trembling. They used to give utterance to a wild roar like young lions, a piece of symbolism based on the fifth chapter of Isaiah. (It is probable that the name of the secret Mau Mau cult originated from the onomatopoeic imitation of this 'roaring like lions'.<sup>9</sup>) (Ali Mazrui has recorded in a recent article that he has heard it being speculated that the letters 'Mau Mau' were intended to be reversed to give us the initials for "Underground African Movement". Why were the initials reversed? "To emphasize the ambition of reversing the scale of power in colonial Kenya, and to stress the underground nature of the movement". Why Mau twice over? "For reasons of sound effect and to echo the noise of a black cat in the stillness of the night"<sup>10</sup>. Carl J. Rosberg and John Nottingham wonder whether the term 'Mau Mau' is a corruption of the Kikuyu word "Muma" which means "oath"<sup>11</sup>.)

Thus we find that there is no agreement among students of the Mau Mau as to the meaning of the term. Ali Mazrui has made an interesting point in his article by raising the question whether the emergence of the name Mau Mau was influenced by Sinophilia or whether the term was a corruption of "Mao Mao". And why did Warihiu Itote called himself General China?<sup>12</sup> It is for political etymologists to answer these questions.

Several theories have been advanced by scholars to explain the phenomenon of Mau Mau. But in order to appreciate the peculiar nature of this 'event' it would be desirable to look at it in the context of the general political situation in Kenya which contributed to the growth of militant politics. To what extent was political violence inevitable or unnecessary? As Tom Mboya rightly puts it, "The question, then, is not whether it is wrong to use violence, but whether nationalism can be expected to remain silent, provoked to the extent it has been in these countries, and when there are no constitutional channels through which nationalism can achieve its objects".<sup>13</sup> So, to what extent did the absence of legitimate political outlets create a condition in Kenya which made use of militant methods acceptable to politicians there and further helped the rise of "nativistic, revivalistic and syncretistic" movements which are often clothed in a religious garb? Immanuel Wallerstein rightly observes that "political protest did not always or necessarily take a political form".<sup>14</sup>

"The Second World War was a watershed in the growth and development of African nationalism in Tropical Africa. Prior to the war African political organizations neither commanded a mass following nor

essentially challenged the legitimacy of the colonial state. The postwar years were to witness a new politics—mass political movements under a leadership determined to replace colonial rule with African majority rule.”<sup>15</sup>

Whereas in West Africa the force of nationalism did not exceed the constitutional limits and a peaceful transition of political power was possible, in Kenya “a nationalism of petition and constitutional protest ultimately gave way to a militant nationalism employing direct action in securing a new political and social order.”<sup>16</sup> The presence of white settlers in Kenya and their absence in West African territories made the two situations radically different. In Kenya, they became an important political force and asserted their supremacy vis-a-vis Africans. It was a constant source of bitterness and hatred which later on produced several explosive situations and made a peaceful transition of political power increasingly difficult. Thus, whereas in West African territories this new variable in the political situation was absent, in Kenya it generated continuous tension and conflict. Broadly speaking, the indifference of the Kenyan colonial administration to genuine economic and political grievances of Africans together with the failure of the leading African political organizations and their leaders to achieve substantial reforms and the absence of adequate outlets for African political activity because of the intransigence of the European settlers gave way to militant leaders and covert organizations.

Towards the end of the Second World War, the method and style of European politics affected most the pattern of African politics. In order to contain the political pressure of people of Indian origin and to control the course of African development, Europeans made fresh efforts to achieve greater unity among themselves. Seeing the settlers involved in the process of consolidating and strengthening their power, Africans also recognized the need for unity and coordination of their activities. In March 1944, a new European body, called the Electors' Union, came into being. Its chief objectives were to preserve “leadership” under European control and to try to reduce the direct influence of the Colonial Office on the administration of Kenya. It also pledged to maintain the old policy of preserving the “White Highlands” and closing it to African settlement. In the African eyes, the emergence of the Electors' Union presented “an image of European determination and power that went well beyond the reality of the situation”.<sup>17</sup>

On 12 December 1944, Sir Philip Mitchell came to Kenya as the new governor and he continued in office until 21 June 1952. He realized the gravity of the economic and political problems of the Africans in Kenya. To achieve speedy economic growth, he believed that cooperation of all the communities was essential. Therefore, he was fascinated by the concept of ‘multi-racialism’—the multi-racial state or multi-racial community. He held that “the only workable solution was the equal representation of them all without any regard to numbers”. Applied to individuals, the doctrine held that only by cooperating with all “Kenyans”, regardless of race, could an individual Kenyan contribute to his happiness as well as to that of the whole state<sup>18</sup>. But the theory of multi-racialism

could never excite enthusiasm in the hearts of Africans for various reasons. For example, when applied to the economic sphere, the theory proved unfavourable to Africans. "By concentrating on the importance of increasing economic *production*, while paying little attention to ensuring a more equitable *economic distribution*, it nullified any broad appeal it might have had to African leaders."<sup>19</sup> Thus the economic situation continued to be disadvantageous to Africans<sup>20</sup>.

The rapid growth of the African press after 1945 was another significant factor which strengthened the urban bases of African nationalism. Some of the papers were published in Swahili and English, but others were written in the vernacular—Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya or Kamba. Most of them were published from Nairobi which became the main base of urban nationalism in the postwar period. The *Coast African Express* and the *Nyanza Times* (which was associated with Mr. Oginga Odinga) were published from Mombasa and Kisumu respectively. Another important and influential paper was *Mumenyereri* ("He who looks after") edited by Henry Muroria who was the Kenya African Union's Assistant General Secretary in 1946. These newspapers and news-sheets became important channels of communication as well as an instrument of political education.

During the Second World War period there was for some time, as George Bennett observes with concealed irony, "a lessening of African political activity"<sup>21</sup> because all the African political organizations were proscribed by the government. The Kikuyu Central Association (KCA),<sup>22</sup> with all its allied associations, the Ukamba Members Association (UMA) and the Teita Hills Association (THA), was declared subversive by the Kenyan government. Consequently, KCA went underground. After the war, two prominent African politicians, James Gichuru and Eliud Mathu, decided to form a new political organization which had the same general objectives as KCA. This new organization, the Kenya African Union (KAU)<sup>23</sup>, grew out of the Kenya African Study Union (KASU)<sup>24</sup> started by them in 1945. In 1946 it was decided to drop the word "study" which implied educational rather than political objectives.<sup>25</sup> Gradually, KAU started broadening its base by opening its membership to all tribes in Kenya.

It was in this political situation that Jomo Kenyatta returned from London in September 1946. He assumed the presidentship of KAU on 1 June 1947. "To the old he was not too young, to the young he was not too old; to the illiterate he was too educated, to the educated he was nobody's fool".<sup>26</sup> Under his leadership, sustained efforts were made to widen and strengthen the base of the African nationalist movement in Kenya. Kenyatta faced major hurdles in transforming the regional and tribal aspect of African political activity into a coordinated and coherent mass movement. The major problems were "the great unevenness of political awareness in the country, widespread tribal parochialism, the small number of educated English-speaking leaders, and the inadequacies of social communication that could not enable them to function as a national elite"<sup>27</sup>. Still KAU got substantial support among the Luo leaders, especially Walter Odede, Achieng Oneko and

Oginga Odinga. Similarly, among the Luhya leaders Joseph Otiende, John Adala and W. W. Awori were invaluable for KAU's subsequent organizational development.

Between 1945 and 1953, several futile efforts were made by KAU to secure favourable political and economic changes through constitutional means. KAU failed miserably in its policies. For example, its demand for six African representatives in the Legislative Council was turned down by the colonial government which was under constant European pressure<sup>28</sup>. An unofficial majority was established in the Legislative Council which comprised 15 officials and 22 unofficials, of whom 11 were to be Europeans, five Indians, four Africans and two Arabs. But the Africans were disappointed by this arrangement. Finally in 1951, KAU submitted its major land petition to the Secretary of State, James Griffiths, who visited Kenya in May 1951. It pointed out the shortcomings of the land policy of the Kenya government which had resulted in severe overcrowding in the African reserves and the creation of a large number of squatters<sup>29</sup> who had no right of security in the European area. In May 1951, Eliud Mathu, the African member of the Legislative Council, made a scathing attack on the 1934 Kenya Land Commission in the Council. Mbiyu Koinange and Achieng Oneko went to Europe to explain the African case on the land problem to members of the House of Commons and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Kenya's colonial government ignored the land petition and rejected it as an "irresponsible attempt". Thus the insensitivity of the government to genuine African grievances helped in a way to strengthen the militants in African politics and correspondingly weaken the position of the moderates.

In Nairobi where urban life was characterized by chronic unemployment and hopeless housing conditions, there grew an enormous number of people who were extremely dissatisfied with their existence and therefore were unmindful of even violent politics. These depressed and discontented people organized themselves into a group known as the 'Fortys Group' (Anake a 40)<sup>30</sup>. The members of the group included such persons as Fred Kubai, Charles Wambaa (Kiambu), Mwangi Macharia, Eliud Mutonyi and Isacc Gathanju (Fort Hall) and Stanley Mathenge and Domenico Ngatu (Nyeri). Gradually this "ginger group" joined the African trade union movement<sup>31</sup> which had become an important instrument under the direction of Makhan Singh for championing the cause of Africans. What was the relationship of this group to KAU and its leadership, especially Jomo Kenyatta? This is an important question which is difficult to answer. According to Negley Farson, the American journalist who met him thrice in 1948 in Kenya, there was good reason to believe that Kenyatta may well have been afraid of them. Whether or not this was so, "he must always be afraid", wrote Farson, "that this left-wing group will do something in the name of Jomo Kenyatta — that their dark and half-educated minds will lead them to use force".<sup>32</sup>

Thus we find that the African political scene was characterized by a decline in the stature of moderates like Eliud Mathu, Tom Mbotela

Joseph Katithi and even Jomo Kenyatta. "Had the government given the people any prospect of justice it is possible that Kenyatta and other constitutional fighters for freedom would have had some chance to control the Kikuyu. As it was, even Kenyatta himself became an object of suspicion to the thugs and there is strong evidence of plots to assassinate him both at a meeting in Kololeni Hall, Nairobi, and also at the burial of Senior Chief Waruhiu, killed by a gunman on 7 October 1952".<sup>33</sup> It seems that Kenyatta tried to follow a middle-of-the-road policy between the KAU moderates and militants. He avoided any open opposition to Mau Mau and other militants as he might have realized that it "could ruin his prestige and might possibly be dangerous"<sup>34</sup> to himself. As he saw that the events were getting out of his control, together with Mbiyu Koinange he made another attempt to ensure a peaceful transition to African self-government by opening a fresh dialogue with the Europeans. A Kenya Citizens' Association consisting of all the three communities was inaugurated on 23 October 1950 to check the deteriorating race relations in the country. However, lack of interest and an attitude of indifference by the Europeans hampered the efforts of Kenyatta and Koinange. Thus Kenyatta's range of manoeuvrability was increasingly restricted. Thrown into such a situation Kenyatta might have decided to let the Mau Mau take its own course.

Thus a stage was set for the occurrence of violent politics in Kenya. From June to November 1951, the urban militants continued to consolidate their hold on Nairobi and began to extend their influence in the politics of Kenya. A time of crisis was developing. But the Africans themselves were not united and therefore any concerted plan of action was not possible without achieving a greater sense of unity and purpose. Moreover, seeing that the Europeans were consolidating and strengthening their position, the Africans further realized the need of coordinating their activities so as to strengthen themselves vis-a-vis the Europeans. Thus members of the Kikuyu tribe began to bind themselves by an Oath of Unity. It began slowly and spread all over Central Kenya, starting in Kiambu district. During the latter part of 1951, the pace of oathing in Nairobi increased significantly. As the movement grew secretly, criminal elements also infiltrated into it.<sup>35</sup> The overcrowded African 'Reserves' became vital areas of militant mass support. The squatters of the Rift Valley were also sympathetic to the new movement. In the districts of Fort Hall, Nyeri and Kiambu there was increasing participation in the oath ceremony. By August 1952 many of the militants had started preparing for resistance in the forests as the government began to resort to stringent measures. The political situation was disintegrating in such a way that it was almost impossible for any one man to control it.

In June 1952 Philip Mitchell retired from the governorship and left the country. A new governor did not arrive until the end of September. In the meantime, the provincial administrators continued to view the phenomenon as some sort of 'dini' or 'religious cult'. They reacted by organizing "cleansing" or counter-oathing ceremonies by witch doctors. They pressed for greater powers to deal "properly"

with the leading African "agitators". However, conditions deteriorated rapidly after the dramatic assassination on 7 October 1952 of Senior Chief Waruhiu, who was the leading government spokesman in the Kikuyu country. The new governor, Evelyn Baring, signed a proclamation on 20 October 1952 declaring that "a public emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to confer special powers on the government and its officers for the purpose of maintaining law and order".

The declaration of Emergency came at an unfortunate moment. It created great desperation and psychological frustration among the African leaders. The increasing mobilization of forces by the settler government in Kenya confirmed their fear and convinced them that unless they resorted to stronger methods they would be crushed. This led to greater mobilization for violent resistance in the rural areas and "the assertive character of their radical politics was transformed into desperate resistance as they sought to preserve their hopes and ideals as a people under increasingly severe siege conditions".<sup>36</sup> The nature of violence changed radically as the units of resistance in the forests were led mostly by people who were not associated with the political leadership which existed in the pre-emergency period. "Though the leadership that emerged in the forests was basically a new leadership, not a part of those elites involved in KAU, the trade union movement, or the rural political organizations in Kiambu, it was infused by many of the same ideals and objectives as the more articulate and generally better-educated elite of the pre-emergency organizations".<sup>37</sup> At the same time, the radical leaders had their objectives fulfilled when they succeeded in creating a situation of discontentment and hostility. Evelyn Baring accepted the belief held by the majority of the Europeans that Mau Mau was an atavistic and secret cult. He further believed that most of the KAU leaders and Jomo Kenyatta were the planners of this movement.

The Kenya government thought that the only way to crush the Mau Mau movement was to remove KAU leaders who were supposed to be its chief planners.<sup>38</sup> Thus, assuming that Mau Mau was an organization with seditious and criminal intentions, the government arrested Kenyatta, Achieng Oneko, Paul Ngei, Fred Kubai and Bildad Kaggia of the KAU national executive and Kungu Karumba, Chairman of the Chura Divisional Branch of KAU in Kiambu, on 21 October 1952. Their trial opened on 24 November 1952 at Kapenguria. It lasted from November 1952 to March 1953. Judge Ransley Samuel Thacker sentenced Kenyatta and the others to seven years of hard labour. The holding of the trial perpetuated the European myth about Mau Mau. It is noteworthy that it was only after the arrest of Kenyatta and other leaders that violence increased in Kenya. In fact, "much of the violence that occurred during the emergency was not simply a continuation of either pre-Emergency political tactics or the Government's security measures but was derived from the conditions of the Emergency itself."<sup>39</sup>

Here it would not be useful to go into the details of each and every incident during the Emergency, but notice should be taken of some major events. On 26 March 1953 two incidents occurred. The first was a successful raid on Naivasha Police Station, in which the attackers

drove away with a truck-load of ammunition, rifles and automatic weapons. The second incident is known as the "Lari massacre" in which about 100 "loyalists" were killed by Mau Mau men. This had a great impact on the course of the Emergency. General George Erskine came to Kenya as the new Commander-in-Chief in June 1953. He prepared an overall military plan to control the movement. The whole country was almost converted into an armed camp. By 1955 the troops were withdrawn from the reserves and security forces took the siege into the forests after isolating the forest fighters completely. And by the middle of 1956 even in the forests the operation dwindled down to a single man-hunt for Dedan Kimathi, who was finally captured in October 1956.<sup>40</sup>

The Mau Mau has been viewed from several angles. The Kenya colonial administration and the settlers regarded it as the "apotheosis of unreason" and as a "barbarous, nativistic and anti-European tribal cult whose leaders planned to turn Kenya into a land of "darkness and death." Another widely held sociological generalization views Mau Mau as the product of the Kikuyu people's failure to adapt fully to the demands of rapid modernization. It attributes Mau Mau to "the breakdown of tribal sanctions under the impact of Western civilization". A third oft-repeated view is that "the minds of the Kikuyu have revolted against a civilization too hastily acquired with a resultant reversion to primitive barbarism."

All these three views suffer from several infirmities and fail to consider the phenomenon of Mau Mau in a proper perspective. For example, the generalization attributing the Mau Mau to the breakdown of tribal sanctions under the impact of westernization misses the mark completely. It explains the breakdown of tribal customs and sanctions only. It does not explain the rise of Mau Mau. Moreover it overlooks the fact that such breakdowns have occurred in other parts of Africa also but they did not produce Mau Mau everywhere. It further proves that Mau Mau is a distinctive phenomenon which could not be explained in such simplified terms. Again, the view that Mau Mau is an 'atavistic escape from modernity' ignores the facts of genuine economic, social and political grievances of the Africans. Moreover, it fails to take into consideration other ideological and political factors without which Mau Mau would have failed to acquire its extraordinary tenacity and the support of the masses of the tribe.<sup>41</sup> In fact, the ideological aspect of this movement has been frequently overlooked by scholars. As the Emergency continued and the horrors of the 'Lari massacre' came to light, Mau Mau increasingly assumed the aspect of a ruthless and desperate struggle against political, social and economic oppression. Hundreds of Kikuyu guerillas, men and women,<sup>42</sup> died in a fanatical fashion but never surrendered. It can be safely said that without the sustaining emotional belief in the justice of its cause the Mau Mau movement would have faded away like its fanatical predecessors, the "dinis".<sup>43</sup>

Even if we have a cursory look at the documents of Dedan Kimathi, who was the chief brain behind the movement, the point is driven home that Mau Mau had national and political ideals to fight for.

In one of the memoranda Kimathi decried the injustices of British rule and wrote: "If colour prejudice is to remain in Kenya who will stop subversive action, for the African has eyes, ears and brains. It is better to die than to live in distress, why confine distress to the soul?" Dedan Kimathi and Waruhiu Itote ("General China") were generally acknowledged as leaders of the Mau Mau movement. They operated in the forests of Aberdares and Mount Kenya respectively. Dedan Kimathi was once a clerk in the Dairymen's Cooperative Union at Thomsou's Falls and Branch Secretary of the Kenya African Union. "General China" was a corporal in the Intelligence Section of a Kenya African Rifles (KAR) battalion. He took part in the Burma campaign where he acquired some training in military strategy and organization. After the war, he is reported to have worked as a locomotive fireman in the railway up to 1950. Besides Kimathi and Itote, there were some daring leaders like Stanley Mathenge and Tanganaiyaka in Nyeri, Matenjegywo, Kago and Mbaria Kaniu in Fort Hall and Kimbo, the "cattle raider" who operated between Nanyuki and Naivasha, and others.

From 1953 to 1955 Kimathi made genuine efforts "to provide an overall perspective of the resistance in the forest". He toured the various "Bushes"<sup>44</sup> and there he discussed the conduct and aims of the campaign with other leaders. Kimathi tried to organize regular meetings of a body that came to be called in 1954 "Kenya's Parliament". A session of this body was held on 23-24 October 1954 in the Aberdares and was attended by 37 leaders including four from Kiambu<sup>45</sup>. However, greater coordination could not be achieved because of the difficulties of communication and unfavourable topography. The 'forest fighters' lacked the training required for sustained guerilla action. "General China" was captured on 1 January 1954. Gradually the campaign degenerated into localized encounters.

Once Kimathi is reported to have said in one of his forest meetings: "I do not lead rebels but I lead Africans who want their self-government and land. My people want to live in a better world than they met with when they were born. I lead them because God never created any nation to be ruled by another nation for ever".<sup>46</sup> At another time in a letter he wrote: "We are not fighting for an everlasting hatred but are creating a true and real brotherhood between white and black so that we may be regarded as people and as human beings who can do each and everything."<sup>47</sup> In October 1953 Kimathi published an important document which can be called his "Testament". It consists of 79 articles. Copies of the document are reported to have been sent to the Colonial Office, London, the Indian Government, the Chairman of the Pan-African Council, President Eisenhower, George Malenkov of Russia, the French Government and Kwame Nkrumah. A quick perusal of extracts from this "Charter" will prove that Mau Mau was a movement which fought for the realization of highly nationalistic ideals.<sup>48</sup>

"...We reject the *foreign* laws in Kenya for they were not made for Kenya and are not righteous.

"We reject to be called terrorists when demanding our people's rights.



"We very strongly reject sleeping of foreigners with our wives and girls, also female imprisonments and carrying of passes.

"We reject a foreign Attorney-General in Kenya for he deals with appearances more than righteousness..

"We reject colonization in Kenya for being in that state we turned into *slaves and beggars*.

"We want an African self-government in Kenya....."

After going through such statements one cannot hold the view that Mau Mau was merely a tribal insurrection or a reversion to barbarism unless one is biased and blind to the realities of the African situation. In fact, "throughout Kimathi's writings and speeches, and in the reports of the meetings held by forest groups, there is a consistent emphasis on the need for justice, on the possibility of reconciliation, and on the right to 'self-government'".<sup>49</sup>

✕ Mau Mau cannot be regarded as a "terrorist and communist inspired insurrection" either.<sup>50</sup> It drew its inspiration from anti-colonial forces of the whole world. It was not imported from outside as alleged by some writers.<sup>51</sup> Mau Mau arose in response to substantial African grievances. Its major aims were to achieve self-government, end colour discrimination and relieve chronic land shortage by opening up parts of the "White Highlands"<sup>52</sup> to African settlement.<sup>53</sup> The movement was launched by men who saw no alternative to violent means.

✓ Recently Donald Barnett and Njama Karari have propounded the theory that Mau Mau was a "peasant revolt".<sup>54</sup> It considers the insurrection as a "battle between the landless and the landed; of poverty against privilege; of the modern concept that all men are born equal against the ancient doctrine of race superiority". As we have already noted, economic underprivilege and land hunger were the chief factors which precipitated the crisis in Kenya. The Kikuyus reacted sharply not only to economic exploitation but also to the arrogance displayed by an alien group of white settlers.<sup>55</sup> Even Sir Michael Blundell in his memoirs admits that "in the tight colonial world of those days they must have suffered much from the inferior position which was imposed on them. I often thought how patiently some of them must have accepted the stupidities and the little arrogances which I regret a few of us used in our dealings with them."<sup>56</sup>

Several authors hold the view that as Mau Mau was the work of a minority group, it does not truly constitute a part of the nationalist movement in Kenya. Fred Majdalany holds that the main aim of the Mau Mau was to establish an independent Kenya "under Kikuyu domination"<sup>57</sup>. In other words, it was mere 'Kikuyuism' guided by tribalistic ambitions. To support their contention they say that Mau Mau failed to spread beyond the frontiers of Kikuyu areas and did not get any support from the other tribes of Kenya. This view completely overlooks the ideological aspects of the Mau Mau movement. It ignores the aims and ideals widely expressed by the leaders of the movement. Moreover, nationalistic insurrections seldom originate with the masses. They

always receive their genesis through the activities of minorities. Mau Mau was no exception. The fact that Mau Mau was supported by only one tribe does not prove the point that it was not nationalistic. It simply shows the remarkable character of the phenomenon. Although the symbols of revolt were sometimes tribalistic the ideals remained 'national'. Mau Mau embodied the emerging nationalism. As such there is no *real* contradiction between "Kikuyuism" and Kenyan nationalism. Mau Mau represents an essential phase of the nationalist movement in Kenya. To think otherwise would amount to an oversimplification and assume that the purposes of Mau Mau were different from those of the nationalist movement. It is exceedingly difficult to say where 'Kikuyuism' stops and nationalism begins. In Kenya both these currents are finely blended together.

For the Mau Mau failure to spread beyond Kikuyu areas, there are several reasons. "It is not really surprising that the movement should have started first amongst the Kikuyu. They more than any other tribe felt the despair brought by pressing economic poverty; they more than any other tribe by their proximity to the forcing house of Nairobi were subject to urban pressures and the great increase in understanding and frustration brought by education; they more than any other tribe daily saw the lands that had been taken from them producing rich fruits for Europeans"<sup>58</sup>. Again, the very question of land goes a long way to explain why Mau Mau was confined to one area of the country—Central Province and the Rift Valley<sup>59</sup>. Moreover, in Kenya the differential rate in social mobilization among diverse cultural sectors of African population was marked<sup>60</sup>. It determined the nature and intensity of responses of other tribes to the political movements in the country. As Tom Mboya rightly points out, the movement "penetrated non-Kikuyu areas later, both because the frustrations were fiercer among the Kikuyu and because they had already organized before the war in the Kikuyu Central Association."<sup>61</sup>

The Europeans' belief that Mau Mau was just another 'dini'<sup>62</sup> is based on certain false assumptions. They thought that the existing political structure was sufficiently suitable for the satisfactory progress of the African and therefore by not cooperating with it Mau Mau represented a rejection of progress. Secondly, Kenya's tradition of nativistic and messianic movements was a significant factor which shaped their conception of Mau Mau. Thirdly, the widespread use of oaths reinforced their view. In fact, Government's whole programme of "rehabilitation", i.e. "process of building of new attitudes", was based on the assumption that Mau Mau is "an advanced form of group insanity",<sup>63</sup> a dangerous hypnotic obsession based on primitive emotions. A 'Mau Mau' ought to go through a 'rehabilitation programme' in order to restore him to a normal state of mind. However, after the 'Holo Camp Incident' of 3 March 1959 the theory of 'rehabilitation' was abandoned.<sup>64</sup>

Another widespread wrong notion is that Mau Mau was an anti-white and anti-European uprising.<sup>65</sup> It is a lop-sided view which cannot be supported by facts. During the whole course of the movement only

30 Europeans, mostly isolated farmers were killed by Mau Mau. Sir Philip Mitchell himself confesses: "If they had intended an anti-European rising and the slaughter of Europeans, well, they could have killed five hundred or two thousand or more of them on the first night".<sup>66</sup>

The European view of Mau Mau as an advanced form of group insanity is based on a wrong conception of the oath ceremonies prevalent in African society. The practice of oath had a tremendous social and political significance. It served two major functions: it helped to promote social solidarity and raise the level of political commitment among the masses. The oaths underwent a tremendous transformation after the declaration of the Emergency and the exodus to the forests. Their political meaning took precedence over the social aspect. There was constant emphasis on traditional Kikuyu symbols so as to make it "an instrument in overcoming social fragmentation and establishing central loyalty ...."<sup>67</sup> The use of traditional symbols did not reflect an escape from modernity but rather it was the employment of common symbols at a time of intense national crisis for the Kikuyu people.<sup>68</sup> Its sanctions lay not only in the fear of reprisals from the secret organization controlling it, real though it was, but also in the potential ostracism from the new brotherhood it was creating.<sup>69</sup>

Thus after 1950 the oath ceremonies began to spread speedily. However, since 1948, when the first of the oath ceremonies is reported to have taken place in the region of Lake Naivasha in the Kiambu area, regional variations in the terms of the oaths had begun to emerge. It happened because of the fact that "there was no central control of the organization, there were minor variations in the different districts and oath administrators did not everywhere use exactly the same technique."<sup>70</sup> In Nyeri and Fort Hall also people bound themselves by the oath of unity. But by mid-1952 a new oath called 'Batuni' had been added. It was committed to the use of violence. It was undertaken in the Rift Valley. As the Europeans became more hostile to the use of the oaths the Kikuyus were encouraged to use them.

Although the technique of oaths succeeded immensely as an "organizational tool," their extensive utilization by the Kikuyus produced certain consequences which were not conducive to the growth of the movement. It alienated Christian elements in the tribe who were apparently horrified by the rituals of the oath ceremonies and that group of Kikuyu traditionalists who did not approve of the (1) participation of women and children in the rituals as well as (2) the method and style of the oath ceremony which assumed different forms under changing conditions, sometimes amounting to violation of the traditional method of oathing. For example, according to the old custom an oath should be taken voluntarily and in public. But during the Emergency as the secrecy of the movement became more essential, the leaders introduced forcible administration of the oath at night in huts so as to compel other members of the tribe to keep their mouths shut.<sup>71</sup> However, "it would be a mistake to suppose that Mau Mau gained its mass support amongst the Kikuyu tribe mainly through the forcible administration of the oath. For

years the Kikuyu leaders had been indoctrinating the masses with their own brand of extremist political idealism and in most cases the oath was taken voluntarily".<sup>73</sup>

While assessing the impact of the Mau Mau movement on the course of African political development and independence of Kenya it should be remembered that there has been a tendency among writers either to exaggerate its importance or to under-estimate it. To reach right conclusions one has to avoid both the extremes. On the one hand, Carl J. Rosberg and John Nottingham hold the view that "Mau Mau was indeed an integral part of an ongoing, rationally conceived nationalist movement."<sup>74</sup> On the other, W.E.F. Ward thinks that "it would be misleading to describe Mau Mau men as freedom fighters. ...They made no systematic attempt to paralyze the government by killing European officials. We can only suppose that its leaders were hoping to gain absolute power in Kenya; what use they would have of it we do not know. Whoever its leaders were, they did not succeed. They created an atmosphere of terror, but they were defeated because mass of their fellow Kikuyu refused to submit. ...The Mau Mau did not hasten Kenya's independence; it delayed it..... In particular, the fight against the Mau Mau delayed the development of African political parties."<sup>75</sup>

The truth lies somewhere between these two views, tending more towards the one expressed by Rosberg and Nottingham. It is wrong to say that the Mau Mau movement checked the growth of political parties in Kenya. As noted earlier, the growth and development of African political organizations were hampered by the policy of the Kenya government. Even after World War II most of the African organizations were not allowed to function properly by the settler-government. Similarly, during the Emergency only associations on the district level were allowed to function and therefore no countrywide associations could emerge. Thus it was not Mau Mau which delayed the growth of African political parties but the policy of the Kenyan government itself.

Immanuel Wallerstein thinks the Mau Mau movement failed (which itself is questionable) and the reasons given by him for its failure are curious. According to him, "Mau Mau repelled large segments of British and world opinion". And as a nationalist had to consider international public opinion, which he thinks played an important role in the timing and ease of transition and as Mau Mau remained indifferent to this factor it failed.<sup>76</sup> He further holds that the Algerian revolution succeeded even after using violence because it met with international approval. In fact, the whole assumption seems to be weak. He has ante-dated the importance of world opinion in the nationalist movement of a country. Moreover, there were internal reasons for the success of the Algerian revolution. Mau Mau is a phenomenon which must be studied and assessed in the context of Kenyan politics only and its comparison in this respect with the Algerian revolution is misleading. He prescribes that a nationalist movement must be *cautious* in order to be successful.<sup>76</sup> As Mau Mau did not remain "cautious", it failed. The criterion prescribed by him is both arbitrary and ambiguous. What

is his scope of "caution"? The Mau Mau movement helped to broaden the base of the nationalist movement in Kenya. It was through this movement only that nationalism spread from urban areas to rural areas. Here lies the chief contribution of Mau Mau to the cause of freedom and independence in Kenya. It hastened the process of political reforms in Kenya<sup>77</sup>. Adopting Thomas Hodgkin's definition of nationalism, according to which every social movement of protest against alien rule is a manifestation of nationalism<sup>78</sup>, we can say that Mau Mau was a manifestation of the self-assertion of the Kenyan people. It can be called the "Little Revolution" of Kenya.

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3. Quoted in C. T. Stoneham, *Mau Mau*, London, 1953, p. 23.
4. *Ibid.*, p.23.
5. Fred Majdalany, *State of Emergency : The Full Story of Mau Mau*. London, 1962, p.75.
6. J. M. Kariuki, *Mau Mau Detainee*, London, 1963, pp.23-24.
7. L. S. B. Leaky, *Mau Mau and the Kikuyu*, London, 1952, pp.95-6.
8. 'Watu Wa Mungu', or 'The People of God' is a 'deni' or 'religious cult' which arose among the Kikuyu in the nineteen-twenties. It represented a blend of mission taught Christianity and tribal beliefs as well as teachings of the Old Testament. The 'arathi' believed that their actions were dictated by the Holy Ghost. They invoked the 'Holy Ghost' 'facing Mount Kenya' (a very significant ritual). The political overtones were expressed through their rejection of foreign goods and when they took to wearing skins and began carrying bows and arrows as symbols of protest.
9. D. H. Rawcliffe, *The Struggle of Kenya*, London, 1954, p.32.
10. Ali Mazrui, "Mau Mau in Two Dimensions", *Africa Report*, May 1967, pp. 46-7.
11. *Ibid.*, n. 1, pp. 331-32.
12. *Ibid.*, n. 10, p. 47.
13. Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After*, London, 1963, p.50.
14. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa : The Politics of Independence*, New York, 1961, p.51.
15. *Ibid.*, n. 1, p.188.
16. *Ibid.*, n. 1, in Introduction, p.xvi.
17. *Ibid.*, n. 1, pp.197-8.
18. *Ibid.*, n. 1, pp.199-208.
19. *Ibid.*, n. 1, p.203.
20. See the Government Report of the Committee on African Wages (Nairobi, 1954) for a full account of the hopeless wage conditions of African workers.
21. George Bennett, *Kenya : A Political History. The Colonial Period*, London, 1963, p.110.
22. KCA, "the direct successor" of the young Kikuyu Association, was started in 1921 by Harry Thuku who was deported to Kismayu in March 1922 by the government which caused rioting in Nairobi. On his return, Thuku became a moderate politician committed to constitutional methods only for attaining political objectives. In the meantime, the new leaders, Joseph Kangethe and Jesse Kariuki, changed the name 'Young Kikuyu Association' to 'Kikuyu Central Association'. The word "young" was replaced by the word "central" as the association was now to be open to all Africans in Central Provinces as well as the non-Kikuyu tribes—Meru and Kamba. In 1928 Jomo Kenyatta became general secretary of the KCA. Gradually, the KCA became "a political movement dedicated to the recovery of the lost lands, increased political representation, greater educational opportunities, the fight against exploitation

- of labour on European farms and the abolition of Hut tax." See J. M. Kariuki, *Mau Mau Detainee*, London, 1963, pp.18-19.
23. The African leaders decided against reviving the old KCA itself for two reasons. Firstly, it was much more easier to get the government's consent to the establishment of a new party than to obtain cancellation of the ban on KCA and, secondly, the time had come for starting a colony-wide organization embracing all tribes which was hardly practicable with the insertion of the word 'Kikuyu' in the title itself. See J. M. Kariuki, *Mau Mau Detainee*, London, 1963, p.19.
  24. There is disagreement among scholars and writers as to the origin of KAU. Rosberg and Nottingham think that KAU was formed in Nairobi on 1 October 1944, but a month later "under pressure from the government," the organization was renamed as the Kenyan African Study Union (KASU), which was to emphasize the fact that the new body was primarily an instrument of imparting information and training, especially about public affairs, to Africans. But at its second annual delegates' conference in February 1946, it reverted to its earlier title of KAU. But J. M. Kariuki differs from this interpretation and holds that KAU was formed only in 1946 whereas KASU was formed in 1945 and the former body grew out of the latter. See Carl J. Rosberg and John Nottingham, n. 1, pp. 212-15 and J. M. Kariuki, n. 6, pp. 19-20.
  25. *Ibid.*, n. 6, p.20.
  26. *Ibid.*, n. 1, p.216.
  27. *Ibid.*, n. 1, p.217.
  28. In 1948, the African demand for greater representation was recognized but the number of seats conceded to them was only four which were to represent Nyanza Province, the Central Province including Nairobi, the Coast Province and the Rift Valley and the remainder of the colony.
  29. Those Africans who either were made landless as a result of alienation of African lands or were unable to meet their needs in crowded African rural 'reserves' were encouraged to settle on European farms for varying periods of service each year—probably 180 days. They used to be called "squatters". They became an important source of labour for European farms. The number of squatters increased to 225,000—a staggering figure.
  30. The 'Fortys Group' had tremendous support in the urban areas of Nairobi. The discontented and criminal elements also infiltrated into this body. It consisted of ex-servicemen of the age-group circumcised in 1940. Most of them had fought in Ethiopia, Madagascar, India or Burma.
  31. Trade unionism in Kenya was revived by Chege Kibachia. He led the famous "Mombasa strike" in January 1947 involving about 15,000 Africans which lasted 12 days. During the strike the *African Workers Federation* was founded of which Kibachia became President. In 1947 Makhan Singh, Fred Kubai and Bildad Kaggia together formed the *East African Trade Union Congress* (EATUC) with Makhan Singh as general secretary and Kubai as president.
  32. Negley Farson, *Last Chance in Africa*, 1949, p.115....'nobody except Jomo Kenyatta can tell you how much he actually uses the "forty" or how it pushes him"; quoted in *Ibid.*, n.21, p.115.
  33. *Ibid.*, n.6, p.23.
  34. *Ibid.*, n.9, p.46.
  35. *Ibid.*, n.1, p. 272. Also see J. M. Kariuki, *Mau Mau Detainee*, London, 1963, p.23. "In the early days the secrecy and lack of direction made it an ideal cover for the violent and criminal elements which are a menace to any state or society. Sometimes these elements would misuse the organization which had begun as a straightforward and spontaneous movement of unity among a people without hope."

36. *Ibid.*, n.1, p.276.
37. *Ibid.*, n.1, p.300.
38. The British Command Paper, known as the "Corfield Report", is the most authoritative analysis of the attitude of the colonial administration in Kenya. Corfield holds that "Mau Mau was developed by Kenyatta as an atavistic tribal rising aimed against western civilization and technology and in particular against government and the Europeans as symbols of progress" (p. 220, the Corfield Report). He labels Kenyatta as "the chief architect of Mau Mau" (p.219). Comparing the significance of the oath of unity with the black magic practised in Europe in the Middle Ages, Corfield says that Kenyatta "was able to blend the technique of revolution, undoubtedly while he was in Russia, with an appeal to superstition...In this way Mau Mau gradually but inexorably assumed the character of a tribal religion, albeit a religion based on evil..." (p.52) See *Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau*, Cmnd. 1030 (1960).
39. *Ibid.*, n.1, p.277.
40. *Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau*. Cmnd. 1030 (1960), p.316.  

By the end of 1956, according to official reports, the casualties were 11,506 Kikuyu killed, 1,035 captured wounded, 1,550 captured unwounded, 26,625 arrested and 2,714 surrendered. On the government side the casualties, both civilians and armed forces, were 95 Europeans killed and 127 wounded, 29 Asians killed and 48 wounded, and 1,920 Africans killed and 2,385 wounded.
41. *Ibid.*, n.9, p.100.
42. The role of Kikuyu women during the Emergency is often ignored by students of the Mau Mau movement. They rendered invaluable services by feeding and looking after the forest armies all night. About ninety per cent of the women supported the movement. See J. M. Kariuki's *Mau Mau Detainee*, pp.35-36.
43. *Ibid.*, n.9, p.100.
44. The whole military plan of the 'forest fighters' was based on the organization of forest camps which were to serve as units to coordinate all activities and plans. These 'forest camps' were known as "Bushes".
45. Kimathi Papers, EFI/3/3/645, October 23-24, 1954; quoted in *Ibid.*, n.1, p.300.
46. Kimathi Papers, EFI/3/3/620, quoted in *Ibid.*, n.1, p.299.
47. *Ibid.*, EFI/3/3/132 quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham, p.299.
48. Quoted in Ione Leigh, *In the Shadow of the Mau Mau*, London, 1954, pp.-190-92.
49. *Ibid.*, n.1, p.300.
50. Sir Michael Blundell refutes the charge of communist conspiracy behind the Mau Mau movement and writes : "The movement was organized on a cell system which appealed naturally to the secretiveness and individualism of the Kikuyu. In the next year or two many attempts were made to link communism with it and allege that it was communist inspired and organized. This was not so and at no time did we find evidence which would support these accusations". See in his book *So Rough a Wind* (London, 1964), pp.-106-07.

Ione Leigh persists in holding the view that "Mau Mau is a disease which has been planted from outside...Those who have planted it have made full use of the savage instincts of the African, of his superstitions and gullibility". He thinks that the organization of Mau Mau on the cell system further proves



that it was communist-inspired. See his book, *In the Shadow of Mau Mau*, London, 1954, pp.16-17.

But D. H. Rawcliffe refutes this stand stoutly and rightly observes; "The Communist influence has been indirect. Its anti-colonial propaganda has been a powerful factor in the emergence of Mau Mau but Mau Mau itself has imbibed little communist ideology; it has remained nationalistic and utterly African.." *The Struggle for Kenya*, p. 97.

51. Tom Mboya in his book *Freedom and After* (London, 1963) p.47, writes categorically that "Mau Mau was the child of economic and social problems which had accumulated over the years and which had not found any solution through constitutional means."
52. The total area of Kenya is about 225,000 sq. miles of which two-thirds is arid. The bulk of African population was concentrated in an area of some 35,000 sq. miles. About 16,000 square miles, 6,000 ft above sea level, was reserved for the sole use of Europeans. This area came to be known as "White Highlands" and was the major cause of Mau Mau unrest and land became the mainspring of African political activity.
53. *Ibid.*, n.9, p.187.
54. See Donald L. Barnett and Karari Njama, *Mau Mau from within: An Analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt*, New York, 1966.
55. Margery Perham on 'Mau Mau' in *Race and Politics in Kenya*. Elspeth Huxley and Margery Perham, London, 1956, pp.273-74.

The movement shows in an extreme and most dangerous form the depth of resentment aroused among Africans by their sudden subjection to an advanced and to them an incomprehensible people. If Kikuyu resentment were an isolated manifestation, it might not have been so difficult to cure. But we are forced to realize today how widely this hatred for western power and superiority is felt, with the longing of peoples to recover their own ego, as groups and as individuals. There are degrees of this feeling, and I must repeat my belief that in Kenya it would not have reached the height represented by Mau Mau but for white settlement. Even with white settlement, if the government had shown itself strong enough at an earlier stage to stand clear of all pressures and rule firmly in the interest of all races—it might have been averted."

56. *Ibid.*, n.50, p.106.
57. *Ibid.*, n.5, p.70.
58. *Ibid.*, n.6, p.32.
59. *Ibid.*, n.13, p.47.
60. *Ibid.*, n.1, p.352.
61. *Ibid.*, n.13, pp.53-54.
62. 'Dini' is a Swahili term for "religious cult". For further details and a concise account of the nature, purpose, history of these cults, see Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 324-31 and D. H. Rawcliffe's *The Struggle for Kenya*, pp.27-35.
63. Sir Philip Mitchell on 'Mau Mau' in *Africa Today* ed. by C. G. Haines, John Hopkins, 1959, p.490.
64. An operation based on the 'Cowan Plan' was carried out and ended in disaster. Out of 88 detainees involved in the operation 11 died and others were seriously hurt.
65. *Ibid.*, n.7, p ix in the Introduction. 'Mau Mau is openly anti-white and also anti-Christian'.
66. *Ibid.*, n.63, pp.489-90.

- 67. *Ibid.*, n.1, p.259.
- 68. *Ibid.*, n.1, p.259.
- 69. *Ibid.*, n.1, pp.259-60.
- 70. *Ibid.*, n.6, pp.52-3.
- 71. *Ibid.*, n.7, p.99.

"From the Mau Mau point of view the step that was taken of forcing people to take the oath against their will was a safe one, even though, by so doing they were acting in a manner that was utterly and completely contrary to native law and custom, which had always laid down that an oath must be taken voluntarily and with the consent of the members of the family of person concerned." Under the Kikuyu custom once a person takes an oath he can be cleansed from its effects only when the "cleansing ceremony" is carried out in the public. And as the participation in such a ceremony could not have been kept secret for long, the Kikuyus to whom the oath was administered forcibly could not avail of this step because of danger to their life from Mau Mau.

- 72. *Ibid.*, n.9, p.52.
- 73. *Ibid.*, n.1, in Introduction, p.xvii.
- 74. W. E. F. Ward, *Emergent Africa*, London, 1967, pp.156-57.
- 75. *Ibid.*, n.14, p.123.
- 76. *Ibid.*, n.14, p.123.
- 77. Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After*, London, 1963, p.51.

"That it was not until Mau Mau had erupted that logical changes began to take place towards improving African conditions in Kenya. The colour bar began to disappear, racial discrimination in the civil service was ruled out by the Lidbury Report in 1955, wages improved and in many other ways Africans were given fuller recognition. The Lyttleton Constitution in 1954 brought in the first six African elected members to the legislative council, and the Lennox-Boyd Plan in 1957 increased this to fourteen: both these constitutional changes came during the Emergency. There was also the Royal Commission on Land in East Africa of 1953-55, and the Swynnerton Plan which followed to accelerate the development of African agriculture...had it not been for Mau Mau, perhaps these changes would never have come; at any rate they would have never taken place as quickly as they did..."

Miss Margery Perham also observes: "Honesty demands the admission that the Mau Mau movement has to its credit that it has brought all races to the edge of the precipice of racial strife—many have indeed fallen over that edge—and forced them to draw back into the unattractive alternative of co-operation." In *Race and Politics in Kenya*, p.274.

- 78. Thomas Hodgkin describes any organization or group as "nationalist" "that explicitly asserts the rights, claims and aspirations of a given African society in opposition to European authority, whatever its institutional form and objectives." See his book *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, p.23. London, 1956. See also Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge, 1960), and James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa" in the *American Political Science Review*, vol. XLVIII, No. 2, June 1954, pp.404-26.

# Italian Colonisation of Somalia

LEONE FIDELI IRACI

THE Italian conquest did not rapidly bring about great changes in the traditional Somali society. Though, from the beginning, grandiose plans peculiar to the colonial age had been propagated in Italy, the real forces which led to the conquest of Somalia were greatly opposed to the object of a real capitalist colonization. Actually, the Government of the Kingdom of Italy wanted to get control of the Somali coast mainly as an outlet for the empire Crispi thought he had acquired in Ethiopia by means of the Ucciali treaty.

There figured as both the instrument and the beneficiary of the occupation a pre-industrial Mediterranean capitalist concern that was an organism which still belonged to pre-industrial Italy. Moreover, only in a certain sense can we speak of the Italian conquest of Somalia at the end of the 19th century<sup>1</sup>. The Italian State was mainly anxious to secure a mortgage on the Somaliland coast in order to preclude its occupation by any other European country rather than to carry out a real occupation. Certainly, the fact that the treaties made with the existing local powers do not mention any alienation of sovereign rights over the territory is not a determinant because such was the use—or abuse—then considered proper.

A real military occupation had not even been attempted at that time. Both the assignment of the Benadir ports by the Sultanate of Zanzibar and the promotion to Protectorate—for a long time purely nominal—of the Sultanates of northern Somalia should serve to forestall the occupation of those territories by other European States and to ensure control of their trade to some extent. "What the Italian Government had in view," it has been said, "and what determined its line of action was peacefully to subject the Somaliland territory to Italian influence by granting the civil administration (under Government protection and control) to a private company, thus relieving the nation of any direct responsibility." In this way the danger that other nations might take possession of the Somali coast and thereby force a passage to Ethiopia was averted; at the same time, possession of a large, exceptionally fertile territory was secured for Italy<sup>2</sup>.

Formally, this kind of occupation was similar to other typical events of colonization, but the peculiar aspect of Italian colonization was brought out by the solid relationship between State and capitalistic enterprise. In other cases, such as the British occupation of East

African territory and the establishment of German colonies<sup>3</sup> the initiative came from private capital even if the goals coincided with the State's, being goals of general interest to the ruling class, goals of power and expansion. In the Italian occupation of Somalia, however, the government stimulated pressure groups which had existed before potentially. The initiative was, in fact, so much a personal action of Crispi's that later governments were inclined to deny the responsibility for it. The Filonardi Company, established on Crispi's initiative, was entrusted with the administration of Benadir, and was by no means so well founded financially as other European colonization enterprises in those decades.

From the beginning Vincenzo Filonardi<sup>4</sup> was opposed to that impulse of modern transformation which animated many coeval creators of European colonialism. The environment in which he grew is the same to which he still belongs—the commercial and bank capitalism of Central and Southern Italy, which was already out of date in North-Western and Central Europe and Northern Italy.

The work from which the previous quotation is taken, which does not dissimulate its apologetic intent towards Crispi, contains some meaningful information on the political set-up and environment in which the Filonardi Company developed.

"In view of the grant that Italy was to obtain direct from the Sultan of Zanzibar, Crispi did his utmost to form an Italian company. The first thing he did was to interest Giacomo Grillo, general manager of the National Bank, in forming a promotion committee.

"Grillo, supported by Consul Filonardi, succeeded, after some time, in obtaining the support of leading figures of the financial, commercial and aristocratic worlds. But Crispi could not consent to a contract which required a Government guarantee of a minimum of 6 per cent investment capital, the authority to use the company's shares in making all the regulation deposits in the different State banks, the enforcement of income tax only on income over and above the 6 per cent investment capital and a 50-year extension of the grant made by the Sultan.

"Then Consul Filonardi offered to collect the capital necessary for starting the company. Crispi wanted Filonardi, on whom he relied completely, to be more powerfully supported and to this end he put pressure on the Società di Navigazione Generale di Palermo."

Crispi wrote on 17 December 1890 to Giovanni Laganà, general manager of the Società di Navigazione Generale: "Navigazione Generale is basically sound and its clientele is such that it should be possible to make a pretty solid company of it. The government, in possession of large territories on account of the recent assignment in East Africa, intends to secure their conquest not by military but by economic means. The company should be formed on the same basis and with the same intentions as the East India Company and similarly it should have political powers".

In the meantime, while busy furthering the Prime Minister's objects, Laganà was charged by the latter to fit out a ship in which Consul Filonardi could visit all the coast subject to Italian influence<sup>5</sup>.

The Sultan of Zanzibar was notified by England and Italy of the Anglo-Italian Protocol. "By now we were in a position to receive direct concession of the four ports on the Benadir coastline. But Mr. Rudini omitted to request it, and this, after all the Italian Government had done to get that part of the coast, augured ill for its reliability and gave rise to the suspicion that Italy did not feel up to coping with the difficulties of the undertaking".<sup>6</sup>

"At last at the end of April, 1892, the Consul in Zanzibar was ordered to start negotiations for the concession and assured that a group of reliable investors led by Captain Filonardi had asked that they might take over the administration of customs. The British Government supported the concession request through its agent, Gerald Portal; the concession was to be made to the Italian Government with the authority to hand over the administration to an Italian company".

Brin, the Minister who succeeded Rudini before the convention was signed, was not willing to give any considerable financial help, so Filonardi was obliged to lay modest claims, too modest because his budget, based on what it had cost the Sultan to run the customs, could not be exact. On the other hand, even if the hope that there might be a healthy flow of trade from the rich countries of the interior was well grounded, that could not happen all of a sudden.

Meanwhile Filonardi would need considerable capital to equip the ports and facilitate the export of goods, to improve the caravan routes, to organize the caravans and to establish trade stations in the interior. Even if the subsidy asked for by Filonardi was extremely modest, it did not bring Brin and Giolitti, who was then Prime Minister, either to settle with him or to ratify the convention of 12 August between Italy and the Sultan of Zanzibar.

After five months, the Cabinet felt it was necessary to ask the opinion of Cecchi, then Consul-General in Aden. In a report dated 21 February, Cecchi proved to be strongly in favour of Filonardi's proposals; he was convinced, he said, that there was a great future in store for Benadir, which could count on the internal trade of Somaliland, Southern Ethiopia, Kaffa, the Galla countries, and so on, thanks to the navigability of the rivers Juba and Shebali.<sup>7</sup>

"In his turn Filonardi, whom Brin had left kicking his heels, wrote, on February 5th, 1893, a reserved letter to Brin urging him to come to a decision and reminding him of the work Crispi had started after the death of Said Bargash in April 1888".<sup>8</sup>

Finally Brin made up his mind, but only after he had asked and obtained (15 May 1893) a supplementary deed to the Convention. The deed bound the Sultan to give Italy the ports and territories of Merca,

Mogadishu and Warsheik for a period of 25 years with the option of a further 25 years' holding thereafter.

Brin, doubtful in spite of the experts' opinion, wanted to return to the provisional three-year administration of the concession so as to be in a position to renounce it at the end of the three-year term and leave the Benadir territories for good. Filonardi's attempt could not be a conclusive one and did not prove satisfactory.

It was a stroke of good luck that Crispi came into power again at the end of 1893, otherwise Italian Somaliland might well have been dead and buried in its very early days. Filonardi's administration, which began early in October of that year, proved it could not get a profitable return on the capital invested which was altogether insufficient. Income from customs being also uncertain since it depended on peaceful conditions in the inland countries, current expenses were very heavy and a considerable amount of money had to be found to meet the cost of equipping new offices.

"The need for strongholds for the defence of the company's premises and interest, in case of disorders, was not foreseen, while the lack of shelter for ships made the landing of any reinforcements in the four ports impossible for at least four months of the year".<sup>9</sup> At the end of the third month, i.e. on 31 December, 1893, Filonardi told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he was not able to fulfil his engagement as he could not meet the high costs; he declared a deficit of 120-130 thousand rupees and asked for an advance of 150 thousand lire. The Minister could not agree to such a request both because he would have had to introduce a bill in Parliament and because the sum for which the advance was sought was not due to the company but represented the rent due to the Sultan of Zanzibar.

Filonardi, bound to comply with the contract, was forced to curtail expenses as much as possible; so he reduced the European staff and cut down the number of Askari in Mogadishu, Barawa and Merca. Even necessary work on offices, warehouses, bridges, etc. was stopped. Thus he was able to hold out. But the Government could not be satisfied with such a solution which reduced the concession to the mere burdensome task of collecting dues for the sole benefit of the Sultan of Zanzibar. While waiting for Filonardi's three-year period of administration to come to an end, the Government encouraged the establishment of a new company which would get the sub-concession of Benadir for 50 years on condition that it put capital into it. The Italian Government had undertaken to give a definite settlement to the concession by 16 July 1896.

The launching of this bold enterprise met with success on 20 February when an agreement after careful consideration by Sonnino and Boselli of its financial aspects was approved.

"Dear Sonnino", Crispi wrote on 17 February, "I enclose the draft contract for the concession of Benadir with some changes which I think

necessary. Would you please consider those changes carefully and then come and see me as soon as you can".

Sonnino sent to Crispi, on 20 February, the definitive text of the agreement which had to be stipulated "between the Italian Government and Giorgio Mylius, Silvio Benigno Crespi, Angelo Carminati, as delegates of the promoters of the *Societa Anonima Commerciale Italiana del Benadir (Somalia Italiana)* on the terms of its legal constitution."

The establishment of the company took place in Milan on 26 June (four months after the battle of Adua) and Crispi came to know of it from a letter which came on the following day. "First of all this Administration wants to offer you its most respectful greetings and to express its gratitude for the assistance given to this undertaking. May the beginning we have made in colonization come up to all our expectations and lead to those most satisfactory results that you certainly foresaw when you became the promoter of this enterprise."<sup>10</sup>

Filonardi's administration of Benadir was coming to an end without there having cropped up any of the important questions that modern colonialism involves. During the three years of its administration the company had not even made an attempt to lay the foundation of a development process: the activity of Filonardi and his few collaborators consisted simply in negotiating with the tribal chiefs and the local bigwigs, and in putting down the not unforeseeable riots. It was not long before repression became the only permanent activity of the company; as a matter of fact, the completion of the walls round Mogadishu (built to control the city's disarmament) represented the company's biggest building work.

The bombing of Merca in indiscriminate reprisal for the murder of Lieutenant Maurizio Talmone represents the most important event of that time. As a colonialist writer described it a few years later, on that occasion Captain Filonardi

"..... ordered Vali Soliman to see that the whole garrison and the Indian merchants were withdrawn by night to the Arab part of the town, between the Garesa and the Customs House, for Captain Incoronato<sup>11</sup> intended to bomb the Somali part of Merca on the following day to avenge the murder of Lieutenant Talmone.

In fact, on 15 October, between 9 o'clock and 11.30 the *Staffetta* hurled 135 grenades into the agglomeration of huts forming the Somali part of Merca. These grenades killed a lot of people, set the huts on fire, caused some old houses to collapse and partly destroyed the town walls. As soon as the firing ceased Captain Incoronato and Cavaliere Filonardi sent a proclamation imposing complete disarmament on the population; and in a few hours eight big heaps of lances, bows, arrows and daggers confiscated from the natives were brought on board the *Staffetta* and handed over to the captain by the garrison.

A second proclamation ordered the population to supply the

building materials and labour necessary to rebuild those parts of the town walls that had been destroyed by the bombing. These orders were promptly executed by the cowed population."

Even the author of these lines, Gustavo Chiesi, ex-Republican deputy, then a convinced colonialist and an expert on Somaliland affairs, was inclined to hesitate before employing such means of repression; even though in those times it was usual to use such methods in the sphere of colonial conquest (50 years later these events were an everyday matter in a conquered Italy) and of course they could not fail to be repugnant to a generation which drew its inspiration from the Risorgimento.

As G. Chiesi remarks: "It is a debatable point whether, considering the great many guiltless and harmless victims such as women and children, the kind of punishment inflicted by Captain Incoronato, and 'Cavaliere' Filonardi on the whole town and its inhabitants, the majority of whom were undoubtedly not responsible for and ignorant of the murder affair, was the most suitable for the purpose.

"Apart from the official report, we have nothing by which to judge whether the state of things at that moment did or did not require such severe repressive action as the bombing was; and we do not hesitate to admit that if those two capable men came to such a decision it was certainly because the circumstances, of which they were judges, called for it.

"But as such necessity does not appear from the official reports we still suspect that the measures were taken a bit too hastily, and that before regarding a whole town as responsible for a crime that was most probably committed by someone who was not of the population, it would have been more equitable just to hold the tribe or the *rer* to which the murderer belonged responsible for the crime."

Mr. Chiesi felt bound to anticipate the object of colonialists by remarking that "some simple soul will probably say that since it is a question of dark people one must not split hairs too much, and that the law of nations does not apply to the Merca case."<sup>12</sup>

In point of fact, both the objectives and tools of the Filonardi company were out-of-date compared with those that European colonialism had at the end of the 19th century. Crispi's colonial policy did not go beyond Zanzibar-like objectives and methods. What mattered to Crispi was the fact that the Somaliland coast was administered by a private company in the name of the State but without its incurring great expense. His activity was moved neither by concern for the native population, a concern which was not lacking even if in a paternalistic form in the most enlightened expression of European colonialism in those times<sup>13</sup> nor by the desire to develop the colonies for the sake of his country.

The company's contract did not aim at economic development or



at reaching a more efficient form of enterprise. In fact the State did not guarantee any possible permanent investment; on the other hand, the company did not make any commitment about economic development. The only thing that obsessed Crispi was to secure for Italy sovereign rights over Benadir territory and to get the power wielded by the Sultan transferred to Italy; the only duty he assigned to the company was to act as a mediator for payments of the rent due to the Sultan of Zanzibar.

The Government gave up its dignity as long as its aims could be reached, allowing, almost explicitly, the perpetuation of slavery. "The slaves who fled from the farms in the interior were, as a general rule, given back to their masters contrary to the peremptory provision of the Brussels Convention, Article VII. On the other hand, except for some vague instructions given by the Minister, the Italian government did not issue any precise order on the subject."

This leads us to believe that the statement made by the different chiefs of Tunni and Mogadishu was true, i.e. that when Cav. Filonardi was entrusted with the administration of the Benadir territory, he promised them, among other things, that he would leave them in possession of their slaves.<sup>14</sup>

The rent paid to the Sultan of Zanzibar amounted to 160,000 rupees a year, i.e. 250,000 lire of those times<sup>15</sup>, quite a meaningful indication of the very low standard of the country's development. According to data contained in the *Green Book* on Benadir<sup>16</sup>, the volume of maritime trade in the Benadir ports under Italian control was still extremely modest; in 1897-98 exports consisted almost entirely of traditional husbandry and agricultural produce and imports (about 650,000 thalers)<sup>17</sup> consisted of consumer goods, mainly cotton fabrics and foodstuffs.

The very fact that the company made a profit almost exclusively from customs dues was a bar to modern colonial policy. It is common knowledge that one of the aims and, according to the classical thesis, the basic aim, of modern colonialism was the quest for new markets and therefore the occupation of control of territories which could absorb home production, adequately protected against foreign competition.

It is plain, in fact it has been a commonplace since the times of mercantilism, that making use of the customs instrument for the sole purpose of revenue precludes its utilization as a protective measure: the customs tariff that gives "maximum" revenue does not give "optimum" protection.

Just because the Filonardi company presupposed and defended traditional society, it did not bring radical changes in the country's social structure: it neither demolished the already existing structures nor created the conditions for progress.

When the State took upon itself the administration of Benadir,

after the end of Filonardi's three-year administration period, it seemed that conditions more suitable to a modern colonial policy should be created. Actually, the new Italian company of Benadir was established on more modern lines and it was more closely oriented to the European policy of colonial expansion. But even here Crispi's pressure groups were not lacking and the participation of industrialists did not guarantee any very different management methods.<sup>18</sup> As a matter of fact no modern undertaking contribution came from the Milanese industrialists while Emilio Duilio was appointed governor of the colony; he had already administered that territory as civilian commissary during the temporary period of State administration.

## REFERENCES

1. Until 1908 the territories actually occupied by Italy were limited to the coast between Adaleh (the name of which had been changed to Itala) and the mouth of the Juba, a distance of a few hundred kilometers, and in addition the left bank of the Juba as far as Lugh was included. Between 1908 and 1914 the present regions of Benadir, Hiran, and the parts not previously occupied on the Upper and Lower Juba, limited to the left bank of the river (the right one being ceded to Great Britain in 1925); that is in fact the area between the two plains as far as and including Baidoa and the valley of the Shebeli as far as Belet Wen. In all, the territory occupied up to 1918 included approximately 20 per cent of the surface area of "Italian" Somalia.
2. Tomaso Palamenghi-Crispi, *L'Italia coloniale e Francesco Crispi*, Treves, Milan, 1928 p.211.
3. Cf. Zoe Marsch and G. W. Kingsworth, *An introduction to the history of East Africa*, Cambridge University Press, 1961.

4. Vincenzo Filonardi, member of a noble Roman family, was in Rome in 1853. He studied in Genoa and in 1880 became a sea Captain. Then he put himself at the head of a firm, The Italian Company for Trade with Africa, and in 1883 went to Zanzibar. Later on the Banco di Roma took an interest in this company.  
Re the Filonardi Company see the recent well-documented volume, although clearly and openly apologetic, *L'Italia nel Benadir, l'azione di Vincenzo Filonardi 1889-1896* by Giuseppina Finazzo, Edizioni dell 'Ateneo, Rome, 1966.
5. *Ibid.* p.203-204.
6. In short it may be concluded that it was a result of Crispi's imposing a personal initiative on the Government and pressure groups. In fact, Rudini's Government refused to pay Navigazione Generale the 200,000 lire expenses incurred by Filonardi's "reserved mission" in the company ship, *Paraguay*. These expenses should have been paid to the Navigazione Generale. *Id* p.204.
7. p.206-207
8. p.209.
9. p. 209.
10. p.211.
11. Captain of the Royal ship *Staffetta*.
12. Gustavo Chiesi: *La colonizzazione europea nell 'Est Africa*, Utet, Turin, 1909, p. 424-425.
13. See John Strachey, *The End of an Empire*, Golancz Ltd. London, 1959, Chap III.
14. G. Chiesi and E. Travelli, *La questione del Benadir*, Milan, 1904.
15. Speaking in terms of the cost of living, we calculate that the lira's purchasing power in 1893 was 300 times what it was in 1965. (The data are taken from 'Le avventure della lira' by Cipolla, Edizioni Comunita 1958, p.122-125). So we can calculate that the annual rent paid to the Sultan of Zanzibar would correspond nowadays to 75 million lire (about 120,900 US dollars).
16. (*Atti Parlamentari*) Legislation XXI Session 1902-1903 Documents pertaining to the administration and conditions of Benadir brought before Parliament by the Minister of the Navy *ad interim* of the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the session of 21 March 1903. These documents are generally called the *Green Book*,
17. i.e. a rate of exchange of 2.20-2.50 lire a thaler, that means about 1,360,000—1,550,000 lire of those times, corresponding in 1965 to 400-460 million lire (about 644,000 US dollars).
18. The fact that the promoters of the enterprise were all industrialists did not exclude their taking part in it more for sake of speculation than with an industrial purpose. Most probably at the beginning, some had at least the intention of cultivating cotton industrially, but from the start the administration followed quite a different trend.

# Reflections on the Political Parties of Dahomey

MATHIAS FINAGNON OKE

*In Dahomey (population 2,050,000, 1962) ethnic considerations have often been of greater importance than party divisions. Political life in Dahomey has always been characterised by an astonishing regionalization closely reflecting tribal divisions.*

*The article below is reproduced from "Le Mois en Afrique", April 1968, No. 28.*  
—Editor

IN Africa South of the Sahara, political parties are an extension of the metropolitan parties. Thus in Dahomey, the UPD (Union Progressiste Dahomeenne) is an extension of the French Socialist Party and was the first real political party to be properly constituted<sup>1</sup> embracing the entire social strata in the country. Its birth resulted in the disappearance of "Comites Electoraux" (Electoral Committees) which formerly constituted the framework of the political life of the country.

But since 1951 a change has taken place. Dahomey, having benefited from two seats in the Assembly, witnessed a wave of agitation among ethnic groups, where certain aristocratic classes (a survival of ethnic groups, former kingdoms, district officials) continued to exist alongside modern institutions which had been created. The local political leaders, wrongly or rightly, taking advantage of this, succumbed to tribal sentimentalism and encouraged the formation of other parties without ideologies and programmes.

A study of these parties reveals a characteristic feature of growing complexity marked, as can be seen, by the impressive list of abbreviations: U.P.D., B.P.A., G.E.N., M.D.D., R.D.D., P.N.D., P.R.D., U.D.D., P.P.D-P.R.A., P.D.U., P.D.D., etc.<sup>2</sup>

Since the aim of this article, however, is to make a contribution on the working of the concept of the single-party system in Dahomey, emphasis cannot be laid on the ideology, influence and geographical location of each of these parties which have been the object of an earlier study.<sup>3</sup> An attempt will be made nevertheless to refer to it when the study touches on the complementary role of the three major political groupings of Dahomey before taking up the concept itself.

The fundamentals of Dahomey's politics were for long simple. The electoral division developed for all practical purposes on an ethnic base—a survival of the former kingdoms and "chefferies"<sup>4</sup> district

divisions. Thus the kingdom of Bariba in the North and its adjoining districts were represented by M. Maga, leader of the predominant ethnic group of the North (G.E.N.) which later became "Mouvement Democratique Dahomeen" (M.D.D.) and then "Rassemblement Democratique Dahomeen" (R.D.D.); the centre was represented by M. Ahomadegbe, leader of the "Union Democratique Dahomeene" (U.D.D.); and the south by M. Apithy, leader of the "Parti des Republicains" du Dahomey (P.R.D.) which later became "Parti des Nationalistes du Dahomey" (P.N.D.)

Since the inception however of the legal framework and implementation of the decrees<sup>5</sup> issued under it, that is to say between 1957-1960, the political life of Dahomey has been characterised by a confrontation between these three major parties and their leaders.

\* As in many other African countries, these parties had regional and tribal roots: the P.R.D. was entrenched in the South-East and had a base of Gun, Yoruba and some Fon-Mia voters. The U.D.D., which very much appeared to be a popular party, had its foothold essentially in the Centre, the South South-West where the Fon-Adja dominate and among the official classes adversely affected in the North—but despite everything its struggle remains a tribal one. The R.D.D. recruited its members from the section of evangelists (the converted Christian populations) in the North and the former students of its leader who had become local elites.

The inter-regional struggles, personality conflicts and the lack of influence of these parties on the masses have since then compelled the top echelons of these political groups<sup>6</sup> to adopt, without any profound analysis of the fundamental facts, the "parti unique" — the single-party system — apparently for the sake of economic and social development. Now, this "parti unique" or single party — which has an influence on the ethnic base of leaders of former political groupings has been quickly converted into a system made easy for people who disregard history and who are satisfied with a superficial facade to accept a temporary alliance which conforms to the same tribal divisions at the level of the single-party system and often provokes an explosive situation.

It should have been necessary, even before setting up this system, to make a study of regionalisation of groups for a better understanding of the place that these parties occupy, that is to say, their ideological and not their tribal influence over the masses and the role they play in national life and in the form of government. Because the single-party concept is essentially a political plan which has certain economic and social options<sup>7</sup>. Now with our economic system having preserved the same structure as that of colonial, or even pre-colonial times, it is difficult without a fundamental analysis of these concepts to usher in real socialism which the single-party system postulates.

Unfortunately for us, almost all newly independent African States have legally or by force introduced single-party systems. After condemning a certain state of violence, an attempt was made to understand

the underlying factors without however making a comprehensive analysis. This is precisely what Alfred Grosser, Professor at the Institute of Political Science in Paris, has done by advancing arguments which have been collectively made in favour of a single-party system and which he enumerates as follows:

1. The creation and affirmation of national unity
2. The necessities of development
3. The lack of personnel
4. The danger of a demagogic opposition
5. The role of mobiliser and collective representation of the population assumed by the party.<sup>8</sup>

These arguments appear quite pertinent, but one is inclined to fear that one cannot justify a state of affairs by running away from an analysis of basic facts which make these States appear today exactly as they were before having the single-party system.

The five arguments enumerated by Grosser are applied in the context of a nation, because they serve to project the construction of national unity (synonymous with the single party). But here it is established that what is only a plan for the nation has been acquired for the State. Now, the latter still retains all its historic past, that is to say, its tribal divisions and its tendency to have a government by elders or the aristocracy.

These reservations made, it follows from our studies of African systems that our leaders have contributed to this state of affairs in the exercise of political power because it is always from these traditional examples, these traditional methods which they utilise to bring themselves to the forefront by imposing themselves as the evolved representatives of certain ethnic groups and by keeping alive conflicts between candidates at the "Chefferie" or district level<sup>9</sup> that the politician of Dahomey and Africa in general becomes popular and acquires the confidence of the Chief and of the electorate under his jurisdiction<sup>10</sup>. He does not present himself so much as a leader of a party as of an ethnic group. His presence in the party is a guarantee of the political survival of his ethnic group. This phenomenon has been furthermore expressed through the polls. One has only to refer to the results of the legislative elections of June 17, 1951, which is clear evidence that the number of votes secured by a candidate in a certain region corresponds to the number of voters voting with his ethnic group residing in the region<sup>11</sup>. It was precisely such a phenomenon that the setting up of the single-party system sought to eliminate.

Now, this elimination is only possible through a horizontal and vertical education at all levels. Otherwise the single-party system, instead of being a safeguard of the citizens and the entire nation, is in danger of becoming a feudal system<sup>12</sup>, a bastion of modern tribalism. The leaders of Dahomey themselves realise this<sup>13</sup> but have not been able to find a solution as to how to replace it.

The single-party system to be really effective requires selective and well-oriented development plans to justify it and in which internal democracy—and not just a multiplicity of bourgeois people pursuing only their private interests—exists and which, above all, permits a free and frank discussion of all important issues. All this means that without a candid appraisal motivated by a sincere desire for the emergence of a modern Dahomey, the initiation of the “party unique” will remain a utopia and a development doomed to certain defeat. Generally, it has been seen that development plans in these single-party States, when they exist, do not appear sufficiently vigorous. More often they remain a dead letter.

The single-party system in Africa runs the risk of becoming by its very nature—whether one establishes its superiority on the ideology of dictatorship of a class or on the contrary to personal rule and not just presidential—as dangerous, it appears, as that of the dictatorship of a class.<sup>14</sup>

It would be far better to initiate a candid dialogue with an opposition party<sup>15</sup> rather than preserve monolithic bodies whose only function is to applaud and to approve. What then is the way out ? A compromise solution could perhaps be found between a single-party and multi-party system leading to a constitutional two-party system. But how can such a transformation be brought about without splitting the country into two ethnic groups?

A constitutional two-party system may not prove an entirely satisfactory solution, because there is every likelihood that the two leading parties emerging from the number of votes polled will correspond to two traditional ethnic groups. Still, it would be the better course. If, by chance, however, the “two parties” of the South were those officially recognised the ethnic groups of the North would not even have the consolation of being in the opposition. A violent emotional upheaval would follow leading to tribal animosity and retard to that extent the emergence of Dahomey as a nation.

There are some people who quote the example of the British system. One cannot however draw an analogy because this necessarily presupposes a solution of the problem of ethnic divisions, a problem unknown in Britain. While the crux of the problem here is actually to find a solution to it.

A start could be made to finding a solution by granting that parties are justified in being different—whether they be political individualities or social, i. e., representing a particular idea or political ideal or the spokesman of a particular working class. A social study of this kind can pose correctly the problem of the party or parties.

These are then some ideas ; their implementation demands specialised studies to focus attention on practical methods for the proper functioning of the system. Perhaps through these *formulae* one could put an end to the game of politics which in Black Africa and specially in Dahomey offers the spectacle of a perpetual settling of accounts between rival groups.

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We have no illusions regarding the weakness of this study, because complete utilisation of the results obtained has unfortunately not permitted us to establish a satisfactory synthesis or to dilate on the theoretical plan. It has nevertheless enabled us to pose subjects for reflection for a sociological analysis of political phenomena which impede the stability of regimes and the economic and social development of African States.

—*Translated by Shanti Sadiq Ali*

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1. If one accepts the definition of a "political party" as the entire organised collective force with the aim of conquest and organisation of power, one has difficulty in applying it to "African political parties" whose members are bound by only personal ties of loyalty similar to those one owes to an individual.
2. List of political parties of Dahomey:
  - B. P. A. : Bloc Populaire Africain
  - C. A. F. : Convention Africaine
  - F. A. D. : Front d'Action Democratique
  - F. A. P. : Front d'Action Patriotique
  - G. E. N. : Groupement Ethnique du Nord
  - I. O. M. : Independents d'Outre-Mer
  - M. A. L. N. : Mouvement Africain de Liberation Nationale
  - M. D. D. : Mouvement Democratique Dahomeen
  - M. S. A. : Mouvement Socialiste Africain
  - P. A. I. : Parti Africain de l'Independence
  - P. D. D. : Parti Democratique Dahomeen
  - P. D. U. : Parti Dahomeen de l'Independence
  - P. N. D. : Parti des Nationalistes du Dahomey
  - P. D. I. : Parti Dahomeen de l'Independence
  - P. P. D. : Parti Progressiste du Dahomey
  - P. R. A. : Parti du Regroupement Africain



P. R. D. : Parti des Republicains du Dahomey

P. R. S. B. : Parti de la Revolution Socialiste du Benin

R. D. A. : Rassemblement Democratique Africain

R. D. D. : Regroupement Democratique du Dahomey (Section territoriale du R. D. A.)

R. P. F. : Rassemblement du Peuple Francais.

U. P. D. : Union Francaise

U. F. : Union des Independants du Dahomey

UN. I. DAHO. : Union Democratique du Dahomey (Section territoriale du R. D. A.)

U. D. D. : Union Progressiste Dahomeenne

3. See our study "Sociology of Political Parties in Dahomey" monograph p. 215, an analytical study of the phenomena of regionalism one can find in the composition of ministerial cabinets....., E. P. H. E., Paris 1963.
4. The idea of "chefferie" is taken strictly in the African sense, i. e. a political-territorial unit—and not regional—of a restricted dimension generally and subject to the authority of a chief, enjoying a certain amount of autonomy vis-a-vis the superior hierarchy.
5. The decrees No. 57-458, 57-459, and 57-460 determined the territorial institutions, conditions of the formation, functioning and prerogation of government committees.
6. The U. D. D. of M. Ahomadegbe did not take part in the formation of this "Union Nationale". It was dissolved a few months later after the discovery of a "plot".
7. Which excludes spectacular operations (Hall des Congres, for example) that do not bring benefits either in the near or in the distant future, for the large mass of peasantry.
8. Alfred Grosser in the July No. 1962 of the Journal "Preuves".
9. "Chefferie" implies here a social grouping formed by the administrative unit, at the head of which is an aboriginal chief as agent of the administration.
10. In these conflicts political figures are opposed as a whole to the most prominent candidate generally supported by the colonial authorities or often a chief who has the greatest influence in the region. Their success leads to enhanced prestige not only with the chief they support but among the whole population.
11. Of special interest with regard to this subject is: OKE F. MATHIAS, *Sociology of Parties*, p. 100 and following.
12. Feudalism here implies a form of political organisation established on personal ties.
13. "It is not necessary that the P. D. U. become a feudal bastion, a poor house for some nobilities who await calmly for the moment to rule and triumph"—speech of President Maga at the P. D. U. National Conference at Parakon: In *Aube Nouvelle*, March 1962.
14. The fall of the P. D. U. and P. D. D. regimes in Dahomey, the seizure of power by the army in Togo, Upper Volta and Central African Republic illustrate our thesis in a manner which cannot be contested.
15. "I am convinced", declared M. Tsiranana, President of Malagasy, "that an opposition, however insignificant, is indispensable because it constitutes a "corrective element" (sic) for the party in power which is not always necessarily in the right"..... "It can create a healthy rivalry against"—*Aube Nouvelle*, No. 29, 1965.

# South Africa's Nuclear Situation

R. L. M. PATIL

KENYA'S representative at the United Nations, Mr. Burudi Nabwera, speaking in the Political Committee recently voiced concern over the inadequacy of the guarantee system under the treaty for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and expressed the fear that South Africa probably already had nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup> If an African State were attacked by South Africa or by another colonial regime, he said he doubted if any of the nuclear powers would go to its rescue. South Africa even without nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to peace in the Afro-Asian world. If it also acquires nuclear weapons, the menace may assume larger dimensions.

The South African regime is never tired of repeating that it badly needs defence equipment. It is argued that *certain countries*, egged on by Russia, Communist China and Cuba, do not wish to see a prosperous South Africa and new schemes are always being hatched to harm her.<sup>2</sup> It is also said, sometimes modestly and at other times threateningly, that South Africa will serve as an outpost of Western civilization in the event of a struggle between the East and the West. "South Africa's industries and the great stability of the government are seen as of value to the West if they should be needed..... We have always told the (Western) world that we would be a foremost fort if needed. But a foremost fort must be properly armed and wholly trusted", said the late Prime Minister, Dr. H. F. Verwoerd,<sup>3</sup> in February 1966. The same theme was repeated by the Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, in September 1967: "It remains incredible that the Republic holding a bastion is denied the means to defend that bastion. It hopes, however, that the matter will be seen in the proper light and that the Western countries will act accordingly."<sup>4</sup> Further, "if South Africa does not receive that full trust or the proper companionship from the West, or if the other nations are not prepared to supply the arms the Republic needs, this *will change South Africa's position.*"<sup>5</sup>

In 1965 significant statements were made by the government regarding the need for defence preparation. During a Parliamentary debate the then Minister of Defence, Mr. J. J. Fouché, announced that the government of South Africa had received "from a Western government" a licence to produce in South Africa a bomb of the most modern type.<sup>6</sup> A few months later, Dr. Verwoerd, while inaugurating South Africa's first nuclear reactor, declared: "South Africa is one of the foremost uranium-producing countries in the world. *It is the duty of South Africa not only to consider the military uses of the material but also to*

do all in its power to direct its uses for peaceful purposes.”<sup>7</sup> The Minister of Defence, Mr. Fouche, addressing a meeting of Rapportryers (an Afrikaans cultural organisation) in December 1965, said South Africa could not continue to make itself a war target if the West was not prepared to supply ground-to-air missiles to defend South Africa's harbours and industries.<sup>8</sup>

South Africa is endowed by nature with immense uranium resources. These have been estimated at 370,000 tons of uranium oxide in 1,100,000,000 tons of ore. The reserves of *eight dollars uranium* (the amount of uranium which can be recovered at \$8 a pound of uranium oxide) have been estimated at 180,000 tons of concentrates. This places South Africa next only to Canada in the world in terms of exploitable uranium resources.<sup>9</sup>

South Africa began producing uranium on 8 October 1952 when the country's first uranium plant was opened at West Rand Consolidated Mines Limited, Krugersdorp, by the then Prime Minister, Dr. D. F. Malan. In the preceding seven to eight years, extensive scientific surveys were conducted with the help of the United States and Great Britain. Under bilateral treaties concluded with Great Britain and the United States, South Africa has been supplying them with uranium oxide in return for nuclear technical know-how.

South Africa's uranium resources have also helped it in another way. By exporting nuclear energy material South Africa has been able to strengthen its financial position as shown in the following tables :

TABLE A  
Value of exports by South Africa of nuclear energy material

1958	R 1064,00,000	1961	R 794,00,000
1959	R 984,00,000	1962	R 743,00,000
1960	R 974,00,000	1963	R 690,00,000

(a) 'R' stands for the rand, the South African monetary unit which is approximately equal to \$1.40. (b) The falling-off of sales is attributed to deferred supply, so made on the request of customers.

TABLE B  
Exports of minerals by South Africa in 1964 in order of priority

<i>Mineral</i>	<i>F. O. B. Value</i>
Gold	R 7304,90,000
Nuclear Materials	R 580,68,000
Diamonds (carats)	R 442,03,000

(Source for A & B, *Year Book and Guide to Southern Africa*, London, Hale, Annual).

South Africa's Atomic Energy Board was set up in 1949. It was entrusted with carrying out operation, research and construction of outfits necessary to the growth of atomic energy technology. On

1 November last year, a law—the Atomic Energy Act—came into force. It provides for the control of a wide range of matters concerning the functions of the Atomic Energy Board.

TABLE C  
South Africa in comparison to Africa in supply of uranium  
oxide to the world

<i>Mineral</i>	<i>World</i>	<i>South Africa</i>	<i>South Africa as per cent of Africa</i>
Uranium oxide	33550 short tons (i.e. 2000 lbs)	5024 short tons	100

(Source : *Africa : Maps and Statistics*, No. 8, April 1964, The Africa Institute, Pretoria).

With the help of the Board, the University of the Witwatersrand set up a Nuclear Physics Research Unit in 1957, now equipped with a Cockcroft-Walton accelerator, while the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research acquired the first cyclotron in the Republic. Two research reactors were installed, one in Pelindaba, Transvaal, 18 miles west of Pretoria, at a cost of over R100,00,000 and the other near Faure, Cape Province. The former, called Safari I, which is the more important of the two, was inaugurated by the Prime Minister on 5 August 1965. It produces power and serves as a modern nuclear physics laboratory useful for a number of operations.

In June 1967, the Atomic Energy Board inaugurated a new R13,00,000 treatment plant for radio-active waste. The plant is one of the most modern and well-equipped in the world. It will use 550 gallons of high-level liquid waste in an eight-hour shift, 2,200 gallons of active waste and 5500 gallons of probably active waste. Erected with foreign collaboration, it will enable Safari I to go into full operation and speed up certain research projects.

By the end of last year, the Board's first zero-energy reactor had gone critical. This extremely important research facility was designed and built entirely by South African scientists. The components of the assembly were also locally manufactured (except the fuel and the electronics).

With the vast experience thus gained and the existing number of highly trained scientists and technicians, South Africa can look forward to building up a network of nuclear power reactors of its own. According to the tentative plan made known in the first week of August 1967 by the Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. J. F. W. Haak, South Africa's first nuclear power station may be erected in the Western Cape in the late 1970's. Preliminary tests conducted at the site indicate it would be sufficiently large for two or even three nuclear power stations with a capacity of 1000 MW each<sup>10</sup>.

Taking 5 MW as the unit for the production of one bomb per year, the first nuclear power reactor of South Africa will be able to turn out, if so desired, 400-600 atomic bombs a year.

Mr. J. J. Fouche, the Minister of Defence who announced that the South African Government had obtained a licence from a western country to manufacture a bomb of the most modern type,<sup>11</sup> and who later demanded ground-to-air missiles for South Africa,<sup>12</sup> mentioned that such weapons were needed to contribute to the defence of Simonstown which he described as a naval base of key importance in controlling the Indian Ocean. He also hinted that his government had been receiving requests from the West to make use of the country's facilities. But he added: "We cannot allow our position to be misused for the convenience of the West if it is not prepared to meet us half-way."<sup>13</sup>

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, former Conservative Prime Minister of Britain, in a speech in the House of Commons before leaving on a tour of South Africa, characterised as folly the British Government's refusal to sell arms to South Africa for the defence of what was going to be Europe's main commercial highway for carrying oil. Referring to the need for greater cooperation with the navies of Portugal and South Africa, as well as their air forces, Sir Alec said: "There may be strong feelings and prejudices in respect of South Africa, but I prefer the security of Britain to prejudice."<sup>14</sup>

When the South African Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, disclosed on 19 April 1967 that while in France he had signed an agreement with the French Minister of Defence which would enable South Africa to obtain a number of submarines of the "Daphne" type, he justified his action by saying: "We have responsibilities around the Cape under the Simonstown agreement (with Britain) and we are prepared to play our proper part."<sup>15</sup>

In the beginning of August 1967, *Rude Pravo*, a Czechoslovak newspaper, made the startling observation that West Germany and South Africa were collaborating to produce nuclear weapons. It mentioned three possibilities—a West German bomb being made *on the territory* of South Africa; a West German bomb being made *together* with South Africa; and a West German bomb being made *for* South Africa. A Russian commentator, Yury Zhukov, wrote in *Pravda* on 29 August: "Everyone waited to see what the reaction to this vital report would be in Federal (i.e. West) Germany whose leaders are so fond of coming out with denials. But Bonn was silent for a week, two weeks, three weeks...." He recalled an East German memorandum on the "Bonn-Pretoria atomic axis" which allegedly described in detail how the West German Government managed to find a loophole in the Paris Agreement of 1954, which forbade Germany from making nuclear weapons "on its own territory".

Of the 178,32,000 people in South Africa (1965 estimate) the whites number only 33,95,000, the Africans 121,62,000, the coloureds 17,42,000 and the Asians 5,33,000 (mostly Indians). Thus both India and Pakistan

have reason to take stock of South Africa's growing power, especially since it would be almost impossible to compel a nuclear South Africa to yield to their demands for better treatment of Asians. They must also bear in mind South African moves to play a decisive role in the Indian Ocean through its Simonstown naval base. The concern expressed by Kenya and Rwanda is thus very much shared by India and Pakistan.

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# Polygamy in Yoruba Society : A Religious or Sociological Issue?

A. R. I. DOI AND J. K. PARRATT

THE main purpose of marriage in the mind of a Yoruba man is the production of children who are his glory. If children do not come, or come not fast enough, as the result of a marriage, the man increases the number of his wives although he does not divorce his barren wife<sup>1</sup>. In the traditional Yoruba society, the number of a man's wives and children was the measure of his success in life and children were considered their father's chief assurance of protection and support in his old age. The possession of many wives and children was regarded as a sign of wealth and nobility. It was not unknown for a man to have as many as 200 children<sup>2</sup>.

It is believed to be a great misfortune if a man has no children to succeed him. As the Yoruba saying goes :

“Ina ku f’eeru boju; ogede ku o f’omo’re ropo;  
Ijo a ba ku, omo eni ni yio gbehin eni”

“When the fire is extinguished, the ashes  
cover its face; when banana tree dies,  
its young shoots succeed it; when a man  
dies, his children should succeed him”<sup>3</sup>.

The traditional order of Yoruba society was very complex. There was the extended family system in which the members of society shared their happiness and misery in common.

The urbanisation of Yoruba land which started long before the advent of Europeans<sup>4</sup> and which continues even today attracted a large immigrant population from less commercially prosperous centres of Yoruba land as well as the other parts of Nigeria. This also helped to strike a decisive blow at the extended family system as the strangers could not be easily assimilated in an established traditional society. But still a Yoruba man was also a keeper of his brother, and an elder brother had an immense responsibility to look after the welfare of his full and half-brothers and sisters.

Since the early 20th century, with the increased monetization of the economy and the great ease of cultivating cocoa and kola-nuts, a young man could attain to some wealth at a much earlier age and perhaps with less exertion. With modern education, a class of salary-earners like

teachers, university lecturers, clerks and administrators came into existence. For these reasons, the all-important position of the father was gradually weakened and a greater degree of individualism began to be fostered. Many young men began the process of breaking up the compounds of their forefathers into small, separate units, initially in line with the plan of the old compounds, and at a later stage were converted into single-family houses with a considerably lesser responsibility of paying fees and other requirements of his brother or brother's son.

When the Christian missions began their work of evangelisation, it was extremely difficult for the missionaries to admit certain essentially African aspects such as the permissive attitude towards polygamy in the face of an official policy that had been laid down in this respect. If a Christian became polygamous, he was excommunicated from the church.

In 1888, for example, the first authoritative Anglican ruling on the subject was given at the Lambeth Conference when it was decided that a polygamist might be received as a catechumen "but should not be baptized, though the wives of polygamists might be admitted"<sup>5</sup>. In the early stages, the Christian missionary churches were of the opinion that polygamists who had entered into their matrimonial engagements before knowing the Christian demand in marriage should not be asked to dissolve all of them save one, but admitted to baptism as they were. This was a view at variance with the almost universal mission practice. A woman married to a polygamist was usually permitted to become a communicant, provided that she married him before her conversion. The Bishop of Lagos issued the *Diocesan Directions* in 1948 saying that "wives of polygamists need not be excluded provided the alliance was entered into when they, the wives, were in a state of ignorance ..... The wives of a polygamist who knowingly and with full understanding entered into marriage with their husbands after baptism cannot be admitted to Confirmation or Holy Communion"<sup>6</sup>. As for baptism of children not born in Holy Wedlock, the Archbishop of West Africa has permitted that they "need not be denied the sacrament of baptism, but due and proper provision must be made for their Christian upbringing; and godparents must be chosen who are in full communion with the church"<sup>7</sup>. This liberal view is now applicable to the children of polygamists with the further advice from the Archbishop that in the case of a female child, baptism should be postponed, except in the case of emergency, until the child comes to years of discretion and can answer for herself; unless the father has a real interest in and understanding of the church, and is prepared to recognise the church's rule about marriage as far as his daughter is concerned and agrees not to give her in marriage to a polygamist. The 1938 meeting of the International Missionary Council at Tambaram<sup>8</sup> sums up the Christian attitude towards polygamy: "The Church must maintain its insistence on monogamy. This is not a matter to be settled by the individual conscience—the criterion is the Will of God for the people whom He has redeemed and purified in Christ. Monogamy is *not* a mere factor of civilization; it is vital to the life of the Church, and its value has been realised in its own experience; it was taught by the Lord Himself and has scriptural authority behind it".

As far as Muslims are concerned, they are divided into two principal groups, the larger body being the orthodox Sunnis and the Ahmadis (or Qadiyanis). Most of the Ahmadis we interviewed in Ile-Ife township in a sample survey were Ahmadis in name only and had absolutely no ideas as to what Ahmadiyyat really implied. Both the orthodox Sunni Muslims and Ahmadis practise polygamy in Ile-Ife. It is permitted by Islam but the right should be exercised under exceptional circumstances. Although Islam permits a plurality of wives, not exceeding *four*, it is only on condition of *strict* equality of treatment among them. The Quran says: "If you fear you will not be able to deal justly with them, then marry only one"<sup>9</sup>. If a Muslim marries more wives than one, his treatment of each must be absolutely equal. It will be his duty to make identical provision for each wife and her children and spend the same period of time with each. The Prophetic counsel is quite clear in the matter and stipulates detailed regulations and instructions for a polygamist subjecting him to a severe discipline. The Prophet has said: "A man who marries more women than one and then does not deal justly with them will be resurrected with half his faculties paralyzed". With such rigorous conditions imposed by the two primary sources of the Shariah Law, the Quran and the Sunnah, monogamy becomes an ideal way for a Muslim.

According to Islam, it is essential to preserve higher values and promote righteousness. Therefore, permission to marry more than one woman at a time is a necessary provision for emergency in order to preserve and foster high social values and for safeguarding society against promiscuity. This is the reason why permission for polygamy may be availed of in a national or domestic emergency, or where circumstances make it desirable that the ordinary rule of monogamy be departed from (in case of increase in women's population).

The permission for polygamy has undoubtedly been abused by Muslims in many parts of the world. More often than not, it has been practised to satisfy one's passion or in accordance with the tradition of a given society. As our research has pointed out, the Muslims in Ife have married more than one wife, "according to the Yoruba tradition", and not according to religion.

Answers to our questionnaires classified the reasons offered by Christian and Muslim household heads when asked about their attitude towards polygamy. An appreciable number of people interviewed replied to this question. The vast majority however replied in 'yes' and 'no' without giving any reasons whatsoever.

As a general rule, we considered that all Muslims were polygamous although it is not always the case. About 9 per cent of all Muslims interviewed expressed disapproval of polygamy. It seems, however, that in the present state of affairs there are more Christians who are polygamous than Muslims. This also confirms what Dr. Van Driesen<sup>10</sup> has gathered from a number of Muslims in the Ife Division who happened to be monogamous in spite of the fact that they were financially in a position to marry more than one wife. Polygamy in Yoruba land is a sociological

rather than a religious factor; it results more from conformity to the Yoruba social pattern than from religious dogmas. We have not come across any example during our research of a man actually becoming a Muslim simply because he wanted to be a polygamist. Acceptance of one religion or another is not a factor in conversion.

TABLE

Percentage of Christians interviewed in Ile-Ife who expressed approval of polygamy

<i>Denomination of Church</i>	<i>% approving polygamy</i>
Roman Catholic	40
Anglicans	50
Baptists	29
African Churches	50
Christ Apostolic Church	30
Apostolic	45
Cherubim and Seraphim	43
(Yoruba Traditional Religion)	92

One may quote the example of the Apostolic Church which is confessedly monogamous but has a high percentage of polygamous followers. On the contrary, when the African Church broke away and later declared that its followers could be polygamous if they so desired, the consequences were not as expected. Indeed, quite the opposite situation resulted and a monogamous section of their followers reverted to their original church<sup>11</sup>. In other words, it is immaterial whether one is a Christian, Muslim or a member of an African Church. Polygamy is an established attitude. It is certainly not a religious question but a traditional and sociological one. Looking at the table of percentage of Churches approving polygamy, it might be interesting to examine some of the reasons given for approval of polygamy. It is clear that polygamy has a high prestige value. A member of the Roman Catholic Church in communion regarded polygamy as a sign of prestige and wealth when he said: "It is a pride to have many wives in my compound." One other person interviewed said he practised polygamy "because having many wives showed high prestige among his neighbours" and the third one considered more wives "a sign of wealth." Accordingly, some members of the Anglican Church were interviewed. They had 30 wives, 25 wives, 24 wives and 15 wives, while an Anglican in Communion had 10 wives. Another Anglican who was not in Communion said he had married 15 wives because "he had complied with his father's attitude since his father had up to 50 wives". Another in Communion commented on his attitude to polygamy that "it depended upon his ability to marry." A member of an Apostolic Church who consulted an *Alfa*<sup>12</sup> instead of a priest said "a Christian might marry about four wives" and an Anglican

also replied that "he preferred four wives." This perhaps was due to the Islamic influence on some Christians. In Yoruba land Muslims and Christians of all denominations as well as the followers of the Yoruba traditional religion live together in perfect harmony and in a number of cases under one and the same roof. Therefore, it is not surprising if such syncretic elements are discovered in the belief and practice of the Yoruba people.

There were some Muslims who declared that they were not obliged to limit themselves to four wives and thought that one should marry "as many as possible". This indicates that even for the Muslims polygamy is not a religious affair so much as a Yoruba trait.

Most of the reasons given for polygamy were not religious. Thus, some Muslims were opposed to it, and those who practised it did not justify it on the basis of the Quran or the Sunna and often mentioned that they married more wives "according to Yoruba custom".

Some people practising polygamy were motivated by purely economic reasons and married more wives "according to money to maintain them", and there were some others who wanted more wives so that they could help them on their farms while the others could work at home or go to market to sell the produce of their farms. There were a number of cases in which people married more than one wife because "the first one did not serve better". In other words, the secondary purpose of customary marriage among the Yorubas in general and the Ifes in particular has always been "to have a woman who would be an assistant to look after the household and lend a helping hand in the work on the husband's farm. This latter reason accounts more for the multiplicity of wives married under customary law in Ife. The more wives he has the greater the number of helpers he has on his farm".<sup>13</sup> Even today the idea of plurality of wives is considered a necessity among a large number of young men in Ife Division. They take into consideration the usefulness of these women and their cocoa farms where the husband clears the bush and tills the land while the women engage themselves in breaking palm kernels, picking cotton, breaking cocoa pods and harvesting crops—jobs considered less onerous.

Professor Southall, discussing the position of women and the stability of marriage in Africa gives his verdict that "Africa remains a continent of polygamy. Polygamy is the undoubted goal of men in rural society, though comparatively few reach it until their later years. This is a built-in value for societies based on patrilineal descent groups. Expansion of the descent group is a positive good and in patrilineal systems polygamy improves a man's chances of numerous progeny".<sup>14</sup>

He also gives another reason for the practice of polygamy in African society. He suggests that it is customary in most parts of Africa that a woman during pregnancy and also after childbirth fall back upon her family and lineage for the long two-year period of lactation. This practice deprives a man of "his main objective in the relationship"<sup>15</sup> and he seeks satisfaction elsewhere. Thus he comes into contact with other

women and gets married in the traditional manner. Although this constant withdrawal of woman for two-year periods of suckling is against the Shariah and completely un-Islamic, even Muslims in Africa practise it with all ease. The problem of marrying more than one wife is not so very difficult as it is quite easy to marry a young girl after paying her price which is not very high in rural areas. It also does not become a financial burden since the additional wife would also become a source of income; she would either become a petty trader or work on her husband's farm.

As we have observed before, there are some men who become polygamous because their wives have failed to give them children. Similarly there are women who are often forced to enter into pre-marital relations and provide opportunities for men who are already polygamous by nature. Barrenness is still an irreparable stigma on a woman in the eyes of men and many husbands seek proof of fertility before committing themselves to marriage. This is why many young girls ardently desire children and also there are "many prostitutes who are often forced into their profession because barrenness disqualifies them for marriage".<sup>16</sup>

Polygamy, therefore, is an old established custom and, to the African, "it appears not only a reasonable but almost an essential institution".<sup>17</sup> Even their wives do not object to the addition of other women in the life of their husbands; they believe that extra hands would lighten the work in the house and on the farm. It may be suggested that the greater success of Islam in Nigeria and some other parts of Africa is not due to Islam's liberal attitude towards polygamy but because it is in some respects better adapted than Christianity to African life.

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5. *Proceedings of the C. M. S.*, 1857, p. 32 ; also World Missionary Conference, 1910, II.
6. Parrinder, *Religion in an African City*, O .U. P., 1953, p. 166.
7. *Ibid*, pp. 166-167.
8. It would be true to say, however, that a more tolerant attitude to polygamy has emerged in some liberal Christian missionary circles since then.
9. *Quran*, ch. 4, verse 4.
10. I.H. Van Driesen in his *Investigation into the Economics of Peasant Agriculture in the Ife Division* (for the Ife Project) has provided us with the following examples : (1) A Yoruba Muslim, living in Ijugbe, owning a considerable area of land and with an estimated monthly income of £60, aged 55, has taken only one wife; (2) another Muslim at Asabi with an annual income of £60 is monogamous. Other examples could be given of Muslims, who are financially able to support a second and subsequent wives, remaining monogamous.
11. J. B. Webster. *The African Churches Among the Yoruba 1888-1922*, Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 84.
12. An *Alfa* is a Yoruba Muslim teacher and preacher. It is an equivalent of 'Mallam' in Hausa which is a corrupt form of the Arabic word Muallim.
13. Olawoyin, "*The System of the Customary Marriage Among the Ifes*, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
14. Southall, A. W., "The Position of Woman and the Stability of Marriage", a section in *Social Change in Africa*, (ed. Southall) Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 52.
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# The Early Years of Trade Unionism in Nigeria

E. O. EGBOH

THE Industrial Revolution, which first occurred in England, affected several parts of Europe and territories colonised by the Europeans. The trade union machinery devised by English factory workers for their defence became a popular instrument of workers' protection in these territories also.

The introduction into Nigeria of British colonial administration saw the emergence of public service institutions which provided fulltime employment for many people. Similar employment opportunities were offered by private commercial firms, both foreign and local.

The workers, whether in government service or in private firms, have, with few exceptions, left their traditional village environments to settle permanently in their new places of employment. For them it is no longer possible to engage in agricultural pursuits or practise village crafts as a sideline. To maintain themselves, their families and other dependents, they have to rely solely on their pay packets. Low financial returns for their services and/or unsatisfactory conditions of service would naturally cause anxiety among them and they would try to safeguard their interests by forming trade union organisations which, as English economic history has amply shown, are the most effective instrument for the defence of workers' rights.

As early as August 19, 1912, Nigerian employees of the government formed a trade union, called the Nigerian Civil Service Union, "to promote the welfare and interests of native members of the civil service"<sup>1</sup>. It was the first trade union organisation formed in Nigeria.

In 1931, some 19 years after the formation of the Civil Service Union, Nigerian railway workers, who hitherto were members of the Civil Service Union, felt in the face of the difficulties confronting labour as a result of the economic depression of the 30's that the Civil Service Union was not adequately protecting the interests of workers in the Railway Service. They broke away and formed a separate organisation known as the Railway Workers' Union (RWU). It displayed a great measure of militancy in industrial matters affecting its members. The same year, Nigerian teachers launched an association called the Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT) to promote educational development in Nigeria and to fight for better wages and improved conditions of service.<sup>2</sup>

Nineteen years had elapsed since the formation of the Civil Service Union when two new unions—the NUT and RWU—came into existence. One would like to know the reason why the example of the Civil Service Union was not immediately followed by others and why it took 19 long years before new trade unions could spring up in the public sector of the economy.

The majority of the institutions then in existence were owned and managed by Government. All workers employed in them were therefore civil servants. Since the Civil Service Union, despite its discriminatory attitude, appeared to have catered for the general interests of workers employed by Government, it may be said that the existence of the Civil Service Union tended to discourage the formation of new unions in separate establishments controlled by Government, with the result that until 1931 no new unions were formed in the public sector of the economy. With the successful breaking away of railway workers from the Civil Service Union in 1931, the way was prepared for the emergence of separate unions in the public service.

Here it is pertinent to consider the relationship between the trade union movement and the law in the country. The movement was not established by law. It had been in existence for some 26 years before the British Government, then responsible for the country's affairs, began to make arrangements for its legal institution in Nigeria and in other British colonial dependencies. According to Dr. Ezera, "it was the British Government's policy to encourage the growth of labour unions in all its dependencies. The foundation of this policy of development was laid by Lord Passfield, formerly Sidney Webb, when he was Colonial Secretary in the Labour Government in 1930. He sent a circular to all colonial governors suggesting that so much progress had been made that trade unions were a legitimate development and suggested a simple legislation based on the Trade Union Act of 1871<sup>3</sup>. The suggestion was adopted in Nigeria and in 1938 the Nigerian Government passed the Trade Unions Ordinance which legally established the trade union movement in the country.

The Ordinance gives legal recognition to trade union activity and provides that a trade unionist cannot be prosecuted for conspiracy because his trade union activities are in restraint of trade; it confers on trade unions the right to enter into agreements with other bodies; sanctions the right of trade unionists to peaceful picketing; makes them immune to any legal proceedings in respect of actions done in furtherance of a trade dispute and protects them from actions of tort.<sup>4</sup> The Ordinance gives trade unions and their members full liberty of operation within the framework of the law.

After laying down the protective clauses guiding trade union organisation, the Ordinance outlines rules regulating the registration of trade unions and their finances. Unlike the British Trade Union Act of 1871, it makes registration compulsory and it is an offence for a trade union to operate without registering itself as prescribed under the Ordinance or for a Union to fail to render an accurate account of its finances to the Registrar of Trade Unions.<sup>5</sup>

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With the passing of the Ordinance, the British Colonial Office, co-operating with the Nigerian Government, sent experienced trade unionists to Nigeria as Labour Officers to assist in the organisation of the trade union movement.<sup>6</sup> As a result of this historical process, trade unionism in Nigeria is regarded as a legacy of the British Government. This raises the question who is the originator of trade unionism in Nigeria, the British Government or some one else? As we have seen, the first trade union organisation in Nigeria was the work not of any government but of civil servants. The initiative for the organisation of the Civil Service Union and subsequent unions before 1938 did not come from the Trade Unions Ordinance of 1938. Although, historically, trade unionism first emerged in England, it is obvious that the British Government was not responsible for its introduction into Nigeria. All that the British Government did was to provide the Nigerian trade union movement with a legal basis which has helped to speed up the course of trade union organisation in the country. Although it was not introduced by the British Government, it is certain that the leaders of early trade unionism in Nigeria were influenced by the history of British trade unionism.

Perhaps we may pause here to consider the possibility of an independent trade union development in Nigeria—an examination of whether trade unionism could have developed in this country without the knowledge gained from outside. Before attempting a discussion of the question, it seems necessary to grasp firmly the meaning of the term "trade unionism".

As R. B. Davison puts it, "Trade unions are organisations of workers designed to improve the working conditions of their members."<sup>7</sup> These workers' organisations, apart from pressing employers to improve wages and service conditions, take part in certain social and economic activities such as scholarship programmes, unemployment and widows' benefits etc. for their members. Broadly speaking, the term "trade unionism" suggests the idea of people coming together for the achievement of certain economic and social objectives. This concept of communal action in economic and social spheres appears to be an important feature of traditional Nigerian life. There exist in Nigeria tribal and village unions which protect the economic and social interests of the people at large. Many old village crafts, such as wood-carving, weaving, leather work and pottery, are run on a guild basis. J. I. Roper confirms this when he says that "occupational organisations have a place within the older forms of African society".<sup>8</sup> In my paper "The Background to Trade Union Movement in Nigeria"<sup>9</sup> it is shown that under the old traditional economy the peasant farmers have various forms of organised group work for facilitating farm operations. It may therefore be said that the idea which made Nigerians pull themselves together for either economic or social purposes has its origin in the traditional social order and is therefore not one of Nigeria's importations from either Europe or America.

In order to answer fully the question, "Could the trade union movement have developed in Nigeria without the aid of the experience gained from abroad?" we have to take account of the practices among

Nigerian labour before the impact (on the country) of British institutions could make itself manifest. When commercial agriculture was developed in the country with plantation farms growing such crops as cocoa, rubber, etc., some illiterate peasant farmers who knew nothing about British trade union organisation abandoned their village farms to work on plantation farms for wages as full-time employees. During their stay on the farms, they formed themselves into "farm gangs" operating within the framework of the traditional tribal or village union to protect their rights. They would threaten to withdraw their services if their demands were not met.

The fact that illiterate and uninformed farmhands (little affected by British ideas) working for wages on others' farms (where organisation and management have not progressed beyond the traditional pattern) could organise themselves into "gangs" to fight (through the tribal or village union platform) for the betterment of their wages and conditions of service appeared to augur well for the future of plantation employees. If the 'gang' found the traditional tribal union incapable of handling its trade disputes with the management, it would probably not hesitate to act without the tribal union in the interest of its members. There was thus the possibility of the 'gang' developing into an independent body to champion the cause of those employed in industry, thereby fulfilling unaided the functions of a modern trade union. It would therefore appear that trade unionism could have developed in Nigeria without British initiative or knowledge acquired from the British tradition.

What the introduction of British ideas of trade union organisation has done is to hasten the pace of a phenomenon which might have otherwise taken much longer to achieve full development.

The conditions necessary for this development were the employees' ability to come together for the common good, full-time wage employment and the need for them to ask the employers to improve wages and conditions of service. These conditions were present in Nigerian society. First, the people had the spirit to organise themselves for the public good. Secondly, to cite only one example, the plantation farms provided the people with a form of indigenous occupation offering employment on a full-time wage basis. Finally, as wages and conditions of service on the farms left much to be desired, there was need for the farm employees to ask their employers to improve their conditions of service. The employees took advantage of these conditions when they formed themselves into 'gangs' to promote their interests at their places of employment. By so doing they seem to have taken the first step which, in the absence of possible setbacks, might ultimately have led to an independent development of a modern trade union movement in the country.

#### **Absence of Trade Union Organisation in Private Firms (1912-1940).**

From 1912, when the Civil Service Union was formed, to 1941, when the Kano Mercantile Clerks Union was established,<sup>10</sup> no trade unions appeared to have been set up by workers in private firms in Nigeria. Some of the factors generally suggested to explain the negative role

in trade union organisation of workers in private firms during this period, which may rightly be referred to as the period of workers' initiative in trade union organisation, are the existence of few or no grievances for redress, the economic depression of the 30's and lack of protective trade union legislation. To claim that the existence of few or no grievances for redress was a contributory factor is to suggest that from 1912 to, say, 1939 when the Trade Unions Ordinance came into force, the managements of private firms in Nigeria were generous to their employees and paid them handsome wages and provided attractive conditions of service.

The conditions under which employees of private firms worked do not support this contention. The *West African Pilot*, referring to conditions in private firms, commented:

- • “We understand that clerks are paid from £1 to £4 per month after two decades of faithful and honest service ..... yearly increments are non-existent in most cases; leave is not usually granted and, where permitted, employees are only allowed half salary to be paid on return from leave but no transport facilities are guaranteed.”<sup>11</sup>

In one of its articles, the *Pilot* said:

“Those who are connected with mercantile houses will admit that things are not smooth for the Africans, no matter how hard they may work or how honest they may be ..... It is often noticed that while one firm pays a junior clerk 40/- (forty shillings) a month, another pays 15/- (fifteen shillings). There are Africans who have put in 20 years in some firms but who do not go beyond £72 (seventy-two pounds) per annum. When some retire the best their firms do to reward them for long service is either a gold watch, an umbrella or a silver coffin.”<sup>12</sup>

It is thus clear that employees of private firms had enough grievances. Can it then be said that the economic depression of the 30's was one of the causes of the absence of trade union organisation among workers in private firms because it disorganised the economy, reduced wages and caused unemployment, and that any attempt by the workers to form trade unions to agitate for better wages and improved service conditions would have resulted in the dismissal of most of them, and that the fear of not losing their jobs prevented them from organising trade unions? In considering this question, we have to observe that two trade unions, the RWU and the NUT, were formed during the depression. While it is true that in a general depression, the railway industry and education as government departments are in a specially privileged position and may not suffer retrenchment to the same degree as workers in ordinary industrial and commercial enterprises, the workers employed in the Railway and Education departments would no doubt feel the effects of economic distress which usually accompany a general economic depression. If during the economic crisis, railway workers and teachers could form trade unions for the improvement of

their lot despite the threat it constituted to the continued employment of most of them, workers in private firms could have at least made an attempt, if they had so desired, to form a trade union. The hardship suffered by workers in private firms during the depression ought to have provided them the necessary stimulus for the formation of a trade union instead of discouraging them from taking such a step. It is the opinion of J. I. Roper that in West Africa, during the depression, falling wages and unemployment stirred many groups of workers into making efforts to form trade unions<sup>13</sup>.

Granted that the depression was the cause of absence of trade union activity among the mercantile workers one wonders why they did not form a trade union long before the depression set in. The fact that they did not form one earlier goes to strengthen the impression that the depression was not necessarily the cause of absence of trade unions.

We shall now consider whether or not the lack of government protective legislation had anything to do with the question. The first legislation authorising trade union organisation in Nigeria was passed in 1938. This makes it clear that between 1912 and 1931, when the Civil Service Union and the NUT were formed, there was no government law protecting the trade union movement in the country. This suggests that if workers in private firms did not form a trade union it was not because there was no protective trade union legislation (since they too could have formed one without the law), but because of some other factor or factors which we have yet to discover.

Other factors usually regarded as responsible for the absence of a trade union among workers in private firms are lack of capable leaders and of adequate financial resources. It is argued that unlike civil service employees, workers in private firms had no men for the organisation and leadership of trade unions. While the suggestion that the civil service had a greater percentage of the Nigerian elite may be accepted, it cannot be denied that private firms had their own quota of the educated class with qualities of leadership. In private firms, they formed a minority but a powerful minority which could have provided leadership to the rank and file. Moreover, some of the leaders of trade unions in private firms during the 40's (when employees of private firms started to organise trade unions) had been in employment long before the formation of unions whose leaders they became in the early 40's. In view of this, it is difficult to accept that lack of educated men was responsible for the failure of employees in firms to form trade unions during this period.

Let us now consider the workers' monetary resources. According to the Department of Labour Annual Report, people employed in government departments were better paid than their counter-parts in private firms. "At skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled levels, firms fall below the Government wage rates"<sup>14</sup>. Because of this some people are inclined to think that one of the reasons why workers in private firms did not form trade unions was that their wages were low and it was not possible for them to find money for the organisation of a trade union. This argument suggests that the employees of private firms were badly exploited. Industrial experience has shown that exploitation is the chief factor leading

to agitation by workers. Exploitation should have aroused the spirit of self-sacrifice among the workers and enabled them to save the money necessary for trade union organisation. The workers, in spite of their low wages, managed to make both ends meet and at the same time found some money for contributions demanded by certain voluntary organisations such as kinship societies and tribal unions to which they belonged. If they could find money for running these bodies, why could they not mobilise resources for the organisation of a trade union movement which would have helped them to increase their income? It may thus be concluded that their inability to pay trade union dues (because wages were low) cannot be accepted as one of the reasons for their not forming a trade union during the early formative period of the movement.

In the search for an answer to the question, it may be worthwhile examining the nature of the leadership provided for Nigerian workers by the Civil Service Union during the first 27 years of its existence, i.e. from 1912 until after the outbreak of World War II. The Civil Service Union as a pioneer trade union was expected to fire the imagination of Nigerian workers during these years by providing them with a dynamic leadership. But the Civil Service Union failed to do so. Its attitude to labour relations was one of cautious supplication. The most it could do was to petition the government on matters related to transfers and leave rights<sup>15</sup>. Its approach to the needs of its members was so negative that people were convinced that "it neither asked for pay increases nor demanded improved conditions of service."<sup>16</sup> for its members. Because the Civil Service Union was not prepared to risk a conflict with the employing authority—the government—it was reluctant to press its case by precipitating a trade dispute and going on strike, if required, as such action might cost its members what they already possessed. Its "constitutional" approach to labour problems of relying on "honourable" petitioning techniques made little impression on managements and so did little to improve the wages and conditions of service of civil service employees. By their "gentlemanly" approach, the leaders of the Civil Service Union appeared to give the impression that they did not clearly grasp the real functions of a trade union in an industrial society and that they were not sure of the ground on which they operated. The Civil Service Union by its performance seems to have failed to convince the rank and file of Nigerian workers that trade union organisation is an instrument which can be successfully employed by workers for the betterment of their lot.

The next issue to be investigated is the attitude of European employers to their Nigerian employees in relation to trade union organisation. The European owners of firms and their managers knew from experience that a trade union movement could strengthen immensely the bargaining position of the working class and thereby give them power to challenge the supremacy of the employers. They therefore lent no support to the idea of trade union formation by their employees. That they tried to nip in the bud moves by their workers to form a trade union is shown by the fact that at a time when the trade union principle was supposed to have been generally accepted, some employers of labour

"are known to have strong objections, which they try to hide, to the institution of trade unionism and have resorted to all sorts of practices to make it difficult for their employees to participate actively in the affairs of trade unions."<sup>17</sup> According to the "Department of Labour Quarterly Review", "some employers particularly among missionary organisations and building firms were observed to be unfavourably disposed towards the trade union movement; they would not like to have any dealings whatsoever with the trade union officials, on the alleged ground that the latter encourage discontent among workers."<sup>18</sup>

The next point to consider is the attitude of Nigerian employees towards private firms. Here it may be useful to understand the nature of both public and private institutions and the way they are managed. A public institution is one publicly owned and managed directly or indirectly by the Government in power, which thus acts in the capacity of a trustee. People employed in government-owned businesses appear to enjoy more security than those in privately-owned ones, because Government does not very easily dismiss its employees. A government may in public interest subsidise an unpaying public concern in order to keep it going and maintain continuity of employment.<sup>19</sup> The situation is different in private firms which are properties of the shareholders in whose names they are run. Unlike government enterprises, they are operated on a purely capitalist basis and their chief concern is to increase profits for the shareholders. If a private firm is hit financially, the shareholders, unlike the Government, may not attempt to prop up the business by subsidy. They would rather dismiss some of their employees and, if the difficulty appears to be permanent, may even close down the business regardless of its public importance.

Employees of private firms know from experience the differences between private firms and government establishments. They know that owners of private firms have the right to remove them from their jobs and employ new hands whenever it suits them, whether or not there is an economic depression. They might have feared that by joining hands to coerce the employers they would be giving them cause to fire them. This partly explains the absence of trade union organisation in private firms between 1912 and 1941.

Another possible factor to be taken into consideration is that most of the Nigerians employed in private firms during this period seem to have had no knowledge of their rights in the new society which was fast emerging. This emergent society was a new creation of the white man and differed in many respects from the traditional society in which they had been brought up. It would seem that many employees of private firms never thought they were part of this new social order and might have felt that in it they had no rights of their own which could be defended. This means that the standard of education attained by the majority of those employed in private firms was not high enough to rouse their national consciousness which would have helped to make the people aware of their social, economic and political rights. W.A. Warmington expresses this succinctly when he says:



“Up to 1930 at least there was little political consciousness among the masses of the working population and although there were periods of considerable hardship and discontent there may have been little feeling among the ordinary unskilled wage earners that their labour was being exploited or that they had rights to be asserted as a class against employers”.<sup>20</sup>

Herein lies another reason for the absence of trade union organisation among workers in the private sector of the Nigerian economy in the three decades following 1910.

As we have seen, private firms had within their ranks educated Nigerians who could have effectively organised a trade union. If they did not take the initiative to campaign for such an organisation during the experimental period of Nigerian trade unionism, it might be due to the employees' lack of confidence in these educated clerks. The semi-literate and illiterate workers who formed the bulk of the Nigerian employees might have feared that the formation of such a body was a device by their educated colleagues to collect money from them for their own personal advancement. Such a view is not uncommon among groups of uninformed people, who, finding themselves thrown into an unfamiliar environment, might justifiably become suspicious of accepting the leadership of others, more enlightened than themselves, especially when most of them were not drawn from the tribal group or groups to which a majority of the employees belonged. One may say that ignorance and fear, resulting from inadequate education, contributed to the non-existence of trade union organisation among workers in mercantile firms during the early years of trade unionism in the country.

Another factor that probably worked against the establishment of a trade union in this sector of the economy is the migrant nature of the employees. A good number of the people working for private firms were employed on a temporary basis. They hoped to go back to their farms for, as far as they were concerned, “employment was usually sought as a means to supplement agricultural incomes”.<sup>21</sup> The high turnover of workers did not create a favourable atmosphere for the establishment of a trade union organisation designed to draw its strength and support from people permanently employed in firms.

### **Early Trade Unionism and Militancy**

The country's premier trade union, the Civil Service Union, is an association of civil servants. As government employees, civil servants are trained to obey the government's “General Orders” and are not expected to do anything that may embarrass it. Although the government “General Orders” do not prohibit trade unionism, their disciplining effect on workers tends to make them docile to the government and predisposes them to the adoption of a constitutional approach in their relations with their employer—the government. The feeling that an unconstitutional approach may be interpreted by the authorities as a revolutionary act deserving strong disciplinary measures prevented them from being militant and made them employ the harmless petitioning method which could not be prejudicial to their interests. Moreover,

there was not sufficient political consciousness among Nigerian workers to make them realise their rights as Nigerian citizens employed in Nigeria. Even if they were aware of their rights and knew that they could adopt a militant attitude in support of their claims, it does not appear that a majority of the workers would have endorsed a strike action in view of the fact that until the passing of the Trade Unions Ordinance of 1938 there was no trade union law for the protection of union members "in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on behalf of the trade union in contemplation of or in furtherance of a trade dispute."<sup>22</sup> In view of this, trade unions considered it dangerous to resort to a measure which could result in a court action that might ruin their finances and earn their leaders prison sentences.

Furthermore, the Civil Service Union, as then constituted, was an exclusive body comprising "the few Africans in top posts."<sup>23</sup> As senior staff officials, they were paid higher salaries and enjoyed better service conditions than the junior African staff excluded from the membership of the union. Therefore they felt no urge to adopt a militant attitude towards the government. They had no serious grievances. This probably explains why the lower ranks were excluded from the union. The top African members felt that since the junior staff were poorly paid and worked under less favourable conditions they would tend to adopt radical measures to force the government to grant them increased wages, salaries and better service conditions, and could in this way bring them into disrepute and might cost them their positions.

Teachers, generally speaking, are moderates. They seem to think that as guardians of youths they should not seek redress of their grievances through revolutionary means as this might lead astray the children under their charge. Moreover, they feel that any individual dispute resulting in strike action would harm the country by retarding its educational advance. For these reasons, the NUT adopted the non-militant technique of the Civil Service Union and confined itself to the constitutional procedure in the handling of industrial disputes.<sup>24</sup>

Only the RWU showed during the early period of trade union growth some measure of militancy and dynamism. One of the reasons why it broke away from the parent body—the Civil Service Union—in 1931 was that the CSU showed no militancy in the handling of matters affecting the interests of its members. According to B. C. Roberts, the Railway Workers Union was founded "as a 'breakway' from the Nigerian Civil Service Union by men who were out of sympathy with the non-strike policy of the Civil Service Union."<sup>25</sup> The militant spirit of the RWU came to the fore when under the leadership of Michael Imoudu, it "successfully spearheaded the nation-wide general strike of 1945"<sup>26</sup> to press the demand for increased cost of living allowance (COLA), made necessary by the increased cost of living brought about by World War II.

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3. Kalu Ezera, *Constitutional Development in Nigeria*, Cambridge, 1960. p. 57.
4. *The Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos*, Vol. VI (Govt. Printers, Lagos, 1959), pp. 3644-3646.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 3647-3652, 3654-3658.
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7. R. B. Davison, *Trade Unions: A Practical Approach*, Longmans 1961, p.7.
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9. This paper was read at the Eleventh Annual Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria at Kano in December 1965.
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13. Roper, op. cit., p. 56.
14. Dept. of Labour Annual Report, 1956-7. Govt. Printer, Lagos. Par. 89.
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16. M. C. K. Ajuluchukwu, *Role of Trade Unions in Developing Nation*, (Lecture, Enugu, 1965), p. 3.
17. Morgan's Commission Report on the Review of Wages (Lagos 1964), par. 13. The Commission obviously have private employers of labour in mind since it is unlikely that Government as an employing authority would go against its avowed policy of espousing the cause of trade unionism.
18. Ministry of Labour Quarterly Review, June 1962, p. 82.
19. This of course does not mean that government cannot close down a business concern that has consistently shown that its continuance is not in public interest.
20. W. A. Warmington, *A West African Trade Union*, (Oxford 1960), p. 4.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *The Laws of the Federation of Nigeria*, Lagos. Vol. VI, op. cit. p. 3646,
23. Ajuluchukwu, op. cit., p. 3.
24. This 'constitutional' approach has however been abandoned by teachers as can be seen from a series of strikes organised by teachers in 1965 in support of their demand for an upward revision of their salary scales.
25. B. C. Roberts, *Labour in the Tropical Territories of the Commonwealth*, (London 1962), p. 42.
26. Ajuluchukwu, op. cit. p. 3. It is interesting to note that even before the formation of the RWU, a mechanics' union formed by the artisan railroad employees of the Nigerian Railway went on strike in 1921 against a threatened reduction in wages and won. See J. S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (University of Calif. Press 1958), p. 212.

# Quarterly Chronicle

## INDIA AND AFRICA

### Emperor Haile Selassie's Visit

The friendly and cordial relations between India and Ethiopia were strengthened by the recent state visit of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia to New Delhi. The Emperor was accorded a warm reception on his arrival at Palam on April 28. He was received by the President, the Vice-President, Mr. V. V. Giri, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai, and other Cabinet Ministers and heads of diplomatic missions.

At a banquet given by the President, Dr. Zakir Husain, in honour of the visiting dignitary, both the President and the Emperor spoke on several world problems. They denounced vehemently the racist policies of South Africa and the repression in Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa. The present situation in South Africa, the President said, "is an affront to human dignity". "African nationalist forces", he added, "are bound to grow stronger and if there is no peaceful liberation of these areas, Africans will be left with no alternative but to use force to end this affront to their dignity as human beings". He stressed the need for self-help among developing countries and said India, the UAR and Yugoslavia had recently initiated tripartite economic trade and industrial relations. He added: "I have no doubt that there is scope for similar cooperation with other developing countries". He expressed the hope that the friendship and cooperation between the two countries would grow further.

The Ethiopian Emperor said "a most despicable type of fascism and racism was holding under tyranny the sons of the soil in the southern part of the African continent. In order to perpetuate its despotic exercise of power, the white minority is using the most abhorrent and cruel means ever known to man". If this situation was allowed to continue, he added, it would explode violently and jeopardise peace in Africa. He referred to the help given by India for the development of Ethiopia. He said that following his last visit to India in November 1956 relations between the two countries had grown stronger. "Indian investors have come to Ethiopia and have put their capital in some of the most important industries in our country". The Emperor added: "Indian teachers, doctors, officers and other professionals have come in large numbers to our country and are contributing their share to the progress of the Ethiopian nation".

Dr. Zakir Husain welcomed the Emperor as a "sincere friend of India" and said : "You have stood by us in our times of need and our people shall remember your unstinted support with gratitude and pride". In his reply the Emperor said he had come to India to exchange views with Indian leaders on questions of mutual interest and "to chart a common course of action towards the solution of problems that beset the world today".

At a civic reception at Red Fort given in honour of the visiting dignitary on April 30 the Emperor said both Ethiopia and India had similar national and international ideals. He said India and Ethiopia had cooperated at the United Nations and hoped this cooperation would continue. Referring to the support given by Indian leaders to the cause of Ethiopian freedom he noted that the friendship between the two countries was old and deep.

The Emperor addressed a joint session of both Houses of Parliament. He was given a standing ovation by the members. Welcoming the Emperor, the Vice-President, Mr. V. V. Giri, said : "Ethiopia has been playing a particularly important role in promoting the idea of African unity. Your Majesty has been one of the prime movers in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity in May 1963. I am confident that under the leadership and guidance of eminent personages like Your Majesty we will be able to solve not only the Rhodesian issue but also the Asian and Vietnam issues. This, if achieved, will make international peace and concord possible".

In his reply, the Emperor said : "The African freedom struggle is irreversible. However small their resources may be, independent African states are committed to liberate the continent from apartheid and all traces of colonialism. This liberation struggle can develop into a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, the world has to rise and live up to its obligations and responsibilities and act soon, lest it be too late". He continued : "It is an affront to humanity that millions of our brethren in Africa still languish under the yoke of colonial rule and apartheid while the rest of the states in the world enjoy the fruits of liberty. African liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, Rhodesia, South-West Africa, had sought to attain their independence through an orderly process of negotiation without resort to violence. But Portugal and the racist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa answered by imprisoning and executing African nationalist leaders and freedom fighters and unleashed a series of oppressive measures. Finding no other alternative, Africans have now taken to arms".

In a joint communique issued at the end of their talks the Emperor and the Prime Minister agreed that the policy of non-alignment continued to be valid as a factor in the defence of peace and promotion of international understanding. The policy of peaceful co-existence, the communique said, had helped to arrest the process of polarisation and had assisted in the easing of international tensions.

The communique reflected the broad identity of views of the two countries on various international issues. Both countries attached considerable importance to the need for promoting general and complete disarmament and expressed the hope that the nuclear powers would take concrete and effective steps to achieve it. (India is opposed to the draft as it stands).

On Indo-Pakistan relations, the Emperor expressed the view that the Tashkent Declaration was an eminent example of the pursuit of peace through restraint, conciliation and statesmanship. Mrs. Gandhi assured him that India remained faithful to the letter and the spirit of the Declaration.

On Indo-Ethiopian relations, the communique noted the increasing cooperation between the two countries in the economic, cultural and political spheres and called for the signing of a trade agreement. It welcomed the agreement on technical, economic and scientific co-operation to be signed soon.

Colonialism in all forms was strongly condemned and South Africa was singled out for censure for pursuing "inhuman and immoral policies".

Dr. Zakir Husain and the Prime Minister accepted an invitation from Emperor Haile Selassie to visit Ethiopia.

#### **Delegations from Tanzania, Algeria, UAR**

The Commander-in-Chief of the Tanzanian People's Defence Forces, Brig Sarakikya, arrived in New Delhi on May 14 and stayed for a week. He was welcomed by the Chief of the Army Staff, General P. P. Kumaramangalam, and others at the airport. The Tanzanian Commander-in-Chief visited the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, where Tanzanian cadets are receiving training, the Infantry School, Mhow, the National Defence Academy and the College of Engineering in Poona. He also called on the Defence Minister and the Defence Secretary.

A five-member Algerian press delegation came to India. They met the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Commerce Minister, Mr. Dinesh Singh, and the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. B. R. Bhagat.

A delegation from the UAR led by Mr. Ahmed el-Sayad Shaaban, UAR Under-Secretary for Taxation Affairs, came to India. It held talks with an Indian delegation. Both India and the UAR have agreed to make certain changes in the draft convention and draft letters to be exchanged between them for avoidance of double taxation. The draft convention was drawn up and intialled in 1964 in Cairo by the leaders of the Indian and UAR negotiating teams.

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### **Appointments of New Envoys**

The following have been appointed envoys to India by their countries : Mr. Sebastian Chale, High Commissioner of Tanzania; Mr. Abdullah Lamrani, High Commissioner of Morocco ; Mr. Rabindrah Ghurburrun, High Commissioner of Mauritius. Mr. John Ndubeze Ukegbu has taken over as new High Commissioner of Nigeria.

India has appointed Mr. O. V. Alagesan as its new Ambassador to Ethiopia and Mr. Raghunath Sinha as High Commissioner to Uganda.

### **UNCTAD II**

UNCTAD II ended on March 28. Mr. Raul Prebisch, its Secretary-General, said that the conference had produced no "positive answer" to the very modest demand" of the Algiers Charter for an increase in imports from the developing countries by the developed nations.

Resolutions calling for steps to finalise commodity agreements and to implement a generalised system of preferences by 1970 were adopted on March 27. The conference called for reconvening of the Cocoa conference before the end of May 1968. It also called for an early International Sugar Agreement, latest by January 1, 1969.

The resolution on preferences "recognises the unanimous agreement in favour of the early establishment of a mutually acceptable system of generalised non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory system of preferences in favour of the developing countries, including special measures in favour of the least advanced among the developing countries (i) to increase their export earnings ; (ii) to promote their industrialisation ; (iii) to accelerate their rates of economic growth.

"Establishes a Special Committee on Preferences as a subsidiary organ of the Trade and Development Board.

"Decides that, for the purpose of the action to be taken due account should be taken of the agreement and comments contained in the report of the second committee. Requests that the first meeting of the Special Committee to be held in November 1968 to consider the progress made by that time and further requests that a second meeting should be held in the first half of 1969 so that the Committee can draw up its final report to the Board. The aim should be to settle the details of the arrangements in the course of 1969 with a view to seeking legislative authority and the required waiver in GATT as soon as possible thereafter".

According to the report of the conference adopted by the plenary session, "the conference had concluded its work by adopting a number of recommendations in respect of some important issues. The conference acknowledges, however, that in respect of other basic issues of substance, it has been unable, on account of remaining differences of

opinion, to reach generally acceptable conclusions. The Conference resolves to continue its efforts to reach agreement by making full use of its continuing machinery and, in particular, of the opportunities for further consultation and study provided by the Trade and Development Board. The Conference, therefore, urges member states to explore earnestly ways and means of assisting and continuing machinery to discharge the responsibilities now placed on it".

Winding up the conference on March 28, the President, Mr. Dinesh Singh, said he shared with many members "a feeling of disappointment" at the failure of the conference to draw up a programme of action. Still he held that "we have to view it in its historical context".

### **'GOOD NEIGHBOURS' SUMMIT**

On May 14, fourteen Eastern and Central African States opened a "good neighbours" summit conference in Dar-es-Salaam. Addressing the conference, Tanzania's President, Dr. Julius Nyerere, appealed for frank consideration of mutual problems. The Presidents of Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the Sudan, Uganda and Zambia, the Prime Minister of Somalia, and Ministers from Congo-Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Malawi, Kenya and Rwanda attended the summit which lasted three days.

The conference reaffirmed support for African liberation movements in Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, South Africa and Guinea. It urged countries helping South Africa and Portugal to stop doing so. It recommended that the remaining problems following the departure of the mercenaries from Africa should be solved in a spirit of good neighbourliness and that steps be devised to punish in future the mercenaries for their "criminal" activities in the continent. The need for the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was reiterated. The conference welcomed the fresh attempts that were being made to find a peaceful solution to the Nigerian crisis. It denounced the abortive coup attempt in Brazzaville on May 15 during the absence of the President.

### **MERCENARIES**

The African continent has for a long time been bedevilled by gangs of professional murderers who are generously paid to subvert the independence of African nations. At the fourth African Summit held in Kinshasa in September 1967, a committee was constituted to look into the matter and resolve it once and for all. The committee was headed by Mr. Sayed Ismail El Azahari, President of the Supreme Council of State, Sudan. The other members were Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, President J. Mobutu of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), President Jean Pedal Bokassa of the Central African Republic, President A. Massemba-Deba of the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), President J. Nyerere of Tanzania, President G. Kayibanda of the Republic of Rwanda, President Michael Micobero of the Republic of Burundi, President Milton Obote of Uganda and President Kaunda of Zambia.



The President of the Committee has released a statement regarding the repatriation of mercenaries from Africa to their individual countries. Some excerpts from his statement are given below.

"On the initiative of the most concerned country, indeed the one that suffered most, we have resolved to repatriate the mercenaries to their respective homes, provided that their various governments undertake in writing that these persons or their like shall not set foot in Africa again. We now declare that these governments have been good enough to send in these undertakings. We trust and pray that they will be able to fulfil their promises, and hope and pray that other countries who have had no hand in this will, by legislation and security measures, find their way to curbing this peril that is an insult to the 20th century man and his ways, a reversion to centuries of barbarism and callousness."

"...I shall be failing in my duty if I do not impress on everybody that the committee through its message and envoys has time and again made it clear that Africa is doing all it can to maintain the best relations with all countries of the world, be they former colonisers or not. Our hand is stretched in goodwill and friendship to the human community at large....."

"We have no time to waste because we are aware of the long road we have to trudge along for developing our continent for our benefit and that the world is no longer divisible, our property is yours and yours is ours. We believe in One World, and call on our friends abroad to cooperate in our march and remove obstacles of the sort we are seized with at the moment."

## **EAST AFRICA**

### **Asians in Kenya**

The nine-man Asian Committee, based in Nairobi, has estimated that there are some 9,000 Asian families left in Kenya with an average of five members each. By the end of May, 600 applications had been made for entry into Britain. Of the 200 vouchers issued, most of them, though not all, were for Kenyan Asians. The Canadian High Commission was receiving about 50 applications a week and a report from Ottawa said 700 had been provisionally accepted by the end of May. Zambia also agreed to admit a small number of Asians provided they carry a certificate from the British High Commission guaranteeing them entry into Britain.

India in the meanwhile cancelled the right of Kenyan Indians with British passports to settle freely in India and restricted the issue of visas. On May 14 a petition with some 10,000 signatures by Indians in Kenya was sent to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi requesting revocation of India's immigration restrictions against them.

### **Negotiations with EEC**

The negotiations between the three East African countries and European Economic Community which have been going on for three years were resumed in Brussels on May 27. The East African countries were represented by the Kenya Minister for Trade and Industry, Mr. Mwai Kibaki (leader), Mr. William W. Kalema of Uganda and Mr. A. M. Maalim of Tanzania. The pattern of any East African agreement is likely to be similar to the Nigerian Association, signed in Lagos in 1966, but not brought into effect owing to the internal strife in Nigeria. It might well be the end of 1968 before any East African agreement is ratified.

### **Tanzania Recognizes Biafra**

The following are excerpts from the Tanzanian Government's statement, made by Mr. C. Y. Mgonja, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, on its recognition of Biafra :

"The basic cause of Biafra's secession from the Nigerian Federation is that people from the Eastern Region can no longer feel safe in other parts of the Federation. They are not accepted as citizens of Nigeria by the other citizens of Nigeria . . . . . These fears are genuine and deep-seated, nor can any one say they are groundless... The only way to remove the Easterners' fears is for the Nigerian authorities to accept its existence, and then to talk on terms of equality with those involved about the way forward.

"The Federal Government argues that in demanding the renunciation of secession before talks, and indeed in its entire 'police action', it is defending the territorial integrity of Nigeria.....Africa accepts the validity of the point, for African states have more reason than most to fear the effects of disintegration. It is on these grounds that Africa has watched the massacre of tens and thousands of people, has watched millions being made refugees, watched the employment of mercenaries by both sides in the current civil war, and has accepted repeated rebuffs of its offers to help by mediation or conciliation. But how long should this continue?

"The constitution of the Federation of Nigeria was violated in January 1966 by the first military coup. All hope of its resuscitation was removed by the second coup, and even more by the events of September and October 1966. These events altered the whole basis of the society. After them it was impossible for political and economic relations between the different parts of the old Federation to be restored.....A completely new start had to be made, for the basis of the state had been dissolved with the complete breakdown of law and order and the inter-tribal violence which existed... . . . In short, the necessity for an arrangement which would take account of the fears created during 1966 was accepted at Aburi, and renounced thereafter by the Federal authorities.

"Surely when a whole people is rejected by the majority of the state in which they live they must have the right to live under a different kind of arrangement which does secure their existence.

"Unity by conquest is impossible. It is not practicable, and even if military might could force the acceptance of a particular authority, the purpose of unity would have been destroyed. For the purpose of unity ...its justification is the service of all the peoples who are united together....

"The Biafrans have now suffered the same kind of rejection within their state that the Jews of Germany experienced.....after all, other efforts had failed. They have declared it to be an independent state. In the light of these circumstances, Tanzania feels obliged to recognize the setback to African unity which has occurred. We therefore recognize the state of Biafra as an independent sovereign entity, as a member of the community of nations. Only by this act of recognition can we remain true to our conviction that the purpose of society, and of all political organization, is the service of man."

So far Biafra has been recognized by Zambia, Ivory Coast and Gabon.

### **Buganda Emergency Extended**

The Uganda National Assembly on April 26 extended the state of emergency in Buganda for another six months. The first state of emergency was declared on May 23, 1966. The opposition staged a walk-out for the first time in two years.

## **CENTRAL AFRICA**

### **Common Market**

On April 3 in Fort Lamy (Chad), a charter creating the Union of Central African States was signed by Chad, the Central African Republic and Congo-Kinshasa. The President of the Congo, Mr. Joseph Mobutu, was designated President of the new association. The charter declares : "The high contracting parties have decided to create a common market of the States of Central Africa. To this end they have decided to harmonise their policies of industrialisation, development and transport and telecommunication systems." It also pledged military assistance in case of foreign aggression.

### **"Zambianisation"**

On April 19, while addressing the National Council of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP), President Kenneth Kaunda announced major changes in the economic policy of the country. He declared that the time had come to put Zambian business firmly in Zambian hands "just as political power is in their hands". As a warning to those Asian and European business communities who have one foot

in Zambia to benefit from the economic growth of the country and the other ready "to jump when they have made enough money or when the country no longer suits them," Dr Kaunda said: "We do not want to keep them here against their will. We are a proud nation. At the same time, it is not fair that we should allow them to take off with the jam and the butter and leave crumbs of dry bread for our people. I am afraid the period of grace is over".

President Kaunda said he would instruct his Finance Minister to prohibit banks, building societies and hire-purchase firms from giving any more loans to "expatriate" (foreign) firms in Zambia. Loans could only be granted in future to companies if all their shareholders were Zambian citizens or all partners were Zambians or if individual owners were Zambians. No new trade licences would be granted to foreigners. When foreigners' trading licences expired they could either sell their businesses to Zambians or become Zambian citizens.

President Kaunda at a meeting at Mulungushi announced state control of 25 major companies engaged in transport, brewing, building, wholesale and retail trade and the timber and fish industries. A new rule of profit control was promulgated, according to which only half of a company's profits could be sent abroad. The balance must be utilised within the country for further development.

## **SOUTH AFRICA**

### **UN Resolution on Sanctions**

A resolution was moved in the General Assembly that the Security Council should approve the use of force, if necessary, to bring South-West Africa under UN control and speed it on the road to independence. The Ghanaian Ambassador, Mr. Richard Akwei, told the General Assembly that total economic sanctions should be imposed against South Africa for its continued refusal to obey UN decisions on South-West Africa. He said: "The Security Council must also consider taking steps to end the privileges and rights of membership of South Africa for its long history of defiance and non-compliance with UN General Assembly and Security Council decisions. It should not exclude the possibility of excluding South Africa from the UN."

Mr. Rudi Nabwere of Kenya called on the major powers to stop paying "lip service to the idea of freedom for South-West Africa and to propose concrete steps for implementing Assembly decisions on a UN takeover of the territory. The Zambian Ambassador called on the Security Council to impose economic sanctions against South Africa to avert a racial conflagration.

The Permanent Indian Representative at the UN, Mr. G. Parthasarathi, said: "We have remained convinced for some time that South Africa has been encouraged in its impudent behaviour by the many-sided support it has received from its trading partners and political allies who continue to ignore the provisions of various resolutions concerning South

Africa". He added that ".....as far as my delegation is concerned, we have repeatedly urged the view that South Africa's compliance with the will of the international community cannot be secured except by the application of mandatory sanctions against that government".

### **Lesotho : Curbs on King Removed**

In Lesotho the College of Chiefs decided in early March to revoke the restrictions imposed on King Mushoeshoe II in January 1967 when he was forced to sign an undertaking not to hold political meetings or to leave his palace, or to receive visitors without government permission. This new attitude to the King is regarded significant in the context of a report, prepared on the advice of Professor Wennis Cowen, a South African lawyer, which proposes a new land tenure system which would deprive the chiefs of their jurisdiction. District courts have been taken over by magistrates, mainly South African. The District Chiefs can no longer influence public opinion so strongly as to affect local decisions.

### **WEST AFRICA**

#### **Monrovia Summit**

On April 25 Heads of State and Government leaders from nine countries ended the first West African "summit" in Monrovia. They signed a protocol aiming at setting up an organisation for common economic development of the States in the region. Both the protocol and final communique were framed in general terms. President William Tubman of Liberia said at the end of the conference that it could be "modestly proud" of its success.

#### **Entente Meet Postponed**

The scheduled meeting of the Entente heads of government was put off for a second time. Originally planned for the end of February, then early March, it now has no fixed date. The reason is that President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast refused to come to Ouagadougou, the Upper Volta capital, unless and until former President Maurice Yameogo was released. President de Gaulle and Mali's President, Madibo Keita, have also "recommended" the ex-President's release.

#### **Organisation of Senegal River States**

Four Presidents — Mr. Sekou Toure of Guinea, Mr. Madibo Keita of Mali, Mr. Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and Mr. Mokhtar Ould-Daddah of Mauritania — formally inaugurated the Organisation des Etats Riverains du Senegal (OERS) on March 24 at Labe in Central Guinea. Mr. Sekou Toure was elected its President. Opening the meeting, Mr. Toure remarked that present efforts to achieve a confederation should lead "as quickly as possible to the creation of a unitary state". Mr. Senghor said: "This conference will stand out in the history of Africa, for it is the first time that these states are creating a confederation. We have all the assets for success". Mr. Madibo Keita

is reported to have said that the results of the summit exceeded all hopes.

The statute of the organisation sets up an Executive Secretariat to be located in Dakar for the development of the Senegal river, for planning and development and for education, cultural and social affairs. There will be a Council of Ministers which will meet twice a year. It will be an "organ of conception, execution and control". A conference of heads of State will meet once a year. A 20-member inter-parliamentary commission has also been envisaged. A Secretary-General will be appointed every three years.

The preamble of the statute says the organisation will seek "to promote and intensify cooperation and economic exchanges". In the "absence of a common monetary zone and free convertibility of their currencies", the members agree to "facilitate inter-state payments in order to develop commercial exchanges".

### **Ghana : New Draft Constitution**

In an announcement on the radio and television, the Chairman of Ghana's National Liberation Council, Lt. Gen. Ankrah, declared in May that the NLC would hand over to a civilian government "not later than September 30, 1969". The Council had decided that there would be separate elections to the Constituent Assembly and then to the National Assembly. Constituent Assembly elections would be organised on a non-party basis in order to allow for "a dispassionate consideration" of the constitutional proposals drawn up by the Constitutional Commission headed by the Chief Justice, Mr. Edward Akuto-Addo. Consideration of these proposals should be "free from the sectional interests of party politics", General Ankrah said. After the Constituent Assembly had concluded its work, the Constitution would be promulgated by the NLC and the country would then be ready to embark on "the second stage of its progress towards civilian rule, with the lifting of the ban on political activity". When the ban was lifted, it would become possible for political parties to be formed to prepare for the elections to the National Assembly.

But all this will depend on the speed and thoroughness with which the Electoral Commissioner can carry out his assignment. His most important task is to compile fresh electoral registers "without which we cannot ensure fair elections", General Ankrah concluded.

### **Nigeria : Peace Talks with Biafra**

On May 23 in Kampala, Uganda, Nigeria and Biafra opened peace talks. President Milton Obote appealed to both sides to end the past year's tragedy in Nigeria. The talks got off to an acrimonious start as both delegations insisted on relating past grievances.

Chief Anthony Enahoro, the Federal Commissioner for Information and Labour who was the leader of the Federal delegation, said: "If the argument is that seven million Ibos in the Eastern part of

Nigeria must enjoy the right of self-determination, surely this same right must be accorded to the five million Efiks, Ibibios, Ekios and Ijaws whom secessionist leaders wish to force into the so-called state of Biafra. They cannot deny the long-standing demands of these articulate minorities for their own state. There is overwhelming evidence of mass intimidation and brutality conducted by the Ojukwu regime against these people. The secessionist leaders knew that they were deceiving the world with their stories about the need for an Ibo state called Biafra. In military terms, the concept of Biafra was dead”.

For Biafra, Sir Louis Mbanefo repeated the demand for an immediate cease-fire, removal of the economic blockade and withdrawal of troops to behind the pre-war boundaries. He held that sovereignty was the only political arrangement which could give security of life and liberty to their citizens. He also proposed the establishment of an international peace force on the cease-fire line with the agreement of both parties.

The leader of the Federal delegation held that a cease-fire could be concluded only when the talks had produced agreement on conditions to ensure a lasting end to hostilities. He stuck to the demand for 12 new states in the Federation, three of them in the former Eastern region. The Lagos regime was willing to grant the Ibos only the East Central State.

According to latest reports, the Nigerians and Biafrans broke off their meeting on May 31. A Biafran spokesman said: “The Biafrans are definitely leaving”. The Federal delegation members were trying to persuade the Biafrans to stay on. But Sir Louis said: “There is no need to stay here wasting our time. We are going.” Commenting on the 12-point plan read out by Chief Anthony Enahoro which would bring an independently supervised cease-fire 12 hours after renunciation of Biafra’s year-old secession, Sir Louis said this was an “unacceptable demand for surrender”.

### **Sierra Leone : Return to Civilian Rule**

Sierra Leone was the first independent state in West Africa to return from military to civilian rule and to constitutional government. This event was, paradoxically, the result of yet another military take-over—the “Sergeants Coup” of April 18. The coup led only to the arrest and detention of Brig. Juxon-Smith and other members of the National Reformation Council, together with senior army and police officers all of whom are still in the Pademba Road Prison. The change from military to civilian rule was swift. Within nine days of the coup the Prime Minister, 62-year-old Siaka Stevens, had been sworn in as also his 18 Cabinet Ministers drawn from members of the All Peoples’ Congress, the Sierra Leone People’s Party and Independents who had been successful in the general elections last year.

**Sudan : Election Results**

Sudan announced the results of its elections on April 18. Three days earlier one of the country's most important political leaders, Mr. William Deng, was killed in Bahr-el-Ghazal Province in an ambush. On May 27 Sudan's new Constituent Assembly re-elected Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Mehgoub as Prime Minister and Mr. Ismail El Azhari as President of the state. The main task of the new Assembly is to give Sudan a permanent constitution. The draft document reflects the best Sudanese legal and political thinking. The form of government will be Presidential on the United States pattern, but Parliament retains much control. It can impeach the President by a two-thirds majority if the impeachment is upheld by the constitutional court. The court has the final decision on whether the government is acting legally. Another striking feature is that strict and enforceable guarantees of religious freedom have been provided. These will diminish communal frictions between the Christians of the Southern provinces and the Arabs of the North.

**MAKERERE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH**

Formerly known as the East African Institute of Social Research and now integrating all social scientists working at Makerere University College, the Makerere Institute of Social Research will hold a series of disciplinary and inter-disciplinary research workshops between July this year and January 1969. The workshops will be in the fields of economics, political science, sociology, social psychology, rural economy and demography, epidemiology and biostatistics. The purpose of the workshops will be to review the state of research in East Africa, identify research priorities, present plans for future research, suggest possibilities for the more effective use of research studies, explore joint publication arrangements and identify prospective research staff. A particular concern of the workshops will be to explore what assistance researchers in one discipline need from other disciplines. It is hoped that the workshops will provide a meeting ground for government ministries and other users of social science research, on the one hand, and on the other acknowledged scholars in East Africa and researchers from overseas universities who are working in East Africa or on East African problems.

Since travel funds are limited, correspondence on the circulated papers is expected to augment the discussions taking place during the workshops. Selected participants will be asked to prepare papers in advance which will be made available to all participants and correspondents to form the basis for a fruitful exchange of ideas and experience. Persons interested in participating in the workshops should write to the Research Secretary, Makerere Institute of Social Research, P. O. Box 16022, Kampala, Uganda, giving particulars concerning their experience and particular research interest.



# Education, Science and Development

D. S. KOTHARI

WHAT is new and characteristic of the contemporary world is the explosion of rising hopes and aspirations for economic betterment, for education, and for national self-assertion on the part of hundreds of millions of people in countries which after centuries of subjugation have, in the last two decades or so, obtained their political independence. Many of these countries have great traditions and a highly sophisticated culture, but almost all of them have an underdeveloped economy still at the level of mere subsistence, and their agriculture still largely exploitative using ploughs, unselected seeds, and methods that go back to the Middle Ages. There have been great civilizations in the past but in all of them the people, except for a negligible minority, lived in ignorance, squalor and poverty. In India the condition of the lower castes, the untouchables and scheduled tribes, has been particularly deplorable for centuries. At the height of the Greek civilization, Aristotle said that to abolish slavery would be to abolish Athens itself. He observed that slavery would continue till man could discover machines to do the work of slaves. The realisation of this has taken more than two thousand years. It was Gandhiji who said that his ardent wish was to wipe every tear out of every eye. For the first time in history, science and technology have provided an instrument of unprecedented power, which if wisely employed can eradicate poverty, disease and ignorance. This imposes a unique responsibility and obligation on man to use the great powers of science for the common good and continuing upliftment of mankind.

The present world is science-based, and in this there could conceivably be no going back unless civilization itself suffered a total collapse because of man's folly or inability to deal in a human way—that is, in the true interests of mankind as a whole—with the forces of almost cosmic dimensions that nuclear energy has placed in man's hands. By debunking magic and sorcery, which aimed to control nature by cheating or cajoling her, science which controls nature through understanding, through reason, has radically transformed the relationship between man and nature and given a new meaning to it. By providing a framework of objective knowledge of natural laws, ever expanding and deepening as each generation contributes to it, science has given man a new outlook and a new destiny. Man now faces himself. He is on the way to *learn*

and master the process of his own organic evolution which got an explosive start about two million years ago with the development of the frontal lobe. (It is this front part of the brain which distinguishes *Homo Sapiens* from the erect apes, and its important function is cooperative behaviour). The development of the human brain, through the discovery and development of tool making, speech and language, cooperative and social behaviour, and ability for abstract and logical thinking, led to a process of rapid *secondary evolution* running parallel to man's biological evolution. The secondary evolution has proceeded at a rate orders of magnitude faster than the organic evolution. In the years to come, it is likely to give man knowledge and power to modify the direction of his biological evolution as well. It may be mentioned that if today man's rational behaviour, when put to individual or group test, often appears to be no more than skin-deep it is an expression of the fact that enough time has not elapsed for the 'saintly genes' to have become sufficiently abundant in the genetic pool of mankind. We may have to wait, may be, for tens of thousands of years for this to happen.

It is almost certain that intelligent life, and possibly super-intelligent, may be discovered elsewhere in the universe before too long and man may succeed in linking himself to a 'galactic telephone system'. At not too distant a future, the span of individual human life may be increased to a few hundred years.

Science is hard work; and a relentless and passionate search for truth. A serious pursuit of knowledge and discovery, and unceasing quest of truth is no routine undertaking. It is not something which can be manipulated by administrative tricks or secured by issuing directives and instructions, whether by Government or any other agency. It demands high mental competence, but above all it demands courage and unflinching dedication. And by bringing an elevating and spiritually satisfying experience, which comes from such pursuit, within reach of a large number of people everywhere science has contributed immeasurably to strengthening the commitment of man to free enquiry and to the quest of truth as his highest duty and obligation. But the process is by no means automatic. It needs careful watching, and nurturing through education, research and wise counsel. Too much emphasis on technology and material achievements of science, as distinct from the spirit of science, which one sometimes comes across in "advanced" countries, can lead to serious imbalance in man's culture and to an erosion and weakening of the sense of fundamental values of life and the moral foundation of society. Too much preoccupation and involvement with means of production and material gains, and too little reflection on values and purpose of life can, in the end, for individuals as for societies, lead only to self-defeating activity and soul-killing frustration.

Even more important than the tangible achievements of science is the spirit of science. Perhaps, nothing comparable to the scientific revolution has occurred in man's history since the Neolithic times. The language of science is a common language, and its achievements are the heritage of all—the only truly common heritage. Science is growing

and expanding at a terrific pace. It is well recognised that the *doubling period* of science and technology is about ten years. This has been demonstrated by considering a number of relevant indices, such as the number of research publications, number of scientists and engineers, output of electricity, and so on. So rapid is the progress of science that, as has been said, a graduate (in science and technology but not, say, in humanities) is almost obsolescent on the day of his graduation. A research paper, if a good one, is almost out-of-date on the day of its publication. A military weapon is nearly obsolete if it works. An expensive research equipment is out of fashion by the time it is procured.

The work in a developing country often tends to follow the fashion set by the "advanced countries", even though the needs of the developing country may be quite different. Whatever the field of science, with the growth of science and technology there is a general tendency for the tools of investigation to become more complex and more expensive. This is sometimes referred to as the *sophistication factor*.

In fields such as high-energy-physics or space research the cost of some of the facilities is fantastically high. To give an example of the scale of *big science*, the 200 BeV high energy accelerator which the U.S.A. is planning to build is likely to cost about \$300 million and may be more. It will take about a decade to design, construct and put the machine in working order. The running cost is likely to be more than a hundred million dollars per year.

### Science Policy

Interaction between science and society, between science and Government is a very complex thing. Many aspects of this interaction are difficult to define with any precision. Even in the advanced countries the mechanism for formulation of science policy and goals is still in a most rudimentary stage. Partly the difficulty is inherent in the situation, because of the inherent unpredictability of fundamental discoveries in science which in a few years may have an altogether new and far-reaching impact on the life and progress of society. Also, and essentially, the difficulty arises from the simple fact that science policy almost invariably goes far beyond science. It involves complex political and social issues and decisions. Science policy has two components, somewhat related but distinct. It is concerned with policy about pursuit and development of science, but it is even more concerned with utilization of science to meet national needs and goals. The national goals which involve science range over a wide spectrum: agriculture and industry, improvement and control of environment, medical care, science education, computers and automation, population control, and so on. Whatever the resources, big or small, there is always the problem of deciding what not to do in order that something can be done with reasonable speed and chances of success. If resources are distributed over everything worthwhile which one wishes to do, then the effort will get so diffused that nothing really would be done. This problem of concentration of effort is a basic issue for every country, and, if anything, it is crucial for a developing country like ours. Even advanced countries (such as the U. K.) are now finding that several areas of *big science* such

as high energy physics and space research are now getting almost beyond their resources.

It is important to recognise that in an age of science and technology, universities in advanced as also in developing countries have acquired a new role and a new significance. Through the powerful and symbiotic combination of teaching and research, education and discovery, youth and age, orthodoxy and heterodoxy, universities in the modern world make a contribution to science and its growth as no other organisation or agency can or does. The experience of more than a century, starting with the great German universities, has demonstrated beyond doubt that teaching and research flourish best in combination. The best of either is achieved in an atmosphere where both are cultivated, and in this invigorating combination of teaching and research lies the real strength of universities.

A face-to-face confrontation and critical dialogue between the professors and their bright inquisitive students, without the inhibition and constraints which generally operate in non-university type institutions, acts as a powerful stimulus to original thinking and creativity and helps to open new horizons of thought. Also scientific work is now becoming increasingly more and more of a team effort, and in promoting team work a university atmosphere has a distinct advantage. When there is shortage of trained men of first-rate ability, as we face today, it is wiser to invest them generally in the universities than elsewhere. This would result in a high degree of multiplication effect, as the top men would not only contribute to research but also to the training of the younger generation. It is important to ensure that the effort exceeds a certain critical mass so that it can generate and sustain a sort of chain process producing many more and more of able men. For the progress of science, education and research, and for the improvement of its quality, it should be almost a basic policy that university type of work should not be done in government establishments or other institutions which are divorced from teaching. This is a matter which needs serious attention. Laboratories for scientific work outside the universities, unless these happen to be directly concerned with applied research and for a clearly defined mission, are unlikely to have a fruitful and vigorous life of more than a few decades (if not less). This arises from a variety of causes. The top men around whom the laboratory was originally organised may have left or would have passed the prime period of their creative activity and inspiration; the laboratory unlike a university lacks the continuing stimulus and challenge of fresh students joining every year; and the purpose for which the laboratory was set up may no longer be relevant as entirely new lines of development may have made to some extent obsolete the field of work for which the laboratory was originally set up. A deteriorating laboratory, whatever the cause of its degeneration, always poses a serious problem. What is to be done with the expensive equipment and the huge staff? It often tends to bolster up its scientifically weak case by asking for more funds, more buildings, and more men. Unable to compete in quality science, it shifts its endeavour to compete in terms of prestige buildings and expensive but not-to-be-used equipment. It tends to believe that people would judge the quality of its work by the

quality of the buildings—marble floors and high salaries may be taken in as an index of quality work and quality scientists. It is much easier and quicker to achieve high quality, even international standards, with regard to buildings and imported equipment than in science education and research. Spending money, specially someone else's money, is far easier than spending thought. In a developing country such as ours the highest priority must go to the strengthening of the universities. If research institutions outside the universities expand too rapidly, it would result in depleting the universities of their competent men, and maybe also of the money which should go to them. In the long run weak universities would inevitably weaken the entire research effort of the country.

It is often suggested that one way of meeting the situation would be to encourage national laboratories and other research institutes outside universities to undertake some teaching work either in association with universities or on their own. This should be fully supported and encouraged. At the same time it is a relevant question to ask as to what extent such an arrangement would strengthen the universities. As a recent editorial in *Nature* on the U. K. Report of the Working Committee on Liaison between Universities and Government Research Establishments (Sutherland Committee Report—1967) has pointed out: "As things are, the evidence the Committee has compiled of the willingness of the establishments to help with teaching can be interpreted not only as a proof of goodwill but also as a sign that the establishments have been endowed with resources which might have been better spent in universities."

### Universities and the Community

Knowledge is vitally important; but if it is to transform society from a state of relative stagnation to one of dynamism and progress, there must be a general willingness and determination to make use of it in the service of the community. Sir Cyril James in his Presidential Address (August 1965) to the International Association of Universities observed: "Universities are not ivory towers, of cloistered bases of peace in which to escape from the problems and frustrations of the contemporary world. They are centres of struggle. They are battlefields (often of fiercely contending forces) on which the victories will largely determine the future pattern of our society". But, in a developing country the general academic atmosphere, apart from notable individual exceptions here and there, is one of timidity and apathy.

In the modern world education should explicitly recognise and foster as its two basic aims (i) imparting knowledge and (ii) imparting of a sense of social responsibility and commitment to the community—willingness to use knowledge for economic and social betterment. The world today has a stock of knowledge which is unmatched in its extent and power, but there needs to be a comparable sense of dedication and responsibility to make use of this knowledge for the service of the community and mankind.

It is the universities which provide the focal points for importing science and technology from where it is in abundance and transmitting it to the local community. They alone, or at any rate, much more than

any other agency, function as the 'ports of commerce' in the great ocean of international science. They act as powerful 'pumps' drawing science and technology from 'advanced' countries, and creating some more in the process, and spreading it wide to irrigate the native soil. *But if the universities in a developing country are to truly serve their country they must be close to the native soil; close to the poor and the needy.* They must be close to the people and to their aspirations and close to the government.

Sir Eric Ashby says with regard to the new African universities (*African Universities and Western Tradition*, Harvard University Press, 1964): "For an African the impact of a university education is something inconceivable to a European. It separates him from his family and his village... It obliges him to live in a western way, whether he likes to or not. It stretches his nerve between two spiritual worlds, two systems of ethics, two horizons of thought. In his hands he holds the terrifying instrument of Western civilisation: the instrument which created Jefferson's speeches, the philosophy of Marx, the mathematics and chemistry of atomic destruction. His problem is how to apply this instrument to the welfare of his own people. But he has no opportunity to reflect on this problem. For one thing, the gap between himself and his people is very great.....the universities and their graduates are isolated from the life of common people in a way which has no parallel in England since the Middle Ages. This is the peculiar dilemma of the African University."

And these are words which we need to ponder over seriously—they are of much more than passing interest in relation to our situation.

### Reconstruction of Education

In the context of our times it is hardly necessary to argue that the improvement and strengthening of universities should receive the highest priority and be treated as a fundamental national goal. If the universities are weak, as several of them are, they cannot and should not absolve themselves of their share of responsibility. This does not mean, however, that the government and the public and other agencies concerned are less responsible for the unhappy situation. A national goal can only be achieved on a national basis and through the active collaboration and participation of all the elements concerned. The attachment of a national objective has to be conceived as a national responsibility.

In a world permeated by science which makes in some fundamental way the future shape of things unknowable and unpredictable, it is most important that the educational policy contains a built-in element of flexibility so that it can adjust continually to changing circumstances. It underscores the importance of experimentation and innovation. Perhaps, the single most important and urgent need in our education is to get out of the rigidity of the present system. In the rapidly changing world of today, one thing is certain: yesterday's educational system will not meet today's, and even less so, the need of tomorrow.

The basic points that should characterise the reconstruction of our educational system may, perhaps, be summed up as (*Education Commission Report*—letter of transmittal):

Introduction of work-experience (which includes manual work, production experience, etc.) and social service as integral parts of general education at more or less all levels of education;

Stress on moral education and inculcation of a sense of social responsibility;

Schools should recognise their responsibility in facilitating the transition of youth from the world of school to the world of work and life;

Vocationalization of secondary education;

The strengthening of centres of advanced study and the setting up of a small number of major universities which would aim to achieve the highest international standards;

Special emphasis on the training and quality of teachers for schools;

Education for agriculture, and research in agriculture and allied sciences should be given a high priority in the scheme of educational reconstruction. Energetic and imaginative steps are required to draw a reasonable proportion of talent to go in for advanced study and research in agricultural sciences; and

Development of quality or pace-setting institutions at all stages and in all sectors.

Education should be used as a deliberate and powerful instrument for social transformation and to increase productivity.

### Rich Countries and Poor

In a historic sense one of the most significant things of our time is that the world, for the first time, has got divided into a poor part and a rich part. The economy in the rich part is highly prosperous and dynamic, whereas in the poor part it is at a bare level of subsistence and is static. In the industrialized countries the average span of human life is about twice that in the underdeveloped world.

The economic gap between the rich and the poor countries is not only dismally large, but is growing wider with the passage of time. This has, of course, its effect on what a country can spend on education. Education is both a seed and a fruit of industrialisation: it is the foundation as also the consequence of rapid economic growth.

In thinking of the ever-widening economic gap and how to meet it one is forcefully reminded of the terrific expenditure which the world is incurring on national defence and the arms race. It is now well recognised that in the case of super powers, and it may equally be true of the

lesser powers, in the context of our times an increasing military expenditure only leads to decreasing national security.

The defence expenditure in the case of most countries ranges from 5 to 10 per cent of their GNP. Against this the aid which the rich part of the world gives currently to the developing world is of about one per cent of the GNP of the rich countries. What is urgently necessary for the development of the under-developed world is, as Professor P.M.S. Blackett has so vigorously and cogently argued in his recent address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, that the aid be raised to about twice its present level. The difficulties that stand in the way are largely political rather than technical. In a sense it is linked also with the problem of nuclear and general disarmament. It is to be hoped that cooperation which has been a feature of the post-war world will be further strengthened, and the flow of aid over the next decade may increase from its current level of one per cent to about two per cent of the GNP of the rich countries. Though its effect on the development of the under-developed world will be of crucial significance, it will not seriously affect the growth rate of the dynamic economy of the developed countries. Its effect on them will be not more serious than about a year's 'holiday' in growth.

It is even more important that the receiving countries recognise that, paradoxically, only those countries deserve aid which are prepared to do without it. In other words, they must be so determined to maintain internal stability and to pursue the path of development and social welfare, and so committed to their programmes of improvement of agriculture and productivity, and education that even if there were no external aid, they would move forward with zest and dedication. In such circumstances aid would help to accelerate the process of development and would therefore prove most useful.

To face successfully the unprecedented problems and challenges of our times we need a symbiotic combination of knowledge and commitment; we need education and science, and co-operation within the country and between countries.—Excerpts from the 1967 Founder Memorial Lecture of the Shri Ram Institute for Industrial Research, Delhi.



## Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter :

### Foundation-stone of Council's Building Laid

Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia laid the foundation-stone of the Council's building, Balvantray Mehta Bhavan, in Diplomatic Enclave, New Delhi, on April 30 in the presence of a distinguished gathering including Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Speaking on the occasion, the Emperor said Africa and India were engaged in the same struggle, shared similar aspirations and had many things in common. He lauded the objective of the Council to promote a better understanding with African countries and hoped it would strive for peace, one of the cardinal principles of life. "I expect much to be achieved in this structure which will be to the credit of the peoples of India and Africa".

Messages of greetings from the President and the Vice-President were read out at the ceremony by Mr. M. S. Gurupadaswamy, Minister of State for Food and Agriculture and General Secretary of the Council.

Earlier, Mr. Asoka Mehta, President of the Council, said the Council sought to interpret African developments to the Indian people and vice versa. In his opinion the keynote to Indo-African unity lay in the friendship between India and Ethiopia.

Mr. Gurupadaswamy, who welcomed the guests, said the first phase of the construction of the building which, besides housing the Council's offices, will have a research library and accommodation for African visitors, would cost about Rs. 7 lakhs.

Later, the Council gave a lunch in honour of the Emperor and his party at India International Centre. Among the prominent people who attended it were Cabinet Ministers, diplomats, members of Parliament, industrialists, scholars and journalists.

### Africa Day

The Council held a reception at Vithalbhai Patel House on May 25 to celebrate Africa Day, the day the OAU was founded. The reception was attended by a large number of people from all walks of life, including envoys of African countries in Delhi.

The President of the Council, Mr. Asoka Mehta, and the General Secretary, Dr. Gopal Singh, received the guests on their arrival. Addressing the gathering, Mr. Mehta said the struggle of the African people against colonialism and racialism was a struggle of India too, although Africa was in the front ranks. India considered itself an ally of African nations in their fight to wipe off all vestiges of colonialism and racialism from that continent. The exciting thing about the people of Africa was that they were trying to face their problems with optimism and courage.

Replying, the Ghanaian High Commissioner, Maj-Gen S. J. A. Otu, expressed the gratitude of the African people for the assistance the Indian people had extended to the liberation movements in Africa. He attributed this expression of solidarity to India's own anti-imperialist struggle.

Mr. Mehta announced that the Council as a gesture of its sympathy for African freedom fighters would send 500 woollen jerseys to the African National Congress, cloth to ZAPU and bicycles to FRELIMO.

### **South Africa Freedom Day**

The Council, in association with the African National Congress, All-India Women's Conference, Gandhi Peace Foundation, Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity and All-India Peace Council, organised a public meeting at Sapru House, New Delhi, to observe South Africa Freedom Day. Mrs. Violet Alva, Deputy Chairman, Rajya Sabha, presided.

Explaining the significance of the day, Mr. Alfred Nzo, chief representative of the African National Congress, said on June 26, 1955, a charter for the freedom of South Africa was adopted by 500 ANC representatives. "It is a day on which the oppressed and struggling masses of South Africa remember their heroes who gave valiant leadership against white imperialism. It is a day of mourning, a day of national rededication and a day of struggle for freedom in South Africa." He read out a number of messages of solidarity and support received from India and abroad, including those from the President, Dr. Zakir Husain, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai, the President of the Indian National Congress, Mr. S. Nijalingappa, and the President of the Indian Council for Africa, Mr. Asoka Mehta.

Addressing the meeting, which was largely attended, Mr. K. C. Pant, Minister of State for Finance and Vice-President of the Council, said June 26 was a day of remembrance of those who had died in the freedom struggle and a reminder of our duty to lend unstinted support to others in the freedom movement, to assist them morally and in other ways. The Indian Council for Africa as a token of its moral support had been giving material assistance to South African freedom fighters. He recalled India's links with the South African struggle and said Mahatma Gandhi had perfected his technique of satyagraha in South Africa and

used it for achieving India's freedom. June 26 was a reminder of our commitment to fight colonialism and achievement of human rights for all.

The suppression of people in South Africa, he said, had a philosophy behind it. Racial discrimination was practised in other parts of the world also, but what made the situation in South Africa unique was that this policy was approved and applied by the State. This made apartheid particularly pernicious. In the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, it was a threat to peace and was like a time-bomb planted in the heart of Africa. If the just aspirations of the people were denied by a police state, it would only delay the march of events, not reverse them. The delay would entail a higher cost in terms of human life.

Mr. Pant recalled President Kaunda's warning that denial of all possibilities of a peaceful change must inevitably lead to a violent conflagration.

His Excellency Mr. S. J. A. Otu, High Commissioner of Ghana, said according to African thinking, strict economic sanctions by the entire world was the most peaceful way of making the South African Government change its policy.

Others who addressed the meeting were Mr. Krishna Menon, former Defence Minister, Mr. Bhupesh Gupta, leader of the Communist Party in Parliament, and Dr. Anup Singh, M.P.

The following is the text of Mr. Asoka Mehta's message:

On the occasion of June 26, South Africa Freedom Day, the Indian Council for Africa conveys its warm fraternal greetings to the people of South Africa who are fighting courageously against the worst form of racial oppression. We pay homage to the innumerable freedom fighters who have laid down their lives in the noble struggle for the future well-being and happiness of all the people in South Africa irrespective of race, colour or creed. The Council expresses its profound admiration for the thousands of freedom fighters serving long terms of imprisonment for the sole "crime" of fighting against apartheid and it takes this opportunity to join all the freedom-loving people of the world to raise its voice in protest and demand their immediate release.

Following in the tradition of our great leaders—the Father of our Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and many others—India, as is well known, has always been in the forefront of the international struggle against colonialism and has uncompromisingly opposed any political system based on racial supremacy and discrimination.

The colonial powers have always tried to create divisions in the ranks of freedom fighters in an attempt to deny them freedom. In this context the Indian Council for Africa welcomes the growing cooperation among the liberation movements in Southern Africa — particularly the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), the African National Congress (ANC), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)—in an

alliance to intensify guerilla operations against the colonial and racist regimes.

As a token of its support and solidarity, the Indian Council for Africa has been rendering material assistance to the liberation movements in Africa and on this occasion it pledges to redouble its efforts. It appeals to all the people of the world who abhor apartheid and racial discrimination to express their solidarity with the struggle till victory is achieved and a just social order established in South Africa for the happiness and progress of all her citizens.

The Bombay Regional Centre of the Council, under the chairmanship of Mr. Harish Mahindra, also organised a public meeting to observe South Africa Freedom Day. The meeting was addressed by Mr. S. K. Patil, Mr. Nath Pai, M.P. and Vice-President of the Council, and Mr. Abdul Wahab Tamin, Consul-General for Sudan.

### **Reception for African Envoys**

Dr. Gopal Singh, General Secretary of the Council, gave a dinner in honour of African ambassadors recently accredited to India. Those present included H. E. the ambassador of Sudan and Mrs. Abdoun, H. E. Mr. Abdellah Lamrani, Ambassador of Morocco, the High Commissioner of Tanzania, Mr. Sebastian Chale, and the Congo Ambassador, Gen. Leonard Mulamba, and his wife.

### **Study Tour by Members**

Two members of the Council, Dr. Anirudha Gupta and Mr. G. P. Deshpande, left on June 27 on a three-week study tour of East Africa sponsored by the Council.

### **African Students' Visit**

The Council arranged a programme of visits for a group of African students who were in Delhi on a holiday. The group comprised Mr. Kassim Salim (Tanzania), Mr. Jerry Nyati (Rhodesia), Mr. Innocent Khupe (Rhodesia), Mr. Maclean Kambazo (Mozambique) and Mrs. D. Kapika (Zambia). The students visited the Okhla Industrial Estate, Faridabad, attended a meeting of the Rotary Club there and had lunch with a Punjabi family. They also visited the Delhi Milk Scheme. They had discussions on labour problems with Mr. Ram Lal Thakkar, INTUC Secretary.

### **Donations of Books**

The Council despatched a set of children's books on India to Dakar, Senegal, and another set of books on India to Dakar University. Sets of 20 children's books will also be sent to 70 schools in Africa for presentation on Children's Day which is celebrated in India on November 14—birthday of Jawaharlal Nehru.

### **Angolan Trainees' Visit to Bombay**

The Bombay Regional office of the Council played host to a group of Angolan boys, led by Mr. D. J. Miranda, receiving training at the Dehra Dun Military Academy, during their visit to Bombay.

### **New Members**

The Executive Committee met on April 14 with Mr. Asoka Mehta in the chair. It welcomed the following new members:

Mr. Jaisukhlal Hathi, Minister for Labour and Employment; Mr. Manubhai Shah, ex-Minister of Commerce; Dr. L. M. Singhvi, M.P.; Executive Chairman, Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies; Mr. A. P. Shinde, Minister of State for Food and Agriculture; Mr. Veerendra Patil, Chief Minister of Mysore; Mr. Harjinder Singh and Mr. Joao Cabral, Research Scholars; Dr. B. L. Maheshwari of the Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad; Mr. G. P. Deshpande of the China Study Centre; Mrs. Kailash Khanna; Miss Premvati Tiwari; Mr. D. N. Saraf; Mr. I. N. Mehta; Mr. B. N. Banerjee; Mr. Sheo Pratap Mishra; Rajkumari Surajkala Sahai; Mr. Kanwar Kishore Pathak and Mr. O. P. Goel.

### **Bangalore Regional Office**

The following have been elected office-bearers of the Bangalore Regional Office of the Council: Mr. Veerendra Patil, President; Mr. P.M. Nadagowda, Vice-President; Mr. M. K. Ramachandra, Hon. Secretary; Mr. T. K. Sreenivasa Setty, Hon. Joint Secretary; Mr. B. V. Rathnaiah Setty, Hony Treasurer.

### **AIR Advisory Committee Meeting**

The Executive Secretary, Mrs. S. Sadiq Ali, represented the Council at the first meeting of All-India Radio's Programme Advisory Committee for the External Services Division held on May 3.

### **IADA Meeting**

The Executive Secretary of the Council attended a meeting of the general body of the India Africa Development Association which reviewed economic developments in Africa and considered a report on investment guarantees. Dr. Bharat Ram was unanimously elected Chairman of the IADA for another term.

### **Newspapers from Sudan**

The Council is thankful to the Sudanese Embassy for arranging supply of two daily newspapers, *Morning News* and *Sudan Echo*, to the library of the Council.

## Book Reviews

### **The Best of Both Worlds?**

Guy Hunter, Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Race Relations, London.

MR Hunter's stimulating book, sub-titled "A Challenge on Development Policies in Africa", exposes the naivete of some of the assumptions behind policies on economic development in Africa currently holding the field and the aid policies that under-pin them. A viable developmental policy for Africa must take note of the central paradox of the African predicament that calls for a far more sophisticated approach than simple transfers of capital and technology from the developed world. In Mr. Hunter's own words: "On the one hand, there is the undoubted ability in developing countries for individuals, with training, to master the most modern technology in a single generation. But on the other hand, there is the obstinate difficulty of installing these technologies in developing countries in a way which makes them fruitful and stimulates further growth. This is partly but not mainly due to lack of capital. It is due more...to the fact that modern technologies correspond to a whole range of social, economic and institutional arrangements and needs in the surrounding society—markets, wage-rate, ideas and values. Secondly, it is due to the fact that growth is a matter of multiple causation—the technology alone will not produce it, nor will capital, infrastructure, or education by themselves".

The failure to recognise this important truth had led to errors that have involved a two-fold waste. On the one hand, African countries—like many other developing countries—have failed to use fully and imaginatively their own special factor endowments for quickening the impulses of economic growth and these factors have acted in consequence as a drag on developmental efforts. On the other hand, they tend unthinkingly to import technologies that have a different ambience and historical perspective and which they are insufficiently equipped to use. They have often been encouraged in this error by donors of aid, whose policies have, in practice, if not in theory, proceeded on the basis that it is capital and modern machinery that are the desiderata. Without necessarily implying any particular diabolism on the part of the aid givers, it could be said that often such blanket transfers of capital and equipment have subserved more the export sector of the donor than the economy of the recipient. The consequence of this has been, on the one hand, a disruption, in econo-

mically and socially expensive ways, of the existing patterns of production and, on the other, the languishing, in an alien clime, of the new and sophisticated machines unless where they serve basic infrastructural needs common to every kind of economy.

Still—and this is the core of the paradox—the question mark in the title of the book is very definitely absent in the body of the book. Mr Hunter does feel that Africa *can* make the best of both the worlds. Africa's very backwardness offers it an opportunity to jump the intermediate centuries of economic development. This it could do by "using her natural advantages and by a highly selective borrowing from advanced technology." What are these advantages? Choosing examples at random, one can say that African societies do not have to duplicate the journey to equality via inequality that other societies have had to make. They do not have historical hierarchical impediments like the Indian caste system or the class snobberies of Western Europe. In the economic field, Africa has no serious problem of agrarian redistribution or rural vested interests. Education, which will be a major "input" in any scheme of African development, will dissolve tribal obstacles to progress unlike since, unlike comparable Indian impediments, they are not encrusted enough to resist change. These are positive factors that have to be fully extended in any organic transformation of the African economy.

Side by side, a selective approach to the technology to be borrowed is absolutely essential. The basic attitude should be to "borrow the scientific principle rather than the developed machine".

Mr. Hunter's is a wise and optimistic book. Many of the conclusions he has tentatively stated have found impressive support from other economists who have reflected long and intensely on the problems of development of the poorer nations of the world. Mr Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama* makes much the same point. The truth is that there has been altogether too simplistic an approach to these problems in the past. Mr. Hunter's book should help in imparting a much needed sophistication to the thinking on the subject.

—N. S. JAGANNATHAN

**The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti**  
K. A. Busia. London, Frank Cass & Co., New Impression, 1968,  
pp. xii+233.

Political institutions, processes and practices in a society are based on the folklore of politics which is an outcome of the traditions of the people and their urges to advance along new paths. An understanding of the political thought and behaviour of a society is thus helped by a knowledge of its traditions and its past. This is more important in the case of the old societies of Asia and Africa which are striving to build new nations and guide their destinies to the new heights of pros-

perity and welfare. It is in this context that the book under review is a valuable addition to the literature on African politics. The book was first published in 1951, on the basis of field work done in 1941-42. It deals with the political traditions of the people of Ashanti. It describes the Ashanti political institutions before the advent of the British administration around 1900 A. D. and tries to evaluate the impact of British rule on the traditional political system of Ashanti. It would have certainly been much more valuable if the new edition had attempted an evaluation of the impact of independence on these traditional structures.

The author has discussed religious beliefs and practices, land tenure and economic activities of the Ashanti as they relate to its political institutions. We find that the social system of the Ashanti was based on the matrilineal bond. Descent was traced through the mother and succession to property as well as to the political offices was handed down in the matrilineal line. Lineage ties thus were the basis of communal life. Lineage was also a unit for political action.

The political organization represented a hierarchy from village to the Ashanti Union. Every village had a village chief or *Odekuro* who communicated with the divisional government through one of the elders—heads of important tribes—assigned for that village. The heads of the important tribes were the councillors of the Divisional Chief. They were selected from among the members of the lineage and the office did not necessarily devolve on the senior man.

Then there was the most important office of the Chief of the Division. He was selected by the commoners from among the eligible members of the royal lineage. The method of his selection and the customs surrounding his office ensured that he would not act arbitrarily. The Chief was not only a secular ruler but he was also the centre of the Ashanti religion. Ancestor worship was an important element of the Ashanti religion and the Chief was supposed to act as an intermediary between the living and the dead. Chiefship thus was a sacred office and the Chief could be destooled (overthrown) only when he violated the accepted code of conduct. The Chief was bound by his oath to consult the elders on all matters and to obey their advice. The elders were also obliged to visit the Chief's house every morning. In addition to his religious, judicial and ceremonial duties, the Chief also enforced law and order within his territorial jurisdiction and defended his people against external invasion in the tribal wars. He was thus the kingpin of the political and social system of Ashanti.

The Ashanti Union was a loose confederation of seven major clans. The Chief of the Ashanti Union, called *Asantehene*, was the head of this Union. He was responsible for maintaining internal peace and harmony in the Union. No Divisional Chief could declare war on another division without first informing the *Asantehene*. The Union had no standing army but the Divisional Chiefs were obliged to supply men and ammunition during wars against the outsiders and the Ashanti Union had strong military power during the 19th century. However, this enabled the Divisional Chiefs to have a voice in matters of war and



foreign relations. The author thus concludes that the Ashanti Union was weak in relation to its constituent units. "The history of the Ashanti Union in the nineteenth century gives the impression that the Union was a loose one in which the separate states exercised a wide degree of autonomy and showed a tendency towards complete independence." (p. 88). Hence, the Divisional Chief's was the most important office in the political system of Ashanti.

The British occupation about 1900 A. D. implied the abolition of the military and political sovereignty of Ashanti. The British administrative organization, headed by a Chief Commissioner, took over the military and administrative duties of the Chiefs but preserved the institution of Chiefship for the purposes of local government. Ashanti was thus administered on the system of "indirect rule" which has been defined by Dr. Lucy Mair as "the progressive adaptation of native institutions to modern conditions." The net result of the British policy was that the Chiefs were left with judicial powers concerning religious offences. They now enjoyed less status and prestige and their authority was undermined because of the loss of their political importance, spread of Christianity and the rise of a small class of educated natives who held petty administrative offices under the British. However, the British made attempts to redefine, regulate and manipulate the position of the Chiefs and supported them against the popular revolt by the commoners. Thus, the once powerful Chiefs were used by the British as the feudal stooges of the colonial administration and as safety valves between the natives and the alien rulers.

The book is a rich store of anecdotes and illustrations. The author's illustrations, however, have been purposively selected to demonstrate the validity of the prevalent beliefs and rituals and little investigation has been made to ascertain whether these popular beliefs were relevant independent of their acceptance by the people of Ashanti. Thus, the book lacks the scientific and objective approach to the study of the social and political institutions of this particular community. Fortunately, it is a thoroughly readable book. The subject has been dealt with in such a way that the reader's interest remains unabated throughout. One is impressed by the author's competence to collect such comprehensive details about the most obscure aspects of the Ashanti society. It will be found useful and stimulating not only by students of the contemporary African scene but also by other social scientists who are interested in understanding the problems of building modern institutional structures on the foundations of traditional structures. This book convincingly demonstrates that many of the aspects of the tribal society find their way into the thoughts and actions of the people moving into the modern age and that the deep-rooted traditions, irrespective of their merits, have great impact on the shaping of the destiny of a people.

—B. L. MAHESHWARI

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(A Journal of African Affairs)

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# The African Personality

SAYED AMIN MAGZOUB ABDOUN\*

EARNEST Renan, the great French philosopher, is quoted as having said: "It is not race, religion, language, state, civilization or economic interests that make a nation." "The national idea", according to him, "is founded on a heroic past, great men, true glory. Common experience leads to the formation of a community of will. More than anything else it is *common grief* that binds a nation together. A nation, therefore, is a great solidarity founded on the consciousness of sacrifices made in the past and on willingness to make further ones in future. The existence of a nation resembles a plebiscite repeated every day." Does this definition of nationhood apply to Africa and her several hundred million Africans? The answer is not very negative.

The continent of Africa is inhabited by various national entities, or rather by different nationalities. The Ghanaians, for instance, are different from the Ethiopians in their way of life, their language, their dress and their physical appearance. Historically, too, they might have shared very little. Today, there are forty independent African States, and there are within the continent today different races, different religions, different languages and different civilizations.

Africa resembles in this sense a great pot inside which all these contrasts and differences are simmering and gradually melting into a new mixture. And the "African Personality", being still in the making, is difficult to define but easier to locate somewhere inside this great melting pot. However, it is true that inside the melting pot there are common African griefs and there are common African glories.

The first five years of this decade (1960-65) are surely the glorious years for Mother Africa. It is the period during which the majority of the States of Africa acquired their independence, and emerged as full-fledged sovereign states. These glorious years also witnessed the rising of an African Mass awakening, and recognition of a place for the African peoples in the international human society.

The fight for freedom started long ago in many parts of Africa. It goes back to the days of the Boer War in Southern Africa before the beginning of the century, and the Mahdist Revolution for independence of the Sudan in the 1880's—as well as the Ethiopian liberation movement

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\* Being the text of a speech delivered under the auspices of the Indian Council for Africa at India International Centre, New Delhi, on July 16, 1968.

against the fascist aggression of 1936.

The fight for freedom in the countries of North Africa is as ancient as recorded history itself. The Egyptians, who were Africans more than anything else, intermittently fought for their sovereignty for many centuries before the birth of Christ.

Yet the mass African awakening in its modern conception was accelerated, I should say, by the turn of this decade which witnessed the emergence of the "African Personality" in its collective form at home and abroad.

Inter-African state relations have grown considerably and have acquired an intensive urge for mutual equality, friendship and brotherhood, as well as collective and truly African representation in the society of nations abroad.

The emergence of the Organisation of African Unity during the same period constituted a turning point in the political history of the continent. It intensified the bringing up of the African "family" and the development of the feeling among the various African masses that they belong to the same stock, and that they are more than just geographical neighbours.

On 25 May 1963, in a highly ceremonial atmosphere, 32 African heads of State and Governments, gathered in Addis Ababa to sign together the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. They solemnly declared their adherence to the following principles:

1. The sovereign equality of all member states.
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence.
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes, by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration (and for this purpose they signed a separate protocol for the establishment of an African Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration).
5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other state.
6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.
7. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

While we are dealing with the "African Personality", I think it is relevant to go through the contents of the preamble of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. It was written in one of the solemn and persistent moods of the African Personality. It spoke of freedom,

equality, justice, dignity, sovereignty, independence and the aspiration of the African peoples for brotherhood and solidarity. It reads:

"We the Heads of African States and Governments assembled in the city of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,

CONVINCED that it is the inalienable right of all peoples to control their own destiny;

CONSCIOUS of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples;

CONSCIOUS of our responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in spheres of human endeavour;

INSPIRED by a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and co-operation among our States in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences;

CONVINCED that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained;

DETERMINED to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms;

DEDICATED to the general progress of Africa;

PERSUADED that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive co-operation among States;

DESIROUS that all African states should henceforth unite so that the welfare and well-being of their peoples can be assured;

RESOLVED to reinforce the links between our states by establishing and strengthening common institutions;

HAVE agreed to the present Charter.....".

The principles of African brotherhood and good neighbourly relations have thus become a popular slogan of the day and in fact many African problems between African states today are handled some way or other within this concept of good neighbourly relations. This is more so in the case of problems previously created by foreign influences and outside interference. The problem of the mercenaries in the Congo, for instance, and the dark shadows it cast on the relations between the

Democratic Republic of the Congo and some of its neighbours, were overcome because of the African desire to preserve good neighbourly relations in the continent, and because the problem itself was a foreign-made issue.

This, however, does not prejudice the fact that very little work was ever referred to the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration which was established a year after the OAU.

Many disputes between African states were not referred to the Commission and were handled away from its premises. This was not because of any resentment over the necessary existence of the Arbitration Commission, but perhaps because the Commission itself needs a vigorous shake-up of its set-up so that it might always take its own initiative to get into the scene whenever disputes arise between member states.

Boundary problems that erupt from time to time between African states are greatly minimised through the application of the valid concept of the necessity to maintain the best of inter-state relations in this era of transformation of the "African Personality".

There are huge boundary problems in Africa. Many of the boundaries of the independent states are not yet officially demarcated or mutually recognized. This is especially true in the states of Eastern and Central Africa—previous British colonies and protectorates. For one reason or another, the British failed to establish well recognised boundary lines in their previous colonies until they left.

In some cases where two British colonies were adjacent, British administrators sometimes cut off a whole triangle or a square of border land and handed it over to their counter-parts in the adjacent colony. This was often done for administrative convenience and the boundaries involved became administrative boundaries. Some East African states have today huge portions of their boundaries administratively demarcated but disputed either legally or politically.

Foreign powers who once ruled the African continent have committed a big mistake and a grave offence by not securing a lasting settlement of all the boundary obscurities in their colonies before the accomplishment of political independence. It is true there were many obstacles. But the chances of a final settlement of many boundaries were far better then than now.

The boundary problems—some of them potentially explosive—are among many other problems which were either left unsolved by the foreign colonisers or actually created by them. I do not intend to dwell on them here, but some of them had their impact on the "African Personality".

The grouping of the African intellectual society into two main divisions of English-speaking and French-speaking does exist, and is a historical fact. The difference of the two cultures has cast its shadows on the "African Personality". However, this language barrier, which is

virtually between East and West Africa, is gradually diminishing in the post-independence period. Meetings of the OAU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the so many regional and inter-state get-togethers have softened this language problem—mainly through breaking other barriers and bringing the African states closer together. The ideal solution, of course, would be intensive person-to-person contacts between the African peoples themselves. It is sad to state that efforts are lagging behind in this respect.

African states have not yet drawn up serious and long-term plans to intensify person-to-person contacts between their respective peoples. The two African intellectual groups (the English-speaking and the French-speaking) are too much attached to their parents abroad and face many other obstacles that keep them still apart. However, the cultural, intellectual and educational attachments of the French-speaking Africans with France are stronger than those in the case of Britain and the English-speaking Africans. This seems strange. Perhaps British education in the colonies was not adequate in this sense. Also the British did not intermingle much with the local people and in local life. In most of the colonies their physical presence was virtually administrative and as Central rulers. Very few of them were settlers.

The French, surely, did more than that. They have succeeded in transforming the life of the elite among their subjects into a new way of life closer to the French way.

Yet this foreign and intensive educational and cultural impact is being overshadowed by a new African outlook that has emerged after independence. Nowadays there is a growing desire for general African integration. In fact the OAU—an organisation of independent African states—has since the last few years sounded an African ambition towards a 'United States of Africa'. This ambition, which was spelled out by former President Nkrumah, still appears a remote possibility and perhaps an unattainable dream in the present African circumstances.

Yet African unity has ever since been accepted by all African states as a common goal, a cherished hope, and an African aspiration. The road to unity however is very long and thorny. We the Africans have first to achieve complete liberation all over the African continent. We have also to defeat the separating forces of tribalism which are not only opposed to African unity but also constitute a major threat to the national and territorial integrity of certain African states.

We have also to develop a general acceptance of the fact that Africa is the meeting place of many religions, creeds, races, languages and cultures which have to co-exist permanently and peacefully, for the sake of African togetherness.

Africa was never the birth-place of the two big religions, now practised by the majority of the people there. Islam and Christianity both came to the continent in some way or another from abroad, and African land should never be utilised as an arena where the two religions should fight and hit at each other.



Missionary societies working inside Africa today have to accommodate this desire for African togetherness, or else, they have to be vacated. They have to adapt their teachings accordingly and to preach, first and before all, unity and peaceful coexistence.

Many Christian missionaries, when Africa was "The Dark Continent" and with the collaboration of the colonial regimes, had sown the seeds of religious intolerance and had brainwashed the minds of some underdeveloped African converts into a very dangerous belief that they had to fight other fellow citizens—for survival. This, for example, was very true in Southern Sudan where white missionaries scared some southern citizens in regard to what they called "the Muslim Arab Slave Traders of the North". It was obscure and redundant gossip and the foreign missionaries concerned themselves knew that slavery and slave trade had long ago been wiped out of the continent and would never return; but they utilised these allegations and many others to increase the psychological susceptibility of the local pagans to seek Christianity as a shelter.

There are still many pagans in Africa. And I feel there is still a need for religious and educational enlightenment. Religion, as Jawaharlal Nehru in his *Discovery of India* rightly stated, "supplied some deeply felt inner need of human nature" and that "the vast majority of people all over the world could not do without some form of religious belief. It has given a set of values to human life and has produced many fine types of men and women"..... "as well as bigoted, narrow-minded cruel tyrants". In the case of the African pagans and converts this "inner need" which Pandit Nehru spoke of should as much as possible be met by the Africans themselves, and through their own tools.

Foreign missionaries should quickly be Africanised, and the Church everywhere has to accept this in entirely good faith and cooperate to achieve it as a cherished African aspiration which is not at all inconsistent with religious enlightenment.

Africa is a young and youthful continent. The average educated African is full of youthful feelings—to the extent sometimes of being critical, blunt and pragmatic in pursuing his national ambitions. In his desire to advance and to catch up with others, he is always seeking a change. This, to me, is among the reasons why of late many changes in government and in regimes are taking place within the African states.

Youthful Africa is difficult to rule. Through coup d' etats or through constitutional means, through the expulsion of military and fascist regimes or through civil strife or disobedience, the African is always for change.

Let us pray that the day shall never come when race or colour of the skin become a determining factor in international relations. There are, however, horrible predictions that the next world war—if ever—will be a war among races of different colours.

I am not a pessimist, and I do not share this belief. But the

African heritage is full of the ugliest human experiences—the experience of apartheid and the exploitation through the hypocritical reason of the skin being black or coloured.

The great martyr of African freedom and equality of races, Chief Albert Lutuli, once ironically thought that when apartheid had vanished from the world, its knowledge would enable the Africans of South Africa “to make their particular contribution to human progress”.

Apartheid falsely believes that the African is to live only because his stock constitutes a labour resource. Therefore, he is to live only on this labour status and is to be brought up educationally, socially, psychologically and legally to accept only this status.

Today, the African, more than any other race, is paying high and hard for the fact that he is black and coloured. This is also true, though to a lesser extent, in the case of Africans or peoples of African origin living in certain countries abroad. Sadly enough, this hostile feeling among races is picking up momentum specially in England, Australia and the United States.

Some time ago, I lived in America for four years. I did not encounter any major racial complications, and I had made many white American friends. Yet I confess that many times I had that inner feeling that perhaps I was not wanted around, and I rarely felt psychological comfort while living in an all-white American neighbourhood.

I wish this were a purely personal experience and were not an interpretation of a general rule.

Other trends of the “African Personality” are being formed by other recent factors, for instance, the “Defend Africa Trend”—I should call it “Defend Africa Against Foreign Exploitation and Mischief” trend. The economic survey of the troubled regions in Africa today adds further to the importance and vitality of this trend. It is not by sheer coincidence that almost all the richest parts of the continent are still either under explicitly imposed foreign exploitation or are threatened to be so. South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, South-West Africa, Biafra, as well as the Suez Canal, are all related problems created by extra-African forces.

This feeling of a common enemy has brought us, Africans, closer together. Our griefs are giving African solidarity a great push forward. The post-independence period helped us in many ways in tailoring African solutions for the problems confronting the continent. The preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the states explicitly embodied in the OAU Charter can be fruitful and valid only when all the African states avoid interference in the internal affairs of each other and any encouragement to subversive activities directed against other African states from within their territories.

Because of the difference in political structures and set-ups from one

African state to another—which ranges from absolute monarchy in one place to parliamentary democracy in another, and to one progressive party rule in a third place—controversial arguments do sometimes arise as to what is a subversive action and what is a corrective action.

In a truly African spirit, and without mentioning names or places, we should all accept, as a common challenge, the fact that the methods through which the African peoples are governed in some African states are still far from ideal. We should, however, have faith in the future while recognising our defects and shortcomings. The “African Personality” should look into the future only through well conceived present circumstances. It does not help very much these days to limit our thoughts only to far-fetched ideals.

# Trade Union Leadership & Foreign Aid: The East African Experience

R. D. SCOTT

IN any new state<sup>1</sup>, trade unions can play a key role in the modernisation of the structure of social and economic relationships. Functionally specific interest groups create new loyalties which cut across and weaken the potentially divisive pluralism of traditional groupings such as the clan or the tribe. Industrialisation frequently gives rise to large-scale labour migration which disrupts the links between the individual and his traditional communal status. Trade unions are one of the most important voluntary associations which tend to fill the gap. Even where the unions remain basically tribal associations (as many do in East Africa)<sup>2</sup>, the industrial organisations respond to new authorities and generate new ideas which help to create rural-urban connections of great importance in the communication of modernisation.

Until recently, the accepted dogma concerning the role of trade unions in the politics of new states was that unions developed spontaneously as an indigenous protest mechanism against colonial exploitation<sup>3</sup>, that they became politicised and played a major part in the nationalist movements seeking independence<sup>4</sup>, and that they represent an important counter-balance to authoritarian control in a one-party state<sup>5</sup>. All of this has been called into question by recent studies, particularly the iconoclastic chapter on unions by Elliot Berg and Jeffrey Butler in a recent compendium<sup>6</sup>. Briefly, they argue that unions tended to keep out of politics before independence, with the exception of "paper tiger" national union centres which did not control the individual unions and were led by aspiring political figures without industrial support. After independence, unions tend to be quickly taken over by the ruling party because of the threat that they might pose to the policies of the national political leadership. They continue to function as industrial relations organisations within limits prescribed by the politicians and are deprived of any autonomous political significance.

The Berg-Butler thesis, despite its limitations as a universal explanation, has done much to restore the balance tipped by the romantic Marxism of earlier writers. In the East African context, this thesis produces a convincing interpretation of events in Uganda and Tanganyika. In Uganda, various attempts have been made to use important national centres for political purposes but the major unions steered clear of party involvement in a fluid situation which might have left the

unions backing the wrong horse. In Tanganyika, the national centre was created by the mass party and became closely identified with it, although many key unionists played only a passive political role. After independence, attempts were made to discipline union leadership through a party-controlled national centre in both areas. When these failed, legislation was passed which restricted the use of direct action and effectively subordinated leaders of the unions to ministerial direction.

The situation in Kenya caused Berg and Butler to qualify their general analysis. The key role of Tom Mboya in both the union movement and the ruling party makes it difficult to sustain the notion of non-involvement. During the Mau Mau emergency, national political parties were banned and the Kenya Federation of Labour functioned as a nationalist political organisation in disguise<sup>7</sup>. Mboya has subsequently played an important role in maintaining amicable relations between the party and the unions, diverting the government from introducing the system of authoritarian controls in force elsewhere. Nevertheless, the union centre and the party do remain separate organisations, each split by its own factional disputes which lead to divergence between them on key policy issues and Mboya remains one of the very few unionists active in national politics.

East African experience also underlines the role of external assistance in the growth of trade unionism in new states. The growth of trade unions depended heavily on assistance from colonial labour authorities whose primary concern was to avoid unrest and particularly to prevent political involvement. The success of these policies tends now to be overlooked, particularly as they were overshadowed by more positive expansionist policies pursued by non-governmental trade union organisations after 1950 which touched off a real boom in union activity. It was no coincidence that there should be a rapid acceleration in union membership at the same time that a large number of international organisations became concerned with developments in Africa. Uganda is a startling demonstration of this. Left in something of a backwater until 1955, union membership rose from 1,642 in 1955 to 10,862 in 1959. Other factors were obviously not constant but a basic reason for the rapid growth was the increasing availability of external assistance in the form of finance and training.

It is unfortunate that the key question of the magnitude of trade union aid cannot be answered with even a moderate degree of certainty. There is no method of finding out the nature and size of the aid given by the various organisations active in East Africa. Isolated figures are published by the larger organisations such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and its larger affiliates<sup>8</sup> but one can only make a very vague estimate of the expenditure of other organisations. On the basis of purely visual evidence, it seems that unions with well established overseas contacts may benefit to the extent of £ 1,500 per annum<sup>9</sup>. This does not take account of the salaries paid to foreign experts sent into the country by the overseas organisation or of the facilities paid for by the ICFTU.

In the past, aid has taken five forms. It is common practice for the

international organisation to begin by sending in an adviser from a more developed country to examine the need for aid and to give the union the benefit of his expert services. This is particularly true of the larger western organisations associated with the ICFTU. Direct aid, with or without prior investigation, usually takes the form of either straight finance or material gifts, especially transport and office equipment. In countries where unions cover a wide area and public transport facilities are often non-existent, cars are a valuable asset which are normally beyond the resources of new unions. In recent years, great emphasis has also been placed upon providing local education facilities to raise the standard of union leadership and to increase the efficiency of the local union organisations. Finally, there has been the widespread but unco-ordinated practice of providing African union leaders with a large number of information tours, conferences and scholarships in the home country of the donor organisation.

Before the Second World War, aid was given on a limited scale and usually justified in terms of the economic self-interest of the workers in the developed countries. Helping to strengthen trade unionism in the less developed areas would avoid the danger of competition from overseas "cheap labour" and lead to greater equality of conditions among the workers of the world. After the war, the internationalism of the labour movement was split by the same forces which had caused a polarisation at the political level. The motives behind aid-giving were coloured by this change and reference is now made to the defence of ("western") democratic rights and institutions or the need to resist neo-colonialism and exploitation by the (anti-Communist) imperialist employers. Underlying this ideological commitment is often a narrower search for national prestige and influence. Within both major blocs, it seems that individual national centres compete with each other and disagree over fundamental questions concerning the nature and direction of aid.<sup>10</sup> Further research may show this to be as true of China and Russia as it has been of the United States and Britain.

The extent to which aid activities have been motivated by considerations of ideology and national prestige is illustrated by the insignificant role played by the only non-political and multilateral agency operating in the field. The International Labour Organisation has been used as an influential vehicle for anti-colonialist criticism and as a propaganda platform by both sides in the "Cold War" debate<sup>11</sup> but has been relatively unimportant in the field of practical aid. Recently it has publicly committed itself to an expanded programme of aid and technical co-operation<sup>12</sup>. In East Africa this programme has been directed from the impressive new ILO headquarters in Dar es Salaam and aims at making technical and educational facilities available to any interested groups, whether government or unofficial. In addition, a number of union leaders, labour officers and personnel trainees for management have been sent abroad on training scholarships. This, however, is a new and relatively small-scale development. Neither in scope nor duration has the ILO programme rivalled the aid given by national and international union organisations.

Predictably, the first external organisation to take an interest in

East Africa was the British Trades Union Congress (TUC). The TUC's claim to "a special relationship" with unions in British colonial and Commonwealth territories has been contested by other international organisations. Yet this relationship undoubtedly did exist, for the logical but often unstated reason that unions in these areas were initially modelled upon British practice<sup>13</sup>. In a comparative analysis of colonial labour policies, Professor Fisher points out that, contrary to French practice, the British TUC never sought to assimilate the colonial movements into a single comprehensive organisation but "in practice the TUC's influence over colonial union federations is perhaps greater than would at first appear"<sup>14</sup>. This influence was exerted mainly at the centre, by contact with the policy-makers at the Colonial Office, and was probably greatest during the post-war period of Labour Party administration. An important influence on union growth was the collaboration between the British TUC and the Colonial Office which resulted in the appointment of experienced union officials from Britain to specially created posts in the Labour Departments of the colonial territories. This system proved to have a major drawback in practice because of the conflict in loyalty it created for the former trade unionists, suddenly transformed into civil servants. Either they absorbed the social norms of the notoriously conservative colonial service and fell out with the unions (as occurred in Kenya) or they reacted strongly the other way, clung ferociously to their union loyalty and ended up in open conflict with the rest of the civil service (as occurred in Uganda). The TUC also sponsored its own training and aid programme independently. Prominent union leaders from all the East African territories were given their first scholarships abroad to study at British institutions and, at least in the case of Uganda, direct financial assistance was also provided.<sup>15</sup>

The principles behind this activity of the TUC are important because of the conflict which they provoked. The basic emphasis was that aid should concentrate on strengthening the democratic "grass roots" of unionism. It was held to be a wasted effort to use aid resources to create an imposing national centre before there was a firm sub-structure of individual unions. National centres in new countries tended to become focii for political activity whereas aid should aim at building up the social and economic functions of trade unionism. This view was challenged by American union leaders. They believed that, "in the conditions of Africa today, the unions and their leaders are bound to be political. The US has an interest in what their politics will be"<sup>16</sup>. To resist Communist influence, aid should be directed towards the leaders in the national centres who were in a position to determine the politics of the movement. It is common knowledge in Kenya that Mboya received considerable financial assistance from the AFL-CIO to further his union career although the union movement as a whole did not directly benefit. Often individual leaders of high calibre were given considerable financial backing and overseas training while relatively little was spent on building up individual unions as instruments of collective bargaining. For the same reason, the Americans also gave offence to their British colleagues by actively supporting the anti-colonial sentiments of the African leaders. While the TUC argued that unions worked most effectively as non-political organisations, leaders of the American

Federation of Labour encouraged the political flavour of the African unions and set out to show that anti-colonialism was not a monopoly of the Communist bloc.

A change in the leadership of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) allowed an uneasy compromise to be reached within the framework of this international organisation<sup>17</sup>. The national centres of Britain and the US agreed to channel all future aid through the central organisation and to limit their independent activities. This removed the awkward situation of having advisers from both countries competing for local influence, but tensions remain, as revealed in the debate over the development of an autonomous regional organisation in Africa. The ICFTU operates through autonomous continental organisations in most areas of the world but Africa has been held back because it would not have the resources to operate without massive aid. Most Western European affiliates of the ICFTU took this attitude when this question was brought up by Tom Mboya at an international conference. They pointed out that the ICFTU in Africa is financed wholly from non-African funds because no African affiliate is able or willing to pay the fees levied from other affiliates. Supporting Mboya, the American union leaders pointed to the impatient urge of African leaders to break loose from Western tutelage and the danger that a Communist "front" organisation would develop as an alternative international union centre for Africans. The ICFTU continues to exercise some degree of control over the funds it passes over to its African regional organisation but events in East Africa in 1963 pointed to growing support for the idea of a genuinely Pan-African and neutralist alternative.

In terms of practical assistance to the union movements of East Africa, the ICFTU has been the most active organisation in the field. Permanent advisers have been based here since 1955 and a lead has been taken in providing on-the-spot leadership training. As far back as 1952, a Visiting Mission had proposed a permanent training college as a more economic and efficient alternative to financing overseas scholarships. Out of this proposal grew the African Labour College at Kampala, which opened in November 1958. The College conducts residential four-month courses for union officials from all over English-speaking Africa and also provides facilities for shorter-term training. A research department also helps unions in the collection of labour statistics and in the preparation of claims and submissions. The College staff were originally drawn on short-term contracts from North America and Western Europe, a situation which gave rise to considerable problems of curriculum co-ordination because of the diversity of national experience on which their teachings were based. Recent Africanisation of the majority of the staff has eased this problem and helped to mould an integrated approach to local problems, but there has been increased suspicion among politicians that the staff becomes too involved in local issues. The College's main problem at the moment is linked with the general quasi-political question of whether East African unions will remain or be allowed to remain affiliated to the ICFTU.

At a conference in Nairobi in August 1963, the leaders of the three



national centres in East Africa recommended disaffiliation from the ICFTU. Tanzania, which had sponsored the move, subsequently joined the All-African Trade Union Federation. This body had been founded in 1958 by the Ghanaian politico-unionists with the blessing of the Communist international union organisation. It never got off the ground in practical terms but did provide an important ideological challenge to the "neo-colonialist" ICFTU. Later Kenya also left the ICFTU amid Mboya's apologies to his former mentors. The situation in Uganda is confused, with one of two competing national centres remaining affiliated to the ICFTU despite government displeasure. The recent political upheaval there may have changed government attitudes as the ministers imprisoned tended to be supporters of AATUF and the most outspoken critics of the ICFTU. In any case, it is likely that the ICFTU executive will face the political facts of life and no longer require formal affiliation as a prerequisite for the receipt of aid.

Working alongside the ICFTU are a number of more specialised union organisations. These International Trade Secretariats (ITS's) are federations of national unions concerned with the same specific field of activity. Eighteen such organisations are loosely affiliated with the ICFTU and eight have been active in East Africa<sup>18</sup>. Unlike the ICFTU, the ITS's do not try to limit aid to those areas which fit the Western qualification of "free trade unions". The ITS's have shown themselves willing to continue assistance to countries which have left the ICFTU in favour of the all-African organisation for as long as such assistance is welcome<sup>19</sup>. The extent of the activities of these organisations is usually determined by their financial position and the extent to which Africa offers future affiliates. In some cases, assistance may take the modest form of free affiliation and perhaps free travel to an annual conference. In other cases, leaders may be trained and their salaries paid to allow the union to expand from a firm administrative base. Finally, spectacular examples can be cited where unions virtually did not exist until created by the strenuous and long-term efforts of a Trade Secretariat working through special advisers sent out with the backing of adequate funds<sup>20</sup>.

The record of other organisations does not bear favourable comparison with either the ICFTU or the ITS's. These organisations include the individual national centres of such countries as China, West Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Israel and Austria, large individual unions in Sweden and the United States, and a number of private foundations. Although the interest is welcomed, the desire "to make their mark" has meant that these organisations administer their own aid programmes separately and often run foul of the larger agencies. The effect is often to disrupt the more comprehensive programmes of the big organisations, especially where the overseas national centre deals directly with the individual union leader. This is particularly marked with respect to the arrangements for overseas trips, an activity which these smaller organisations tend to regard with particular favour. In Uganda, for example, the representative of a trade secretariat complained that the General Secretary of a newly formed union would be absent during the most critical period of the union growth because he had

accepted a scholarship to Bulgaria without warning. When a replacement was found, he too disappeared on a scholarship to Eastern Europe. In Kenya, the General Agricultural Workers' Union almost collapsed in the absence of its most able leader, first at a year's training course in West Germany and then at a seminar in Canada<sup>21</sup>. William Friedland, after long experience in Tanganyika, noted that some leaders spent so much time away from home that they had become in effect, "international tourists" while their unions had languished<sup>22</sup>. Agencies with longer experience tend not to engage in this sort of activity because they have come to realise that the right place for a good leader is at home in Africa, learning from practical experience and keeping his union functioning.

The recurrent problem of absentee leaders is only one of a number of dangers to which foreign aid exposes the African union movements. Inevitably, most leaders are drawn from groups literate in English and possessing some knowledge of the techniques of organisation. In most cases, this means that unions are led by clerks and other non-manual employees, even where most of the workers are in some form of manual employment<sup>23</sup>. Aid in the form of financial and material assistance removes the need for leaders to maintain efficient subscription collection and, in the form of trips overseas, raises the leaders' evaluation of their own status and their taste for higher living standards. Consequently, the initial gap between officials and members in the union tends to be widened rather than narrowed by the receipt of aid.

This raises the wider question of the control and direction of aid. Advisers in all African countries point to an unhappy history of misappropriation of aid funds by local leaders. It has already been noted that differences existed within the ICFTU over the extent to which the donor countries or organisations should exert control over the allocation of funds. In practice, two systems operate side by side in most East African territories. Where the donor agency has a local representative, he will be allowed to allocate aid direct to the recipient organisation and also to supervise its use. This is true of the ICFTU and most Trade Secretariats. Other organisations sometimes channel their assistance through the local national centre or even through a particular national leader. This has led in the past to widespread abuses, as the aid is regarded as a form of personal patronage which the leader has dispensed to serve his own interests. For example, during a political campaign in which two national union leaders were opposed, the following press statement appeared:

"Through my efforts the Austrian Federation of Labour has given the equipment in the offices and the van was also given through me. We are both claiming to represent the workers in this constituency so I am taking around the van to prove to the workers what I have done for them. My opponent has been out several times; what has he brought back for them?"<sup>24</sup>.

Without adequate supervision there is also the danger that new unions will adjust their attitudes to the belief that aid will be constantly

available and will make little attempt to establish a source of independent finance. This is true of the Uganda Trades Union Congress which was founded in 1956 and still relies almost wholly on outside aid. The constitution requires the payment of affiliation fees, but it has not proved possible to levy these fees while outside organisations appear willing to foot the bill rather than let the organisation collapse<sup>25</sup>.

This leads to several "hindsight" which might be relevant for future aid administration. The first is that both material and financial aid should be closely reviewed by the donor organisation. The ICFTU have finally evolved a procedure which keeps wastage to a minimum. All aid is allocated on a project basis for specific purposes and channelled to the union through either the international's local field representative or a specially employed chartered accountant. This raises administrative costs but does ensure that the money is used for the purposes for which it was intended. There is also a strong argument in favour of giving aid on a diminishing scale rather than permitting a union to depend permanently upon international charity. Aid resources in the trade union sphere are not unlimited and, if used efficiently, should be building up the capacity of the new organisation to stand on its own feet. If aid is merely prolonging the existence of an amorphous body that would otherwise collapse, then that aid is being wasted.

The second observation is that material aid should be preferred to direct financial grants wherever possible. Most donor organisations have reached this conclusion as a result of bitter experience and the judgement is backed up by the more far-sighted and realistic African leaders. The Kissel Report (see note 11) recounted how a considerable sum donated by a European organisation for educational purposes had been used to buy a new car for the General Secretary of the African union. When visiting Kenya, Mr. Kissel noted that "Mr. Tom Mboya warned me not to send money and that we should give direct aid in office equipment and so forth. I believe that he is 100 per cent correct"<sup>26</sup>.

A third lesson from experience is that education is more effective if provided on-the-spot by carefully selected advisers and teachers. The character of the overseas experts is just as important here as in other fields of international assistance and too many advisers in the past have been lacking in vigour, adaptability and plain good manners. Training assignments should not be used as patronage rewards for European unionists due for retirement; some of the greybeards in East Africa were useless because they could not stand the climate and the stress of constant uncomfortable travelling. Similarly, an adviser who is so uncompromising that he gets himself into trouble with officialdom often succeeds in wasting his own time and wrecking the efforts of others to build up mutual confidence. Nevertheless, well-chosen advisers and the presence of local institutions such as the African Labour College have proved much more beneficial to the growth of trade unions than money spent on providing overseas scholarships and other jaunts.

Fourth, there is a need for greater co-ordination to allow the most efficient use to be made of limited resources. Relations between the

ICFTU and the ITS's collectively and between individual secretariats have often been strained by personal and organisational rivalries,<sup>27</sup> and at the level of national centres this competitiveness has been even fiercer. The net effect of this is often the playing off of one organisation against another and the tendency for aid to be absorbed at the leadership level without permeating to the roots of the union structure.

Finally, there is a need to extend the forms of aid to take account of the new positive role which trade unions are expected to play in the economic development of their newly-independent countries. The lead has already been given by three pilot projects. In Ethiopia, a West German union organisation has started a co-operative garage which will undertake specialist training for motor mechanics and similar training schemes are being sponsored by American and Scandinavian unions for garment-makers in Kenya and woodworkers in Malawi and Zambia. In all cases the union will be providing a valuable service for its members, at the same time helping to raise the level of national labour productivity. Faced with the power and authority of an independent government, trade unions will retain a measure of autonomy only if they succeed in making a positive contribution towards the achievement of official policies.

The situation has changed so rapidly in Africa since the author first visited East Africa in 1962 that the basic ideological premises behind trade unionism are often no longer valid. Genuinely "free" trade union organisations are as rare as party organisations hoping to move peacefully from opposition to power. African socialism has many faces but very few of them smile on the rights of their opponents. Trade unions survive only by being useful as a means of communication between rulers, civil or military, and the urban workers. The Nigerian General Strike and the role played by the unions in some of the coups in Francophone Africa show that they can wield political influence in periods of instability. But most independent African governments have shown that they will not tolerate a westernised "free trade union" system if this means economic uncertainty through the threat of strike action and the emergence of alternative centres of political power. Consequently the leadership of the union movement is becoming integrated into the political hierarchy and the freedom of the unions circumscribed by coercive labour legislation.

This is a fact of life which outside unionists and aid agencies must learn to live with. As shown above, there is considerable room for improvement in the efficiency with which aid is dispensed. Nevertheless, the ultimate objective should not be, and cannot be, the replication of a basically western model. Trade unions may or may not survive in a recognisable form in Africa; outside assistance should be concerned with the survival and not the form.

## REFERENCES

1. "New state" can be defined as a state which has recently acquired independent political sovereignty, internationally recognised as qualified for membership of the United Nations. This provides a legalistic but neutral definition in contrast to such question-begging terms as "modernising nations" or "developing areas" and emphasises the key political significance of decolonisation instead of economic criteria.
2. For a longer discussion of this topic, see my article on Ethnicity and Ugandan Unions, *Mawazo*, Vol. 1, No. 3, July, 1968.
3. See T. Hodgkin: *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, (Muller, London, 1956). Ch. 4, p. 126.
4. See B. C. Roberts: *Labour in the Tropical Territories of the Commonwealth*, (Duke University Press, 1964), p. xv.
5. See B. H. Millen: *The Political Role of Labour in Developing Countries*, (Brookings Institution, 1963), p. 88.
6. Elliot Berg and Jeffrey Butler: "Trade Unions" in J. S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg (eds.): *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (University of California, 1964).
7. The disguise was, of course, penetrated by the colonial administration and attempts were made to prescribe the Kenya Federation of Labour under the legislation forbidding national political organisations. Significantly the intervention of officials of the British TUC prevented this.  
See G. Bennett: *Kenya—A Political History* (Oxford University Press, 1963) p. 139.
8. The ICFTU African Labour College in Kampala was built at a cost of £125,000 and annual operating costs are now over £50,000. The International Transport Workers' Federation devotes 25% of its annual budget to aid projects (approx. £20,000), and also receives assistance from a special ICFTU-sponsored International Solidarity Fund. The International Federation of Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers budgetted for an expenditure of £56,000 in 1962.
9. This figure includes the cost of office equipment, salaries to local officials as union organisers, transport costs, and the cost of fares and accommodation for at least one member of the executive to an overseas function of some kind.
10. "National attitudes create problems of power relations in international labour organisations. The labour movement of each country places value on its own forms and ideas and claims sovereign rights which it is reluctant to delegate. The stronger national organisations tend to play a dominating role internationally, thus reproducing in the labour movement a condition similar to that of 'big power' politics in general international relations."  
L. L. Lowin: *The International Labour Movement* (Harper, 1953), p. 335.
11. In May, 1957, the US State Department set up a tripartite policy committee to review the long-range value of ILO membership in view of recent trends regarding the Russian participation. The report of the committee concluded that:  
"The tripartite structure of the ILO, despite its weaknesses, presents an almost unparalleled opportunity continuously and vigorously to challenge Communist ideology".  
(Quoted in the *Newsletter of the Overseas Employers' Federation*, N5705, May, 1957).

12. Mr. Ernest Bell, of the Secretariat of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) :  
 "Long experience points to the fact that standard setting is not enough, and that help must be given to countries to set up machinery and the institutions which will enable them to apply the standards laid down..... and to ensure that social progress keeps pace with economic development .....Hence our operational programme of technical co-operation".  
 (Speech to the Thirteenth Ordinary Conference of the International Federation of Clerical, Commercial and Technical Employees, Berlin. July 1961. Conference Proceedings, p. 37).
13. The Colonial Labour Advisory Council attached to the British Colonial Office emphasised this point in a Memorandum to the Colonial Secretary, 24 May 1951, when they warned against the effect of any radical departure from British practice.
14. G. Fisher : "Trade Unionism and Decolonisation", in *Presence Africaine*, No. 35, p. 148.
15. See *The Report of the Annual Conference of the Trades Union Congress, 1956*, p. 215 (London).
16. Quoted in *The Times Review of Industry*, London, July, 1959.
17. The ICFTU had been organised by a number of Western European countries after they had split with the World Federation of Trade Unions because of its apparent identification with the policies of the Communist bloc. The American Federation of Labour joined at a later date although the Congress of Industrial Organisations (US) had joined at the beginning in 1949.
18. International Federation of Building and Woodworkers; International Federation of Clerical, Commercial and Technical Employees; International Union of Food and Allied Workers; International Federation of Petroleum Workers; International Federation of Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers; Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International; International Federation of Free Teachers' Unions; International Transport-workers' Federation.
19. The General Secretary of one of the Trade Secretariats operating in Africa made the following statement on this subject :  
 "I am in favour of all action aiming at establishing a common African trade union movement. It is my opinion that ITS's desirous of helping African trade unions should accept affiliation from AATUF unions. Several ITS secretaries with whom I have discussed this point share my view".  
*Report of a Survey Mission to Africa, 7 November, 1961—10 March, 1962*, by Mr. E. Kissel, General Secretary of the International Federation of Clerical, Commercial and Technical Employees.
20. In Uganda, this is true of the Uganda Public Employees' Union ; the Uganda Building Construction, Civil Engineering and Allied Workers' Union ; and the National Union of Plantation Workers.
21. International Federation of Plantation, Agriculture and Allied Workers (IFPAAW). Executive Committee Fourth Meeting, July 1962, *Report on Regional Activities*, p. 3.
22. W. H. Friedland : *Unions and Industrial Relations in Underdeveloped Countries*, Bulletin 47, January 1963, p. 40. New York State School of Industrial and Labour Relations, Cornell University, New York.
23. In the branch of the National Union of Plantation Workers at the Uganda Sugar Factory, Lugazi, the pioneer union leaders were nearly all hospital orderlies because this job meant more free time, a central position from which to contact all workers and required a degree of literacy in English.
24. *Uganda Argus*, 20 April 1962.

25. The General Secretary of the Uganda TUC pointed to the dangers of this situation in his Quarterly Report:

"The financial situation is still very bad.....very few unions have paid in anything.....It is now high time that the UTUC became entirely dependent on its own resources. At present the enemies of labour are making capital of this little outside assistance to call the organisation an agent of external forces".

*Quarterly Report of the Uganda TUC, July, 1963.*

26. *Report of a Survey Mission to Africa*, op. cit., Kenya Report, p. 6.

27. In 1962, the International Transport Workers' Federation expressed its

"profound disappointment at the lack of urgency which many ITS's displayed in their approach to the vital problem of how best the various parts of the international movement can work together.....The main obstacle to agreement is not technical but the fact that a number of ITS's evidently fear that formal machinery will impinge excessively upon their autonomy".

(International Transport Workers' Federation: *Report on Activities, 1960-1961*. Section VI, p. 110).

The history of the Public Services International also admits that :

"ICFTU-ITS relations have not been entirely happy .....many reasons are given for this, such as friction over ICFTU structure and methodology, lack of diplomacy, and shortage of funds which would assure an adequate program by either the ITS or the ICFTU".

(*Public Services' International: An international labour study* by the US Department of Labour, prepared by J. L. Harmon, 1962).

# Problems and Prospects of East African 'Federation'

GEORGE W. M. KAMBA

**I**N order to understand the concept of East African Federation as we envisage it today, we have got to look at a few facts of historical and geographical importance which have led to this concept. Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika, as it used to be called, had a common history and were ruled by the same colonial power and have had close political and economic ties.

In African society, a nation is made of numerous tribes which in turn are a conglomerate of numerous clans and these in turn are composed of individual families. At the Berlin Conference (1894) when the European Powers were slicing Africa, the ethnical factor was not taken into consideration and the people who sat round the table in Berlin literally drew their boundaries on a blank map, and very few guiding features like mountains, valleys and rivers were very occasionally used to mark the boundaries. It is, therefore, not surprising that the people of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania have this ethnical bond and yet most boundaries are clearly cut through the midst of a tribe whereby one section is in Kenya and Uganda or Uganda and Tanzania as the case may be. Accordingly, the will and the wish on the part of these tribes along the borders has always been to be closely associated with their tribesmen on the other side. Fortunately, until now there has been no restriction on travel or trade between our people and as such a political federation of the three countries has always been genuinely desired by our people. It is this oneness which has all along dictated the will and wishes of our people.

To begin with, the British Government set up a number of commissions to examine the idea of an East African Federation. The most important of these commissions was the Young Commission. Its findings in a nut-shell were that the time for federation was not ripe.

As early as 1898, Lugard, an outstanding British administrator and Governor, spoke of the "rise of our East African Empire" which he believed should be governed as one State. The commission which I have referred to found different racial groups in East Africa opposed to federation at different times for different reasons. African and Asian opposition came largely from a suspicion that the federation, if created, would be racially dominated by the white settlers of Kenya as the Central African Federation was by Rhodesian whites. At the same time, the



white settlers were obsessed with power because of fear. Therefore, while the British remained in power, federation was not acceptable.

Another factor was that Uganda was known as a protectorate, Kenya as a colony (the coastal strip of Kenya was known as a protectorate administered by the British under a special arrangement with the Sultan of Zanzibar who claimed that his dominion extended over this area). Tanganyika, on the other hand, was administered by the British Government after World War I under the mandate of the League of Nations and later under the United Nations. It is, therefore, a fact that the administration of Kenya was primarily "direct rule" while in Uganda it was "indirect rule" through local authorities and this system also applied to Tanganyika. The element of uncertainty in Kenya independence dominated the Nationalists in East Africa and it became obvious that while Uganda and Tanzania aspired to independence under majority rule, in Kenya the case was different. There is not enough time to give all the historical factors which led to Kenya's independence. Suffice to say that before Kenya achieved independence the three leaders of East Africa—the Prime Minister of Uganda, Dr. Milton Obote, the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, Mr. Nyerere, and Mzee Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya—came forward and demanded Kenya's independence from the British so that an immediate political federation could take place. The bait was too much for the British Government.

The Opposition to a federation imposed by the colonial government did not mean that African leaders in the three countries were opposed to federation. Indeed, the pan-African movement strongly encouraged the idea of political federation in Africa. In East Africa the three leaders of the movement for independence were strong pan-Africanists and in 1958 an Organisation of the Pan-African Movement for East and Central Africa was formed. At the meeting of 1958 and at a number of other meetings statements strongly supporting federation were made. It was believed then that the feeling of unity that existed would disappear if each country sought independence separately. Finally, in Nairobi in 1963 all three East African leaders declared: "*We, the leaders of the people and governments of East Africa, pledge ourselves to the political federation of East Africa. We share a common past and are convinced of our common destinies.*"

We are now in 1968 and despite these strong feelings, federation has not materialised. There are a number of reasons for this. Let us briefly analyse some of them.

1. Before independence federation was suspected because the British Government favoured it and there was a real fear that another Central African Federation would be created, dominated by Kenya white settlers. There is no reason to doubt these fears, more so because we have seen with our own eyes the developments that have taken place in Central Africa in general and Rhodesia in particular.

2. Just before independence the problems which were examined and seemed insoluble were :

- (a) Should the Federal Government have the main powers in deciding matters affecting all three countries?
- (b) How would a Federal Constitution be changed?
- (c) How would revenue be distributed among the three States?
- (d) Who would decide on when a state of emergency existed and where would troops be based? These may look simple and straightforward problems, but give them a deep thought first and you will judge yourself.

3. Since independence the political and social systems of each country have developed differently. Although all the three governments prefer to be socialist they differ a good deal in their approach to socialism.

Tanzania's *Arusha Declaration* and the nationalisation of certain industries go much further than in the case of Uganda and Kenya. Their attitudes to foreign investment and economic planning are different. Politically, Tanzania has now become officially a one-party State. If, therefore, a federation was formed, there would rise the problem of deciding whether the political parties in Uganda and Kenya could contest elections in Tanzania.

4 Economically, not all the three countries have benefited to the same extent from the past economic market. There is obviously the possibility that the federation would not be able to guarantee that the three States would all benefit equally. I will explain briefly this point by looking at the new East African Treaty of Co-operation.

I should like briefly to touch on the point of sovereignty. I am of the opinion that it is very difficult for an independent state which has won its independence through a struggle to readily surrender its sovereignty. This, however, should not be the main problem inasmuch as we expect a spirit of give-and-take, but efforts in building nation states in the three countries may work against the idea of federation and one tends to note that the leaders in their attempts to develop the natural resources of their countries and fight poverty, ignorance and disease have had less time to deal with the problems of political federation.

### East African Treaty of Co-operation

Having looked at some of *the problems* concerning political federation, let us have a glance at the past history of East African economic co-operation and the new Treaty of Co-operation signed on 6 June 1967 in Kampala. This will give us an idea of the importance attached to some form of co-operation by the three countries of East Africa and the difficulties that have affected co-operation in the past and which the new treaty attempts to overcome. There are many advantages to be derived from economic integration; in discussing these advantages I would like to emphasise three points:

1. Integration, which, in East Africa has meant a common market and common services, promises a higher rate of industrial growth than would be possible for either Uganda, Kenya or Tanzania. This is because the bigger market created by about 30 million people makes for economies of scale and specialisation in factories.
2. Integration of the economies of the three countries also gives another advantage; it encourages foreigners to invest money in East Africa.
3. The third advantage is that by encouraging industrialisation, integration helps the three governments to control and prevent the growth of neo-colonialism. Here I would like to briefly add that *without economic independence political independence is meaningless*. The East African countries as a big economic unit in Africa can effectively combat control of their economies by foreign interests. The same argument has been used in Europe for economic co-operation because of fear of domination by American capital and industry which have a huge market at home and are big enough to afford the research, economies of scale and specialisation that big industries can benefit from. The Europeans fear that American industries will be established in Europe and compete with their industries.

### **Problems of East African Co-operation**

Although we have seen that the region as a whole benefits greatly from economic co-operation, not all countries benefit equally and this has been one of the major setbacks and main reasons for establishing the new East African Treaty of Co-operation. The following examples will show the kind of problems we have had in the past:

(a) East African exports of manufactured goods show that Kenya supplies 70 per cent, Uganda 20 per cent and Tanzania 10 per cent. There are at least two problems here; obviously Kenya is much more industrialised and benefits greatly by exporting to the other partner states. Secondly, the customs duty levied by East Africa on foreign goods means that Uganda and Tanzania who could buy cheaper goods from abroad would not do so and therefore help Kenya industry even more. In addition to the problems of unequal benefits from the Common Market, there are also problems of unequal benefits from the East African Common Services. In 1963 an estimate showed that the East African Common Services Organisation put £15m into Kenya's economy, £5m into Tanzania's and £2m into Uganda's. Naturally efforts were made to deal with these problems. In 1961 the Raisman Commission said Kenya should compensate Uganda and Tanzania. In 1965 the Kampala Agreement proposed "quotas" for goods that could be exported from one country to another. Actually, under the Kampala Agreement the governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania agreed to share a range of "key industries" and to accept a system of import quotas for goods manufactured in East Africa. I believe the Kampala Agreement failed because it did not tackle the actual problem facing Uganda

and Tanzania. Neither proposal was satisfactory. It was therefore decided by the three governments to establish a commission to work out a treaty. The treaty establishes the Economic Community in East Africa. The Community aims at maintaining the contribution of the Common Market and the Common Services while seeing that there is a *fair share* of benefits and industrial growth. It has two main machineries: (1) political and (2) economic.

### Political Machinery of Co-operation

The executive authority consists of the East African Authority, headed by the three heads of state. They are assisted by three ministers of cabinet rank who are responsible for East African affairs in their countries. In addition, there are Councils—a Common Market Council, a Communication Council and a Research Council, etc. Then there is an Assembly which passes laws affecting the Community. These laws have to be approved by the heads of state to become effective. Finally, common services which are to be public corporations will be run on commercial principles. These include corporations for railways, harbours, airways and posts and telecommunications.

### Economic Machinery

The Treaty sets out to maintain a stable Common Market and Common Services and at the same time ensure that all partners benefit equally. There are a number of ways of achieving these aims, but I will only mention only three:

1. *A Transfer Tax.* The advantage of this tax is that it will actually encourage industries to grow rather than merely preventing goods from the other country coming in and the effect will be to allow Tanzania and Uganda to put duties on Kenya goods in particular.
2. The East African Development Bank is to assist new industries in the three countries. 39 per cent of the capital will be invested in Tanzania, 39 per cent in Uganda and 22 per cent in Kenya. The Bank will try to help develop industries in each country that will make the economies complementary rather than competitive.
3. The Common Services Headquarters have been reallocated to spread the benefits more equally among the three countries. Tanzania is to be the new headquarters of the centre of the Community Headquarters and the Harbours while Kenya retains the Railways and Airways. The headquarters of the Posts and Telecommunications services and the Development Bank will be in Uganda.

The East African Treaty of Co-operation is a firm declaration of the belief of the three heads of state in the value of co-operation among their countries. The Treaty itself does involve political co-operation as well as economic co-operation and points to future co-operation—

possibly to political federation in the future. The Treaty may not solve all the problems mentioned. We do not yet know whether the transfer tax and the Development Bank will lead to a reshaping of the distribution of industries in East Africa. We do however believe that the Treaty will make possible a fairer distribution of the benefits accruing from the Common Services and will help promote further efforts for co-operation.

I would like now to talk about the feeling concerning federation. Here, you will appreciate my problem, in that I can only speak for my government.

Uganda is ready to federate. This has been stated over and over again by our President, Dr. Milton Obote, and was stated again last year (1967) while the East African Co-operation Treaty was being debated in Parliament (to give it the force of law). We realise and accept the benefits of this Treaty of Co-operation, but we are convinced the ideal is federation. We also accept that the Treaty is a road to that federation. We are ready to move in that direction, but not to jump there. The Uganda government is committed to the cause of federation, but would not like a federation which might fail. We believe in a strong federation. In 1963 the Uganda government made a move but the attempts to federate failed; some of us were asked to give too much and others were not ready to surrender anything. We believe what East Africa has achieved is unique. In other parts of Africa, forces of disintegration are at work and this is true of many other parts of the world. It is therefore our belief that we would be doing a great dis-service to Africa if we do not promote this spirit to the advantage of Africa. The East African Co-operation Treaty has left our doors open and it is encouraging to know that Ethiopia, Somalia, Burundi and Zambia are already negotiating with the East African governments to join this Community. However, we should not be blinded by our achievements in establishing the East African Community. We should work for a bigger Community because it is our belief that we share a common past and are convinced that we have a common destiny. It is therefore absolutely essential that when we people in East Africa and people outside East Africa talk of an East African political federation, we should not be blinded by emotions, but work for federation—the kind of federation that will not be a mockery, a federation that will be strong and effective and, above all, a federation which will create better conditions for our people, better facilities for our people and better prospects for our people. Let this be understood that federating for the sake of federation will not serve the purpose. We have got to remember that we have to surrender some of our sovereignty, especially in matters like *foreign affairs and defence*. In this connection, it is necessary to find a form of association that is compatible with the newly-won independence and economic needs of each country. It is in this respect that when the time is ripe for federation, whether in the present form of the three members of East Africa or in a wider Eastern African concept, or even in a wider form, it will be necessary for us to put all the cards on the table ready to surrender our sovereignty, in part or fully, to improve our prospects and until such time as each of the East

African countries is ready to surrender her sovereignty and join a round-table and talk as an independent sovereign state, it will not be easy to achieve a political federation. Let me end by quoting my President's words in the National Assembly. "In 1963 Uganda could not federate because the other two partners had asked from us more than we could give. Now we are ready and we are ready to federate and we are ready to give more. If Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam are prepared, we are ready".

# **Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika 1920-1960: Outline of Economic Development**

P. RANDALL BAKER

**T**HIS paper has been divided into three periods, each having distinctive economic trends largely influenced by events in the wider world field. For each of these periods, I hope to indicate the major lines of economic development and spatial differences in the part played by Africans. In East Africa as a whole the period 1920 lies between the establishment of the basic economic patterns and the divergent views which accompanied independence. By 1920 settlers were being encouraged in the "White" Highlands to provide revenue for the "Uganda Railway". In Uganda cotton had been established for over a decade among the peasants and in Tanzania the new mandate authority was picking up the threads of the plantation subsistence economy after the devastation of World War I.

## **A : 1920—1939 : Economic Fluctuations and the Rise of the African in the Economy**

With the early 1920's came the collapse of European plantations in Uganda, while in Kenya the alien European element became even further entrenched economically with the programme of land ownership for demobilised soldiers. This set the basic pattern of the Uganda and Kenya economies for 30 years. The fluctuations of the world economy to which the primary products exporting countries are so sensitive had a dominant role in much of the pattern of events. In Uganda, the early disillusionment with plantation agriculture which accompanied the failure of cocoa, rubber and other experimental crops was accentuated by the sharp decline in world prices of primary exports in 1921. An almost unanimous desire to sell up and leave resulted in the take-over of most estates by Asians. Alienated land was a valuable commodity for the Asian entrepreneur, for the law of 1916 had precluded outsiders from further large purchases of land for economic exploitation, and this sudden disposal of land by Europeans opened the way for a large Asian infiltration into commercial plantation agriculture. Fortuitously, the Asians developed the one cash crop which had not previously been exploited on a large scale—sugar—and this brought in large returns. In this early part of the 1920's the Asian plantation, a significant part of the modern economic scene in Uganda, was established.

Throughout the three territories there was a widespread introduction of the African into a cash economy. The methods varied spatially,

though the main difference was between the peasant cash crop development in Uganda and the wage-earning agricultural labourer in Kenya. In Uganda, the rapid growth of cotton cultivation among African peasants led to an export revenue of £2.3 million in 1923. The prospect of this cash wealth and the visible signs of what it could buy in the way of galvanised roofing and bicycles encouraged many people to leave the purely subsistence sector and devote part of their economic activity to the raising of cotton. This was also an easy way of commuting labour commitments to cash and paying off the yearly poll-tax. The rise of peasant cotton in Uganda had several side-effects which were a source of consternation to the Government. The general contentment of the native with a small cash income from his cotton *shamba* meant that there was a shortage of labour in other sectors. It is true that there was not the demand for native labour in Uganda that there was in Kenya, but some compulsion was considered necessary because of the opportunity costs of cotton growing against the low wages offered elsewhere. The period of obligatory labour was extended to 60 days in the early 1920's. However, the demand for compulsory labour fell away by 1927, and in 1928 the obligation was entirely commuted to a cash payment. A further economic reform amongst the peasant community was enacted in 1928 when the *Busulu* and *Envujo* Law was passed. A system of rent and tribute had existed between the peasant and the landowner very reminiscent of the system which prevailed between the peasant and the chief previously. The *busulu* was an obligation to labour commutable by a 10/- cash payment, but the *envujo* (which is of more significance to this paper) consisted of a tribute percentage of food and beer. By the mid-20's the recipients had levied an *envujo* on cotton crops. This acted as a firm disincentive to expand the acreage of the Protectorate's sole large money earner. A Government committee in 1926 stated that one-third of the crop was being taken in this way, and a strong desire arose to protect the *bakopi* from exploitation. Under the law, payments were strictly controlled at a reasonable level effecting a compromise with both sides. Fears were expressed, it should be added, about the way the Uganda cotton economy was growing, for many feared the attraction of cotton might draw the peasant away from food crops to such an extent that there would be a danger of famine, or recurrently short food supplies which would adversely affect the balance of payments.

By the end of the 1920's Uganda's economy seemed thriving. In 1929 came a repetition of 1921 and prices crashed throughout the world. This became particularly embarrassing for Uganda, for in 1929 inspired by seemingly bright prospects, the Secretary of State had advised a more ambitious development programme and the recurrent expenditure involved soon became an unwelcome burden on the falling revenues of the Uganda Protectorate Government. So it was that much social development was curtailed, and the authorities were instructed to view the economy with an eye to diversification. It was not exceptionally hard on the Africans, for, despite Government fears they had not forgone their subsistence crops and could easily fall back on them. By the early 1930's, the economy had regained sufficiently for the Secretary of State to recommend the institution of income tax, though this was hotly contested in Uganda. It was stated that there was no need for such a



tax; it was too difficult to administer and it was an example of Uganda being treated as an appendage of Kenya as regards policy decisions in London. The income tax was rejected. Until the outbreak of war in 1939, Uganda's economy continued to prosper, especially with the extension of the railway to Kampala in the mid-30's providing easier and cheaper export of primary produce to the coast at Mombassa. Such native labour as was recruited was used to bring together the economy of the Protectorate as a whole by public works projects. The economy was almost exclusively rural, and following the radical change in land ownership and subsequent fragmentation, the very land of Buganda had been given an economic value.

## **Kenya**

The African native in Kenya faced quite a different situation than his counterpart in Uganda, for he was discouraged from playing any productive part in the emerging commercial agriculture, firstly because he was needed as cheap labour for the European of the reserved White Highlands farms, and secondly because he was considered incapable of growing anything of the complexity of cotton and coffee. The "inevitable low quality and disease dangers" of African cash crops were feared to jeopardise the reputation of European produced primary cash exports to the world market. Thus the African in Kenya often had his introduction to the cash sector of the economy through wage labour on European farms and not through market returns on his produce. The initial good economic start of Kenya after the First War was followed by several serious economic setbacks. The slump of 1921 was felt keenly on the capitalised farms of Kenya, and particularly by the demobilised soldiers lacking in experience who had taken up farms after the war. This was closely followed by an extremely adverse revaluation of the £ and the rupee which raised the loan burden of the farmers by 50 per cent and drove many of them into bankruptcy. Many of the economic developments in Kenya, however, have to be viewed in the light of strong settler pressure on a frequently weak or sympathetic governor. Despite not being able to drop African wages by one-third after the rupee devaluation the settlers were able to effect the controversial Customs Union in 1927 which was accepted in East Africa not realising the considerable preferential treatment of Kenya which it contained. They threw up a wall of "tariffs to protect their interests". Previously, the Bowring Commission of 1922, which counted among its members Grogan and the redoubtable Delamere, had introduced tariffs on the "infant industry" arguments to protect the Kenya wheat growers.

Throughout the period before 1939, the question of labour for the European farms was a principle issue both in the Colony and overseas. The first move came in 1920 when the Native Authority Ordinance was extended to 60 days obligatory labour, and this prompted the Secretary of State to declare in 1922 that this economic move was "subject to his approval in each instance". Governor Northey's circular to administrative officers requesting them "to do *all in their power* to increase the flow of labour for plantations and farms in the territory" brought forth a stream of criticism in the United Kingdom, where shades of forced

labour were suspected. Churchill worked towards a balance between the legitimate demands of farmers and the encouragement of African cultivation on the reserves. But there was very much a system of economic *apartheid* in Kenya deliberately holding back the economic progress of the natives in order that the labour supply should not be reduced or made more expensive.

After the slump of 1929, the Kenya settlers worked to achieve the establishment of statutory monopolies enabling effective price discrimination to be practised. This they achieved in 1930 with the creation of the Wheat Agency, which was a monopolistic organisation designed to keep the price up above export parity. This raised the price unjustifiably and unreasonably for the consumer. Despite this economic position of power, the settlers adamantly refused to accept Lord Moyne's suggestion that the Europeans were not contributing (monetarily) their full share to the economy. Lord Moyne even questioned whether European initiative in the social and economic fields was best after all, and quoted the case of neighbouring Uganda in defence. The imposition of an income tax was vehemently opposed by the Kenya whites and a graduated poll-tax was introduced as a compromise. African incomes too were the subject of conflicting opinion, for the Chief Native Commissioner was not happy to see Africans taken from the reserves and made dependent on paid labour and limited food supplies whereas the native authorities were more interested in the prospect of increased monetary returns from local taxes. Throughout this period, however, the African was carefully excluded from all commercial activity such as shopholding or trading, and his position seemed almost hopeless against the powerfully entrenched settler group. After 1930, the economy boomed under the protective tariffs.

### Tanganyika

Tanganyika lagged behind Kenya and Uganda partly as a result of the economic and social disruption which occurred when it was a theatre of war. But its development was more on the lines of Uganda, with *arabica* coffee instead of cotton in the Kilimanjaro area developed by the Chagga, and *robusta* produced by the population in the Bukoba area. By 1923, exports had reached £1,733,000 largely based on these new developments and the revival of former German sisal estates. The economic fluctuations took a heavy toll in Tanganyika, however, because many of the indigenous people were still not used to a cash economy and retreated to the subsistence sector as soon as prices showed any marked downtrend. Developments in the secondary and tertiary sectors were retarded by this trend. A graduated poll-tax for Europeans was introduced against opposition to help salvage the revenues.

Added to the other factors holding back the economic development of Tanganyika was the threat of a possible return of the territory to Germany and the deterrent effect this had on the level of capital investment. After the crisis of 1921 it was not until 1933 that the economy became really solvent again. The labour question which had plagued Kenya was reflected on a diminished scale, but against a more sensitive background in Tanganyika. For, in the territory, slavery had been abolished

only in 1922, and in 1923 the native population was protected by a law which insisted that any employer could only keep a "native" away from his domiciled area for a maximum of 6 months (later extended to 1 year). Further social stipulations protected the housing and feeding of such employed labour. There was a radical difference of attitude towards the 'native' population shown by the authorities in Tanganyika and Kenya. This was in large part encouraged by the legal contents of the mandatory agreement. In recognition of this, the Government adamantly refused to release the former German estates for non-African large-scale capital development for many years.

Tanganyika was fortunate in 1930 in having a gold strike at Lupa which provided wage employment for several thousand Africans. Development throughout however was noticeably slower than in Kenya and Uganda.

### **Awakening of Government Interest in Education**

The attitudes mentioned in the Phelps-Stokes publication on Education in East Africa are typical of those prevailing in the early part of the period. The mission education system was to be supported and inspected, but direct Government initiative was to be small. A Kenya White Paper of 1923 stated: "It is the mission of Great Britain to work for a higher intellectual, moral and economic level than that which the African possessed at the time of British adoption." Behind this rather elevated ideology was a practical attitude however: "...education of the natives to deal effectively with the environment, and of others to recognise the potentialities of the natives." Education was predominantly a practical vehicle of economic development. The Tanganyika Report of Education of 1921 stated: "...produce boys fit to take an active part in the economic development of the country", and to this end primary schools were started under the Government in district headquarters and larger villages. The Tanganyika situation was quite different, be it noted, from that in Uganda and Kenya, for Tanganyika had inherited 99 schools (Government run) from the former German administration which had a much more direct attitude towards education. There were in Tanganyika no grants-in-aid to the mission schools, whereas in Kenya and Uganda £61,000 and £20,000 respectively were allocated to the missions annually. However, closer scrutiny reveals the distinctly functional Kenyan attitude to education: per capita £12 for Europeans, £2 for Asiatics and circa 3/- for the "remainder". This was the financial allocation of education funds. Government stated "this is much more than in most tropical dependencies". There were but 2 Government schools in 1923, and the staff of one consisted of Headmaster, Asst. Headmaster, tailoring instructor, mason and carpenter. The accent was very much on the practical aspect of education. Kenya's view was summarised thus: "Literary education *per se* is harmful to the African" (1921). This was not a peculiarly Kenyan attitude in the early 1920's however, for a committee to report on the Civil Service in Uganda said in 1921: "We are opposed to any general literary education for the African general population...it should not proceed beyond a level which will enable the native to learn a trade and earn a living. The native is likely otherwise to regard himself as

superior...for whom the responsibilities of every-day life have no meaning." The Government did not entirely accept this though Makerere College was established in 1922 to train Government servants. After 1923, the Uganda Government accepted a less functional attitude towards native education, though in that year Dr. Garfield Williams complained : "Inevitably the whole educational system is subordinated to the ecclesiastical system." A broader attitude towards education was considered alien to the planters' interests reflecting the former subordination of education to purely economic ends. The Tanganyika Planters' Association declared in 1927: "We view money being spent on education (i. e. in 1927) with considerable alarm". The Government acceded to some degree and promised that the "output of pupils would not exceed the employers' demands".....this led to a retrenchment in the early 1930's.

Throughout this period, the missions continued to give a broader education to their pupils, and the Phelps-Stokes report on Education in East Africa (1924) bemoaned the transition from the "good old days" when stations such as Rabbaï had given sound "basic education" to the native (i. e. carpentry, masonry and basic reading/writing). Under the inspectorate system, nevertheless, educational standards were critically observed. Such Government programmes as were instituted were subject to the vagaries of the economy and with the approach of war in 1939, as in the previous depressions, money was scarce and programmes were curtailed or held in check.

#### **World War II : Incentive and Disincentive**

The demands for manpower and food which escalated in East Africa during the Second War had radical effects on the economy. In Kenya, Dr. Clayton has shown how many of the 'native' cultivators were drawn out of the subsistence sector by the high prices being paid. Nearly all the cotton crop of Uganda was bought by the Government of British India, and most of the coffee by the Ministry of Supply; so detrimental price fluctuations were ironed out. Also during the war, the concept of complete market control was introduced, and is still largely a feature of Kenya's economy today. This was to have important economic repercussions in the post-war period. The war effort provided the drive which enabled the controversial income tax to be introduced in Uganda and Tanganyika, though it had been finally pushed through in Kenya in 1937. The shortage and strict control of goods gave rise to the black market concept which still flourishes today in the maize world. Though the control over the economy acted as a brake in many ways, Tangaynika's economy, which was not controlled, was subject to violent fluctuations at this time. In general prices of essential foods rocketed, which benefited only those people who grew them and raised the cost of living enormously of those outside the primary production sector. This brief period set the scene in many ways for what was to follow.

#### **1945-1960: Reconstruction, Boom and Threatened Decline**

The post-war period was one of rapid, and largely unpredicted, economic growth. Unprecedented developments took place in agriculture, industry and services. In Uganda, grandiose plans were made

for the construction of Owen Falls Hydro-Electric Scheme which really symbolised the optimism of the post-war era. The U.E.B.\* was created to take charge of this scheme, which it was hoped would speed up the industrialisation of Uganda and earn revenue by selling bulk supplies of electricity to Kenya. Behind much of this thinking was a fortuitous system which arose out of the Second War in the marketing sector. To protect the producer from violent fluctuations in primary product prices in the world market, Price Assistance Funds were formed which absorbed surplus incomes in good price years and subsidised producers in a slump. However, the completely unforeseen boom in coffee after the war soon found the Funds for cotton and coffee growing at an enormous rate. Before long there was £17,000,000 lying in the Funds in Uganda and this interest-free development capital was too much of a temptation for the Protectorate authority. The money was dipped into for many of the long-term development projects in the social sector. In many years, the grower received less than  $\frac{1}{2}$  the export value of his crop. In this optimistic period, U.D.C.\*\* was created with a capital of £5m., copper was exploited at Kilembe, cement at Tororo, and textile factories were built at Jinja. A chain of hotels was strategically located throughout the country. Nothing radical was done to reduce the very heavy dependence on the two primary export crops which provided 90 per cent of exports, a large proportion of revenue through export tax, and most of the country's development capital. The money was used to help the cooperative movement take over cotton ginneries in order to drive out the middleman and Africanise the ginning stage. Further aid to the Africans came with a grant of £400,000 from the Legislative Council to assist them in the retail trade and an African Loans Fund was started in 1953 to assist those needing capital to start a business or were already in some established venture.

Optimism soon turned into gloom when the steady decline in primary prices caught the coffee boom. The P. A. F's were heavily drawn upon (and are now empty). The creation of a world quota system for coffee was designed to assist the producing nations in the 1960's exports and the prices of coffee improved. The provision of large quantities of cotton as aid to India from the U. S. A. undermined Uganda's largest cotton market. The recurrent expenditure incurred by large non-productive investments in social fields soon proved a heavy burden on the declining revenues.

## **Kenya**

After the war Kenya retained its tight control over much of agricultural marketing but there was a rapidly emerging wage class in the towns of Kenya to match those on the farms, and there was a serious fear that a food shortage might arise. The "Reserves" were now heavily pressed to meet the subsistence needs of all those living in them. At last attempts were made to improve the productivity of the African farms. Unlike the pre-war period when prices had been kept deliberately high, the move was now to provide a cheap food supply to the secondary sector. This movement was formalised during the "Emergency"

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\* Uganda Electricity Board.

\*\* Uganda Development Corporation.

of the 1950's when the necessary powers became easily available to enforce the 3 tenets formalised in the "Swynnerton Plan: consolidation, planning and extension. Through the cooperatives largely, Africans in Kenya took to sisal, arabica and pyrethrum. Prompted by the *Mau Mau* movement and the need to alleviate grievances, the U. K. gave £5 m. towards the Swynnerton Plan, and soon the number of arabica growers increased seven times between 1952 and 1958. Despite the beneficial economic results arising from the "Emergency" there was the loss of much capital development money which was expended on military actions. This held up a road improvement programme and unsurfaced roads (Nairobi-Namanga) exist in much of Kenya today. In the secondary and tertiary sectors, the rapid turnover of people from overcrowded Reserves worked to keep down the wage level, though a minimum family wage was instituted in the late 1950's. In 1959, the Government announced that the "White Highlands" were finally to be opened to African development.

### Tanganyika

Tanganyika benefited from the high primary product prices after the war, and most of the Government capital thus accrued was devoted to long-term development projects, especially the much needed road-improvement programme. However, with the higher incomes came a shortage of consumer goods from the developed countries which were still recovering from the war, and a consequent fear of inflation if people had too much money (this is part of the reasoning behind P. A. F.'s). The Authority also saw the need for a freehold system to combat the rising population pressures in some parts and a consequent breakdown of traditional systems. Industrialisation was almost nil, and the economy remained heavily dependent on the earnings of such crops as sisal. A brief but spectacular diversion was provided by the vast groundnut scheme in the late 1940's which cost the U. K. Government £3,700,000.

### East Africa

Before World War II the suggestion for a closer union among the three territories had been mentioned and studied on many occasions. Fears were expressed by Uganda that a closer union would result in domination by the white farmers of Kenya. Kenya viewed with suspicion the active participation of the African farmer in the economy. After the Second War, and especially after the granting of independence to India, the horizon of self-government drew nearer. Movements for closer union became a reality with the establishment of the East Africa High Commission in the late 1940's. It was hoped that the centralisation of such common services as posts and telecommunications, customs and immigration, airways, railways and research would result in a more productive use of skilled manpower and capital. A greater market was created by the East African Common Market and to some extent economies of scale were able to operate. In this way, the benefits of the wealthier parts were partly redistributed to the poorer, just as the Kenya-Uganda line subsidised the rail services in Tanganyika.

As the 1960 decade approached independence was becoming a reality and even the Kenya whites had resigned themselves to this.

Large amounts of capital flooded from that country as independence drew near but many settlers left. Closer union was still an important political issue, and now the main points of discussion had become economic. It was no longer the political domination by the Kenya whites which was feared—rather the concentration of industries in that territory. These were attracted by the larger European market, better climate and the social attractions of a modern city such as Nairobi. Once secondary and tertiary sectors grew they provided their own stimulus. Despite this imbalance in favour of Kenya, that country continually showed the most adverse balance of payments as Asians and Europeans despatched money to their overseas accounts, and the profits of some industries were repatriated.

In 1961, the entire picture of life in East Africa changed with the independence of Tanganyika. It was mooted by President Nyerere that *uhuru* should be delayed if a Federation of East Africa could become a reality. There was no concrete outcome of this revolutionary idea and Tanganyika became the first independent country in East Africa in December 1961. Towards the close of the 1960's the threads of closer economic union had survived with the High Commission being transformed into the East African Common Services Organisation.

The period 1920—1960 had seen the operation of three different systems behind the development of the three territories. In Kenya, a submissive colonial government practised *laissez-faire* towards the outspoken white community and the African was largely subservient to the needs of expatriate farmers. In Uganda, the model African peasant economy provided the wherewithal for development and progress especially in the boom after 1950. A pseudonym of 'sleepy backwater' was often applied, largely because progress was steady, unspectacular and not enlivened by the hot controversy of settler politics. In Tanganyika, the mandate responsibilities encouraged a superpaternalistic approach from a cautious authority. In this way the three countries developed their typical colonial economies all attempting to sell similar products in the unpredictable world market. Although over 80 per cent of Kenya's exports were European produced, and over 80 per cent of Uganda's exports were African produced, the problems they faced were the same. At the end of the colonial era all faced independence with roughly the same intention: rapid economic development to fulfil political claims. All the countries however face a limited range of agricultural alternatives, a small domestic market, an artificial world situation for cash crops and a great demand for expensive social services at home. The divergent forms of government developed since the end of colonialism are different vehicles for achieving the same economic end with basically similar economies. Tanganyika is attempting to mobilise its human resources and control the various organs of development in a radical fashion; Kenya is replacing the extensive farms of the 'Highlands' with intensive resettlement schemes which increase the subsistence sector at the expense of cash exports but relieve pressure in the Reserve areas of colonial times. Uganda continues much as before, but conscious of the need for diversity. The diversity which always characterised the unity of E. Africa is still present.

# Historic African Cities of the Soudanaise Sahara

OUSMANE SILLA

*The "Soudanaise Sahara" comprised the former territories of West French Africa in the sub-equatorial Sahara covering the regions on each side of the valley of the river Niger. The centre of this region was Bamako, the present capital of Mali. In 1959 the Soudan joined Senegal to form the federation of Mali, a member of the "Communaute" established by France in that year of overseas territories formerly under French administration. In 1960, however, Senegal separated from the Republique Soudanaise and the latter took the name of the Republic of Mali—Ed.*

**I**T is the general belief that cities were unknown in pre-colonial Africa. It is necessary to explore the definition of the word "urban" to be able to give a positive reply to this assumption.

Geographers specialising in urban studies have restricted themselves to these definitions among many others. "The city is a group of people whose activities are seldom tied to the soil. Most of them are neither cultivators nor breeders, but are traders, artisans, industrialists, bureaucrats. The city contrasts with the village by the presence of solid buildings (brick-and-stone structures)". These definitions permit one to state that the urban phenomenon existed in Africa during the pre-colonial period. It is possible to find in ancient Africa, during pre-historic times, an important settlement in the valley of Niger which is proved by the discovery of paleolithic and, more so, neolithic beds.

Ptolemy provides us with more precise information. His map contains innumerable names, sites and locations of what is today part of Guinea, Senegal and especially the middle valley of the Niger. One's attention is drawn in particular to the cities of Koufe, Doudou, Quellegeio, and Nigira Metropolis which, it is certain, were cities of commerce, as Ptolemy could have known them only through the Mediterranean trader coming there in search of gold, ivory, etc. There were then genuine black cities in the 11th century. The Arabs mention, on their part, cities which were in existence when the Islamic conquerors arrived. The historian Ibu al Faquil al Hamdhani speaks in 870 with admiration of the State of Ghana. Gold and slaves, he recounts, were exported from the cities of Ghat, Ghan, Kakou and others. In the 11th century, El



Bekri describes enthusiastically the capital of the old empire, Sarakoley. Hawdqual describes the city of Aoudaghost (between Nema and Nioro), the situation of which called Mecca to his mind. In pre-colonial Africa, C. Anta Diop notes that in the time of Kankan Moussa, black Africa had already its masons organised in groups with a foreman. When Askia Mohammed seized Diaga in 1532 he took away 500 masons with their chief Karamogho. He retained 400 of them and sent the remaining 100 to his brother, the Viceroy of the Kingdom, of Kanjari, Amar Komdiago, to construct his capital Tendirma on the right bank of the Niger not far from Timbuctoo. Djenney and Timbuctoo, according to all hypothesis, would be prior to Islam.

The Mossi kingdoms had their cities : Ouahigouya with its fortress palace and Ouagadougou, city of "Moro-Naba"; Kong in Ivory Coast was founded by the "Senoufous"; Kumasi was the capital of the kingdom of "Ashanti" built towards 1680. The "Yorubas" had Ife, a religious city; Oyo and Benin were purely black cities; Kano, Zinder, Zaria, Sokoto of the "Haussas", Bida and Mowva of the "Noupeys", Konka of the "Kamouris" were prior to Islam.

Ahomey was a political and religious centre; the kingdom of Kongo had as its capital Mobodji. It is thus apparent that Black Africa has been reached through the Sahara since the remote past. The urban centres were at first scattered on the outskirts of the Sahara, then they spread out gradually towards the south. For centuries the Soudan was found dotted with lively cities. There were numerous routes linking the South Sahara to the Soudanaise Africa. There were two principal routes. One of them started from the Wadi Drac (a watercourse in the Sahara) and went up to Aoudaghost. It took 51 days from Sidjilmassa to Aoudaghost. The voyage lasted 15 days between that city and Ghana, the imperial capital; from the latter to Silla through Upper Senegal, it required 20 days journey with caravans; from Ghana to Gao 15 days; from Gao to Tadde Mekke it took nine days. The scope of the subject thus being vast we limit our study to the cities of the region Sahara-Soudanaise (Ghana or Koumbi Saleh, Aoudaghost, Gao, Djenney, Timbuctoo).

Many assumptions have been made as to the name and site of the capital of Ghana. Cheick Anta Diop calls it Gana and basing his references on former authors describes it thus : "It was already a cosmopolitan city. It had its Arab quarters. Islam was tolerated there side by side with the traditional cult before the conversion of the royal dynasty and the people. In the time of El Bekri the town had already 12 mosques in the Arab area with their Imams, their Mouzzims or Mouedderis, teachers, and their salaried readers. It was full of legal experts, scholars and learned men. Ten thousand meals cooked with a thousand faggots of wood were served there daily. The Emperor was present when the meals were distributed to the population at the gates of his palace".

The protocol of the court is described thus : "The Governor of the capital of Ghana is seated on the ground before the King and all

around stand the Vazirs, that is to say, the Ministers in the same positions". According to El Bekri, the King of Ghana always lived in a stone chateau surrounded by a rampart. Idrissi is still more precise. According to him, the Emperor lived in a fortified chateau built in 1116, ornamented with sculptures and paintings and fitted with glazed windows. The capital had its Muslim cemetery. The Emperor exchanged ambassadors with Morocco and maintained diplomatic and commercial relations with Egypt, Portugal and Bornou.

Idrissi, talking of the gold exploited in the land, writes: "It is the principal production of the black countries ..... there are in the land of Waagara flourishing towns and renowned fortresses; their inhabitants are rich; they possess gold in abundance and receive products brought to them from the most distant countries in the world". Each of these cities had its own system of measures and consequently the urban money minted bore the coat of arms of the city. Speaking of other houses, Idrissi says those belonging to the noble were of stone and accacia wood. The common people lived in huts of clay covered with thatched roofs.

The excavations undertaken by Bonnel de Mezieres, a French archaeologist, in the beginning of the 20th century (1911-1913) confirm to a large measure the finding of the chroniclers and Arab geographers of the 11th and 12th centuries. A city was rediscovered which is presumed to be the ancient capital with houses almost habitable with a few fittings, and walls of 30 cm thickness, metallurgical workshops ..... But at the zenith of its glory, the empire of Ghana had many large towns with houses and edifices of stone (Nema, Qualatta, Aoudaghost, Koumbi which was without doubt the autochthonic name of Ghana).

### Koumbi Saleh

Raymond Mauny assumes that Koumbi-Saleh must be considered as the ancient capital of Ghana; excavations have been undertaken there to elucidate his theme. Aoudaghost was situated at a distance of 10 days journey from this city. The *Tarikh El Fattach* furnishes some details: the name of the Capital, it says, was Koumbi which was a large town. Speaking about Ghana the *Tarikh es Soudan* says: "The capital was Ghana, a large city situated in the land of Ba Ghana. This, according to Delafosse, is synonymous with the word Ouagadou in Sarakoley, meaning the land of cattle. Now if it exists precisely in Bakhounon, there are two Koumbis (Koumbi Saleh and Koumbi Dioufi); one of these points — Koumbi Saleh — presents extensive ruins: not only ruins of stone of very beautiful architecture, but also important cemeteries, one of them with a tomb of columns surrounded by six enclosures. Koumbi Saleh must have been the principal capital of the empire of Ghana, according to Mauny. It answers better to the requisite conditions than Settah, the only other city of stone which could be compared to it and which represents perhaps another site of the capital of Ghana." Koumbi Saleh should therefore be the seat of the empire of Ghana which would date to the Middle Ages and which must have passed through many periods.

(1) Before the early Islamic period, prior to the arrival of Arabs in the area South of the Sahara and their being established there as traders (8th-9th centuries),

(2) Before the late Islamic period between the 9th century and 1075. The Arab traders set themselves up at Kôumbi and introduced Arab Berber architecture in their buildings, mosques and edifices.

(3) The early Islamic period (between 1076 and the beginning of the 13th century) the ruins of which recall the old edification of tombs with columns and the neighbouring Muslim cemeteries.

(4) The late Islamic period (beginning of the 12th century to the end of the 13th century). This marks the decline. The trading functions pass to Oualata and Djenny. Three-fourths of the city is ruined and its inhabitants have moved into new cities.

From Koumbi we pass on to the city of Aoudaghost or Awdaghost. El Bekri, quoted by V. Monteil, describes it thus : "It is a populated city and is full of sand. It has a large mosque and many small ones which are well attended and where the masters teach the Koran. All around the city spread gardens of palm trees. Its market is always lively. The crowds there are so dense, the noise so loud that one can hardly hear what one's neighbour is saying. The purchases are paid for in gold powder since silver has not been discovered there. One finds there beautiful buildings, beautiful and very elegant houses. It is the most ancient city whose ruins are conserved in the Western Sahara." Idrissi in 1154 describes briefly Aoudaghost as a small city. "Its population is very small. One could describe thus the splendour of Aoudaghost between the 4th century and the middle of the 11th century (1054). Yakobi (872) calls it Ghast, "a prosperous oasis with living houses". All of them speak of it as a city constructed with stone, beautiful houses and edifices solidly built. C. A. Diop says that in 990 Aoudaghost, a Berber centre, was governed by a black Farba who collected taxes and customs dues in the name of the Emperor on property and merchandise from the population of the city, the majority of whom were Arab Berbers.

## Gao

Gao "is one of the most ancient centres of West Africa. Situated on the Niger at the opening of the route starting from the North through Tilemsi, it has been since early times one of the markets where one exchanges the products of the South with salt and other products of the North. The caravans coming from the desert broke journey there while the waterway of the Niger made possible free and easy relations with the black countries." R. Mauny, the archaeologist, notes on the subject of Gao : "There is no doubt that Gao, which is called Kuku, Kunku or Kanku in the diverse manuscripts, if one refers to the work of the geographer Al Khawa Rizmi. Still in the 9th century Yakoubi mentions a kingdom of Kaw Kaw (the largest kingdom of Soudan and the most powerful—about 872). About 996 Al Mouhallali tells us : "The king has a city on the eastern river of the Nil (Niger) with the name of

Sarnâ; the city has markets and merchandise. The king has also a city to the west of the Nil where he lives with his nobles and his confidants. It has a mosque where he offers prayers, while the people have their *Moussala* (Islah) between the two Madrasas (schools). The king has in the city a palace which no one can occupy except himself and which still shelters only a eunuch. El Bekri (1067) also mentions the division of the city into two parts: Kaw-Kaw consists of two cities: one of them is the residence of the king and the other is inhabited by the Musulmans. Al Zourbi (1150) mentions specifically that the caravans arriving in Gao come especially from Egypt and Ouargla (in the middle of Algeria already in the Sahara) and not a few from Sidjilmara. He says: "The city stands isolated in the middle of Nil river (Niger) which surrounds it on all sides. One cannot go there except by boat. Ibn Said Gharnate (1286) places the city on the east of the river. Ibn Batuta passed it in 1353 (Koukou, he says, is one of the most beautiful lands, largest of Soudanaise cities). The 16th century, or, more exactly, the period from 1493 to 1591 will mark the grand epoch of Gao under the reign of the Askias. The *Tarikh El Fattach* enumerates 7,626 houses (nearly 50,000 inhabitants) in Gao under the Askias.

Leon the African, who without doubt visited Gao at the beginning of this century, reports: "Gao is a very large city..... without high walls... the majority of houses are ugly; all the same one can find some edifices rather beautiful and comfortable in which lives the king with his court."

We see that Gao, even at the time of its splendour, was a city of straw huts and dry mud. Cheick Anta Diop notes that Gao, under Askia El Hadj, a census done by students lasting three days made it possible to establish that Gao consisted of 7,626 blocks of stone houses including straw huts.

## Djenney

A city which must have been founded by pagans in the middle of the 2nd century (Hijr), affirms Sadi. Its inhabitants were converted to Islam at about the end of the 8th century (Hijr), says the same author.

Djenney is one of those cities where for more than 8 centuries foreigners continued to come. Timbuctoo became internationally famous, thanks to Djenney, as Es Sadi, the author of *Tarikh Es Soudan*, declared it to be. Djenney, according to Ch. Monteil (Paris 1932), is a metropole of the central delta of the Niger, a testimony of its past up to most recent times. When one looks at Djenney from the outskirts, says the *Tarikh Es Soudan*, it seems as if you see before you just a thickly wooded forest. There were two Djenneys, as stated in the *Tarikh Es Soudan*: "Originally, the city of Djenney was constructed at Djoloro. Later it was shifted to the place where one finds it today. The former city was situated in the south of the modern city."

The first Djenney goes back to the year 800. The exact period of the foundation of the present Djenney is unknown. Barth fixes

it at 1043 while Delafosse gives the date 1250: Djenney comes from the word "Al Djana" (paradise) and which abbreviated to Djana became Djenney. It appears that when work on the new city was started, the buildings crumbled down several times. Then the divine spirits and soothsayers ordained that the body of a "Bozo" virgin must be incorporated into the surrounding wall in order to ensure good luck for the new building. It is admitted that it is in the ramparts near the gate of Kanaja that the body of the virgin is to be found. The present-day Djenniens continue to keep watch fearing that negligence will be followed by a calamity to the city. They gave to one of the quarters of the city the name "Djoloro" and it is said that the name of Djenney could have originated from the Bozos, and pronounced first Djanna to mean "the small Dia" in memory of the metropole from which originated the Bozos. Leon the African has described the Djenney of 1500 to us in these terms : "The place where stands the city used to be an island in July, August and September following the overflow of the Niger. That was the time merchants from Timbuctoo went to Djenney for trade." F. Dubois furnishes the following description of the city : "As soon as one has climbed the ramparts and crossed the walls, the first surprise takes a more definite form, the mind is baffled and nonplussed, more and more bewildered by the novelty and strangeness of the city inside. Truly, one wonders where one is. The angle of Babacuc could have suddenly transported you a thousand leagues from the Soudan. Because it is not in a land of huts eternally alike in their childish simplicity one can expect suddenly the spectacle of a real city; yes a city in the modern European sense of the word and not just a disorderly agglomeration just because of the large numbers of houses. Here one finds real houses. Here are roads perfectly arranged and wide. (These roads, these multistoreyed houses, double generally, their stylish frontage, a style which suddenly captures the eye). It offers the spectacle of a city which seems immense. There is nothing Arab in the style of the houses. In none of the houses (old or new) can one find even a trace of cupola as characteristic and banal as in Egypt, Syria or Algeria. The massive and simple lines of the dwellings of Djenney have nothing in common with the slender palaces of Cairo or Damascus nor with the complicated and delicate masterpieces of Cordova, Granada and Seville. One can count in the region of Djenney alone 7,077 villages. In the walls of the houses the recesses of clay work enable pigeons to make their nests. Djenney is surrounded by a wall which has 11 gates, only eight of which remain. Historically Djenney escaped from the hegemony of Mali. But the city was dependent on Mali. The Mansa had given it, under this title deed, to his wife. A servant ensured that the Mansa's orders were executed and tributes collected. Djenney benefited from economic development due to the frequent visits to Mali by the large number of foreign wholesale traders who came from Africa Minor and the Near East. When the Sultan of Djenney, Koumboro, was converted to Islam he issued an order to summon all the Ulemas; their number rose to 4,200. He renounced paganism in their presence and enjoined them to pray to God to grant three things to Djenney:

1. That whoever, driven out of his country by poverty and misery, came to live in the city should discover there by the grace of God

such abundance and riches that he would forget his former country;

2. That the city should have a number of foreigners superior to those of its nationals;

3. That those who should come to trade their merchandise there sell their personal goods cheap and thus benefit the inhabitants.

Immediately on being converted to Islam, the Sultan demolished his palace and replaced it with a temple intended for the worship of God. This is the present large mosque. He constructed another palace for his court, near the mosque on the east side. This palace still existed at the time of Es Sadi (1655). The *Tarikh El Fattach* informs us that this palace was taken by Sonni Ali, then by El Hadi Mohamed, and finally destroyed. Its destruction took place between 1655 and 1665.

This is how Sonni Ali took Djenney : Sonni Ali blockaded the city of Djenney by means of 400 canoes. The resistance of the Djenniens made Sonni inclined to withdraw. The *Tarikh Es Soudan* covers a period of seven years, seven months and seven days of the siege of this city. Having entered the city Sonni left behind an official named Modyo as his representative among the Djenniens.

There were in the city traders who came originally from Africa Minor and whom the Djenniens confused with all the Sahariens who followed the profession of traders under the title of "Souna." Talking of the movement of trade in Djenney, the *Tarikh Es Soudan* writes : "It is one of the great markets of the Muslim world. There one meets the salt merchants coming from the mines of Teghazza and those who bring gold from Bitou. It is because of this blessed city that caravans flock to Timbuctoo from all the corners of the horizon."

The Berbers and the Arabs from the oases of the northern part of the Soudanaise Sahara formed a lively community on the fringe of the local society whose head exercised, in principle, great authority among the administrative and religious nobility. Encouraging and animating the economic life, they exercised their influence on the indigenous political life to defend and increase their prosperous trade. Their agents spread all over to the numerous markets where they got their supplies and replenished their stocks. This made Djenney a place of importance. It fell to Djenney-werey (the body in charge of security) to ensure free access to the markets. It had at its disposal for this purpose an armed force, says Es Sadi. The traders never failed to remind the Djenney-werey of this burden of responsibility—all the more so as it is they who financed, whenever necessary, operations to drive out and punish thieves, looters and all those who disturbed the peace. The Djenney-werey acted in concert with the nobilities and was composed of the traditional heads of families and representatives of the Muslim community whose head was the "Cadi" (judge). The latter exercised some authority over the Djenney-werey and received the support of the college of judicial experts. Among them were those who had gained recognition for their knowledge and others who had shown their independence vis-a-vis the holders of temporal power whom they belittled

due to their general illiteracy and the suspicion of being superstitious. As we have said, the Modyo represented the Askia. He supervised the work of the Djenney-werey which levied the taxes due to its master.

During the Moroccan occupation of the city, the administrative authority was constituted by the Hakem whose main task was collection of revenues; he also ensured security and order with the help of a garrison commanded by an indigenous magistrate and lieutenant-generals.

Under Sonni Ali, trade was developed in an astonishing manner. Askia enacted standardisation of weights and measures, every market of some importance was placed under the supervision of an inspector. Djenney was the great trading centre. The main products of the country consisted of millet, rice, fish, cattle and cotton. Cotton goods furnished a brisk and lucrative trade in exchange for various kinds of cloth from Europe; copper, brass, arms and other articles.

These goods were stocked in vast, multi-storeyed buildings which provided on the ground floor spacious warehouses. Other goods stored were rice, millet, jars full of honey, blocks of 'Karite' wood (out of which a combustible substance is made) groundnuts, red pepper, tamarind, dried fish, onions and indigo cakes, baskets of cola nuts, bars of iron, packets of ostrich plumes, ivory, raw gold, and the musk of the civet cat, dried leather, lead and marble bracelets from the hills of Hombouri. The market of Djenney was spread out in the centre of the city in the form of a rectangle with lanes cutting across it symmetrically and wide raised platforms—the former for the sellers, the latter for the movement of buyers. The money changer was also there showing little white heaps of cowries.

To end this description of what Djenney was like, it would be appropriate to say that Djenney taught the people of Niger town planning and trade.

### **Timbuctoo**

From Djenney, let us proceed to Timbuctoo. According to the *Tarikh es Soudan*, Timbuctoo was founded by the "Touaregs Maghcharen" (nobles) at the end of the 5th century Hijr, i.e. towards 1100. As a matter of fact El Bekri does not cite Timbuctoo towards 1050, but Ras el Ma, where his informant met the Madacas, whom it is not possible to compare with the tribe which is mentioned in the *Tarikh es Soudan*. Timbuctoo at that time was essentially a market and not a city. It did not become famous till the end of the 9th century Hijr, that is to say, towards 1300. Ibn Batuta visited it in 1352. It was the emperor of Mali who became the first prince of Timbuctoo (1336-1337). Kankan Moussa left behind a Governor there. The Sultan of Mossi sacked the city 10 years later but did not settle down there. Towards the end of the reign of the princes of Mali (about 1433) the Touaregs Maghcharen (nobles) retook the city for a period of 35 years. In January 1468, Sonni Ali sacked the city and installed himself there. The Askias succeeded him (1493-1591) followed by Moroccan Pashas (April 1591 to approximately 1660). Timbuctoo knew the art of

preserving its enduring intellectual fame and commercial activity praised all over the world and its prestige as a rich and powerful capital.

Timbuctoo did not attain the status of a city worthy of its great name until the traders from Djenney came and settled there. The year 1469 when Sonni Ali captured Timbuctoo is a significant date in the history of the city.

It continued to develop to become Timbuctoo the great city universally renowned, the fabulous city, the Queen of the Soudan. It doubled in size. All its houses were well constructed and arranged alongside symmetrical roads. The former mosques were rebuilt. The mosque university of Sankorey achieved widespread reputation. The fame of its professors is well known. Foreign savants flocked there from Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Ch. A. Diop has described the intellectual life of the city thus: "The students comprised, without distinction of age, all those who were animated by an inextinguishable thirst for knowledge."

The time-table of the courses stretched throughout the day, interrupted only for the hours of prayer. Some savants even taught for part of the night. Immediately after prayers, students grouped themselves around the professor who gave lessons, commented on texts, and had discussions with them. The professors did not receive any remuneration officially. They taught for an ideal and were compensated for by great respect, gratitude and recognition by their pupils and students who after learning to recite the Koran entered different branches of higher studies. Some of them would bring subsidies on Wednesdays, holidays, providing the professors with a means of livelihood. According to Kati, there were 150 to 180 scholars teaching the Koran in Timbuctoo and a professor, Ali Tarkaria, used to receive about 1,725 cawries on Wednesdays.

Another mosque, Gin Ghereben, towered over the city with its minarets. This was another intellectual centre. Timbuctoo concentrated all its efforts on developing the arts. There were libraries full of important collections of old manuscripts. It benefited by the Arab intellect. It was able to acquire the best collections and build up the most well equipped libraries. Each section of the population devoted itself to intellectual intercourse.

The search for knowledge of the sciences originated in the study of the judicial principles contained in the Koran. Pious families and educated people lived in Timbuctoo around the mosque of Sankorey, forming a university quarter. The libraries contained almost the entire Arab literature. Timbuctoo specialised in the manuscripts trade. "Books", writes Leon the African, "sold very well there, so much so that one earned more profits from this than from other goods which could be sold." The students received a diploma called "adjaga" at the end of their studies. Timbuctoo reached the zenith of its glory in the field of learning in the 16th century.

The law and order and sense of security prevailing there attracted wholesale merchants and traders from North Africa and the Orient. The



*Tarikh es Soudan* mentions the commercial activity of Timbuctoo. Kabara was the trading port from where goods were cleared whether to Djenney, Mali, the Upper Niger, or towards Tinekka, Gao, Tademekka, Koukia and the land of Dendi—the present-day Upper Dahomey. The port was controlled by the Guimi-Koi or Goumer-Koi.

“This port is a miniature port, a toy port. The quay, littered with bales, jars and sacks which the pot-bellied ships load, vibrates with maddening activity. Boatmen and thrifty passengers camp everywhere. Across the streets there is a continuous movement of dock workers, donkeys and camels. Convoys arrive from Timbuctoo in search of goods and nomads from the desert bring along livestock to exchange them for provisions. Kabara is not the only port to serve as a wharf and a dock in Timbuctoo. It shares this dual role with two other ports. Timbuctoo has thus three ports because of the watercourse.”

The city of Timbuctoo was governed by a “Timbuctoo-koi”. The “Yabou-Koi” was the head of the market and collected taxes from traders. Security was the responsibility of the “Assara-Moundio”, who was like a superintendent of police. As pointed out earlier, Timbuctoo was the meeting place of all those who travelled in canoes or on camel back.

The Arab traders were the most enterprising and richest element of the city to whom banking was not unknown. Travellers could procure from them letters of credit for the whole of North Africa. They offered big credits to Dioulas or Negro pedlars. The district of Baghinde was to a large extent occupied by the Arabs. The colony was called “the community of white men”. It had as its head a sort of deputy who was known as “the Chief of the White” and was counted as a member of the nobility, taking part in their deliberations. Timbuctoo had a population of 40,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, all traders. Each one, including his wife and children, was a wholesale dealer, commission agent or broker.

Tailoring occupied a place of great importance in Timbuctoo; one used to find, in particular, proprietor tailors employing in one establishment called “Tindi” 50, 70 and even 100 apprentices. The tailors manufactured trousers or the flowing Sudan robes. Others decorated them with exquisite embroidery. These embroidered robes were among the renowned articles of Timbuctoo. Shoe-makers tanned leather and produced hand-stitched red boots.

Timbuctoo had also public baths, one of them with bizarre fittings. Along the cistern (tank) in the open air, huge jars were embedded which were filled by those who wished to perform their ablutions.

Timbuctoo was not just a centre of trade and great learning. For the whole of West Africa it was also the main pleasure haunt. Apart from gold, ivory, ostrich plumes, one of the principal attractions was certainly the easy morals prevalent there. Leon the African has written: “The inhabitants of Timbuctoo are all of a pleasing disposition and very often they go away in the evenings to dance in the city till late in

the night". Ibn Batuta writes in the same way : "These people have very peculiar manners. Thus the men are never jealous of their wives ; as for the latter they never feel embarrassed in the presence of men ; they choose their friends and companions from among men. And the men on their part have women friends who do not belong to them by marriage. Thus it often happens that a man on entering his house finds his wife in a tete-a-tete with her lover. But he is not offended. The liaisons of women and men are taken in the best and most honourable light". This dates back to 1350. The features of the women of Timbuctoo, even though dark, became more refined with the continuous mingling with Arab and Berber races.

To their natural gifts were added their love of finery and elegance, painting their fingers with henna, brightening the lustre of their eyes by shading their eye-lashes and eyebrows with antimony.

The women of Timbuctoo were not mere housewives; they were high society ladies. The care of children, the kitchen and the home was in the charge of male or female slaves. The lady of the house passed her time playing the violin, the single cord of which was made of camel's hair, and receiving and paying visits to her friends. Besides these society ladies Timbuctoo had a large number of women who lived on the fringe of this highly fashionable group.

According to the written sources available, this is how the leading historical cities of the Soudanaise Sahara existed. But among them, only Timbuctoo has received such diverse epithets.

Timbuctoo, hallowed, mysterious. Its past binds it also to the history of Africa, to the world of Berbers and the civilisation of Arabs.

—*translated by Shanti Sadiq Ali*

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# OCAM : An Experiment in Regional Cooperation

R. S. RANA

A MEETING of the Heads of State of the 13 French-speaking African States<sup>1</sup> to discuss the problems common to them was held in Nouakchott (Mauritania) from February 10 to 12, 1965. As far as Africa was concerned, considering that "(i) the malaise from which the OAU is suffering arises essentially from non-respect for its charter, (ii) respect for the sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal affairs constitute the *sine qua non* conditions for peace and development in Africa, and (iii) the situation in Congo (Leopoldville) and the intensification of the Cold War by the two blocs in Africa constitute a permanent danger for the OAU ; and [noting] (iv) the covetous desires of outsiders which are becoming more pronounced in Africa, the Heads of State of the Organization enjoin prudence and vigilance on all".<sup>2</sup> The conference also decided to create a new organization. Described by such platitudes as "historic", "epoch-making", "triumphant", "ground-breaking", the conference finally turned out to be no different from any other African conference. Nevertheless it is noteworthy because of the three notable decisions it endorsed:

- (i) The formation of a new organization, the Organization Communautaire Africaine et Malgache (OCAM).
- (ii) An overt condemnation of Ghana and "certain countries" which "welcome agents of subversion and organize training camps on their national territory" for the purpose of interfering in their neighbours' internal affairs.
- (iii) The first significant declaration of support—mutual and conditional—for the legal (i.e. Tshombe) government of Congo (Leopoldville).

The conference, which announced the creation of the new organization (OCAM) and dissolution of the UAMCE<sup>3</sup> which it replaced, was officially described as a "meeting of the Heads of State of French-speaking Africa." There was no reference to the UAMCE because four members of the old UAM<sup>4</sup>—Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, and the Central African Republic—had never joined the UAMCE. The UAMCE was formed at the conference of Heads of State and Governments of French-speaking African States held in Dakar from March 7 to

10, 1964. The new union which replaced the UAM was to be concerned exclusively with economic, technical and cultural problems.<sup>5</sup>

The new organization was to be an African grouping having as its objectives, within the framework of the Organisation of African Unity, promotion of cooperation and solidarity among African States and Madagascar in order to accelerate their development in the political, economic, social, technical and cultural spheres. It represented a clear compromise between states anxious to rebuild political ties which characterized the Union Africaine et Malgache (1961-64) and those preferring to activate the looser Union Africaine et Malgache de Coopération Economique (UAMCE).

The back-to-the-UAM movement, which had as its chief spokesman President Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast and was supported by other members of the Conseil de l'Entente (Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Upper Volta, and Niger) and Togo and Gabon and the Malagasy Republic, was strengthened by such factors as the ineffectiveness of the Organisation of African Unity in solving the Congolese crisis and its inability to deal constructively with the explosive problems of East and Central Africa. Another factor was concern over the character and extent of Chinese activity in Africa, particularly in Niger and the Congo, and the increasingly radical foreign policies of such states as Ghana.<sup>6</sup> A third, and no less important, factor was the new vitality of the Entente itself, a consequence of Dahomey's agreement to settle its differences with Niger within the organization, and of the Ivory Coast's emergence from its splendid isolation of the last few years as a result of its economic success both at home and abroad.

While the first group intended to revive the political role of the UAM that had been undermined by the creation of the UAMCE, the second group of countries, including Senegal, Cameroun, Mauritania, the Central African Republic and Congo (Brazzaville), arrived in Nouakchott anxious to avoid any action that might harm the political initiative of the OAU, but willing to seek a broader basis for cooperation in economic, technical, cultural and social development. For them the UAM was legitimately dead, the OAU must be given the fullest support in its political activities, and the loosely drawn UAMCE offered an adequate framework for cooperation among the 14 French-speaking states.

The new organization struck a compromise between the two points of view. Yerim Diop, writing in the 18 February 1965 issue of *L'Unité Africaine*, party organ of the governing Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, summarised the outcome thus:

"It [the OCAM] satisfies the wishes of the heads of Conseil de l'Entente in the measure that it constitutes an organization created to reinforce cooperation and solidarity between the African and Malagasy states, not just like its predecessor, the UAMCE—in economic, social, cultural and technical areas, but in political matters as well. And it satisfies no less, in a

large measure, those states favouring economic cooperation (since it envisages a definite effort to accelerate development in all areas in all the states concerned) without putting their membership of the OAU in doubt.”<sup>7</sup>

The President of Mauritania delivering the opening speech stated the purpose of the new organisation. He said:

“Our future organization, whatever it may be, cannot be a regional grouping if only because the Malagasy and Mauritanian Republics, to mention only these two, are anti-podal. It should instead be a kind of intermediate stage between the OAU and the regional economic groups in which several of our countries take part, such as the organization of the littoral states of Lake Chad which combines the English-speaking and French-speaking states, or such as the Committee for the Development of the River Senegal which unites the member states of the UAMCE and other non-member states. Lastly, certain African states belonging to groups outside Africa are at the same time members of the OAU. Mauritania herself could belong to a Maghrebian economic organization tomorrow without for that matter ceasing to belong to the Committee for the Development of the River Senegal, the West African Customs Union, the organization we are creating and the OAU.

“Our organization will lastly have to be flexible enough for other African states, with which we are linked by ties similar to those I described above, to join us one day, should they realize that our organization does in actual fact satisfy the criteria I have just analysed.

“I am convinced that, aware of our responsibility to our nations and to Africa, we shall together be able to find a solution which will enable us to safeguard our ties of friendship and serve African unity.”<sup>8</sup>

A sense of continuity with the dissolved UAMCE was maintained by providing for the retention of its administrative structure and institutions; the OCAM's President was to be M. Mokhtar Ould Daddah, last of the UAMCE's rotating presidents; its headquarters were to remain in Yaounde; and UAMCE Secretary-General Diakha Dieng of Senegal was to carry on the same functions in the new organization.

The character for the OCAM which was agreed upon at the meeting of Foreign Ministers<sup>9</sup> held in Tananarive (Madagascar) on 12-18 January 1966 and later adopted unanimously by the Conference of the Heads of State held in Tananarive on 25-28 June 1960<sup>10</sup> provided for three organs of the OCAM:

1. The Conference of the Heads of State and Governments as the supreme organ of the organization, meeting once a year in ordinary session.

2. The Council of Ministers consisting of the Foreign Ministers of member-states, meeting once a year in ordinary session, responsible to the conference, and implementing co-operation policies among member-states as directed by the conference.

3. The administrative General Secretariat, appointed for two years by the conference on the proposal of the Council of Ministers, with its seat at Yaounde (Cameroun) and its mandate renewable.

The charter was to come into force on receipt by the Government of Cameroun of the instruments of ratification by two-thirds of the signatories.

Agreement was also reached at the Tananarive Conference of Heads of State on economic matters, such as the establishment of a Sugar Common Market providing for preferential treatment for sugar producers participating in it, establishment of a multi-national insurance company and a joint shipping company, and mutual consultation on planning.<sup>11</sup>

Even before the charter of the OCAM could be prepared and approved dissensions arose. Beginning with the conference of Nouakchott where the idea of the new organization was born, representing a compromise between the two groups of States belonging to the UAM and the UAMCE, the new organization had experienced a few pulls which tested its strength. Even the signing of the charter which was approved at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the member states in January 1966 was postponed to June 1966 because of objections from Congo (Brazzaville). Congo (Brazzaville) withdrew its objections in March 1966 but while deciding to continue its membership of the OCAM and expressing a willingness to cooperate with the other member states of the organization in economic, scientific, cultural and technical matters, it rejected the idea of the organization playing any political role.

Mauritania, one of the sponsoring members of the OCAM, announced officially on 7 July 1965 its decision to withdraw from the organization. President Ould Daddah of Mauritania, explaining the reasons for the withdrawal, stated:

“Mauritania cannot form an integral part of a group of states which might...appear at a given moment as a possible rival of the OAU...or might risk harming the authority of that organization”.

Despite M. Ould Daddah's statement, it was generally believed that the real reason for Mauritania's withdrawal was the Congolese question, that is, admission of Congo (Leopoldville) to the OCAM.

A special conference held at Abidjan on 26 May 1965 and attended by nine Heads of State<sup>12</sup> had decided to admit Congo (Leopoldville). The Central African Republic and Rwanda subsequently endorsed the decisions of the conference.

Table I  
From the UAM to OCAM

	Member of UAM (1961- 64)	Signed Agree- ment Establish- ing UAMCE (1964)	Attended Founding Conference of OCAM at Nouakchott (Feb. 1965)
Cameroun	—	—	—
Central African Republic	—	×	—
Chad	—	—	—
Congo (Brazzaville)	—	—	(a)
Dahomey	—	—	—
Gabon	—	—	—
Ivory Coast	—	×	—
Malagasy Republic	—	—	—
Mauritania	—	—	—
Niger	—	×	—
Rwanda	—	—	(b)
Senegal	—	—	—
Togo	—	—	—
Upper Volta	—	×	—

a. Congo (Brazz.) was represented at Nouakchott by Minister of Interior Germain Bicoumat rather than by the Head of State. Moreover, the government subsequently dissociated itself from certain passages in the Communiqué.

b. Although Rwanda was not represented at Nouakchott, President Gregoire Kayibanda subsequently indicated that Rwanda would adhere to the OCAM.

Source : *Africa Report*, March 1965, p 8.

From the date of the signing of the charter in June 1966 to the first meeting of the Heads of State of the OCAM held at Niamey in Niger in January 1968, the Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache had gained confidence in itself and prestige in African political circles. Gone was the half-apologetic tone the group adopted in the early days of the OAU when the 'radicals' branded it a Trojan Horse of neo-colonialism. Gone too was the burden of sheltering an outcast Congo in the figure of Moise Tshombe, whose admission to the group in 1965 hastened Mauritania's withdrawal from the meetings of the heads of state. Moreover, since the previous meeting in Tananarive, the OCAM has had some success in reshaping the OAU somewhat in its own image. OAU Secretary-General Diallo Telli, who in 1963 had reproachfully challenged the Francophone leaders to scuttle the OCAM's predecessor for the sake of African unity, came to Niamey and declared that the OCAM had an honoured place on the African political scene.

The meeting of the Heads of State held from 22 to 24 January 1968, though originally scheduled for 20 January 1968 and preceded by a preparatory meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the member states of the OCAM, took a number of decisions including one about continuing association with the EEC. Though expressing the intention of renewing the Yaoundé agreement with the EEC which was to expire on 31 May 1969, the Heads of State conference agreed that the new agreement should be "better adapted to the imperatives of development" for African countries. To emphasize the significance of the coming talks with the Six



to the OCAM countries, the conference unanimously decided to retain President Diori as the head of the OCAM until the negotiations with the Six were complete. Speaking after the Niamey Conference about the attitude to be taken at the Brussels talks, Diori said the OCAM intended to press hard to retain its trade preferences with the Six even though they (members of the OCAM) were under fire from supporters of a much wider third world position against the industrialized powers. He added: "We will present a common front at the UNCTAD in New Delhi, otherwise we would lead our countries to destruction"<sup>13</sup>. The other agreements reached at the conference included (1) organization of the Sugar Common Market created at the OCAM summit conference at Tananarive in June 1966, (2) creation of a common market for meat; and (3) setting up of joint institutions for technical cooperation and training of young leaders.

The OCAM, besides its economic and Francophone emphasis, had not shrunk in its geographic thrust towards Congo (Kinshasa) and across the Sahara to the Maghreb. Even though the withdrawal of Mauritania had given a setback to trans-Saharan cooperation the OCAM Conference of January 1968 attracted emissaries from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. The inclusion of Congo (Kinshasa) in the OCAM widened the organisation economically, and geographically it covered about 55 million people and 20 per cent of the land area of the continent of Africa.

According to the progress report submitted by Secretary-General Diakha Dieng, the OCAM since the Tananarive Conference had built on the foundations of its 'predecessors relations with the World Bank and IMF, the Economic Commission for Africa, UNCTAD, and the EEC. He described the OCAM as a service organization devoted to promoting its members' interests.

- (a) The OCAM was very ably represented by President Diori at the Brussels meetings with the EEC in October 1966 and at Abidjan in December 1966.
- (b) Just as the EEC was represented (by Jean Ray) at the Kennedy Round negotiations, so was the OCAM. In fact the Eighteen found their "Ray" in President Diori. He was again selected unanimously as President of the OCAM until the new negotiations with the EEC about the renewal of the Yaounde Convention were over.
- (c) The OCAM presented a common front at the pre-UNCTAD meeting of the "Group of 77" in Algiers. They also coordinated their activities at the UNCTAD meeting in Delhi.
- (d) The OCAM briefs its members before the annual meetings of the governors of the World Bank and IMF and has "established an effective means of naming our representatives to the administration of these organizations". According to Dieng, these tactics have brought measurable success. "Loans

obtained from the World Bank by OCAM states have risen from zero in 1962-63 to \$1.5 million in 1963-64, to \$24.9 million in 1964-65, and to \$71 million in 1966-67.

The OCAM has before it the task of concluding satisfactorily the negotiations with the EEC. Its success in Delhi was limited as was the success of UNCTAD as a whole.

### **OCAM and France**

It may be pointed out in conclusion that France's contribution to the OCAM is considerable (France gave Niger about \$140,000 to help it pay for the Niamey Conference, and built bungalows at the Grand Hotel to accommodate the Foreign Ministers)<sup>14</sup>. Indeed, the OCAM could be said to represent France's concept of regional development in Africa. France has undoubtedly been using the OCAM for projecting French interests in Africa keeping herself in the background. Through the OCAM, France, for example, has been trying to increase its influence in Kinshasa as Belgian influence is dwindling. Similarly the recognition of "Biafra" by two<sup>15</sup> of the four states that have recognised it and the recent statements about the intentions of France to accord recognition to "Biafra" speaks for the considerable influence exercised by Elysee Palace.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, any change in the character of the government at the Elysee Palace will greatly jeopardize the effective functioning of the OCAM.

In spite of the close association of France with the members states of the OCAM, the latter's performance has been remarkable. While the rest of Africa is plagued by either internal dissensions or conflicts with neighbours the members of the OCAM are evolving new avenues of cooperative action, thus proving the wisdom of the supporters of economic unity before political union as against the radicals who favour political union to precede cooperative measures. The idea of regional cooperation before continental unity has been strengthened by the successful operation of the Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache.

## REFERENCES

1. The countries represented were Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Togo, Gabon, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville) Senegal, Mauritania, Rwanda and Madagascar.
2. The final communique as published in *Africa Report* (Washington, March 1965), p 10.
3. Union Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation Economique.
4. Union Africaine et Malgache.
5. The Union Africaine et Malgache was created under a charter signed at Tananarive (Madagascar) in September 1961 by twelve former French territories—the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta (all ex-colonies), and Cameroon (the former French trust territory).
6. Ghana had border disputes with Togo and Upper Volta and the presence in Ghana of exiled Opposition groups from these countries and their different attitudes towards the crisis in the Congo (Leopoldville) were some of the points of friction between Ghana and these countries.
7. Quoted in Victor T. Le Vine, "New Directions for French-speaking Africa?" *Africa Report* (Washington, March 1965), p 8.
8. Quoted in R. A. Ketteler, "From the UAM to the OCAM" in *Afrika* (Bonn, Germany, July 1965), p 20.
9. The only Foreign Minister who declined to initial the document was M. Charles David Ganao of the Congo (Brazz).
10. The conference was attended by Heads of State of 12 countries and delegates of the Congo (Leopoldville) and Rwanda.
11. To protest against the alleged part played by Ghana in an attempt on the life of President Diori of Niger, the OCAM countries agreed among themselves to boycott the coming OAU meeting to be held at Accra in Ghana in December 1966. They, however, attended the preparatory meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAU called by the Prime Minister of Nigeria in Lagos.
12. The countries represented were Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta. The countries which were neither represented at the conference nor later associated themselves with its decisions were Mauritania, Cameroon and Congo, (Brazzaville).
13. Bruce J. Oudes, "OCAM Comes of Age", *Africa Report*, (Washington, Feb. 1968), p 51.
14. *Ibid.*, p 55.
15. Gabon and Ivory Coast.
16. After the meeting at Nouakchott in February 1965 where the OCAM was set up the Heads of State participating in it sent a joint request to President de Gaulle to pay official visits to their countries.

# South Africa in Geopolitics

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

**S**OUTH Africa had a dominant strategic position in the early 19th century as it guarded the sea routes to India and Australia. After the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, the importance of this region diminished. But Britain felt a special responsibility for a colony so near Portuguese territories. Moreover, the warlike natives inhabiting the area needed careful supervision. With the Suez Canal closed today the importance of that country is more vital than ever, since it dominates the approaches and communications to the South Atlantic and South Indian oceans, as well as to South Central Africa.

At the same time, it is one of the most isolated nations today because of its racial policies.

## Geographic Backbone

All visitors report that the Union is in every sense a picturesque country, whether the picture is captured on film, on canvass or in the mind. It has a year-round holiday climate ranging from moderate temperature to sub-tropical and without extremes of heat and cold.<sup>1</sup> The seasons are, however, reversed; summer runs from October to March, and winter from April to September. Most of the country is rain-free during winter.

The country's dominant terrain is characterized by its height: 40 per cent of its area, the southernmost part of the great African plateau, is more than 4,000 feet above sea level. Practically all the area below 1,500 feet is in the narrow coastal plain and the valley of the Limpopo River. The coastline is remarkably uniform and lacks good natural harbours. Durban, although landlocked and sheltered, has to be periodically dredged; East London, the only river port, has the same problem. Port Elizabeth is exposed to the southeasterly trade winds, and Cape Town to their northwesterly counterparts.

A steep slope or escarpment is traceable under various names for the entire length of the country, and reaches greatest prominence in the east; here the ridge (on the border of Natal and Basutoland), the highest land in South Africa, is known as the Drakensberg and forms the divide between rivers flowing south and east to the Indian Ocean and those that flow east to the Atlantic. The former are swift streams, the most important being the Tugela with its tributaries, and Mooi, and the Klip; the latter, which flow nearly six times as far as the others, are

broad but navigable rivers draining a huge area. The Vaal, upon which the mining and industrial Witwatersrand depends for its water supply, joins the Caledon and the Orange, both of which rise in Basutoland; the Orange, 1,300 miles long, is next in size to the Zambezi, 1,650 miles long, in southern Africa.

### **Economy**

Until World War I, the South African economy was based mainly on agricultural production and the mining of diamonds and gold. But limited rainfall and poor soils restrict the area suitable for crop production, although South Africa is an important livestock-raising country. Chief pastoral products are wool, mohair, hides, and skins. In areas suitable for cultivation, temperate-zone and subtropical crops are grown. In addition to wool, citrus and deciduous fruit, corn, sugar, and peanuts are important exports. Apart from wheat, the country is fairly self-sufficient in essential food supplies.

Since World War I, and particularly since World War II, there has been rapid development in manufacturing, which now accounts for a larger proportion of the national income than either agriculture or mining. A valuable export trade in manufactured goods has been built up in recent years, although a number of African and Asian states have placed official boycotts on South African goods<sup>2</sup>.

South Africa is the world's largest producer of gold. Production has traditionally enabled South Africa to import goods and services at an exceedingly high rate. The country also ranks as a leading producer of diamonds, uranium, platinum, chrome, manganese, iron ore, asbestos, antimony, and monazite.

The country's industrial development has been due to the geographical distances from world supplies, especially since World War II; an element of importance is also the low wage levels of African employees. Domestic consumer goods (clothing, shoes, processed goods, and the like) are still the most common products, but Iscor and other steelworks now supply some of the country's iron and steel requirements; motor-vehicles assembly plants at Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage have developed considerably since the war. A plant for extracting oil from coal has recently been put into operation at Sasolburg.

In short, South Africa is largely self-sufficient, and is growing rapidly.

### **Historical Roots**

Before the arrival of the Europeans, South Africa was thinly settled by Hottentot and Pygmy people. Bartholomew Diaz was the first mariner to reach the Southern Cape, six years before Columbus touched the West Indies (1486). Although many seafarers, including Vasco da Gama, passed the Cape on their way to India, the roughness of the land discouraged any exploration or settlement for the next 65 years.<sup>3</sup>

A settlement was founded at the Cape of Good Hope by the Dutch East Indian Company in 1652. In subsequent decades additional Dutch, German, and Huguenot refugees from France settled in the Cape area. In the 18th century, the settlers began to encounter, and to defeat in war, the various Bantu tribes moving southward from Central Africa. British military occupation of the Cape near the end of the century and subsequent British settlement and extension of influence sparked a long and chequered history of conflict between the two dominant national strains in the country. In 1836 many Dutch farmers (Boers) started the northward migration (the "Great Trek") which resulted in the creation in 1852 and 1854, respectively, of the independent republics of the Transvaal (the South African Republic) and the Orange Free State.

Relations between these two independent republics and the British government continued to be strained. The famous diamond strike at Kimberley in 1870, and 16 years later the discovery of the extensive gold deposits in the Witwatersrand region of the Transvaal accelerated European immigration; overseas capital was invested heavily in the area; mines and towns developed, and railroads were pushed from the coast to the interior.

This "economic invasion" of the mineral-rich interior by foreigners alienated the Boer farmers and led directly to open conflict between the British and the Boers in 1899. In 1902 the Boers had to surrender and became British subjects, but were promised self-government; this was granted and a constitution was enacted in 1909 when the South Africa Act was passed and the Union of South Africa came into being in 1910.

The South Africa Act and the Statute of Westminster of 1931 gave South Africa the independence of a sovereign state with full power to amend its constitution. The executive functions of the Republic are nominally vested in the State President, but actually in the Prime Minister. He is always the leader of the majority party in the House of Assembly; the other ministers are appointed by the President on his recommendation. The legislative power is vested in a white Parliament consisting of the President, a Senate, and a House of Assembly. Most legislation is initiated by the Cabinet and introduced in the House of Assembly, the dominant legislative body.

### Politics

The National Party, headed by Balthazar J. Vorster, is in full control of the government. It is supported by the great majority of Afrikaners and by a small but growing number of English-speaking South Africans. It sponsors racial segregation. Its main strength is in the rural areas because of peculiarities of the electoral systems, although Afrikaner migration to the cities has significantly strengthened its support there. Most Afrikaners belong to one of the three Dutch Reformed Churches. The Party's policy is to ensure the continued domination of the white man through statutory segregation (*apartheid*). Its ideology favours the racial identities of other groups, and the transition of tribal areas towards autonomy.

The chief opposition party is the United Party, propounding a somewhat less restrictive racial policy; it proposes that all racial groups be represented in the central parliament of a racial federation. It is supported by the English-speaking sector of the white population and by a small proportion of the Afrikaners, and by large business interests.

The Progressive Party, founded in November, 1959, by former members of the United Party who thought that the United Party's racial policy was too near to that of the Nationalists; the party would enfranchise "qualified" persons regardless of race or color and entrench in a constitution safeguards for individual liberties and group rights. (But in the 1961 elections it gained only one representative).

The small Liberal Party (which includes among its leaders the noted South African author Alan Paton) features multiracial membership and favours full and equal rights for all adult men and women of all races and colors. But it has never won an election in a white constituency. (The party is also handicapped by the fact that a few members participated in sabotage, including the Johannesburg train station bombing in July, 1964).

The Communist Party was declared illegal in 1950. Its one to two thousand members and supporters are mostly whites, "though also embracing some Africans and Indians."<sup>4</sup>

### **Racial Problem**

Numerically the Bantu predominate (68.3 per cent) from the total of 18,298,000; there are 19.3 per cent, 9.4 per cent colored and 3 per cent Asians. Some cultural differences exist among the Bantu tribes, but they have a common Negro-Hamitic origin and speak related languages. In their natural state they are a relatively primitive pastoral race with a strong tribal organisation. The white section of the population is made up chiefly of the English and Afrikaners, the latter, descendants of the Dutch pioneers, in the majority. Minorities include 1.3 million mulattoes (people of mixed European-Hottento-Bantu-Malay ancestry, who are locally called "Cape Coloureds") mostly in the south-western Cape, and half a million Asians, mostly in Natal. Few now remain of the original non-negroid Bushmen, who have, however, left some fine cave-paintings.

The social and political structure of South Africa is dominated by its multiracial character. The Afrikaners, aware of their small numbers and their isolation, are suspicious of interference, and die-hards among them retain some hostility toward the English since the Boer War. The English, a less cohesive section of the community, are nevertheless aware of this feeling and jealous of their own rights. The two groups maintain a position of uneasy supremacy over the Bantu. This native group is permitted to own land only in reserves set aside for them, which comprise some 11 per cent of South Africa's territory. With this restriction, some critics estimate that the Bantu population is unable to maintain a subsistence level, although this is officially

denied by the government. The position is made worse by the pastoral economy of the Bantu, and the high value they place on cattle, which leads to overgrazing, erosion, and severe impoverishment of the soil. Those living on the reserves are suspicious of government attempts to teach them new techniques which cut directly across tribal traditions. The majority, particularly young men, are compelled to leave and seek work in the cities, where their movements are strictly controlled; their living quarters are confined to "locations" in the city limits, which vary from simple but adequate housing projects to unsanitary shanty towns. Virtually without political rights, cut off from their own social background, they nevertheless form the backbone of the country's economy. Growing discontent has united formerly warlike tribes and violent political agitation is increasing.

The related languages of the Bantu tribes are generally comprehensible to the members of any one of them; many speak some English and Afrikaans as well. Afrikaans is essentially Dutch, but is highly prized in South Africa by the Afrikaners both as a token of individuality and as a literary medium. Bilingualism is encouraged, and is obligatory for certain types of employment. Other racial groups speak their own languages, but the Cape Coloureds (or mulattoes), who have no distinct language, speak either of the "official" languages (English and Afrikaans) or a mixture of the two.<sup>5</sup>

### **Course of Politics**

Between the two World Wars, the Union of South Africa was ruled by men who now seem very moderate in comparison with the Nationalist government that has held office since 1948 with increasing majorities. However, the Hertzog-Smuts<sup>6</sup> governments were strongly racist in relation to the native Bantu peoples, who outnumber both the white groups combined by about three to one.

In spite of this disparity in numbers, the country has always been ruled by its white elements. During the 19th century, when South Africa was a British colony, the British settlers naturally exercised an influence out of proportion to their numbers. In fact, they were outnumbered by the Afrikaners of Dutch and French descent, against whom they fought the "Boer" War. Once that war was over, the Afrikaner leaders, (General Louis Botha and General—later Field Marshal—Jan Christiaan Smuts) decided that the best policy for their people was to cooperate with the British, and while they led the country, this was the policy pursued. But it was not acceptable to the more extreme Nationalists, who wished to rule in accordance with their own narrow views.

The Nationalist Party won the elections in 1924, but it could not govern without the parliamentary support of the small Labour Party. General Hertzog, the Nationalist who then became Prime Minister, had to postpone the fulfilment of his party's policies. In 1933 Smuts formed a coalition government which held together until World War II. But Hertzog opposed South African entry into the war, precipitating a showdown with his less nationalist colleagues. Smuts obtained



parliamentary authorization for the declaration of war, and thereupon Hertzog left the government.

Some steps were taken during the period which brought South Africa nearer to apartheid, a policy favoured by almost all the Afrikaners. The Hertzog-Smuts coalition passed a bill taking away the right, which the Bantu in Cape Province had enjoyed since colonial times, of voting for members of parliament provided they voted on a separate roll and chose only Europeans to represent them.

The South Africans were granted a C class mandate over former German South-West Africa, which they administered as if it had been a South African province<sup>7</sup>. It had a legislative assembly run entirely by the whites. In the course of the interwar period, British and Afrikaner immigrants came to outnumber the Germans in the legislative assembly, and at once tried to persuade the Union to annex the territory as its fifth province. This would have required either the permission of the League of Nations, which was not likely to be granted, or outright defiance of that body, which General Smuts, as a founder and consistent supporter of the League, would not countenance. The Republic of South Africa has consistently refused to convert it to United Nations trusteeship status.

In October, 1961, the General Assembly of the UN censured "South Africa or its delegate" for his speech upholding Government's policy of apartheid. The bitter tone of the resolution reflected the general frustration over the failure of the UN, in all the years since India raised the question of racial discrimination in 1945, to make the slightest impact upon South Africa's policy of white supremacy. In fact, the speech by Eric H. Louw, the South African Minister for External Affairs, made clear the essential facts regarding apartheid; furthermore, Louw irritated the Africans by striking back against Liberia and Ethiopia, which were mainly responsible for the attempts to hale South Africa before the International Court of Justice for extending apartheid to South-West Africa.

Several geopolitical factors must be noted here. Only a handful of Asian delegates refused to vote for the censure resolution; however, a number of those who voted for it felt that it was a severe blow to the future of the UN. As was demonstrated by the 67 votes cast for the resolution, the anti-colonial forces, plus the Soviet bloc, had their way on such issues in the General Assembly; Western members were reluctant to oppose them for fear that they would lose any chance of gaining the support of the newly independent countries on other issues—notably those in dispute with the USSR. In fact, the Netherlands, despite its racial ties with South Africa, went so far as to vote for the resolution, since it was trying to get Asian and African support for its proposal to hand over the Netherlands New Guinea to the UN rather than continue to argue about surrendering it to Indonesia.

The United States, Britain and France neither joined the debate nor voted on the censure motion.

Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd had one basic argument: that black Africans cannot govern themselves, much less the white. He was a brilliant diplomat, the inspired defender of the Afrikaner faith, the unquestioned captain of the Afrikaner laager. But his fortress was vulnerable and his enemy within. Not all the white people were happy with Verwoerd's policies. There was a vocal minority of racists who accused him of doing too much for the "bloody kaffirs." His regime was widely criticized, moreover, for its refusal to allow television in South Africa—a restriction intended both to keep out foreign "liberalist" programs (such as "I Spy") and to protect the Afrikaans language against the incursions of English (there are no packaged shows in Afrikaans)<sup>8</sup>. And there were many whites opposed to apartheid; in 1960 Verwoerd survived an assassination attempt by an anti-apartheid white farmer who wounded him in the ear and jaw at a Johannesburg cattle show. But he was assassinated on September 6, 1966. Balthazar J. Vorster was selected to lead the government.

Vorster did not abandon Verwoerd's apartheid policies, but implemented the de-centralization process implicit in the concept of separate Bantustans for black Africans; in 1967 he announced a five-year development plan for the reserve Bantu areas and increased the authority given to tribal administration in the reserves. He moved farther toward a kind of federation in which relations between South Africa and the Bantustans would be governed by agreements between them. He also eased up the rigid apartheid policies when he announced (in 1967) that South African athletic teams would be permitted to play in South Africa against teams from non-white countries in international competitions. He also indicated that the government would not prevent blacks from playing in South African teams.

A split also developed in the Afrikaans Dutch Reformed Church on apartheid. Some elements of the church have defied the national church leaders by supporting the multiracial, all-denominational Christian Institute, which denies there is a scriptural basis for apartheid.

In 1967, economically, South Africa continued to experience a boom, which helped to keep, somewhat, the racial situation calm. The nature of the Afrikaner rule remained apparent, however, in the government's prosecution of the editors of two newspapers for having reported on the bad conditions in prisons, and in the extension of the prison sentence of the former Pan-African Congress leader, Robert Sobukwe.

### **Trends in Geopolitical Policies**

South Africa's major foreign policy problem has been the UN General Assembly's vote to take the administration of South-West Africa away from South Africa. But the international organization has been unable to enforce the vote, although it has continued the pressure on South Africa over the territory where South Africa is applying its apartheid policies. (In 1967 it offered self-government to Ovamboland, in the northern part of the territory).

In fact, the racial policies of South Africa have been inseparable from all its foreign relations. In 1967, the government took important steps to improve its relations with black African countries; it received official visits from the leaders of Lesotho and Malawi and established diplomatic relations with them. This move toward making peace with independent Black Africa represented a major change in the direction of South African foreign policy.

But the situation is not so rosy when we consider the U. S.-South African relations. In Washington the government of South Africa is condemned in no uncertain terms. (The United States, for one thing, usually votes solidly with the nations of Black Africa when resolutions blasting South Africa are put forward at the U.N.) Washington, for example, goes along with the U.N. attempt to wrest control of the disputed territory of South-West Africa away from South Africa. Furthermore, it refuses to sell arms to South Africa, on the ground that the arms could be used to suppress the black population. The arms embargo even extends to equipment for the South African Navy, a small, 33-ship fleet that has the responsibility of patrolling 2,000 miles of strategic coastline around the Cape of Good Hope. In addition, Washington forbids any ship of the U. S. Navy to call at a South African port; instead of using the extensive facilities at Cape Town, on the South Atlantic, and Durban, on the Indian Ocean, the U. S. Navy must find other means for repair and support.

A U. S. Navy warship on its way from the American East Coast to Vietnam, for example, must either refuel at sea or use ports in Angola or Mozambique—both territories of Portugal, another country of whose policies in Africa Washington strongly disapproves. And this costs the American Navy not only a lot of money but also exacts a high toll in efficiency, not to speak of the claim that “lives are being lost in Vietnam because the Navy can’t use the ports down there.”<sup>9</sup>

South Africans point out that Cape Town has the biggest and best-equipped drydock in Africa, and that there are no other such facilities between the east coast of Africa and Australia, all the way across the Indian Ocean.<sup>10</sup>

But American business in South Africa takes quite a different attitude. American investments there are worth somewhere around 750 million dollars—second only to the British<sup>11</sup>—and, until direct investment in most countries was cut off by President Johnson in January, 1968, were climbing steadily. What is more, when Washington put the ban on investment abroad, individual Americans rushed to buy stocks of South African companies (especially the gold-mining stocks). Thousands of Americans have long been owners of millions of dollars’ worth of shares in South African companies, those with no direct U. S. connections.

It is estimated that, for instance, “individual Americans hold stock worth some 100 million dollars in one of the world’s biggest mining concerns; this giant concern not only mines much of South Africa’s gold,

but also, through an associated company, produces much of the world's supply of gem diamonds. It has large holdings in Rhodesia, another country not favored by Washington, and mines copper in black-run Zambia and diamonds in black-run Sierra Leone and Tanzania." Furthermore, "out in the wilderness of South-West Africa, another big mining company is producing copper. It has extensive copper-holdings in Zambia and Botswana, two black-run countries, and is owned mostly by Americans—46 per cent of it by a single American company."<sup>12</sup> Other American interests are producing copper both in South-West Africa and in South Africa itself, in joint ventures with South African companies and another U. S. mining concern. "These companies obviously not only are contributing to the strength of the South African economy, they are helping to make South Africa able to withstand any U. N.-inspired sanctions that might some day be imposed in an attempt to oust the whites from control."<sup>13</sup>

The government is sponsoring a feverish, nationwide search for oil, and the big American oil firms are in the forefront of those granted prospecting concessions. The biggest-selling auto in South Africa is an American compact, and the company that makes it is gearing up a new 25-million-dollar plant outside Pretoria (since its old plant at Cape Town cannot keep with production demand).

Above all, even today, despite boycotts and the snubs administered by the Black African nations, South Africa exports a good deal of its production to the rest of Africa. Nor is the U. S.-British arms embargo really having much effect; the South Africans are simply buying from others. (France, for one thing, is supplying three submarines to the South African Navy, and also supplies planes for the South African Air Force and armoured cars for the Army).

As a result of the embargo, all joint consultation between the U. S. and South African navies on defense of the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope has been halted; nor can South African officers be sent to the U. S. for training any more.

Yet, despite the arms embargo the South African Navy continues to supply information to the U.S. naval attache at Cape Town on Russian trawlers, which ply the waters off South-West Africa.<sup>14</sup>

At the same time, the ports of South Africa will continue to be filled to capacity until the Suez Canal is reopened.

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14. There are no restrictions on U. S. merchant ships calling at South African ports. Several U.S. shipping companies maintain regular services between the two countries. American Negro merchant sailors, moreover, reportedly "consider the ports of Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth and East London to be good shore-leave towns despite the racial separation laws," according to "U. S. and South Africa," *op. cit.*

# Quarterly Chronicle (June 15—Aug. 15)

## INDIA AND AFRICA

**Trade Agreement with UAR :** On June 26 a new trade agreement was concluded between India and the UAR to step up trade, and economic cooperation between the two countries. A UAR delegation led by Mr. Ibrahim el Desouki Imam, Director-General of the Ministry of Economic and Foreign Trade, visited India to sign the agreement. The Indian delegation was headed by Mr. V. K. Ahuja, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce. According to a Press communique issued on June 26 both the countries proposed new items of export—steel, chemicals, diesel engines, tyres and other materials from India and petroleum products, ethyl alcohol and nitro-cellulose from the UAR.

**Gift of Machinery to Kenya :** Machinery and equipment were gifted to Kenya under the Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme of the Government of India for the establishment of the Common Service Centre in the proposed Industrial Estate at Nairobi. A set of law books under the same programme was also presented to the East African Community Chambers of Counsel, Arusha, Tanzania, and to the Library of the High Court at Kampala (Uganda).

**Film Delegation to Kenya :** An Indian film delegation led by Mr. A. Naik, Chairman of the Indian Motion Pictures Export Corporation, visited Kenya on June 31 on a five-day visit. It had talks in Nairobi with representatives of the Kenya Film Corporation of the Kenya Government. The talks, which were exploratory, related to the possibility of Kenya importing more films from India. The Indian delegation offered to provide facilities for training Kenyans in techniques of film production.

**Trade Delegation to Tunisia :** An Indian trade delegation headed by Mr. V. K. Ahuja, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, recently visited Tunisia for a week. The delegation concluded a new trade agreement with that country. India has an unfavourable balance of trade with Tunisia and the new agreement is expected to provide more opportunities to increase Indian exports consisting of tea—about 80 per cent of the total exports—pepper, textiles, diesel and machine goods. India imports lead, mercury, and phosphate from Tunisia.

**Moroccan Tea Delegation :** A Moroccan tea delegation led by Mr. Omer Ben Ibrahim, Chief of National Office of Tea and Sugar, Morocco, visited India on July 4 for a week and signed a new agreement on July 11 in New Delhi, under which the Tea Board of India will supply 2,000 kgs. of green tea to Morocco. The Moroccan delegation assured that Morocco would import more tea of this variety from India.

**Indian Experts for Africa :** An Indian expert was deputed to the Economic Commission for Africa under the Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme as Adviser to the Executive Secretary of the Commission for promotion and

rapid development of small-scale industry in Africa. Another Indian expert left for Nigeria as Director of the Nigerian Purchasing Agency which is to be set up at Lagos. His deputation is being administered by SCAAP.

**Ghana Team's Visit :** A four-member team from Ghana visited India in July with a view to study the work of the Administrative Staff Training College in the country. Mr. V. Jibidar, Deputy Industrial Adviser, Small-Scale Industries in the Economic Commission for Africa for development of small-scale industries in West Africa, arrived in India for three months' training in small-scale industries.

**Trade Delegation to Sudan :** An Indian trade delegation visited Sudan in June-July and extended the existing trade agreement by six months.

**Trade Delegation to Libya :** The Indian Deputy Commerce Minister, Mr. Shafi Qureshi, led a trade delegation to Libya in July. India hopes to establish a trade legation in Libya. At present Indian exports to Libya are worth only Rs. 6 million. India is also likely to consider setting up joint industrial ventures in Libya.

## AFRICAN COMMENTS ON CZECH CRISIS

### ETHIOPIA

His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, in a Press statement said the events in Czechoslovakia in the last few days "have saddened me much". He added : "Czechoslovakia is a sad and unfortunate repetition of the misfortunes that befell many other small states in the past and might recur until all states learn that the consequences of disturbing basic conditions of harmonious inter-state relations are in the end harmful to the interests of all states. I urge that all foreign troops that have been introduced into Czechoslovakia without the consent of the properly constituted government of Czechoslovakia should be withdrawn forthwith, and that the misunderstanding between Czechoslovakia and her immediate neighbours settled by peaceful means." (Voice of Ethiopia, August 23, 1968).

### UGANDA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uganda, in a statement said the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact countries was a regrettable and most humiliating action to the Czechoslovakian people. This action was fraught with alarming international implications and consequences. It added : "The first serious implication is that the action throws in doubt the assurances given by the great powers to respect the sovereignty of all nations, big or small, and even the sovereignty of their weaker allies. The very purpose of smaller nations agreeing to be members of the UN is the implicit understanding that great powers will respect their sovereignty. The implication that leadership not acceptable to the Soviet Union cannot be tolerated in Czechoslovakia is equally alarming in that the interests of the Soviet Union are placed before those of the people of Czechoslovakia.

"Military or any pacts entered into should be for mutual benefit and not as instruments to threaten and subdue the weaker members. The events of the last



few days would render such pacts meaningless...Because of this and other considerations, we have informed the Embassy of the USSR that it is the view of the Uganda Government that Soviet troops and those of her allies be withdrawn without conditions." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Entebbe, August 23).

## GHANA

The Government of Ghana on August 22 strongly deplored the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russia and other Warsaw Pact nations and called for the immediate withdrawal of the occupying forces. It described the action of the invaders as "unjustified aggression and blatant interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia."

In a statement issued in Accra, the Government said the action of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany "constitutes a flagrant violation of one of the fundamental principles of the Warsaw Pact." The statement added that it was reminiscent of events in Hungary in 1956 and struck a severe blow at the very foundation of international law and posed a serious threat to the security and territorial integrity of small nations.

"The Government of Ghana unreservedly condemns all forms of intimidation, threat or use of force against small states by big powers", the statement added. It further deplored the invasion of Czechoslovakia as an act fraught with grave consequences for world peace, to the people and Government of Czechoslovakia. (*Daily Graphic*, August 23).

## ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY

**Liberation Committee Meeting :** On July 16 the 13th session of the OAU Liberation Committee was opened in Algiers by President Boumedienne. He said the fight against colonialism was a "single fight which should not end until all parts of Africa had gained independence." The Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Abdelaziz Boutefflika, was elected President of the Committee.

On July 20 the Committee adopted the following resolutions : (i) Aid will be given to the nationalist movements in the French Afar-Issa territory, the Djibouti Liberation Movement (it has its headquarters in Ethiopia), and the Somali Coast Freedom Party (headquarters in Somalia) ; (ii) The Canary Islands are an integral part of the African continent and the inhabitants have the right to self-determination. It has been decided to provide aid to them so as to secure their liberation from Spanish rule ; (iii) It has been decided to provide funds to the African Independence Party of Portuguese Guinea (PAIGC) and the Cape Verde Islands, the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and Zapu of Rhodesia. (Based on a report published in *African Research Bulletin*, Exeter, England).

**Commission on Refugees :** The fifth session of the OAU ad hoc commission on refugees opened in Addis Ababa on June 17. The main object of this meeting was to draw up a draft instrument for dealing with all problems relating to refugees of the whole continent. It also considered the recommendations made by the international conference on the legal, economic and social aspects of this

problem held earlier in 1967 at Addis Ababa. According to the *Ethiopian Herald* of June 20 the commission succeeded in formulating a new draft convention covering specific aspects of the refugee problem in Africa. A two-member drafting committee comprising Ghana and Senegal was set up to complete the convention.

**Education Ministers' Conference :** The major proposals which emerged from the two-week conference of African Education Ministers in Nairobi included : (1) Reform of primary education on more practical lines to educate the masses for life as "producers", instead of concentrating on an elite, and to check the rural exodus to the towns ; (2) Establishment of "Centres of Excellence" to check the "brain drain" from Africa by training highly skilled technical personnel and applying science and technology to African social development plans ; (3) Priority for the training of more African secondary school teachers.

Scientific and Technical Training in relation to Development in Africa was opened on July 22. It was jointly convened by the Director-General of UNESCO and the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU. Its terms of reference were to consider problems relating to education and scientific and technical training in Africa ; to review a ten-year report on UNESCO activities in Africa, including the possibility of setting up regional offices for education, science and culture.

There were 165 delegates, including 25 Ministers of Education, from 32 "Middle" African and four North African States. (*East African Standard*, July 29).

## UN COMMITTEE ON APARTHEID

The UN Committee on Apartheid held special meetings in Sweden and Britain. The committee issued a communique on June 26 urging the launching of a campaign in the UN to have freedom fighters in South Africa recognized as prisoners-of-war under the Geneva Convention, and maintenance of a register at the UN of all persons imprisoned in South Africa in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The communique made the following major observations : (i) that the intensified application of the apartheid policies of the South African government has caused a further worsening of political conditions in South Africa and in other areas of South Africa ; (ii) that South Africa has extended its racial philosophy beyond its national boundaries by supporting the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia and by its illegal occupation of South West Africa. This poses a grave threat to the security and independence of African states ; (iii) that the South African government has been exploiting the economic weakness of her neighbouring African states. Therefore it is necessary that concerted international efforts are made to make these states less dependent on South Africa ; and (iv) that as the armed struggle has been considered unavoidable by the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa international assistance should be in the form of political, material and moral support.

The British Anti-Apartheid Movement presented a detailed report in a memorandum titled "The Nature and Technique of South African Propaganda Ministry" to the UN Special Committee on Apartheid which has been published as a UN document. It describes the annual South Africa Year Book as a publication "which contains as much false and racist information as anything Dr. Goebbels published". (*East African Standard*, July 13).

## EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

**East African Economic Community :** The signing of the agreement linking the East African Economic Community with the European Economic Community in Arusha (Tanzania) on July 26 came at the end of long and difficult negotiations. At one stage the talks broke down completely because of European refusal to meet East African terms. France, seeking to safeguard the interests of its former colonies, chiefly the West and Central African Francophone states who have a longstanding association with "The Six" through the Yaounde Convention, was the main stumbling block, but finally modified its stand.

While imports from the European Economic Community between 1965 and 1967 have more than doubled, exports to Europe declined from £27,041,225 in 1963 to £21,159,498 in 1967. The agreement, which secures duty-free entry of East African exports to Europe, is expected to rectify this. (*East African Standard*, July 27).

## KENYA

**Accord on Kenya Indians :** An agreement was reached between the British and Indian governments in regard to settlement of persons of Indian origin holding UK passports now residing in Kenya.

An official release by the Government of India published in the *National Herald* of July 27 said : "India will give these persons visas valid for six months instead of three months as at present. The British High Commission will place an appropriate endorsement in their passports giving the holders the right of entry to the United Kingdom."

These arrangements have been arrived at to enable Kenya Indians with British passports to consider their future. If at the end of the expiry of visas they want to settle down in India permanently they can apply for Indian nationality but if they want to go to Britain they will be given entry certificates by the British High Commission in India.

The release added : "Where such persons are denied permits for residence or for the practice of their trade or profession or their livelihood is curtailed by the restrictions of their right to trade, the British High Commission will place an appropriate endorsement in their passports giving the holders the right of entry to the United Kingdom." The new arrangements are a sequel to the passage of the British Immigration Act fixing an annual quota of 1,500 for UK citizens of Asian origin for entry into Britain. They ensure the right of entry to UK passport holders of Indian origin in Kenya into Britain irrespective of the quota system.

The London *Times*, commenting on the compromise formula, said on July 24 that "the draft agreement has been worked out in accordance with Mr. Callaghan's assurances to allow Kenya Asians to return to India of their own volition. Under present regulations introduced by the Indian Government last March, Kenya Asians who want to return to India are forced to enter the United Kingdom if their residence permits are withdrawn by the Kenya Government. It is understood that the Indian Government has now agreed to assure Britain that she will only accept those Asians who are under compulsion to leave Kenya. Britain, it is said, has been reluctant to enter into an agreement on endorsing immigrants' passports with United Kingdom

entry visas until it received an assurance that India would not become a half-way clearing house to defeat the purpose of the immigration Act."

**Asians in Kenya :** Recently a survey of the Asian community in Kenya was conducted by Mr. Martin Emals in association with the Institute of Community Studies at University College, Nairobi. The survey estimates that there are 67,000 British Asian citizens out of a total of 188,000. The latter figure is taken from the 1962 census figure of 176,000 plus an estimated natural growth of 12,000. The figure of 67,000 is the remainder after deducting other known categories, including 48,000 Asians who become automatically Kenya citizens at independence and 20,000 who opted for Kenya citizenship during the two-year grace period.

The breakdown also includes 4,500 citizens of India, 500 citizens of Pakistan, 45,000 who left for Britain or India between 1963 and 1968, about 1,000 who are believed to have gone to Canada, 1,500 dependents who have gone to the UK, since March, and the 500 covered by the 156 British vouchers issued up to June 12 to heads of families.

The survey states that of the remaining 67,000 in Kenya, 67.35 per cent would prefer to settle in India if they had to leave Kenya, 18.19 per cent would go to Britain if they could; 6.54 per cent to Canada, 1.48 per cent to Pakistan and 0.47 per cent to other Commonwealth countries. The views of 5.07 per cent were "not ascertainable". (*East African Standard*, July 29).

**Local Elections :** Over 500 candidates of Mr. Oginga Odinga's opposition Kenya People's Union were disqualified in the local elections on the technical ground that there would be no elections at all in Kenya's major centres. In Nairobi, while riot police stood by, all 40 KPU candidates were declared disqualified. The same happened in Mr. Odinga's stronghold of Kisumu where the KANU holds no seats on the municipal council. Apart from the nomination results still due from four areas, only 70 of the 19,000 seats in the country will be contested. Mr. Odinga also claimed that other prospective KPU candidates were eliminated by the abrupt raising of the deposit from £5 to £10, by bringing forward the nomination date without notice, or by making various surprise demands, such as the presentation of tax receipts by intending candidates.

**Malawi President's Visit :** The President of Malawi, Dr. Hastings Banda, paid a state visit to Kenya from June 11 to 16. A joint communique issued after the talks between Dr. Banda and President Kenyatta stated that the two leaders had held discussions "on matters of mutual interest with special emphasis on the need to strengthen economic and cultural relations." They "rededicated themselves to the cause of human dignity, liberty, brotherhood and cooperation of African nations." In a statement issued on June 10, the Opposition Party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU), dissociated itself from President Banda's visit. The statement charged Dr. Banda with being anti-African. (*The Nationalist*, Tanzania, June 11).

**Zambian President's Visit :** On May 30 President Kaunda paid a seven-day state visit to Kenya. In a joint communique issued in Nairobi on June 5 both leaders called for the use of force to topple the Smith regime in Rhodesia. They expressed their concern over the explosive developments in Southern Africa and condemned the "perverted philosophy of apartheid."

**Somali President's Visit :** On July 24 President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke of Somalia arrived in Nairobi on an official visit. The joint communique issued at the conclusion of the President's visit expressed satisfaction over the progress in the relations between the two nations. The two leaders pledged their support for all the measures devised to liberate Africa from the colonial yoke. They reiterated that the use of force as an ultimate solution to topple the illegal Smith regime could not be ruled out. They agreed that the tripartite working committee consisting of Kenya, Somalia, and Zambia should be convened as early as possible.

**Assistance from Japan :** The Japanese and Kenya Governments signed an agreement on July 30 under which Japan will continue to provide for two more years technical and financial assistance for the training and research centre for small-scale industries at Nakuru established three years ago. The Japanese Government will provide as much assistance as possible for the training of skilled manpower. (*East African Standard*, August 1)

## TANZANIA

**Nyerere's Visit to China and North Korea :** President Nyerere paid a three-day "goodwill State visit" to China on June 17. Speaking at a State banquet, he underlined the importance of safeguarding the sovereignty of the people. He said China and Tanzania were both committed to socialism. "We have adopted different methods—if you like, different bricks—but both countries are working for the same objectives—the sovereignty of the people and their freedom from exploitation and discrimination."

In his speech on June 21 at a farewell banquet President Nyerere reiterated that the friendship between Tanzania and the People's Republic of China (which he described as friendship between "most unequal equals") was based on the principles of respect and equality. President Nyerere was warmly welcomed in Pyongyang, North Korea, on June 23.

**Relations with Britain Resumed :** Diplomatic relations between Tanzania and Britain were restored on July 4 after a break of more than two and a half years. Tanzania was among nine African countries which broke off relations with Britain in December 1965 following the OAU's resolution on Rhodesia. It was the last to resume these ties. According to a statement issued by the Commonwealth Office in London the two countries will shortly exchange High Commissioners.

Commenting on the resumption of diplomatic relations with Britain, *the Nationalist* in an editorial said "Tanzanians are honoured and satisfied that it has been their consistent and uncompromising stand which has influenced Britain to declare NIBMAR—No Independence Before Majority Rule—thus making a commitment before the whole world that she would not allow Rhodesia to turn into another South Africa. The resumption of ties will enable Tanzania to press Britain more effectively to implement NIBMAR" (*The Nationalist*, Dar-es-Salaam, July 5).

## CONGO REPUBLIC

**National Assembly Dissolved :** On August 1, President Massamba-Debat dissolved the National Assembly by a decree. He suspended the Political Bureau of the ruling National Movement of the Revolution (MNR). He announced that

until new elections were held he would rule by decree. A Committee for the Defence of the Revolution was set up by the President.

According to Agence France Presse an abortive *coup* was staged on July 31 following demonstrations by the extreme left-wing of the MNR. In a broadcast the President said he had taken these measures to satisfy demonstrators. The army has pledged its loyalty to the President.

## MALAWI

**Closer Ties with South Africa :** Malawi would like to further strengthen its newly established relations with South Africa, the Economic Affairs Minister, Mr. Banda, told South Africans visiting Malawi under the auspices of the Johannesburg Council for Adult Education. South Africa has promised Malawi £ B11,000,000 in loans since the two countries established diplomatic relations in December. (*East African Standard*, July 31).

## ZAMBIA

**Kaunda's Visit to UK :** President Kaunda's visit to the UK after his journey to Sweden, Denmark and Finland was viewed with considerable interest against the background of reports that he was anxious to strengthen Zambia's air defences with missiles and military jets as he believed that Zambia was now in the real southern African firing line. Mr. Wilson has challenged the Zambian claim to Britain's commitment to give more defence help, since most of the former Central African Federation's arms went to Rhodesia. Britain is training Zambia's army and air force under an agreement renewed this February.

Dr. Kaunda's fears have been reinforced by the talk in Pretoria of bombing guerilla "holding camps" in Zambia and the attack on the Luangwa Bridge on June 9, temporarily cutting off Zambia's only road link with Malawi. The next object of sabotage could be Zambia's newly-completed £16m pipeline through which petrol is starting to flow from Dar-es-Salaam.

On his arrival in London the Zambian President warned that the world was "heading for another tragedy in so far as the Southern African issue was concerned." Answering questions, President Kaunda said he hoped to discuss the supply of military equipment with the British authorities to get their reaction, but he would not say what he was looking for. "We are asking for it as a defence against aggression. We are not being aggressive in Zambia". (*The Nationalist*, July 17).

Addressing a meeting of Commonwealth correspondents on July 17 President Kaunda admitted that "I am having difficulties getting missiles from Britain. But who else is going to arm us?" "Immediately the East comes in", he continued, "we have an ideological conflict as the West will move in to defeat communism. There you have a readymade explosive situation". Dr Kaunda stressed that "either we allow ourselves to be wiped out or we defend ourselves".

On his way back to Zambia on July 21 President Kaunda said (at Nairobi airport) that Zambia had managed to make Britain revise her decision that she would not give any more help to fight the Rhodesian rebellion. We hoped we would be able to get something going, he added. "We have also managed to stir strong

feelings in the British public in favour of some activity against Rhodesia." According to a report appearing in the *Times of Zambia* (July 20, 1968), a Commonwealth spokesman emphasised that there was no problem about a licence to export missiles to Zambia as this was an ordinary commercial transaction. He stressed that it was not military aid which Zambia was seeking. It was merely a talk about defence.

Colin Legum, the Commonwealth Correspondent of the *London Observer*, in a special feature on President Kaunda's visit on July 21 wrote: "President Kenneth Kaunda has had a considerable impact on public opinion; but it is doubtful if he succeeded either in finally convincing British leaders or the public that a race war of Vietnam proportions is building up in Southern Africa, or that only preventive action by the major Western Powers can help avert it". He described Britain's Rhodesia policy as "Micawberish" and pointed out that "the problem of Rhodesia seems unlikely to be settled without confrontation with South Africa" in conjunction with the UN. He singled out the Conservative Party leaders and Mr. Alec Douglas Home in particular for criticism. The latter after listening to Dr. Kaunda "went to give a lecture at the Institute of Strategic Studies on 'The Global Importance of Southern Africa' in which he stressed the value of South Africa to Western defence interests". (*Observer*, London, July 21, 1968).

Earlier during his visit to Denmark, Dr. Kaunda signed two agreements with the Danish Government on aid projects relating to technical assistance. It was agreed that there should be an exchange of trade missions between Sweden and Zambia.

**Chinese Rail Team in Lusaka :** Eight Chinese railway experts arrived in Lusaka in early August to start a survey at the Zambian end of the 1,000-mile Zam-Tam railway line. Zambian officials, according to the *East African Standard* (August 6, 1968) said China had offered an interest-free loan to build the railway which is estimated to cost at least £100,000,000.

A Government Statistical Bulletin issued in Lusaka in the first week of August revealed that Zambia's industrial production has more than doubled in the four years following independence. The statistics also showed that exports increased by some 30 per cent from £188,000,000 to £235,000. Zambia cut imports from Rhodesia by more than half in the two years after Rhodesia's 1965 Declaration of Independence. Last year Zambia's imports from South Africa were worth £36,000,000 against £31,000,000 from Britain and £16,000,000 from Rhodesia.

**United Party Banned :** In a dawn broadcast on August 15, President Kaunda announced the banning of the opposition United Party because his security intelligence "had revealed that its members were engaged in acts which were a threat to public security and peace." It was later announced that Dr. Mundia, leader of the United Party, and two others had been indefinitely restricted to an undisclosed area. Mr. Mundia formed the party last year after losing his parliamentary seat. He had previously been dropped from Dr. Kaunda's Cabinet, in which he was Minister of Commerce, after allegations that he held shares in a private company which his Ministry was assisting.

**Coming Elections :** On August 1, President Kaunda told the Central Committee of the ruling United National Independence Party that Zambia was reaching

"a very critical period in terms of the unity of the nation". This was taken as an indication of his anxiety for the UNIP maintaining supra-tribal loyalty during the forthcoming general elections, probably in October. The National Assembly is being enlarged to 100 seats.

**Relations with Somalia :** The Somali Prime Minister, Mr. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, paid a three-day official visit to Zambia on June 27. In a joint communique the leaders of the two countries condemned Britain for her failure to topple the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia and called on African nationalists to close their ranks against "oppressors". The two countries have agreed to exchange Ambassadors. Mr. Egal disclosed at a Press conference that Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania would hold a tripartite meeting in Tanzania soon.

## NORTH AFRICA

### ALGERIA

**Nationalisation of French Enterprises :** On July 5, Algeria's sixth independence anniversary, President Boumedienne said at a public meeting "the revolution has overcome all plots and divisions, a real agrarian reform is under way ; the country will be endowed with an industrial complex in accordance with our needs." With the exception of oil prospecting and production (marketing of all gas and oil products was nationalised last May) all main sectors of Algerian industry are now nationalised. France, in retaliation for the nationalisation in June of 18 major industrial enterprises—17 of them French with a total value of 311,000m francs—has reduced the monthly quota of Algerian workers into France to 1,000 a month. The Algerian official radio described this as "a grave unilateral measure". At the end of June Algeria set up a new Economic and Social Council with its functions defined as "assuring the participation of the nation's vital forces in the planning and execution of the Government's Economic and Social Policy".

**Algero-Soviet Economic Cooperation :** A trade agreement was signed in Moscow in August between Algeria and Russia to step up trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. They agreed to work jointly in several industrial projects. The agreement stipulates the sale of 35 million hectolitres of Algerian wines to Russia between 1969 and 1975 (France refuses to buy Algerian surplus any more). It will increase Algeria's capacity for buying goods and equipment from Russia and help her in repaying credit which is due, and in financing the extension of the iron and steel works at Annaba.

A decision to expedite the completion of certain projects has also been taken by the two countries. They include projects in the iron and steel sector and the reorganization of nine concerns in the socialist industrial sector of Algeria. The two countries have agreed to increase and develop cooperation in the scientific and cultural spheres also. (*News From Algeria*, August 15).

Algeria's trade with the USSR increased five-fold between 1966 and 1967—\$55 million against \$12,800,000.

**Algerian Stand on Non-Proliferation Treaty :** A resolution tabled by the USA, USSR and Great Britain on nuclear guarantees to non-nuclear victims of aggression was adopted on June 19 by the UN Security Council. Algeria, Brazil,



India, Palestine and France abstained from voting. The Algerian representative, Mr. Tewfik Bouattoura, stating his Government's stand, pointed out that the resolution appeared to be directed against the popular Republic of China, which was absent from the Security Council, and reckoned that the set-up proposed by the authors of the resolution "re-invented, so to speak, the notion of the protectorate" which was highly discriminatory in character since it established two categories of states, the signatories to the Treaty who will benefit from apparent nuclear protection, and the others on whom aggression has been virtually authorised. In this, he said, there was an indirect modification of the Charter's contract which confers Security Council protection on all member states. (*News from Algeria*, July 1).

## UAR

**Nasser's Visit to Russia :** President Nasser arrived in Moscow on July 4 on a seven-day official visit to the Soviet Union. Talks between the Soviet leaders and the UAR President opened at the Kremlin on July 5 and ended next day.

The joint communique issued at the end of the talks noted that there had been "a frank exchange of views on a wide range of questions concerning the further development of all-round cooperation between the USSR and the UAR, the Middle East situation, and ways of eliminating the aftermath of the Israeli imperialist aggression as well as other international problems of mutual interest." The two sides "agreed on further joint steps with the aim of restoring peace and security in the area." They expressed their "firm conviction that the attempts of Israel and the imperialist forces supporting her to perpetuate the results of the treacherous attack on the Arab countries in June 1967 are doomed to failure."

The communique declared that the basis for solving the Middle East problem must be the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967. It expressed both countries' support for the efforts of Dr. Gunnar Jarring, the UN Secretary-General's envoy in the Middle East. The communique declared : "Israel's refusal to implement this resolution proves again that the policy and actions of this state are alien to the interests of peace. The strengthening of peace in the Middle East must be based on respect for the lawful rights of the Arab peoples, including the Arab population of Palestine."

President Nasser, according to the communique, "expressed profound gratitude to the Soviet Union for its political support and great practical assistance in strengthening the economy and defence capacity of the UAR." It noted that the Soviet Union "will continue to render the UAR around political and economic support and aid, as well as assistance in the strengthening of its defence capacity."

The two sides expressed satisfaction that "despite the intrigues of the colonial powers, the anti-imperialist forces and the national liberation movement on the African continent have achieved great successes." They stressed the importance of the Organization for African Unity.

## WEST AFRICA

### CHAD

**President's Visit to Russia :** President Tombolbaye visited the Soviet Union on June 17 on an official visit. He hoped that Chad would "be able to count

on the constant support and on even greater aid from its Soviet friends." He said Chad's policy was based on "a progressive system of development, respect for all nations... non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, constant combat against the forces of oppression and domination and a constant search for world peace".

## DAHOMÉY

**President Confirmed :** Dr. Emile Derlin Zinsou was confirmed as President by an overwhelming majority on July 28 by a referendum. The Military Revolutionary Committee, which had governed Dahoméy since the last coup in December 1967, was dissolved on July 31. The President of the Committee, Captain Mathieu Kérékou, said: "We can now go back to our barracks, convinced that we have precisely laid down the framework in which the new President and Premier will develop following the objectives which we fixed on December 17 1967."

## EQUATORIAL GUINEA

**Draft Constitution :** Following talks lasting several months in Madrid, a draft constitution for an independent Guinea was announced by the Spanish Foreign Ministry. A group of the African delegates who were present at the conference at Madrid denounced the constitution and described it as "a simple imposition of the tests unilaterally drawn up by the Spanish delegation". The draft was not put to the vote at the conference. (Based on a report in *West Africa*, June 29).

The bill granting independence to Equatorial Guinea was approved on July 24. The Spanish Foreign Minister was quoted as saying that the granting of independence was an act not of abdication but of deliberate policy. Under this constitution Spanish Guinea will be a unitarian, democratic republic. The President of the republic will be elected for five years by universal suffrage.

## GHANA

**Programme for Industrial Promotion :** A Government programme for the promotion of Ghanaian enterprises was outlined in a Policy Paper on Ghanaian participation in and ownership of some important sectors of the economy. Entitled "Promotion of Ghanaian Business Enterprises", the paper reserves the following fields for Ghanaians : 1. Retail trade business with annual sales of less than NC500,000; 2. Wholesale trade business with annual sales of less than NC1 million; 3. Taxi services; 4. Other small businesses employing less than 30 persons and/or with a fixed capital investment of less than NC 100,000; 5. Representation of overseas manufactures except where special permission is granted by the Government to a foreign concern.

The Government would allow non-Ghanaian interests in the protected fields a reasonable period of time during which substantial Ghanaian participation or complete takeover could be arranged. Non-Ghanaian enterprises registered under existing laws and regulations would be allowed to continue their operations subject to the following conditions : (a) They institute training programmes immediately to equip Ghanaians to take over shortly from expatriate personnel; (b) Two years after the effective date of this pronouncement no expatriates, except the working proprietors, shall be engaged by these enterprises; and (c) For entre-

preneurs in the retail, wholesale, taxi and other small-scale business fields, within a period of three years from July 1 at least 60 per cent of their equity holdings shall pass into Ghanaian hands and at the end of 5 years, the enterprise shall be completely Ghanaian owned. (*Ghana Times*, July 18).

## NIGERIA

**Peace Talks in Niamey :** The OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria met in Niamey on July 15. Earlier the Head of the Federal Nigerian Government visited Niger and Cameroon "to ensure that the position of his government is fully understood". The Committee also invited Col. Ojukwu to hear his views.

On July 17, the Committee recommended a limited truce in the civil war to establish a demilitarised zone for relief work. Further, the Federal Government was requested to guarantee air, land and sea corridors through which relief measures could be carried out. Another recommendation was that the demilitarized zone should be patrolled and maintained by an international police force which should include neutral observers acceptable to both parties. These recommendations were made because of the "urgent need for supplies of food, medicines and clothing to be sent quickly to the affected areas." According to Radio Niamey on July 18, General Gowon rejected the recommendations.

At a Press conference on July 18, Colonel Ojukwu offered the following peace terms : (i) Immediate cessation of fighting on land, sea and air; (ii) Immediate removal of the economic blockade set up by Nigeria against Biafra; and (iii) Withdrawal of troops behind the pre-war boundaries to enable refugees to come back to their homes.

The OAU Committee adopted a resolution on July 19 calling on the Federal Government to set up its promised relief corridor so as to enable the sending of relief supplies to the affected and starving areas. "It demanded a guarantee for the safety of international welfare organisations working there. After the preliminary talks between the representatives of Biafra and Nigeria on July 20 a partial agreement was reached for a demilitarised corridor of five to eight km. It would be supervised by civilian observers from six nations making up the OAU Consultative Committee.

Only July 26 a communique was issued at the conclusion of the talks between the Federal and Biafran delegations which said: (i) That during their deliberations the two parties have adopted the following agenda for the Addis Ababa peace negotiations under the auspices of the OAU Consultative Committee; (a) Arrangements for a permanent settlement; (b) Terms for the cessation of hostilities; (c) Concrete proposals for the transport of relief supplies in food and medicines to the civilian victims of the war; (2) That the two parties have examined in detail arrangements for the sending of relief supplies to the victims of war and that they will hold further consultations regarding this matter at Addis Ababa.

It was agreed that peace negotiations should begin in Addis Ababa on August 5. The prospects of the Addis Ababa conference have not been very hopeful. According to Agence France, "it is now almost certain" that the majority of Heads of State, represented on the OAU Consultative Committee, will not attend the talks, and their absence seems to be the first consequence of Federal leader General Gowon's decision not to meet the Biafran leader, Ojukwu".

**French Support to Biafra :** On July 23 Mr. Jean de Lipkowski, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the French Senate on the Nigerian civil war said : "The Government has made efforts to see that no act on its part should contribute to prolonging the conflict". But on July 31, a French Government statement stressed that "the Government believes . . . that the present conflict should be resolved on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination".

Radio Biafra said: "We hope that the French Cabinet announcement is a forerunner of many more friendly gestures to come". Chief Enahoro, just before he left for the Addis Ababa peace talks to represent the Federal Government, said "after this French decision, we will just have to go in and finish it (Biafra) militarily".

Following the French-encouraged recognition of Biafra by President Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast and President Bongo of Gabon, it was expected that the rest of OCAM would follow suit. But this has not happened so far. President Senghor of Senegal, for instance, came out against the independence of Biafra in Paris in August in spite of his previous suggestion that Biafra had an "organic right" to secede. President Hamani Diori of Niger, also in Paris in August, said the Nigerian problem must be left to Africa to solve "with positive help from outside".

Apart from France, the West German government has urged combined EEC action to get aid into Biafra. (In a year, when the Yaounde treaty is due for re-negotiation, the Common Market's 14 African associates, it is said, would have to take account of the attitude of the Six as a whole).

Pro-Biafra feelings have been expressed in the Netherlands and the five Scandinavian countries, who have already called for a ceasefire in a combined conference at the United Nations, are said to be contemplating taking the conflict to the Security Council.

In Britain the *Times*, the *Financial Times* and the *Guardian* have urged Britain to ban arms supplies.

Gen. de Gaulle made a further pronouncement in favour of Biafra at a Cabinet meeting on August 14 when he said that it seemed impossible to him that the problem could be settled by a military solution.

## SENEGAL

**Pay Raise for Workers :** An agreement on a raise in minimum wages and tighter price control was reached by trade unions, Government and management representatives in Dakar on June 14. The talks followed widespread labour unrest in the country during which curfew and martial law were imposed.

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

**Freedom Struggles :** Patrick Keatley, *Guardian* correspondent, in a firsthand report on the guerilla war in Southern Africa has stated (*National Herald*, New Delhi, July 21) : "The operations of the Frelimo maquisards are now such as to pin down 45,000 Portuguese troops in profitless battles they never seem to win. On the basis of population ratio, Portugal is now spending five times as much on her military forces there as the Americans are spending in Viet Nam..."

Patrick Keatley considers the arrival of Chinese technicians for the Zam-Tam

Railway in the long term as "perhaps the most significant development in the shaping of the battle line for the ultimate black-white clash in southern Africa.

**Frelimo Congress (Mozambique) :** The second Congress of Frelimo was held inside Mozambique in the last week of July. It re-elected Dr. Eduardo Mondlane as President of the movement. Dr. Mondlane told the *Nationalist* (Tanzania) on July 30 that the Congress was able to formulate a lot of things with regard to the strategy of the war and that "there is better understanding among combatants of what is involved in the struggle..." He said: "...The situation of the war now inside Mozambique is more favourable to us as the Portuguese are in a stalemate and the only active force of the enemy is the Air Force... We have now moved on from the phase of ambushes and are concentrating on attacking the enemy in his own territory, that is in garrisons, bases, posts and isolating the towns where he is hiding..." The prospects of crossing the Zambezi River and carrying the struggle farther south are very bright..."

He regarded the convening of the meeting inside Mozambique as "a great victory for the fighting people of Mozambique" as it proved that the people "have a liberated zone inside Mozambique".

*The Standard* (Dar-es-Salaam) reported on July 25 that "Rhodesian forces backed by South African police have had to call out jet bombers and fighters to break up concentrations in a series of fierce battles with African nationalist freedom fighters on two widely separated fronts in the remote Zambesi valley".

## MOZAMBIQUE

**Dam across Zambesi :** Portugal's plan to harness the Zambesi River in Mozambique by building the Cahora Bassa dam, the most important hydro-electric project in Africa, will cost more than £130 million, it was announced on July 17. Zamco, the consortium which will undertake the project, was organised by the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa and groups of leading French, German, South African and Swedish firms. The main consumer of Cahora Bassa's power will be the Republic of South Africa. Employment preference on the project will be given to Portuguese soldiers who have completed service in Mozambique. (*The Times*, London, July 17.).

## RHODESIA

**Cabinet Crisis :** A Cabinet crisis occurred in Rhodesia as a result of which Mr. William Harper, Minister of Internal Affairs and Public Service, resigned on July 4. He also resigned from the ruling party and Parliament. A statement issued from the Prime Minister's office noted that the resignation was "entirely unrelated to any difference of opinion on constitutional or other political issues". But in a statement Mr. Harper said: "... I wish to say that for some considerable time it has been more and more evident to me that it is not possible for me to be at one with the Prime Minister....."

The former Rhodesian Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Field, also resigned from the Rhodesian Front because of his dissatisfaction with the party leadership and its lack of resolve to carry out the party's principles and policies.

**New Constitution :** A new Republican Constitution for Rhodesia is envisaged by the Rhodesian Front. The proposals, which have the support of the

National Executive, were published on July 18 for discussion by the rank and file. The constitution envisages a 23-member Senate and "an interim government" of either 68 or 64 members which would give way to one consisting of a National Parliament and three Provincial Councils, one for Mashona, one for Matabele and one for whites. These Councils are expected to grow into parliaments—with an over-all multi-racial National Assembly. There would be a Head of State who would be appointed by the Government for five years. As regards the law which would be applied in Rhodesia, it says that the law in force in the colony of Cape of Good Hope on June 10, 1891, with some "minor modifications" would be applicable in Rhodesia. The other recommendations deal with the abolition of the Constitutional Council, introduction of a Land Tenure Act and a declaration of rights. According to the Land Tenure Act both European and African land should be defined and multiracial areas preserved.

**Privy Council Decision:** The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council delivered an important decision on July 23. It declared that the decision of the Rhodesian High Court with regard to the validity of the Emergency powers assumed by the Rhodesian government since November 11, 1965, is "erroneous", and that such regulations have no legal validity, force or effect. Lord Reid reaffirmed the sovereignty of the UK Parliament over the "annexed territory of Southern Rhodesia" which was acquired in 1923 and that sovereignty continues. Their lordships were of the opinion that the "usurping government" now in control is not a lawful government. They held that it could not justify disregard of legislation passed or authorised by the UK Parliament. On August 12, Mr. Justice Dendy Young announced in Salisbury his resignation from the Rhodesian Bench as he could not accept the High Court's refusal to acknowledge the authority of the Privy Council.

## SOUTH AFRICA

**Student Agitation :** In August the South African government's pressure on the Cape Town University Council to cancel the appointment of an African staff member, Archie Mafeje, to a senior lectureship in African studies was the cause of demonstrations led by the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) and the Cape Town Students' Representative Council. Later the demonstrations spread to other English-speaking universities.

**Exercise Sibasa :** Nearly 5,000 South African airmen and soldiers joined the nine-day "Exercise Sibasa" on August 12 in the northern Transvaal Veld, an ideal guerrilla territory 70 miles from the Rhodesian frontier. This is the first time that annual manoeuvres have been devoted entirely to anti-insurgent warfare — the kind of attack which South Africa considers itself most vulnerable to. (*The Times*, London, August 13.)

**Terrorism Act Condemned :** The International Commission of Jurists condemned South Africa's Terrorism Act as "a piece of legislation which must shock the conscience of every lawyer. . . Not only does it create offences of such uncertainty and such broad scope that no one can predict what conduct will fall within its terms. (but) it goes on to remove most of the guarantees of a fair trial for persons charged under it". (*Daily Despatch*, East London, June 21).

# British Sovereignty in Rhodesia

CLAIRE PALLEY

THE sovereignty of the British Crown and Parliament over Rhodesia has now been authoritatively reasserted by the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case in which the wife of a detained African nationalist leader challenged the legality of his detention by Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, in his capacity as "Minister of Justice" in Rhodesia, and by the Superintendent of Gwelo prison (Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke and another).

Prior to this decision, doubts had been expressed by lower courts and in certain legal and political circles whether United Kingdom legislation dealing with the illegal seizure of independence by Mr. Ian Smith's regime was legally effective in Rhodesia. The degree of recognition which should be accorded to legislative and administrative measures by the regime and its organs had also been the subject of speculation.

Now the highest court of Rhodesia, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, has resolved all doubts, restating the unassailable sovereignty of the United Kingdom Crown and Parliament and denying all validity to measures of the Smith regime.

## State of Emergency

Shortly before the illegal seizure of independence, the Governor of Rhodesia, acting on the advice of the then Prime Minister, Mr. Smith, declared a state of emergency in Rhodesia and made regulations providing for the government of Rhodesia during this period and for, among other things, the detention and arrest of persons whom it was, in the opinion of the Minister of Law and Order, expedient in the public interest to detain.

Immediately after the illegal declaration, the Governor instructed the citizens and the Judges of Rhodesia that it was their duty, subject to their refraining from all acts which would further the objects of the illegal authorities, to maintain law and order and to carry on with their normal tasks.

Subsequently, on November 18, pursuant to the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order-in-Council 1965 (Statutory Instrument No. 1952 of 1965) reiterated that the declaration

of independence was void and provided:

That no laws might be made by the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia;

That the executive authority of Southern Rhodesia might be exercised by a Secretary of State;

And that the Governor was not to act on the advice of his Council—which he had in any event dismissed.

Nonetheless, the emergency regulations continued in force for three months, so that even after the dismissal of Mr. Smith and his Ministers provision had been made for the running of the country.

### First Hearing

However, on February 4, 1966, these measures ceased to operate and Mr. Dupont, the Officer administering the Government, purported to extend the state of emergency, to issue fresh regulations, and to provide for the continued detention of persons who had been detained during the earlier lawful state of emergency.

It was then that the litigation to test the constitutional position began, when the wife of a detained African nationalist leader, Daniel Madzimbamuto, brought proceedings for his release.

At the original hearing in the High Court, Judges Lewis and Goldin ruled that the applicant's husband should not be released because the courts must give effect to certain legislative and administrative measures by the regime which was the only effective government in Rhodesia.

Although in the court's view the regime was unlawful, it was necessary in society's interest for the courts to continue functioning and to enforce some of the regime's measures so as to avoid chaos and a vacuum in the law. Public policy and necessity dictated, in the view of the Judges, that the courts accord the regime's measures this degree of recognition.

### The Appeal

The matter was then taken on appeal to the Appellate Division of the High Court of Southern Rhodesia. All five Judges held that the detention was *ultra vires* Section 4(1) of the Emergency Powers Act, the empowering statute, since Mr. Dupont had issued a regulation making a blanket detention of all persons who had previously been detained, whereas the court construed the statute as requiring that the Minister of Law and Order must consider each case individually before ordering preventive detention.

This finding was unrelated to the legality of the regime, but the Appellate Judges then went on to pronounce on the legal effect of the declaration of independence. The court was split as to the consequences of the illegal declaration and as to the basis of its own authority.



Judges Macdonald and Quenet held that they derived their authority from the 1965 Constitution and that the regime had become the lawful government. Judges Fieldsend and Jarvis held that they derived authority from the 1961 Constitution and thought the regime was an unlawful government, but, on reasoning similar to that in the lower court, held that in order to protect the interests of society they should accord validity to certain of the regime's legislative and administrative measures.

Judge Fieldsend would only do this on a very narrow basis, applying rigid tests of necessity, while Judge Jarvis would permit the regime to do anything permissible for the lawful government under the 1961 Constitution.

### **Chief Justice's View**

Chief Justice Beadle, however, purporting to "decide in the light of the political realities of what the law is", held that neither the 1961 nor 1965 Constitution was in force and that the court derived its authority from the tolerance of the regime. The Chief Justice considered that in such circumstances a judge must declare the law as he perceived it to be, and thought that this amounted to the principle that the regime could do anything competent to a lawful government under the 1961 Constitution.

Thus, for differing reasons, Rhodesia's Appellate Division had declared that, within certain limits, laws enacted by the regime should be enforced and its administrative measures should be carried into effect.

Sir Hugh Beadle took the further step, in litigation claiming that a right of appeal lay to the Judicial Committee and in other litigation seeking a stay of execution of persons condemned to death, of stating that a Privy Council decision, if given, would be a *brutum fulmen* so that no appeal lay as of right, despite the provisions of Section 71 of the 1961 Constitution, which conferred such a right.

In addition, he refused to recognise the right of Queen Elizabeth to exercise the prerogative of mercy in Southern Rhodesia.

### **Judicial Committee's Ruling**

The Judicial Committee entirely rejected this reasoning, unanimously holding that it remains the highest court of appeal for Rhodesia and denying that its judgments in respect of that colony are empty thunderbolts.

It has incontrovertibly stated that the Crown and Parliament of the United Kingdom possess undiminished sovereignty over the colony of Southern Rhodesia and that the measures taken under the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 are unquestionably lawful.

It has, incidentally, dismissed the argument put forward in other proceedings in Rhodesia—that the Act and Orders thereunder were of

no effect in Rhodesia because they were not promulgated there. (English constitutional law governs Rhodesia, and the doctrine of promulgation is therefore irrelevant as a rule of statutory interpretation of the Roman Dutch law.)

It has shown that there is no limit to Parliament's legislative power over Rhodesia, and that Parliament at Westminster is not fettered by the 1961 convention that legislation will only be enacted at the request of the Southern Rhodesia Government. In any event, such a convention was probably abrogated by the illegal declaration.

Furthermore, allegiance by Rhodesian citizens is due solely to the Crown of the United Kingdom and not to any so-called State of Rhodesia.

### Counter-measures Valid

Thus all counter-measures taken by the United Kingdom since the illegal declaration are valid in law, and it was and is for Her Majesty in Council under the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 or for Parliament at Westminster to judge whether any new law was or is required and to enact such new laws as might be thought necessary or desirable.

Conversely, not only is the regime itself unlawful and without governmental authority, but its actions are all likewise unlawful. It has not the status of a lawful government because it has not yet successfully usurped power, the lawful ruler, the United Kingdom, still taking steps to regain control through the imposition of sanctions and other measures.

Nor can any of the regime's actions be recognised by reason of any argument that it is the sole effective or *de facto* government operating internally within Rhodesia. The Judicial Committee made it clear that such arguments were related only to the sphere of international law and were inappropriate to the position of a usurper.

Finally, the court, by a majority (four—one, Lord Pearce dissenting) declined to recognise that any doctrine of necessity, analogous to that adopted by the United States Supreme Court in civil cases subsequent to the civil war, applied in Rhodesia. The Southern Rhodesia Order-in-Council had obviated any such necessity by taking provision for Her Majesty in Council to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Southern Rhodesia and by providing that executive authority might be exercised by a Secretary of State.

Nor could the Governor's instruction that citizens continue with their normal tasks permit any action in contravention of the Order, which in effect prohibited legislative and administrative measures by the regime.

Even Lord Pearce would only concede that, at most, the doctrine of necessity could operate within narrow limits to validate action required for the ordinary orderly running of society which did not

impair the rights of citizens under the lawful 1961 Constitution and which did not either help or was intended to help the usurpation, or run counter to the policy, of the lawful sovereign.

### **Momentous Implications**

The implications of the Judicial Committee's decision are momentous. All measures by the United Kingdom in respect of Rhodesia are legally valid. Conversely, all measures by the regime are unlawful, so that persons who carry into effect the measures of the regime are aiding and abetting unlawfulness.

In particular, this raises serious problems for the judiciary, those concerned with the administration of justice, the Civil Service and the security forces. No judge or judicial official can enforce laws or administrative decisions made by the regime after the dismissal of Mr. Smith by the Governor on November 11, 1965.

For example, the carrying into execution of death sentences confirmed by the warrant of the Officer administering the Government is unlawful, as is the enforcement of amendments of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act effected by the so-called Parliament of Rhodesia—i.e., the possession of arms of war, an offence carrying a mandatory death penalty.

As the Judicial Committee pointed out, citizens should continue to maintain law and order and carry out their normal tasks, so far as they do not act in support of measures contravening the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order-in-Council.

The Committee goes on to say: "It may be that at first there was little difficulty in complying with this direction, and it may be that after two-and-a-half years that has become difficult."

It must not, however, be forgotten that the responsibility for creating these problems rests solely on those who illegally sought to declare Rhodesia independent and continue to assert this illegal independence.—BIS

# Algeria's Industrial Development

A. CHANDERLI

LET us first of all mention a few salient facts about this part of North Africa. A look at the world map will give the enquirer the answer to a number of questions he is asking himself about Algeria. Indeed, Algeria's geographical position explains part of her behaviour and attitude.

Situated in a geographical context rich in diversity, she has to adjust her behaviour so as to belong wholly to this natural setting. A Mediterranean country, Algeria must do everything to try to fit herself into the matrix of nations that belong to this sphere. Over the centuries, her relationships with southern Europe have come to play a dominant role in her destiny. Unfortunately, Algeria's contribution to the Mediterranean civilization has been up to now unrecognized. It is Algeria's ambition to make her contribution known and felt in all fields consistent with her potentialities and possibilities.

An African state, Algeria is building with African countries—whose independence was accelerated by her struggle—a new set of relationships based on a dynamic approach to the problems confronting the continent. An Arab land, Algeria's actions are inspired by her history and traditions that make her part of the Arab people. Her contribution to the cause of the Arabs is based on a realistic appraisal of the situation in the Arab world. Besides, her position with respect to the pending Arab problems is well known, and therefore needs no further explanation.

Finally, as part of the "third world," Algeria has certain responsibilities. These responsibilities stem from the awareness, by the Algerian people, that there are in the world some other peoples who share with them a common destiny.

Their fate depends to a great extent on what they between themselves can accomplish to reach the level of decent livelihood.

In view of all these intertwined relationships and responsibilities, Algeria has embarked on a programme of development designed to bring her up to the level of modern countries. To catch the spirit of the age requires of Algeria a very careful, well-planned and sound approach to the problems she is encountering.

**Industrial Development**

Algeria's economy is characterized mainly by two important factors. These factors are closely related to the historical circumstances under which the country has found itself. The first one is that Algeria's economy is externally oriented. That is to say, external markets for the products and the labour force she exports condition to a great extent the development of the country. The second factor is the grave internal dismemberment, so to speak, that is apparent in the existence of a modern and a traditional sector. These two aspects taken together further aggravate the problems of development by combining to cause a potential growth stoppage. Algeria's actions in the field of industrial development are best explained if seen in the light of these two major elements.

What are the guiding lines Algeria has followed when setting out on a programme of industrial development? The philosophy which forms the basis of Algeria's endeavour to industrialize herself stems partly from political and social considerations, and partly from the country's economic and geographical situation.

First, a country is not wholly independent until it has acquired the necessary means that lead to complete control over its economic infrastructure. In this day and age, to be independent means, or should mean, to be free from want and to have economic power at home. A nation to be worth its name can no longer survive in today's world if it does not provide for its people a decent level of livelihood. To reach this goal, the only logical way is for the country to exploit for itself the natural resources it has. Of course, this can be done in a number of ways, for instance, through sincere cooperation between governments of different countries.

Second, in view of the fact that private enterprise in the industrial sector is almost non-existent for various reasons, the public sector must assume the responsibility for setting up basic industries. This has to be stressed because, in a country like Algeria, private saving is not sufficient to meet the heavy expenditures required for building the industrial infrastructure. One cannot also expect private enterprise to invest in a sector where the returns are low and take long to come. Coupled with the necessity of planning, these facts stand in favor of governmental action in the major sectors of industry.

Third, the Algerian authorities responsible for the country's industrial development believe that the developing countries should not hesitate to turn their industries toward the most modern and most dynamic sectors, nor should they shy away from using the most recent processes, however complex they might be. It is only by paying the necessary price at the beginning that they can succeed in lifting themselves to the levels already achieved by other countries, and hope to narrow their economic and technological gap.

In choosing this path toward industrialization, Algeria has taken a number of necessary steps. One cannot embark on a programme of

industrial development without knowing what is there not only in the field of industry, but also in all other sectors. It is then possible to make studies to see what is needed, what is feasible and what is possible to produce. After that, reflection on the best course to follow is called for. It is only by going through all these stages that the industries chosen can be developed. This process is apparently costly and time-consuming, but the tougher road chosen implies some immediate sacrifices in order to reach better results in the future.

Fourth, experience has shown that the creation of a complex of large industrial units has a stimulating effect on medium and small industries, whereas the inverse process is very difficult to accomplish.

Fifth, to be economically independent *vis-à-vis* their old metropolises, the developing countries should diversify their markets and sources of supply. To this end they ought to multiply their commercial and economic relations and work toward the creation of large economic units on regional and sub-regional levels.

Sixth and last, industrialization does not mean putting up a few scattered units over the whole territory. To be successful, a programme of industrial development has to integrate the various aspects of the entire economy of a country. In other words, the industries required at the beginning of the programme have to provide the basis for further industrialization. Briefly, what is needed is what has come to be called "industrializing industries". Without them the whole scheme will be jeopardized and industrialization will soon come to a grinding halt. In the process, millions of dollars and a lot of talent will be spent to no avail. Algeria, keenly aware of the experiences in other parts of the world, is determined not to fall into this trap. This is why the process of industrial development is apparently taking a long time to reach a satisfactory level.

These are, in brief, the principles that seem to guide Algeria's industrial development.

What are now the concrete measures that Algeria has taken to speed her industrial growth, and what industries has she built since independence?

Chief among the assets of Algeria are her hydrocarbon and mineral resources. Prior to the country's independence, these resources were massively and irrationally exploited by private foreign companies eager to amortize rapidly the expenses they had incurred. Needless to say, in the process they derived large profits which found an easy way out of the country and were invested in the "safer" places of Europe and elsewhere. To put an end to this chaotic and manifestly harmful situation, Algeria decided that these resources should first and foremost benefit the country in which they were found. In other words, that they be "economically as well as geographically situated".

That is why hydrocarbons have so far led Algeria's industrial

pace. Because they offer the possibility of integration between agriculture and industry, these resources do provide a solid basis for harmonious development. With respect to hydrocarbons, Algeria has taken a number of steps. One, the first gas liquefaction plant in the world was put into operation in 1964. The CAMEL (Compagnie Algerienne de Methane Liquide) unit can produce 2,310,000 m<sup>3</sup> of liquefied gas which is exported to Britain and France.

Second, the first pipeline financed, built and operated by Algeria was put to use in 1964-65. Its maximum capacity is to reach, in the final stage, 22 million metric tons of crude oil. This operation has been a major achievement as up to that time, the developing countries were reluctant to enter the field of oil transportation, letting foreign companies take advantage of a major source of profits.

Third, Algeria started building a major petrochemical complex at Arzew in the west of the country. This complex, when it becomes operational in early 1969, will produce 1000 MT/d of ammonia, 500 MT/d of ammonium nitrate, 400 MT/d of nitric acid and 400 MT/d of urea. The complex, which will consume 500 million m<sup>3</sup> of natural gas annually, required a total investment of \$60 million.

Fourth, the National Steel Company (SNS) was created in 1964. Its aim is to give Algeria the possibility of transforming on her soil the minerals with which she is endowed. Thus, pig iron will be first produced in late 1968 and steel at the end of 1969. The Annaba steel complex will push Algeria's industrialization further by providing the biggest part of the country's requirements of pipelines, thus saving the government a precious amount of foreign currencies.

Finally, in conformity with Algeria's policy of producing at home what can be economically produced, a number of processing industries have been set up. A number of textile factories, a sugar refinery, various juice and vegetable plants, and rubber factories are contributing to the expansion of Algeria's industrial base and to its exports.

To manage the enterprises that have been created, the government has set up a number of national companies, some of which have now a world reputation, such as SONATRACH, the oil company. These companies are autonomous as to their dealings with each other and with foreign companies. But their actions are coordinated by the Ministry of Industry and Energy which sets down, in consultation with their managements, the lines of action they are to follow. This way of doing things has the advantage of allowing the companies a great degree of freedom of action, at the same time permitting the government to direct and correct, if need be, their investments.

As an example of how these companies coordinate their actions with each other, one might mention the recent deal the oil company, the steel company and the mining company concluded with a Japanese firm. The oil company will get pipelines from Japan, and the mining

company will sell iron ore to the steel company. The latter will in turn sell pig iron to the Japanese firms. In this way Algeria's economy is stimulated and her interests preserved.

These national companies, which now control almost 80 per cent of the Algerian industrial sector, have proved to be a success and no doubt their activities will increase in the future.

### **The Future**

After six years of independence, Algeria has achieved a certain level of industrialization. But, in fact, the efforts of the Government have been directed toward the creation of an "industrial mentality" in a traditionally rural country. That is why in some instances there have been lags and insufficiencies in the programmes to be achieved. This has never been hidden or minimized. From the beginning it was seen that problems might accumulate in the process of industrialization. But the stakes were really too high: Algeria had either to accept its fate or soar into the industrial world. That is why, to accelerate the process of industrial growth, prospects have been created in petrochemicals, mechanical industries, food industries, etc.

Sonatrach is planning to put into use, in 1968, a 16-inch pipeline which will supply oil to the refinery of Algiers which is now using crude transported by tanker from Bedjala in the east. The maximum capacity of the line is to reach 6 million MT per year. Another pipeline is to be constructed between Mesdar and Skikda on the Mediterranean. This 34-inch line will carry up to 30 million MT/year in the final stage. A 40-inch gas line is already under construction. The Hassi-R'Mel-Skikda line will supply the second Algerian gas liquefaction plant at Skikda. The line will carry up to 12 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year in its fourth stage. It will be used to supply natural gas to various Algerian cities in the east of the country.

Another project is the Arzew refinery which will go into operation in 1971. The refinery will produce a variety of products such as LPG, gasoline and lubricating oils, the latter being actually imported by Algeria.

Finally, a phosphatic fertilizer complex is to be set up at Annaba. This second complex will satisfy Algeria's needs of fertilizer as well as enable it to export a substantial quantity.

The National Mechanical Constructions Company is going ahead with its plans of manufacturing, among other things, machine tools and 5,000 tractors per year in 1970.

Plans are also under way to produce diesel engines, electrical motors, electronic components, etc.

### **Conclusion**

In these few lines I have tried to give a picture, perhaps an incomplete one, of how industrialization is seen by and practiced in Algeria.



The problems that this country faced on her way were mentioned and the industrial achievements shown. Basing one's conclusion on what the past has been one might cautiously say that Algeria will "take off" in the early 1970's.

But if industrial development is thought to bring Algeria up to the level of modern countries, it has never been assumed that any country could develop in a vacuum. On the contrary, Algeria has always held the view that a certain solidarity should exist between countries that are close together, either geographically, or because they have the same problems. What is needed today is a greater awareness on the part of the developing countries of the problems of industrialization.

The "third world" countries should stop waiting for miracles or for solutions to come from the developed countries. They should set themselves to task and find their own solutions to their common problems.

Algeria's industrial development is based to a great extent on the possibility that the developing countries have to interchange products they might manufacture. If the developing countries need more trade than aid, great potentialities exist in trade between themselves. The often repeated argument that these countries' products compete with each other, rather than complement each other, is fallacious and biased.

Algeria's experiment or any other developing country's would prove to be a failure if it lacked this necessary international dimension.

# Price Policy in a Developing Economy

L. K. JHA

INDIA is a developing country. We want not only a steady but a rising rate of growth. The two major constraints on our growth have been the shortage of savings in relation to investment needs and the inadequacy of foreign exchange. New lines of production and techniques have to be adopted, and these changes do not—cannot—come about “autonomously”. In some cases, new profit expectations have to be created; in others, the existing ones have to be altered in the light of what is considered socially optimum. Our price policy has to be fitted into the socio-economic pattern set by these considerations and limitations.

Clearly, for our growth we have to make heavy investments, but the shortage of savings is there. In the resultant situation there is both the pressure and the temptation to expand investment through deficit financing or credit creation. Either of these, unless their volume and their timing are carefully determined, would lead to excessive monetary expansion and an upsurge in prices. This is not the occasion for me to discuss the intricacies of fiscal and monetary policy. What I wish to do is merely to indicate that the danger of an inflationary price rise remains a constant companion—or shall I say, menace?—to the process of development.

There are two other factors somewhat peculiar to Indian conditions which have a bearing on the problem of inflation which I would like to touch upon. When a country is not suffering from a foreign exchange shortage, the inflationary pressures generated by pushing the level of investment beyond the level of voluntary savings are counteracted by additional imports and the impact on the price level is thus moderated. In the early years after Independence when we had large sterling balances we were able to augment our level of imports to meet the rising demand in the economy without serious difficulty. Today we are no longer in the same comfortable position. Although external aid has helped us from year to year, its limitations have to be recognised in any formulation of an investment programme which we do not wish to end up in a cumulative price rise.

Another factor is the key role of food supplies. The increases in income resulting from a step-up in investment generate a marked increase in the demand for food, particularly as the population also is

rising. Food items have a high weightage in any index of consumer prices. The inadequacy of food supplies in relation to rising demand sets off an increase in food prices which is soon transmitted, both directly and through wages, into the cost structure. A demand generated inflation of food prices thus tends to become a cost induced inflation of industrial prices. In Indian conditions food supplies thus are a major factor to be taken into account in determining the safe limits of monetary expansion.

The question may well be asked whether the risks of inflation are not less than the risks of stagnation, or, to put it differently, should not development be achieved even at the cost of price stability? This is clearly a matter of judgment. Moderate price rises are often inevitable—and to an extent desirable. But even strong economies have found, after a period of creeping inflation, that the process must be checked. There is little evidence to support the view that inflation stimulates growth; there is considerable evidence that it undermines it. Inflation is not only an inefficient means of financing investment expenditure; it is also iniquitous because it imposes a greater burden on the fixed income earner than on the more prosperous sections of society. Furthermore, it worsens the external payments position by diminishing the volume of exports and pushing up import demands. When the value of money is declining, the desire to save suffers a decline. Thus inflation only aggravates before long the two obstacles to development—the shortage of foreign exchange and the shortage of savings. To my mind, one of the prime objectives of policy in our conditions must be the attainment and maintenance of price stability primarily in respect of food articles, but to the extent possible in the general price level through a limitation of aggregate expenditure whether for current consumption or for investment to levels indicated by the availability of real goods and services.

Even when all possible steps have been taken to stabilise the overall price level and even when such stability exists, variations in the prices of individual products in response to changes in supply and demand conditions will occur. This is the second aspect of price policy to which I had referred earlier. What we have to consider in this context is how valid for developing countries and particularly for India is the conventional analysis which leads to the conclusion that such price fluctuations far from being a cause of concern serve the very useful economic role of correcting imbalances between demand and supply in the short run and securing the allocation of resources in a manner which gives the maximum satisfaction to the community.

In India, as in several developing countries, it would be unrealistic to expect conditions of free competition which is one of the basic assumptions of this analysis. Capacity in several industries is less than domestic demand and imports are not always possible. What is more, if an increase in demand pushed prices up it is by no means certain that additional investment would flow into these sectors. Paucity of capital and of foreign exchange may well make it impossible to add new capacity to cope with the shortage. A monopolistic situation can come about in a developing country even when no one tries to create it, and there is an

understandable desire in these conditions to keep prices under curb.

There is also in developing countries the need for building up a wide range of facilities where commercial considerations of maximum direct return on the investment do not or cannot always apply. These are the fields of development which lead to what are termed external economies and provide the infra-structure for development, such as power, transport and the like. This is in fact not a problem peculiar to underdeveloped countries. The Affluent Society also has similar problems. Only, in the case of developing economies, the area of such infrastructural investment is very much larger and covers not only the provision of basic services such as power and transport, but also essential investments in goods like steel, for instance. Given the continuing shortage of capital it would be unrealistic to expect in the foreseeable future that through the free play of the price mechanism and by allowing capital to be deployed with higher profits as the prime objective one would secure reasonable investment in sectors important from the point of view of overall growth or social benefit.

Another major consideration which militates against the acceptance of the free pricing system in developing countries is the fact that as a rule they suffer from wide disparities in the distribution of income and wealth. Behind the concept that by allowing the prices of individual products to be determined by the impact of consumer demand measured in terms of money we get a pattern of production most satisfactory to the consumer lies the tacit acceptance of the prevailing pattern of income distribution. In developed economies, where the bulk of population is assured of gainful employment and a reasonable standard of living, where the tax system is capable of correcting such inequities in income distribution as may need to be rectified, society not only accepts but welcomes the policy of letting the prices of individual products to find their own level. In a country where the bulk of the people are steeped in poverty, no one with a social conscience could argue that the price of the basic necessities of life should when shortages develop be allowed to soar because the richer sections of the population and the richer areas in the country can afford to buy up the entire supplies at higher prices. Rationing by the purse could, in these circumstances, prove highly irrational.

In a country like India, where there is not enough of either savings or of foreign exchange to maintain the stream of supply of goods which the economy needs, where investment has to be guided into particular channels and where special consideration has to be shown to the needs of the vulnerable sections of society, competition by itself cannot be the regulator of the price level and recourse to some degree of administered pricing becomes inescapable, even for the limited objective of distributing more evenly the incidence of shortages.

At the same time care has to be taken to ensure that price regulation does not help to perpetuate the very shortage that it is intended to relieve. A successful price policy has to be conceived in a long-term perspective. While we may not wish to leave our economy at the mercy

of market forces, we should not hesitate to harness market forces to subserve our objectives. A well-conceived price policy should in the short run prevent the exploitation of the consumer in conditions of scarcity and in the long run provide adequate inducements to the producer to step up his output.

Price regulation is not synonymous with price control. There are several ways in which prices can be regulated. However, since price control is popularly believed to be the most effective weapon of price regulation, it would be useful to consider both its possibilities and its limitations. In situations of acute scarcity, price control, assuming it is effective, prevents the producer from charging a higher price even when the prevailing consumer demand would have enabled him to do so. Since price control does not by itself alter the underlying supply and demand position, the supplies which the producer makes available at the controlled price can be easily cornered by others. Quite often, the trade buys up the stocks and holds back the supplies for the "under-the-counter" transactions. Speculators who have not been in the trade at all also enter the field with a similar intent. Consumers too often build up large stocks for themselves. Unless price control is accompanied by measures to regulate the demand through some form of rationing, supplies can be monopolised by a few, and the needy may get no relief. All too often, ill-administered price controls lead not to the desired results but to loss of revenue to the Exchequer, loss of resources to the producer and accentuation of shortages for the consumer.

On administrative considerations alone a good deal of selectivity is needed before price control is imposed and the possibility of having adequate control over distribution and consumption has to be taken into account. Further, since one of the prime objectives of price control is to benefit the weaker consumer, one should focus attention on those items which are really of interest to lower income groups. One of the problems to be faced in this context relates to the position of raw materials. If the price of a raw material is controlled but that of the finished products made out of it is not controlled, then processing industries make extra profits at the expense of the basic industry or primary producer without real benefit to the consumer. Conversely, if the price of the finished product is controlled but the raw material price is free, the producer of the essential consumer item under control may face a most undesirable squeeze. It is only after a careful assessment of such factors that the choice of items for price control can be wisely made. From a long-term point of view it is important that the level at which the price is controlled should not be such as to discourage higher investment leading to larger production of the commodity in question.

The fixation of too low a price, however well-intentioned from the point of view of equity and benefit to the consumer in the short run, comes in the way of the augmentation of supply by making investment in that sector less attractive. Investible resources tend to flow into the uncontrolled sectors which *ipso facto* become more profitable. On the other hand, in the key sectors, important either for current consumption or for future growth and where because of their strategic character price

controls have been set up, investment tends to be shy. If public investment tries to make up for deficiencies of private investment, it only means continued low returns to public enterprises in this sector. The predilection for fixing a low price for all essential articles can thus turn out to be a short-term gain and might prove self-defeating in the long run.

Our own experience with agriculture in the past decade has some lessons for us. In the early stages of our planning there was understandably special emphasis on the maintenance of low food prices. However, as population increased, as incomes went up and as urbanisation proceeded, prices inevitably rose over a period. At the same time there was no advance assurance to the farmer that the extra effort and resources he would put in for increasing food production would be adequately remunerated. This was in contrast with the policy followed in respect of sugar cane and jute where minimum prices were assured. At the same time there were many agricultural products whose prices were left completely free. There was thus a tendency for the farmer, wherever he found it feasible, to take up the production of those products where a minimum price was assured or where he knew he would command a definitely higher price in the open market. In particular, he had little incentive to deploy expensive inputs which could have resulted in a larger production of foodgrains. We have since then rightly shifted the emphasis of policy on providing an assured minimum price for the major food crops so as to sustain the incentive for production and investment. The results are highly encouraging. However, the same agricultural experience brings out that the problem is not a simple one of allowing a price rise of an individual product because we want more of it. The other crops—the cash crops, the export crops—are important too. A competitive spiralling of prices would not benefit the community or result in increased production all round. A balance has to be maintained. Account has to be taken of the cost of inputs as well as their availability. An integrated approach rather than an isolated treatment is called for.

My main point is that price regulation must be viewed as an aspect of the investment problem. The fact that the need for price control has arisen is a signal that active steps are needed to move investment resources into that sector. The decision to intervene in the pricing process carries with it the responsibility of intervening in the pattern of investment. We may attempt in the short run to do away with the operation of the price mechanism in a particular sector, but like Banquo's Ghost the price problem reappears when appropriate investment decisions are involved. As long ago as the First Plan it was recognised that even in respect of public sector investment though the direction of investment need not be guided by the profit and loss calculus, "the relation between costs and returns has to be judged, at least as a first approximation, in terms of market prices." It would therefore commend for consideration the thought that even when prices are controlled, the controlled price must be at a level that would stimulate production and investment.

Such a policy would be beneficial from another point of view as

well. When supplies are scarce it is advantageous to encourage diversion of demand to other products whose supply is relatively plentiful. For instance, if there is a shortage of rice, it would be a better policy to raise its price somewhat and to encourage the consumption of other grains whose supply is more abundant, even, if necessary, by subsidising their sale, than to keep the price of rice low and to stimulate the demand for it, without being able to meet it.

What, I may be asked, then happens to the vulnerable sections of the community? How can they afford to pay higher prices for their basic needs? These are very valid questions which have to be faced rationally rather than sentimentally. We must accept the social need to subsidize certain basic needs of those sections of the community which cannot afford to pay an economic price for them. But does it follow that the benefit of the subsidy should also go to those who do not deserve it? Also is it necessary that the burden of providing the subsidy should fall on the producers of the basic goods and services rather than on the community as a whole? If education has to be provided free or at a low cost to the poor, should the rich also get it at the same price? And would the essentiality of education justify a policy of low salaries for school teachers and much higher salaries for clerks because the services of the latter are less essential? If in the interests of the vulnerable sections, consumer prices have to be kept uneconomically low and if at the same time the producer is not to be discouraged from expanding production and investment in the sector concerned, a system has to be evolved whereby the subsidy is limited to the needy. The burden of the subsidy could be borne by the exchequer or by the better off sections of the community. The technique of dual pricing can, in some cases, help the producer to obtain an overall return at a level to encourage production and investment and at the same time meet the minimal consumption needs of the community at a controlled price. This is indeed the rationale for our current policy with regard to sugar. In respect of cement and steel too similar experiments have been made. There is need for a careful study of the experience in these areas for any lessons it might have in respect of any wide application of the principle which incidentally is capable of extension to selling for exports as well.

Clearly, given the administrative difficulties in policing effectively a complex system of price controls over a wide range and for a long period, the effort must be to limit the area of price control and to shorten its duration. What then should be done about those sectors where price control does not apply? If price controls apply to essential sectors, investment in luxury trades then becomes attractive. Control over prices of luxury items is hardly the solution. Direct licensing of investment leads to problems of its own. There is therefore need to explore other methods of profit regulation than through price control.

The use of the fiscal weapon has much to commend itself. Our direct taxation system does accord some degree of preference to producers in the priority sector. But basically it is not through direct taxation but through indirect levies that profit regulation is better achieved. Curbing high profits through direct taxation has the defect that

it is apt to penalise better profits flowing from an efficient use of capital no less than profiteering in conditions of scarcity. One device worth considering in this context is that a part of the higher profits in conditions of scarcity should be compulsorily ploughed back into expansion of production. The imposition of stiff excise duties on products which are considered less essential discourages investment in them by cutting into their profitability. It is both desirable and fair that wherever possible such excises should be levied before much investment takes place in these sectors.

What about products which are neither suitable for price control of the effective kind nor are so inessential as to warrant a throttling of demand through a stiff excise? To my mind serious consideration should be given to allowing some imports both to augment supply and to regulate prices in such cases. No one is more aware than I of our foreign exchange difficulties in doing so. The criterion of essentiality in allowing imports has to be high. But I submit that the criterion to be applied for setting up domestic production has to be high too. I venture to suggest that one criterion for considering the development of 'import substitute' industry is whether its products are essential enough to warrant imports in the absence of domestic production or if domestic production is inadequate. The difference in import substitution in, say, machine building industries and in cosmetics then becomes apparent. I would commend import substitution in this stricter sense to measure the true import saving rather than the looser concept of producing at home the commodities the import of which has been banned or curtailed on the ground of their low priority.

Much of what I have said so far relates to the regulation of profits. An even more important element in pricing, much less amenable to control, is cost. Time will not permit me to go into this field except to make a few observations of a general nature.

The choice of items to be included in a programme of import substitution requires careful scrutiny from the cost angle. We have neither the resources—nor is it our objective—to produce everything we need internally and without relying on imports. So in selecting what we shall produce a good deal of thought has to be given to comparative cost factors and our bias should be for producing those goods where we expect to have a relatively lower cost structure. Secondly, in domestic price fixation we should avoid adopting the "cost plus" formula. While this may meet the objective of profit control, it does not put any premium on economy or efficiency that would provoke industry to look into its cost structure aimed at a reduction of unit cost. Even though imports may not be physically possible, I would suggest for consideration the thought that cost of imports plus the appropriate import tariff should serve as the appropriate basis of calibration. The concept of the tariff as an instrument of protecting domestic industry so as to equalise the advantage between the foreign and domestic producer has fallen into comparative disuse with the increasing use of quantitative restrictions on imports. A greater use of the tariff approach, even in theory, in determining the level of administered prices would permit an evaluation



of factors beyond the entrepreneur's control and compensate him for them but would not take into account cost differentials arising out of uneconomic or inefficient production.

The problem of an appropriate price policy in a developing economy thus arises largely owing to the existence of persistent pressures towards inflation and external payments deficits. These structural characteristics are compounded by institutional factors which temper the operation of market prices in the conventional sense. While imbalances are created, there are few natural correctives. Appropriate fiscal and monetary policies are clearly necessary; even so some intervention in the pricing system is often indicated.

Price regulation is, however, not to be equated with price control. Price control to be effective has to be administered well and this means it should be limited in range and short in duration. Else there is the danger that the regime of price control would perpetuate the very shortage that brought it into being. This also calls for a diversion of investment resources into the area where supplies are scarce. The level at which the price control is set should be such as to make it worthwhile for investment resources to go in and at the same time it is necessary to protect the vulnerable sections of the community. The allocative function of price has thus to be fitted into the larger social priorities. Dual pricing has potentialities in this direction. Fiscal devices can also be deployed. Price fixation should also pay attention to cost rather than rely on a cost plus formula. The cost of imports plus an appropriate import tariff could serve as the basis of calculation.

The pricing system is and should be regarded as an instrument of economic management rather than a matter of ideology. I began by drawing attention to the crucial role which economists expect the price mechanism to play. Although I was referring to Western economists let me make it clear that even in collectivist economies the importance of the pricing system is receiving increasing recognition, for example, under the influence of Prof. Lieberman in the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav price reform experiment. Economic and efficient pricing and profit as a yardstick of efficiency are common to both market and collectivist economies. What is needed is a controlled use of the pricing system rather than price controls so as to obtain the advantage of the efficient and economic use of resources within the broader ambit of planning—of combining the interests of consumers with incentives to producers—in short to strike a *via media* between centralised control and complete freedom—Shri Ram Memorial Lecture, 1968.

## **Activities of the Council**

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter:

### **Lecture on African Personality**

A meeting was organised under the joint auspices of the Indian Council for Africa and India International Centre in New Delhi on July 16. H. E. Sayed Amin Magzoub Abdoun, Sudan Ambassador, spoke on "The African Personality". Mr. Asoka Mehta, President of the Council, was in the chair. The text of Mr. Abdoun's address is published elsewhere in this issue.

### **Receptions**

The President of the Council, Mr. Asoka Mehta, gave a dinner in honour of African diplomats in the Capital and the General Secretary, Mr. M. S. Gurupadaswamy, held a reception in honour of African diplomats and to meet Mr. S. Nijalingappa, President of the Congress Party.

A lunch in honour of Dr. S. O. Biobaku, Vice-Chancellor, Lagos University, Nigeria, was given by the President of the Council, Mr. Asoka Mehta, on August 7 when Dr. Biobaku visited India on his way to Australia.

### **Swazi Independence Celebrations**

Swaziland Independence Day was celebrated by the Council in New Delhi on September 5 with a reception and a film show.

The Council expresses its deep appreciation to the British Information Services for making available to it the excellent coloured documentary USUTU which describes through the eyes of an African family the progress of a large afforestation project in Swaziland. The Council greeted Swazi students at Indian Universities in Lucknow, Darbhanga, Hyderabad, Bangalore and Trivandrum. It places on record its thanks to Dr. B. L. Maheshwari, a member of the Council, for organising a function in Hyderabad and to Mrs. Leela Damodara Menon for arranging a get-together in Trivandrum.

### **Annual General Meeting**

The Executive Committee of the Council met on July 16 and the Annual General Meeting was held on August 13. The annual report and audit report were adopted. A vote of thanks was recorded

for the efforts made by Mr. Manubhai Shah to expedite the building plan and raise funds for it. A resolution was unanimously passed authorising the Executive Committee to constitute a sub-committee to suggest amendments to the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Council with a view to simplify them. Dr. Anirudha Gupta and Mr. G. P. Deshpande, who visited East Africa on behalf of the Council, gave members a brief report. A detailed report will be submitted by them shortly.

The following became members of the Council during the period July-August : Mr. S. N. Jauhar and Shrimati Mohinder Kaur, M. P., (life members) ; Shrimati Phulrenu Guha, Minister of State for Social Welfare, Mr. R. P. Sinha, Secretary, Congress Party in Parliament, Mr. Ramesh Jauhra, a journalist, and Mr. L. K. Roy (ordinary members).

#### Visitor from Sudan

Dr. Muddathir Abdul Rahim, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science, Khartoum University, was the guest of the Council from September 21 to October 8. The Indian School of International Studies invited Dr. Rahim to deliver a series of three lectures on the Middle East. Dr. Rahim spoke under the joint auspices of the Council and India International Centre on "National Integration in Sudan". Mr. C. K. Daphtary, former Attorney-General, presided and Mr. K. C. Pant, Vice-President of the Council and Minister of State for Finance, welcomed the distinguished speaker.

Dr. Rahim explained the salient features of Sudan's draft constitution at a reception held in his honour by the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies. Dr. L. M. Singhvi, Executive Chairman of the Institute and a member of the Council, presided.

The Council later arranged a talk by Dr. Rahim in Aligarh University on "The Middle East and the World" and in Bombay on "Africa and the World" under the auspices of the Bombay branch of the Council. An interview with Dr. Rahim was also arranged by All-India Radio during which the outstanding Indian scholar on Sudan, Mr. Ayub Sayed, raised a lively discussion.

The President of the Indian Council for Africa, Mr. Asoka Mehta, was host at a dinner in honour of Dr. Rahim. Mr. I. K. Gujral, member of the Executive Committee of the Council and Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs and Communications, gave a lunch for Dr. Rahim to meet parliamentarians and other dignitaries and the Associate Editor of *Africa Quarterly*, Mr. S. A. Mehdi, gave a dinner for Dr. Rahim to meet Delhi Africanists.

Dr. Rahim held discussions with the President of the Council, members of the Congress Party in Parliament, Mr. S. Nijalingappa, President of the Congress Party, members of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Association, and Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, former Defence Minister. He visited the Indian Institute of Public Administration, Gandhi Museum, Parliament House and Jamia Milia.

A visit was also arranged to the Nilokheri Community Development Block and the Indian Dairy Research Institute, Karnal. Later Dr. Rahim was the guest of the Bombay and Bangalore branches of the Council and spent two days in Ahmedabad as the guest of the State Government before he left for Sudan.

The Council is grateful to the above mentioned persons and organisations for their kind cooperation as also to the Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperation and Community Development, the State Governments of Mysore and Gujarat, the Vice-Chancellor and members of the Political Science Department, Aligarh University, the Ambassador of Sudan, H. E. Sayed Amin Magzoub Abdoun, and the Chief Representative of the Arab League States Mission, Mr. Abbas Seif El-Nasr.

### **Publications**

On the occasion of Mozambique Liberation Day (September 25) the Council released an illustrated pamphlet, *Struggle in Mozambique: A Firsthand Report*, by Anders Johansson, a member of the foreign staff of *Dagens Nyheter*, the largest morning paper in Scandinavia and one of the first journalists to tour the territory with Frelimo guerillas.

In response to several requests, the Council brought out a second edition of *Africa: What Lies Ahead* by the late D. K. Chisiza, Secretary-General of the Malawi Congress Party.

*This is Kenya*, the second book in the Independent Africa Series, has been published.

The Council expresses its profound gratitude to the Ghana High Commission for its donation of nine valuable books on Ghana's economy, politics and development plans and for the following daily newspapers: *Evening News*, *Daily Graphic*, *Pioneer*, *Echo* and the weekly *Spectator*; to the Nigerian High Commission for the *Daily Times*; to Mr. Ayub Sayed, an Indian scholar, for back issues of the Sudan *Morning News*, 1965, 1966 and 1967; to the American Library of Congress for a set of 10 reference books on Africa.

### **Donation for Nigerian War Victims**

In response to a world-wide appeal issued by UNICEF for funds to provide food and medical aid to children and their mothers in the war-stricken eastern Nigeria, the Council donated a sum of Rs. 1,000.

## Book Reviews

**African Integration and Disintegration : Case Studies in Economic and Political Union.**

Edited by Arthur Hazlewood. London : Oxford University Press, 1967, 414 p.

This is a very fine book dealing with the problems of unity in Africa. It attempts to highlight the significant aspects of the Africans' quest for national and continental identification. The book contains studies by seven authors, six of whom are scholars affiliated with British and African educational institutions and the seventh is a French civil servant.

Here one finds a collection of eight case studies and two general papers concerning the problems and processes of unity in Africa. Although it is aimed at covering both the political and economic aspects, perhaps the personal preferences of the editor have led to greater emphasis on the economic aspect. Thus, one finds a rich collection of valuable data about various aspects of economic activity in Africa. The value of the book is further enhanced by its coverage of both English and French-speaking Africa.

Hazlewood, in his introductory paper, outlines the nature of the problem. He points out that despite speeches, conferences and resolutions, the quest for African unity seems to have approached little nearer its goal. The national boundaries established by the colonial powers are firmly entrenched and there is reluctance on the part of the governments of African states to surrender autonomy to a new super-national unit.

Economic integration has fared a little better than political integration. As is well known, much of the trade of African countries is with non-African countries and their economies are not complementary. The low level of development and intra-African trade should generally make a customs union of small importance but Hazlewood argues that these very factors make "the customs union question a fundamental one" because a customs union will stimulate industrial growth. He also suggests that because of their small territories and small populations, a customs union becomes more important to African countries.

Hazlewood obviously believes in the desirability of economic integration in Africa. Partly because of this enthusiasm perhaps, his intro-

ductory paper has become a plea for economic cooperation in Africa. He is, however, aware that economic integration is not merely a matter of establishing a customs union. The economies of the different countries in Africa must be made complementary and infra-structure will have to be developed before intra-Africa trade could grow. Hazlewood does not see any prospects for dramatic changes but makes a strong plea for maintaining the "enthusiasm for cooperation" in economic and political matters.

The eight case studies deal with special areas. The two more important among them are Hazlewood's study of economic integration in East Africa and James O'Connell's study of Nigerian politics. Hazlewood discusses the economic inter-relations among the three East African countries, i.e. Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, and describes the working of the East African Common Market. O'Connell's is an excellent case study of the problems of national integration in a "multi-national state". His competent treatment of the various forces in Nigeria from the colonial period through independence and to the internal struggle up to the end of 1966 makes his paper a "must" reading for the understanding of the Nigerian situation today. Besides its topical importance, the study also has relevance to the problems of political development in heterogeneous societies.

In the concluding paper, Catherine Hoskyns takes a continental view to see to what extent pan-African ideas and organisations have been able to promote integration, either among wider groups or in the continent as a whole between 1957 and 1966. She has competently described the evolution of the concept and practice of pan-Africanism and traces the rise and fall of the different organisations. It is significant that nine different organisations were set up in Africa during the decade following 1957, and only two of them are now surviving.

It is important to remember that the concept and practice of pan-Africanism have undergone significant changes during the last decade. Nkrumah had hoped to achieve a United States of Africa and emphasized universality of membership as a principle for African organisations. This principle was followed at the Conference of Independent African States, to which initially even South Africa was invited. By 1960, however, the principle of universality was abandoned. This was manifested by the establishment of UAM and the Casablanca bloc. The OAU in 1963 incorporated the principle of universality but the struggle over this issue is not yet over as was indicated by the controversy concerning the OAU membership of Tshombe's Congo.

Hoskyns' paper clearly brings out that a United States of Africa as the ideal of pan-Africanism has been given up and along with it the organisational approach to federation or political union has also been abandoned. The emphasis now is on functional cooperation among African states. Similarly, more stress is now placed on regional cooperation rather than on continental unity.

The author has highlighted the following trends in the pan-African

movement. Greater contacts have been established among African states, and there is more awareness among them of developments in the continent. In other words, horizontal communications have been improved a great deal during the last decade. However, there has been no actual shift of power from the individual states to the regional bodies and it has not been possible to shift the centre of action from the territorial to the continental level. The emphasis in Africa today is on nation-building and not so much on evolving a continental political system.

Hoskyns also points out that the direction of pan-African activity has shifted from liberation, economic and political integration and projection of African personality abroad to regulating relations and resolution of inter-state conflicts in Africa itself. In a way, the pan-African movement has become more inward-looking.

The book includes an excellent bibliography which incidentally demonstrates that scholarly literature on Africa is expanding rapidly.

In spite of its great value, the book suffers from a basic conceptual deficiency. The meanings of the terms 'integration' and 'disintegration' have not been explained. Hoskyns has given a rudimentary definition of 'integration' (p. 354) which fails to provide satisfactory answers to the several questions involved: whether integration is limited to inter-state cooperation or it also implies common institutional structures, similar educational and administrative systems and, above all, shared values and norms of behaviour. Substantial work has been done in this field by Professor Karl Deutsch of Yale and others and clarification of these vital terms in the book would have helped to bring about greater clarity in the analytical framework.

B. L. MAHESHWARI

### The City of Ibadan

P. C. Lloyd, A. L. Mabogunje and B. Awe, eds. Cambridge, 1967, pp. 280. 45s.

Urban areas have been the chief centres of acculturation in modern Africa. It is here that tribal segregation relaxes and large numbers of people come into contact with varied aspects of modernity. While urbanization is a recent phenomenon in much of sub-Saharan Africa, the Yorubaland in western Nigeria is an outstanding exception.

This book presents a sociological study of Ibadan, a leading Yoruba town and the largest *inland* African city south of the Sahara. It is a collective study, comprising contributions by 14 scholars which portray the evolution of the city, its ethnic structure, its elite, its life and work and its prospects. A city of a million inhabitants, Ibadan is not one of those several towns which existed before the Portuguese arrived in West Africa. Ibadan had its beginning in the 19th century. The original Ibadan consisted of huge compounds, each holding hundreds.

of inhabitants who claimed descent in the male line of one of the more powerful immigrants of the early period and were engaged in agriculture and crafts. Parts of the traditional town still survive, but much of it is swamped by modern administrative, commercial and residential areas.

Ever since Ibadan became a provincial headquarters in 1952 immigration into the town began to rise steadily. The development of the manufacturing industry in the post-colonial period attracted more people from all parts of Nigeria. Even so the indigenous elements preserve their identity with the result that Ibadan is in fact two towns, one of indigenous people and the other of strangers. While lineages dominate in the former, ethnic associations characterize the latter. The elite of Ibadan is also divided into two groups. The traditional elite of chiefs, non-literate commercial magnates and local school teachers and officials, and the national elite of senior civil servants, university teachers and political leaders preserve their respective identities. All these add up to a series of complex relationships between the traditional and modern sectors of Ibadan. The new social, economic and political patterns resulting from this process have been examined and evaluated by the contributors to the volume with competence. The book provides much useful material for sociologists specializing in Africa.

M. S. AGWANI



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# AFRICA QUARTERLY

(A Journal of African Affairs)

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# Gandhi in Africa : The Last Phase

ROBERT A. HUTTENBACK

MAHATMA GANDHI is properly remembered as the father of India's independence, uniquely achieved through the practice of non-violence. It is too frequently forgotten, however, that *satyagraha* as a political technique evolved not in India but during the twenty-one years Gandhi spent in South Africa—years during which he developed the philosophical precepts which were to guide him throughout the rest of his life. On the 100th anniversary of the Mahatma's birth which was celebrated throughout the world on Oct. 2, it seems highly appropriate to retrospectively glance at least at the end of the great struggle Gandhi waged in Natal, the Transvaal and finally the Union. It is doubly fitting that this work be undertaken in an Indian journal devoted to African affairs.

Gandhi had arrived in Durban during May 1893. He had come to South Africa not as the defender of the rights of a beleaguered Indian population but rather on a short-term contract in connection with a civil suit. However, the indignities to which Indians were subjected so outraged the sensitive and proud young man that he determined to enter the lists against the white colonists. Gandhi spent the years between 1893 and 1899 in Natal during which period he focussed the attention of the entire British Empire on the Indian dilemma. After the Boer War, during which Gandhi organized an Indian ambulance corps, he determined to return to India; for he was convinced that the loyalty of the Indians to the British cause throughout the conflict must have resulted in the elimination of most of the anti-Indian prejudice. But it was not so, and Gandhi managed only a brief sojourn in India.

If the problem remained the same, the battleground shifted from Natal to the newly conquered Transvaal, where the replacement of Afrikaner rule by British hegemony had not ushered in the amelioration of the Indian condition that Gandhi had confidently anticipated. Almost the opposite was true. The British administration, led by Lord Milner, first attempted to move Indians into locations for purposes of residence and business and then mounted a campaign to halt Indian immigration into the Transvaal in conjunction with a programme of Indian registration. These same objectives were pursued by the Transvaal after it was granted responsible government, in December 1906, and it was to fight against them that Gandhi first invoked *satyagraha*. But the struggle was not destined to be resolved for many years. Not that Gandhi ever expected total victory. He fought more for principle than substance. He was determined to save the Indians at least their dignity and honour.

In the summer of 1909, both an official delegation from the Transvaal and an unofficial Indian one, consisting of Gandhi and Sheth Haji Habib, proceeded to London in connection with the negotiations to be conducted on the question of uniting the various British colonies in South Africa under a single jurisdiction. Gandhi realized that as long as the Indian problem remained unsettled, the chances of achieving union were considerably reduced, and he went immediately to work. From his hotel in Victoria Street, he addressed the Colonial Office in the first of what was to be a continuing stream of letters.<sup>1</sup> But he could not stem the tide, and the advent of the Union of South Africa on May 31, 1910, did not, therefore, usher in a bright new era for the Transvaal Indians; it merely connoted the continuation of an old struggle in a slightly different context.

General Botha became the new Union's first Prime Minister and immediately resumed the struggle with Gandhi that he had commenced as head of the Transvaal regime. The Indians demanded the absence from the text of any Union immigration act of a differential bar to the entrance of Asiatics and the same status for all immigrants upon entrance. In practice, however, Gandhi was willing to agree to the exclusion of all Indians from the Union, with the exception of a very small number to be admitted annually. These last two points became the eye of the struggle between the Indians, led by Gandhi, and the government. Often agreement was almost reached, only to have it go aglimmering at the last moment.

It must have been sad for Gandhi to see the prospects for a settlement often so tantalizingly close and yet still out of reach. *Satyagraha* was the equivalent of a state of war for the Indians. The current campaign had already lasted more than four years, and many had fallen by the wayside under the strain of battle. A few stalwarts still courted arrest, however, and their families were to some degree supported by the Satyagraha Association. But the funds of the organization were drying up. Since 1906, Gandhi's preoccupation with politics had brought his once lucrative legal practice to a standstill, and he was no longer able to supply financial backing. Money was needed to run the movement's offices in Johannesburg and London and, for that matter, to keep *Indian Opinion*, the newspaper Gandhi had founded in Natal, on its feet. It was a war of attrition, and time was on the side of the government. Sporadic gifts, such as that of Sir Ratan Tata, the Indian industrialist who in 1910 donated Rs. 25,000,<sup>2</sup> delayed the inevitable end. Gandhi came to the conclusion that the continuation of the struggle demanded a drastic cutting of expenditures. If only the families of all the passive resisters in prison could be gathered together on a co-operative farm. But the Phoenix settlement was near Durban, some thirty hours by train from Johannesburg, and in a different province.

It was Herman Kallenbach, a German architect and a supporter of Gandhi, who came to the rescue. He purchased an 1,100-acre farm 21 miles from Johannesburg and offered it to Gandhi, rent free, for the use of the *satyagrahis*. The estate, which Gandhi named the "Tolstoy Farm," in honour of Alexei Tolstoy, whose philosophy he greatly

admired, bore a small house and about a thousand fruit trees. Gandhi planned to turn it into the sort of communal settlement of which he was so fond. Between them, Gandhi and Kallenbach erected a small cluster of corrugated buildings, and the colonists, who usually numbered between 50 and 75, and who were variously Hindu, Muslim, Parsi, and Christian, moved in. All the residents—men, women, and children—were expected to do their share in running the establishment. There was a common vegetarian kitchen, and Kallenbach, who had learned the art of shoe-making from some German monks, imparted his skill to his fellow residents.<sup>3</sup> As Gandhi put it, "The work before us was to make the Farm a busy hive of industry, thus to save money and in the end to make the families self-supporting. If we achieved this goal, we could battle with the Transvaal Government for an indefinite period."<sup>4</sup> Gandhi, always the experimentalist, was able to pursue his theories on health, education, and the virtuous life. He even tried, in conjunction with Kallenbach, to work out the implications of *Ahimsa* (non-violence) as they applied to snakes!<sup>5</sup> Later Gandhi concluded:

Tolstoy Farm proved to be a centre of spiritual purification and penance for the final campaign. I have serious doubts as to whether the struggle could have been prosecuted for eight years, whether we could have secured larger funds, and whether the thousands of men who participated in the last phase of the struggle would have borne their share in it, if there had been no Tolstoy Farm.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, in April 1911, General Jan Smuts, the minister of interior for Botha's government, agreed to Gandhi's demands, and a provisional agreement was reached by an exchange of letters. At a public meeting held in Johannesburg on April 28, the Indian community ratified the compact, and for a time at least the struggle was over. On June 1, the Indian prisoners were released; and on June 5, as a symptom of the new lighter mood, a soccer match was played between the Pretoria passive resisters and those from Johannesburg. That only an armistice prevailed was reflected by the Indians' attitude to the accession of George V to the throne. They professed their loyalty to the Crown, but would not join the official celebrations of the coronation. Gandhi took the opportunity, however, to once more pronounce his adherence to the precepts of the British constitution and the imperial philosophy of equality. "It may seem somewhat anomalous to a stranger," he wrote in *Indian Opinion*,

why and how British Indians of South Africa should tender their loyalty to the Throne and rejoice over the crowning of the sovereign in whose dominions they do not enjoy the ordinary civil rights of ordinary men. British sovereigns represent, in theory, purity and equality of justice..... British statesmen make an honest attempt to realize the ideals. That they often fail miserably in doing so is too true but irrelevant to the issue before us.

... The genius of the British constitution requires that every subject of the Crown should be free as any other, and, if he is

not, it is his duty to demand and fight for his freedom so long as he does so without injuring anyone else...<sup>7</sup>

It was during the deceptive calm that followed the provisional Smuts-Gandhi agreement that Gopal Krishna Gokhale, the most revered Indian political leader of his day, visited South Africa. Gokhale had kept in close touch with Gandhi and the Indian situation in South Africa for 15 years. He was undoubtedly the most prominent Indian ever to visit the southern part of the continent, and he came with the blessings of both the British and Indian Governments. Well advised by the wily Smuts, the Union Government made Gokhale a state guest and showered him with flattery and adulation. From the time of his arrival in Cape Town on October 22, a private railway carriage was placed at his disposal, and throughout the one-month tour red carpets and illuminations greeted him at every stop. Gandhi, who acted as Gokhale's secretary (and valet), became more and more uneasy as he watched the effect this treatment was having on his great guest—dulling the edge of his resentment. In a sense, the Union Government was stealing the Indians' saviour.

Gokhale saw all the prominent members of the government, and on the 12th of November had lunch with the Governor-General. The one reform Gokhale was determined to achieve while in South Africa was the repeal of the £3 tax levied annually on ex-indentured Indians resident in Natal, and as he left the Union, he was convinced he carried with him a promise to that effect from the government. The failure of the Union to carry out this undertaking (which Botha and his ministers denied ever making) and a decision in the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court that only those marriages performed according to Christian rites were legal, presaged the recommencement of conflict. The last point was of particular importance, as it would, under the terms of the Immigration Act then going through Parliament, prevent the wives of Indians resident in South Africa, who were still outside the Union, from joining their husbands. As Gandhi remarked :

...This terrible judgment thus nullified in South Africa at a stroke of the pen all marriages celebrated according to the Hindu, Musalman and Zoroastrian rites. The many married Indian women in South Africa in terms of this judgment ceased to rank as wives of their husbands and were degraded to the rank of concubines, while their progeny were deprived of their right to inherit the parents' property. This was an insufferable situation for women no less than men, and the Indians in South Africa were deeply agitated...<sup>8</sup>

The failure of the Government to afford redress forced Gandhi once more to ask his confreres to withdraw their support from certain of the laws of the Union of South Africa. On the 13th of September, in inaugurating the new campaign, Gandhi wrote in *Indian Opinion*: "A settlement without a settlement spirit is not settlement...It is much better to have an open fight than a patched-up truce. The fight this time must be for altering the spirit of the Government and European population of South Africa. And the result can only be attained by prolonged and bitter suffering that must melt the hearts alike of the

government, and of the predominant partner."<sup>9</sup> *Satyagraha* is essentially a majority weapon. What must that old political campaigner Gokhale have thought when Gandhi informed him that his "army of peace" consisted of at least 16 and at most 65 *satyagrahis*.<sup>10</sup> But Gandhi's methods often prospered best when the odds against success were the longest.

On the 15th of September, a "pioneer party" of 12 men and 4 women, including Gandhi's wife, Kasturba, left Durban for Volksrust, there to cross the border into the Transvaal illegally. Kasturba and her companions were duly arrested, deported, and when they attempted to cross the border again, sentenced to terms of hard labour ranging from one to three months. Others followed the "pioneer party's" lead, and the government's discomfiture began to grow, even though Gandhi informed the *Transvaal Leader* that the struggle was to be limited to about 100 passive resisters.<sup>11</sup>

The campaign entered a new phase on October 17, when Gandhi visited the Natal coalfields near Newcastle. He urged the indentured miners to strike until the government removed the £3 tax, and 78 workers ceased work, were arrested and sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour. Soon 3,000 Indians from the Newcastle, Cambrian, and Durban Navigation Collieries were on strike. On October 22, railway employees at Dannhauser struck, and 1,500 workers from the same vicinity decided to walk to the Transvaal border and court arrest.

The Union suddenly found itself faced by a serious threat, and its response became increasingly desperate and coercive. The mine operators cut off the water and electricity to the miners' quarter, driving them forth, and making Gandhi suddenly wealthy in poor men. On the 26th of October, 800 more miners went on strike. What was Gandhi to do with his unemployed and hungry followers? The Indian merchants of the mine area were of little help. If the government could be induced to arrest and jail them, it would at least have to feed them. In consultation with Kallenbach, Polak, and his secretary, Sonia Schlesin, Gandhi determined to lead his motley army from Natal into the Transvaal. Hopefully, the authorities would intercept them on the way, but if they should fail to do so and if by some miracle the strikers completed the journey successfully, Gandhi intended to incorporate them into the Tolstoy Farm establishment.

They marched forth on October 28—2,037 men and 127 women—on a ration of a pound and a half of bread a day and an ounce of sugar. The 36 miles from Newcastle to Charlestown, a town close to the border, were covered in two days. "The pilgrims which Gandhi is guiding," wrote the *Sunday Post*, "are an exceedingly picturesque crew. To the eye they appear most meagre, indeed emaciated, their legs are mere sticks but the way they are marching on starvation rations shows them to be particularly hardy."<sup>12</sup> On November 6, the procession advanced on Volksrust expecting trouble, as some of the local worthies had threatened to shoot the Indians like rabbits. But the border was crossed without incident. At 8-30 p.m., in the Transvaal, Gandhi was



arrested, only to be immediately released on bail,<sup>13</sup> so that he could rejoin the *satyagrahis*.

Two days later, Gandhi was once more taken into custody, this time at Standerton, and again he put up the bail of £50. The following day, November 9, when he was apprehended for the third time, Gandhi was not released. The marchers, however, continued in good order to Balfour, where they were stopped and herded onto three special trains bound for Natal. En route they were starved, and upon reaching their destination they were prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned. The government allowed its more imaginative instincts to come into play. The mine compounds were declared to be outstations of the Dundee and Newcastle jails. The mine-owners' European staffs were appointed warders, and work in the mines was made part of the sentence. When the miners refused to go underground, they were whipped, fired upon, and, in general, treated with the utmost cruelty. As news of these excesses became generally known, more miners and plantation workers from Tongaat to Umgeni joined their colleagues in the field, only to be set upon by the mounted military police.

On the 11th of November, Gandhi was tried at Dundee, Natal, for having induced indentured Indians to leave the province. The court was crowded with Europeans and Indians as Mr. J. W. Godfrey, appearing for Gandhi, addressed the bench:

...The circumstances which had brought Mr. Gandhi before the Magistrate were well known to all persons, and he was only expressing the desire of the defendant when he stated that the Magistrate had a duty to perform, and that he was expected to perform that duty fearlessly, and should therefore not hesitate to impose the highest sentence upon the prisoner if he felt that the circumstances in the case justified it.<sup>14</sup>

The resident magistrate, Mr. J. W. Cross, sentenced the defendant to a £60 fine or nine months' rigorous imprisonment, and Gandhi, unhesitatingly, chose the latter. On November 13, Gandhi was moved to Volksrust jail, and on the 14th he was sentenced to a further three months' term by the Volksrust court. Two days later, all Indian labour in the Durban area—on the railways, sugar refineries, docks, and corporation facilities—struck work. A clash between the strikers and the police ensued resulting in the injury of 16 Indians and the death of one. On the 18th of November, Gandhi was moved to his third place of imprisonment, the Pietermaritzburg jail. All in all, Gandhi was treated worse than he had ever been previously. At first he was made to dig stones and sweep the compound. Later he was confined in a cell just ten feet by eight, which at night was lit only when the guard came on his periodic rounds. Gandhi was not allowed to have even a bench in his place of confinement, nor was he allowed to exercise. He was in general harassed, and every attempt was made to humiliate him. When he was summoned to give evidence in another case, he was marched to court, handcuffed, and with legs manacled.<sup>15</sup>

But the passive resistance campaign was having an effect all over

the British world. In South Africa itself, although some newspapers chided the government for indecision and for having become "mere pawns in a game as mad and cruel as has ever been devised by any group of fanatics or of notoriety-loving agitators,"<sup>16</sup> others openly sided with the Indians.

Lord Hardinge, the viceroy, in violation of time-honored custom, attacked both London and Pretoria. "It is not easy to find means whereby India can make its indignation felt by those holding the reins of Government in South Africa," he exclaimed in a public speech in Madras.

...your compatriots in South Africa have taken matters into their own hands, organizing passive resistance to laws which they consider invidious and unjust, and opinion which we, who are watching their struggles from afar, cannot but share. They violated those laws with a full knowledge of the penalties involved, and are ready with all courage and patience to endure the penalties. In all this they have the deep and burning sympathy of India, and also of those who like myself, without being Indian, sympathise with the people of this country...

Hardinge next referred to the measures allegedly being used in South Africa to crush passive resistance, "measures which would not be tolerated for a moment in any country claiming to be civilized." The Government of South Africa, the viceroy conceded, categorically denied the charges levelled against it, but in the process admitted practices which at best were neither wise nor discreet. In the conclusion of his address, Hardinge urged the appointment of an impartial committee to investigate and report on the Indian problem in South Africa in all its ramifications.<sup>17</sup> The Madras speech almost overnight made Hardinge into perhaps the most popular British figure ever to serve on the sub-continent, but in South Africa Botha and Smuts pressed for the viceroy's recall.

The situation grew ever more desperate, as Lord Gladstone, the Union's governor-general, telegraphed the Colonial Office on behalf of the Natal Indian Congress:

Indian mass meeting, over 5,000 present, strongly condemn Government of Union of South Africa attitude arrest and imprisonment of Gandhi, Kallenbach, Polak, and others for striking demonstration of feeling against £3 tax. Strikers imprisoned, Mines proclaimed temporary gaols. Brutally assaulted, flogged, some shot at, wounded. One died today result flogging. Strikers confined estates under police guard. Thousands continue to come out. Situation getting more serious every hour. Increasing difficulty feeding people and keeping order. Active, prompt, intervention by Imperial, Indian Governments necessary lest greater hardships ensue, even many lives may be lost.<sup>18</sup>

At this darkest hour, however, a new development suddenly shattered the gloom. The Union Government, perhaps as a result of Hardinge's speech, on December 11 announced its intention to establish an "Indian Enquiry Commission" to investigate the cause of the strike and the disturbances that occurred in connection with it and to make recommendations for the future.

The *satyagraha* struggle was now destined to end, but it was still not officially over when Gandhi travelled to Pretoria to see Smuts. It was January 9, 1914, and a railway strike was looming on the horizon. As was his custom, Gandhi was not at all anxious to take advantage of the government's embarrassment, and he promised that *satyagraha* would be suspended, at least until the strike was settled. This decision had a profound effect. One of Smuts's secretaries, with somewhat strained jocularity, told Gandhi:

I do not like your people, and do not care to assist them at all. But what can I do? You help us in our days of need. How can we lay hands upon you? I often wish you took to violence like the English strikers, and then we would know at once how to dispose of you. But you will not injure even the enemy. You desire victory by self-suffering alone and never transgress your self-imposed limit of courtesy and chivalry. And that is what reduces us to sheer helplessness.<sup>19</sup>

The report of the Indian Enquiry Commission appeared in April 1914. Much of it was devoted to a discussion of the events leading up to the passive resistance campaign and an analysis of the various incidents which occurred during the strike. Its most significant sections, however, left to a few paragraphs at the end of some 40 pages, contained the recommended changes in both the law and in administrative practice. Most significantly, it urged the abolition of the £3 residence tax payable by Indians in Natal, and the recognition of marriages performed under other than Christian rites. The Commission's report was accepted and the necessary legislative commitments were made in Act No. 22 of 1914—the so-called Indian Relief Bill.

Gandhi now felt that he could at least return to India. One wonders what he would have been like without the South African experience. Gandhi had landed in Natal as the junior counsel for a commercial firm earning a salary of £ 105 per annum. Within a few short years he was receiving £5,000 a year in legal fees, all of which he was to contribute to a cause in which he deeply believed. Operating in a sphere where he really had no rivals, Gandhi was able to rid himself of the uncertainty which had caused him to collapse while cross-examining a witness in Bombay, and to emerge not only as a skilled lawyer, respected throughout Natal, the Transvaal, and later the Union, but as a political leader of great maturity, flexibility, and imagination. As Gandhi left South Africa for the final time in July 1914, his constituents flooded him with testimonials and farewell banquets.

Even Gandhi's former rivals were not ungenerous in praise. *The Star* of Johannesburg, on July 15, wrote :

As we remarked the other day, he has proved himself a singularly purposeful patriot and a strategist of considerable ability. But with this intense pride in his people has "marched" a feeling for Imperial considerations without which a solution might never have been found, and without which future guiders of Indian opinion in this country will find future policy almost impossible to direct.

Smuts, for his part, exclaimed with obvious relief : "The saint has left our shores, I sincerely hope for ever."<sup>20</sup> Yet, in an essay he contributed to a collection on Gandhi's Political Method 35 years later, Smuts wrote :

It was my fate to be the antagonist of a man for whom even then I had the highest respect..... I must frankly admit that his activities at that time were very trying to me. Together with other South African leaders I was busily engaged in the task of welding the Old Colonies into a unified State... It was a colossal work which took up every moment of my time. Suddenly in the midst of all those engrossing preoccupations, Gandhi raised a troublesome issue. We had a skeleton in our cupboard .....<sup>21</sup>

"[I] would like to make a final appeal to our European friends who take an interest in the British Indian question in South Africa," Gandhi proclaimed in his valedictory.

Let me appeal to them to take a humanitarian view of the question, the imperial view of the question. Rightly or wrongly, for good or evil, Englishmen and Indians have been knit together and it behoves both races so to mould themselves as to leave a splendid legacy to generations yet to be born, and to show that though Empires have gone and fallen, this Empire perhaps may be an exception and this is an Empire not founded on material but spiritual foundations.

That has been a source of solace all through. I have always believed there is something subtle, something fine in the ideals of the British Constitution. Tear away those ideals and you tear away my loyalty to that Constitution ; keep those ideals and I am ever a bondsman (Cheers). Both races should see that those ideals of the British Constitution always remain a sacred treasure.<sup>22</sup>

As he sailed away, Gandhi knew not what great task still lay before him in India. Wistfully, he wrote from shipboard :

..... I have been so often prevented from reaching India that it seems hardly real that I am sitting in a ship bound for India. And having reached that what shall I do with myself. However, "Lead Kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom. Lead Thou me on....."<sup>23</sup>

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# India and the Decolonization of Africa

RAHMATULLAH KHAN

**M**ORE than seven hundred million people have attained independence since the Second World War began. Africa, the last bastion of colonialism has shaken the yoke off its shoulders at a pace no one would have imagined when the Charter of the United Nations was drafted. Less than one per cent of the world's population now lives under colonial rule. This small percentage of people living in about fifty-one dependent territories has posed new problems for the world community.<sup>1</sup>

The process of decolonization has been the most spectacular achievement of the post-World War II era. It would be hazardous to claim for the UN the entire credit for the decolonization of Africa and Asia. Equally foolish would it be to assert that what the UN is today is because of the newly emerged Asian-African states. Surely there has been some interaction.<sup>2</sup> The complexion of the UN has significantly changed owing to this phenomenon. So has the UN helped substantially in shaping this phenomenon. One can say that the UN acted as a hand-maid in the process of decolonization. Most of the troubles in post-independent Africa, e.g., the Congo, should more properly be attributed to the "teething troubles" of new-born nations rather than to the premature deliveries by the UN.

In such a fantastic phenomenon, in which the utmost caution is called for in any assessment of the role of the UN itself, to claim that India had played a "role" is, on the face of it, presumptuous. No one country, no one institution should be given the credit solely or primarily. A cluster of international events or what the present writer would call "a current of history" is responsible for this Great Emancipation. Yet, to ignore the part played by India would be swinging to the other extreme. India did play a useful role in this process. It would not be blowing our own trumpet if we remind ourselves of this. One way of bringing out India's role is to assess it separately after the process of decolonization is described at some length. The other way is to describe the process fully, India's contribution coming in as a "refrain" in the background. Since India's contribution has been both direct and indirect both the methods are adopted here; the first method, it is felt, would adequately cover India's contribution by proxy—if one is permitted to call it by that term.

### Evolutionary Approach of the UN

The Charter of the United Nations, which has become the charter of liberty for the dependent peoples, was drafted at San Francisco in an atmosphere marked by preponderant concern with world peace. There was a section of delegates who viewed the future organization as the dispenser of peace and prosperity for all. Despite the bold assertion in the Atlantic Charter the concept of self-determination received very guarded acceptance at the conference. With the help of enlightened opinion in the gathering India tried to incorporate the principle as a binding obligation in the Charter. The Colonial Powers, however, were unwilling to make any specific commitment in this regard. The relevant passage in the San Francisco documents records the move this way :

“Concerning the principle of self-determination, it was strongly emphasized on the one side that this principle corresponded closely to the will and desires of people everywhere and should be clearly enunciated in the Charter; on the other side, it was stated that the principle conformed to the purposes of the Charter only in so far as it implied the right of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession.”<sup>3</sup>

Consequently, the problem of dependent peoples was sought to be solved through an “evolutionary” approach. Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the UN Charter, which contain no mention of the principle of self-determination *per se*, nevertheless, lay down a plan as to how it should be achieved. The seminal provisions of this scheme are as follows :

#### Chapter XI, Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end :

- (a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
- (b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
- (c) to further international peace and security;
- (d) to promote constructive measures of development, to

encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and

(e) to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

### **Chapter XII, Article 76**

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be :

- (a) to further international peace and security;
- (b) to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
- (c) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
- (d) to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

The territories involved in the trusteeship system in the African context were only two, viz, Somaliland, a former Italian mandate which attained independence smoothly after a fixed period of ten years, and South-West Africa, a former mandate of South Africa which the Union refused to place under the UN trusteeship system and which hangs fire until now. Therefore, not much emphasis is placed on the trusteeship system of the UN. It was by a liberal exploitation of the Chapter entitled "Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories" that the whole process of decolonization was achieved. Greater emphasis therefore must be placed on this chapter.

### **The Legal Approach**

The first thing that must be mentioned in this connection is the initial controversy that raged about the scope of the Chapter. One



school of thought held that the "Declaration" in Chapter XI was in its very nature not binding on the Colonial Powers and that it was inserted into the Chapter only as a set of guidelines.<sup>4</sup> This kind of interpretation gained credence on the basis of the views of the Colonial Powers which were responsible for framing the Charter. Mr. Winson Churchill, referring to Stettenius' Yalta formula that the international trusteeship system should be applied to all "territories", is reported to have said :

"..... Under no circumstances would he ever consent to the fumbling fingers of forty or fifty nations prying into the life's existence of the British Empire."<sup>5</sup>

This restrictive view is held even today by Portugal.<sup>6</sup>

The other school of thought which held that Chapter XI was constitutive of legal obligations was voiced forcefully by scholars and statesmen from time to time.<sup>7</sup> India, along with the Philippines, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Indonesia, expressed strong support for this view in the UN General Assembly.<sup>8</sup> It needs no great legal acumen to see that any attempt to accord a lesser legal significance to a part of an international treaty—which is the case with the UN Charter—than any other part is going against all the canons of constructions of treaty law.

### **Political Pressures**

The point that is sought to be established by reference to the above legal controversy is this. The early battles in the field of decolonization strangely were waged on a legal level. But in course of time, or perhaps simultaneously, the attacks seem to have been multi-pronged. Let us move on to the venue of political pressurizing. In a letter of 29 June 1946 the Secretary-General required member-states to specify their position as to the definition of the term 'Non-Self-governing Territories' and the factors governing the definitional problem.<sup>9</sup> The letter had very significant undertones in the scheme of Art. 73. Paragraph (e) of this article enjoins members "to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible."..... Juxtaposed with a resolution adopted by the General Assembly in the very first session—to the effect that "the obligations accepted under Chapter XI of the Charter by all Members of the United Nations are in no way contingent upon the conclusion of trusteeship agreements or upon the bringing into being of the Trusteeship Council and are, therefore, already in full force"—the Secretary-General's definitional query threw open the whole question of colonial administration.

Who is to decide as to whether a particular territory comes within the purview of Chapter XI or not?<sup>10</sup> The way the United Nations assumed authority in this regard is a fascinating story.

### **UN Assumption of Power on Colonies**

The first step in this direction was taken by the General Assembly

when it adopted a resolution (No. 66) which "noted" the fact of enumeration of certain territories as Non-Self-governing by certain member-states.<sup>11</sup> Though some writers<sup>12</sup> felt that the resolution meant little by way of clarifying the powers of the General Assembly in the determination of the territories under Chapter XI, it certainly was a first step. For, after this resolution another was adopted in 1948 (No. 222) in which the General Assembly expressed the opinion that it was essential for the United Nations to be informed of any changes in the constitutional position and status of a territory as a result of which the Administering Member considered it unnecessary to continue to transmit information.<sup>13</sup> This resolution is important in that it restricts the discretion of Administering Members from unilaterally changing the status of their colonial territories. In fact it went a step ahead when it "considered" the cessation of information regarding Puerto Rico, Antilles, Surinam and Greenland and "approved" of such cessation. These might be considered as the negative factors in the competence of the General Assembly (i.e., noting, considering and approving of the existence, continuance and cessation of Non-Self-governing territories).

Moves towards establishing positive factors of UN authority in the field of colonial administration were made from 1951 to 1953. In order to ascertain the validity of cessation of information the General Assembly thought it expedient to lay down the factors which might serve as a guide in deciding whether or not a territory had attained a full measure of self-government. In 1953 it adopted a resolution (No. 742) which enumerated *inter alia* the list of factors governing the question whether a territory was covered by Chapter XI of the Charter. With this resolution the General Assembly might be said to have assumed the competence to lay down the general criteria.

With the admission of Portugal in 1956 as member of the UN, the General Assembly's power to deal with specific cases came to be tested. Soon after its admission Portugal's responsibilities over its colonial possessions attracted attention. Portugal came out with a bland statement that it did not have any territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter, that according to its constitution, which was unitary in character, all territories were exactly in the same position, and that an "overseas territory has no more and no less in its status than any other territory."<sup>14</sup>

India contended strongly that the Portuguese contention was untenable. It argued that the constitutional position of colonial possessions was not the criteria on which the determination should be based, but the fact of "colonial conquest", the perpetuation of which was contrary to the whole trend of twentieth century thought. "The cardinal test", maintained the Indian delegate, "was whether the people of dependent territories had or had not attained a full measure of self-government, and that test had to be applied in the light of the factors enumerated by the General Assembly....."<sup>15</sup>

The debate continued until 1960 when on the initiative of India, along with some other countries, a committee was appointed to go into

the question. This committee, which was headed by Mr. C. S. Jha, comprised India, Morocco, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, produced a report laying down the relevant principles.<sup>16</sup> According to this report, "*prima facie* there is an obligation to transmit information in respect of a territory which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it."

The cumulative effect of the debates and the Jha Committee report can be seen in the resolution that the General Assembly adopted in December 1960 (No. 1542) which applied concretely the principles it had itself evolved in its Resolution 1541 (XV), and specified for the first time the territories in regard to which Portugal is under an obligation to transmit information under Chapter XI of the Charter.<sup>17</sup>

Thus was completed the consolidation of authority of the UN over most of the alien possessions of the Colonial Powers. Once the administration of these territories was laid open to international supervision the death-knell of colonialism was sounded. From this position the further step of scrutinizing specific obligations imposed by Chapter XI was the most logical. One such obligation was to develop self-government.

### Self-government and Independence

Article 73 (b) requires Administering Members to develop self-government in Non-Self-governing Territories. The impression one gets by way of reference to *travaux préparatoires* is that the framers of the Charter, though anxious to make independence not of universal application, did not rule out independence as a possible goal for dependent territories in appropriate cases.<sup>18</sup> On the same logic the Charter prescription of "self-government" could not be deemed to exclude independence. Here, again, India's contribution was of crucial importance. Mr. C. S. Jha, India's Permanent Representative at the UN, in a statement before the Six-Member Special Committee, stated :

The progressive development of self-government is to take place as indicated in Article 73 itself with "due account of the political aspirations of the peoples" and recognizing the principle that the "interests of the inhabitants of the territories are paramount". Who can say today that the aspirations of any peoples, whether under trusteeship or under colonial administration as a non-self-governing territory, are or can be anything short of independence.<sup>19</sup>

Also, in the context of transmission of information the apparent disabilities imposed by Article 73 (e) — which required information only of "statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions" — was overcome with a disarming candour. First, it was argued that "voluntary transmission" of information of a political nature was entirely in conformity with the Charter.<sup>20</sup> Later the General Assembly lent new emphasis to its interests in the political developments of Non-Self-governing Territories by adopting Resolution 848.<sup>21</sup>

Mr. R. Venkataraman, the Indian delegate, supplied the rationale of this development in these words:

It is hardly necessary to stress the inter-relationship of social, educational, economic and political conditions. It is unrealistic today for any one to assert that politically submerged inhabitants of dependent territories need nothing more than a little economic advancement, a little social encouragement or a few universities and schools.<sup>22</sup>

In a fitting climax to these developments the General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1960, without a dissenting vote, which proclaimed the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. The operating part requires member-states of the UN to take steps to transfer all power to the peoples in Trust and Non-Self-governing Territories.<sup>23</sup> India, which was one of the sponsors of the resolution, was elected, in recognition of its services in the field presumably, a member of the Special Committee of Twenty-four, which was to serve as a watchdog of the General Assembly — examining and recommending measures for accelerating progress in the implementation of the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

#### **A Blend of Pragmatism and Doctrine**

In addition to the above, India's contribution was also felt in the decolonization process on abstruse concepts of sovereignty as well as in infusing pragmatism in the proceedings. As an example of the former one might cite Mr. V. K. K. Menon's commentary on the report of the Good Offices Committee on South-West Africa:

No mandatory power has any sovereignty over the mandated territories.....Sovereignty does not rest either in the United Nations or in the League of Nations. Sovereignty over this territory rests in the people of that territory alone and lies latent, and the purpose of development of the territory is to make it actual.<sup>24</sup>

Again, on the word "may" in Article 75 of the Charter, which is supposed to give arbitrary power to mandatory Powers to place their mandated territories under the UN trusteeship system, Mr. Menon was eloquent in the Trusteeship Council:

There is placed upon the Union of South Africa a Charter obligation. I am not referring to a moral obligation. Now in this matter a great play is made of the use of the word "may" in the relevant article of the Charter.....

.....I submit, Mr. Chairman, that this "may" is merely an expression of simple futurity.....The reason for this is that the territories that come under trusteeship are not contemplated to be only those that were mandated, but others as well. And this is the reason for this "may", because in other cases — in cases of territories not under mandates — it must be purely a voluntary choice, because they are not under any kind of trusteeship.<sup>25</sup>

The element of pragmatism was infused when on 27 November 1961 the Soviet Union and Nigeria proposed two draft resolutions fixing different target dates—the former 1962, and the later 1970. Mr C.S. Jha argued persuasively (and successfully) :

The difficulty about fixing a target date—whether it is 1970 or 1962, or some intermediate date—is that any date is likely to be too long in some cases, and perhaps too short in others... [also] it pre-supposes a certain patronizing, paternal attitude...—and target dates have a habit of becoming fixed dates...The best thing we can do is to persist in demanding that immediate measures be taken by the colonial Powers for the implementation of Resolution 1514 (XV) and to prod them relentlessly and ceaselessly.<sup>26</sup>

India's voice was heard also on matters big and small; whether it was urging a common roll system in the Fiji,<sup>27</sup> or supporting the Congolese appeal to the Security Council for help in expelling mercenaries,<sup>28</sup> or deploring the "solid wall of defiance" which South Africa had put up over South-West Africa.<sup>29</sup> It has been in the forefront of the struggle against colonialism in the United Nations.

### **Indirect Contribution**

India's indirect contribution to the consolidation and further development of decolonization will surely go down in the history of the UN. We have in mind its efforts to gain for the suppressed people the right to overthrow the last vestiges of colonialism by force. In December 1961 when India used armed force to take possession of Goa, the debate in the Security Council revealed a bitter clash of views as to the relationship between the UN Charter and the struggle against colonialism. Portugal contended that the Indian action be denounced by the Security Council. Mr Adlai Stevenson (USA) categorized the UN inaction thus: "Tonight we are witnessing the first act in a drama which could end with the death of the Organization."

Mr Jha's reply to the debate stressing the colonial nature of the Portuguese title and the refusal of Portugal to co-operate with the United Nations, ending with his challenging statement will be remembered for long. He stated : "My country has never accepted and will never accept any legal, moral or ethical basis for the process by which India became colonized.".....And further : "It must be realized that this is a colonial question...this is a matter of faith with us. Whatever anyone else may think, Charter or no Charter, Council or no Council, that [sic] is our basic faith which we cannot afford to give up at any cost."

Prof. Richard Falk after a thorough discussion of the Goa case in his lectures to the Academy of International Law (The Hague) threw his weight on the Indian side in preference to his own country's delegate, Mr Stevenson's "wooden conception" of international law.<sup>30</sup> With that support of the most progressive of the contemporary international lawyers we might conclude that India's contribution in the field of decolonization took a full turn with the liberation of Goa.

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# African Studies in India

ANIRUDHA GUPTA

IN the West interest in African studies received a fresh impetus after the end of the Second World War. Prior to that, most territories of tropical Africa were more or less regarded as special preserves of different colonial Powers and this factor, among others, contributed to limiting the scope of independent research in African subjects. With a few exceptions, the studies undertaken at this time in the fields of African anthropology, sociology, government, etc., were carried out either at the instance of or in conjunction with the colonial administrators. This does not, however, mean that all these works lacked originality or that they provided only an apology to the Imperial rule; on the contrary, the writings of such pioneers as Mergery Perham, Elspeth Huxley, Henri Junod, Raymond Buell, etc., not only brought the light of understanding about a continent of which little was known outside, but they also laid a basis for the organization of African studies on a larger and more systematic scale after the war. Nevertheless the fact remains that the colonial governments did not encourage individual initiative or expertise in an area in which they considered they had the last say. Hence even the completion of such classics as Lugard's *Dual Mandate* (1929), Frankel's *Capital Investment in Africa* (1938), and Hailey's *African Survey* (1946) could not have been possible without the approval and assistance of the British colonial office.

## Post-War Interest in Africa

The post-war process of decolonization, however, changed the situation drastically. As more territories in Africa became independent their involvement in world affairs began to grow and, as a corollary, the interest of the outside world in Africa also became more marked. This interest had obviously a *pragmatic-utilitarian* side : from the point of view of the outside powers it became increasingly important to know how the minds of independent Africans worked, how they exercised and stabilized political power and, in general, what possible impact the new states of Africa had on international relations ? The answers to these questions, even when they were put in an academic form, had same value for governments and policy-makers. On the other hand there was a genuine enthusiasm among scholars and writers that the opening up of Africa would vastly expand the scope of research and that it would help in developing new tools of research for the understanding of the emergent societies. In the rush, it cannot be denied, some works were produced only with a view to attract newspaper headlines.<sup>1</sup>

### Proliferation of African Studies in the West

Thus a variety of factors—some pragmatic, some academic—created a favourable climate, especially in Europe, Britain and America, for the study of new Africa. And it was at this time that generous financial grants came from private and governmental sources to promote African studies at the university level. Thus in 1948 a chair of African history was established at the London School of Oriental and African Studies and, also, in that year a centre was opened at the Boston University for the promotion of African studies in America. From these rather small beginnings the pace of growth over the next two decades was phenomenal: thus, by 1967, there were in Britain 19 advanced centres of African studies and 6 departments devoted to special disciplines pertaining to Africa. In the USA there were some 40 formally organized African studies units in American universities and colleges, 21 of them at major centres. "In 1966, these latter units included 260 faculty members with African specialization and 1,000 graduate students who were continuing their disciplinary specializations with commitments to the African area."<sup>2</sup> In France, in addition to the Paris universities, several provincial universities, including Strasbourg and Bordeaux, started research centres in African studies.

### In Other Parts

The proliferation of African studies in Britain, France and America has thus been one of the most spectacular achievements of post-war university education, but interest in Africa was not confined to these countries only. Even those countries which had smaller resources or which came late on the scene or which — like the socialist countries — expressed ideological solidarity with the African peoples were not slow in setting up African study centres at the institutes of higher learning. Thus, to give a few illustrations, in Belgium, a new institute, the *Institut-des Pays au Developpement*, was established in 1961 with a view to study the political, economic, and social problems of the developing countries; in Canada, a Committee on African Studies was set up in 1962 at the McGill University in Montreal; and in Japan, the non-governmental *Ajia Afurikakeukyuko* (The Afro-Asian Institute of Japan) has been training and sending young Japanese scholars to African universities and other institutions for a two-year period to carry out socio-economic surveys. Among the countries of the Socialist bloc, the African Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which was established in 1962 under the guidance of Professor I. Potekhin, has a large number of staff and students working on various African subjects. Even in a small country like Czechoslovakia university teaching on African studies commenced in 1961-62 and a department of African and Asian studies was set up within the faculty of philosophy, Prague. The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, has an African Affairs Committee and also a "Research Commission for African Subjects" and a "Committee for Social Relations with the Peoples of Africa."

Of late both West Germany and East Germany have shown increasing interest in Africa, and this interest is reflected in the Orga-



nization of African research in both the countries. In East Germany the *Afrika Institut* of Karl Marx came into being in 1960 and, as this institute has come in possession of the official records of the former German colonial office, it has opened a unique opportunity for scholars and historians to investigate one of the least known chapters of colonial history.<sup>3</sup> In West Germany, the initiative came from the Foreign Office and it was at its instance that the German Africa Society was set up. In addition, the two universities of Hamburg and Berlin are charged with special responsibility to conduct research in African subjects.

### Contribution of African Studies

It would not, however, be correct to suggest that the expansion of African studies has meant only the expansion of the scholars' field of activity on a geographical scale. It is true that at times the scramble for knowledge about Africa reminds one of the earlier scramble among the Western powers for empires in Africa, and it is also true that sometimes the findings of scholars are used by the Governments for a variety of purposes which are not wholly above board;<sup>4</sup> but, in a general sense, African studies have represented a new challenge—a testing ground—to the academic world as a whole. In Political Science, for instance, Africa with its problem of change, tensions, and endemic instability has not only provided an excellent opportunity for the testing of general models and theories but also the incentive for reformulating old theories to meet new situational categories.<sup>5</sup> In History, the search to know and reconstruct Africa's past has reinforced the historian's determination to emancipate human knowledge from its "Euro-centric" chains. In recent times more emphasis has been laid on compiling the oral traditions of the African peoples—a field in which "the historians of Africa are making their most important contribution to historiography generally..."<sup>6</sup> Similarly, the theories of economic growth and development have come to be tested more and more for understanding African problems and for expanding the range and relevance of these theories in terms of actual life.

Thus the phenomenal advance African studies have made in recent times represents an advance of human knowledge in the social sciences. Indeed it would not be an exaggeration to say that the inter-disciplinary approach in the social sciences has become only meaningful in view of the scholar's attempts to come to grips with the problems he faces in studying Africa.

### Stage of African Studies

But neither the interest of scholars nor the proliferation of academic centres means that the study of Africa has come to maturity. In fact, like the African scene, attempts to study Africa have remained subjected to the uncertainties of a transitional phase. There is as yet a great need to know more facts, even in the elementary sense, before African studies could be projected as another branch of the academic disciplines.<sup>7</sup> Further, the anxiety to renovate old theories or create new

ones has sometimes led to ridiculous results.<sup>8</sup> Both these factors—the paucity of facts and the immaturity of theoretical models—therefore call for a more extensive and co-ordinated study of Africa. As Lystad observes :

The increase in the numbers of researchers and greater co-ordination among them may increase the frequency with which the tools of science are put to use. Most disciplines are only now on the continent, and many cannot even claim that... without exception they call for greatly increased research activity, and, almost without exception ... all have truly elemental needs, considerably below the levels of sophisticated theory and method there persists the need for facts at the empirical level ; there is a paucity of data that is descriptive in sufficient detail.<sup>9</sup>

Thus on the basis of the above discussion we can arrive at certain conclusions: first, that interest in Africa in the post-war period arose from a host of factors of which pragmatic consideration was an important one. Second, that the promotion of African studies has been given priority in the programme of university education in many countries. Third, that African studies have not yet come anywhere near maturity and, fourth, that considering the present stage of knowledge about Africa, it would not be any duplication if more scholars and research centres devote themselves to the study of Africa. In fact this would be most desirable.

### **India's Interest in Africa**

It is by keeping these conclusions in mind that one can make a few tentative suggestions about the promotion of African studies in India. However, before doing so, it is necessary to make a quick survey of (i) India's connections with Africa which will also show the pragmatic aspect of her interest in Africa ; (ii) the existing facilities for African studies in our universities, and (iii) the size and kind of resources and expertise one may set in promoting African studies on a long-term basis.

From a purely nationalist viewpoint, it cannot be denied that India too has a stake in the African continent. So long as the Africans represent a sizable and somewhat homogeneous voting group in the United Nations it is to India's interest that she cultivates friendly relations with them. Besides, in view of the recent British policy of withdrawal from east of the Suez, the western coast of the Indian Ocean has assumed a certain importance which India cannot ignore. This provides another reason why she should give added importance to her friendly diplomatic relations with the countries of East Africa, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius. Further, within the structure of the UNCTAD, closer Indo-African relations could be evolved with a view to breaking, as a Tanzanian leader pointed out, the commercial relationship among the new nations and replacing it by an economic one.<sup>10</sup>

These policy objectives should be considered and pursued within

the overall framework of Indo-African relations as they exist today. On a comparative study it will be seen that, among other nations, India has been in the unique position of gaining the confidence and sympathy of the African peoples long before they got independence. Thus, her nationalist background helped her to champion the cause of African liberation movements; her consistent stand against racial and colonial oppression led her to condemn and agitate against the racist regimes of southern Africa and Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique. Further, with a view to help the Africans to move on the path of economic self-reliance, India provided scholarships to African students for obtaining higher education, sent technical aid and expertise to those countries which asked for such help and, in recent times, helped in promoting Indo-African joint ventures in the field of small and medium size industries.

Thus the *pragmatic* element in India's interest in the African countries cannot be denied; what is important is that this element should be sustained and given proper direction by an intellectual climate. In other words our policy goals and objectives in Africa cannot become meaningful unless we have sufficient knowledge and expertise about Africa so that public opinion can be reasonably informed and the policy-makers can be helped in taking right decisions. It is here that African studies in India assume added importance. Pure academic interests in the African field may be a luxury which India cannot at the moment afford; at the same time no national goals in respect of an important continent like Africa can be pursued in an atmosphere of intellectual vacuum. Hence we must see (1) what kind of non-official agencies are there in this country to promote Indo-African understanding, (2) what is the state of African studies in our universities, and (3) what possible improvements or new schemes can be suggested in this respect without straining unnecessarily our limited national resources.

### **Non-official Agencies**

In the early fifties the Foreign Affairs section of the All India Congress Committee (AICC) had a small unit which maintained, under specific instructions from Jawaharlal Nehru, close contacts between Indian leaders and visiting African politicians and students. Apart from the scholarships which the Indian Government awarded, a generous flow of funds from private and official sources went to African nationalists through this unit. Later, again under Nehru's guidance, it was decided that a non-official organization be established to promote Indo-African goodwill, to look after African students and visitors, to organize seminars on African subjects, and to start a journal primarily devoted to African affairs. Thus in 1959 the Indian Council for Africa was formed. Apart from this organization, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations also gives a few scholarships and travel grants to the Africans.

In 1962 the Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, which has its headquarters in Cairo, opened a branch in New Delhi, but its activities have remained mostly confined to establishing contacts with various

African liberation movements and to those kinds of activities which have a certain ideological bias. At present the Indian branch of the South African National Congress works in close co-operation with this Committee. Besides there is the India-Africa Development Association which represents chiefly the interests of a group of Indian industrialists in "investigating the opportunities available for industrial collaboration with Africans."<sup>11</sup>

### **Department of African Studies**

These are, however, non-academic bodies and, with the exception of the Indian Council for Africa, they have not made any consistent effort so far to inform Indian opinion about Africa. In this respect it was hoped that the Department of African Studies, set up at the Delhi University in 1955, would stimulate intellectual interest in Africa. In recommending the establishment of the Department, the committee appointed by the Academic Council of the University had observed :

that its main function will be to provide facilities for research in African subjects leading to the Ph. D. degree of the university. The Committee also felt that the courses of instruction for the M. A. degree in history, economics, political science or anthropology should include optional papers relating to Africa, so that knowledge of African affairs may be widespread. In the initial stages, the Committee recommended the institution of a two-year post-graduate diploma course open to the graduates of the universities, and that some arrangement may be made for the training of the probationers of the Indian Foreign Service. It was also stipulated that the department will work in close collaboration with the departments of history, economics, political science and anthropology, as also with the Indian Council of World Affairs and the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs.<sup>12</sup>

It is not our intention to assess how far the Department has fulfilled these objectives. According to Prof. Varma the Department's performance has not been very satisfactory owing to the following factors : (a) lack of financial support and no provision for the training of scholars "through field work ;" (b) initial mistake of allowing direct enrolment of students in the Department "both from the point of view of their sustained interest in the academic disciplines and, more important, from the point of view of their future employment," (c) lack of co-ordination between the department and those in other disciplines. "This isolationism", he says, "has been responsible for the lack of interest in area studies among the faculty as well as among students" etc.<sup>13</sup>

In the light of these observations we can now assess the limits and possibilities of promoting African studies on a more systematic scale and, perhaps, as complement to the already existing facilities at the Delhi University. It is obvious that the main hurdle in this direction will be finance : in order to train people in African affairs we

need to send them regularly to their respective areas which would involve some amount of foreign exchange ; on the other hand financial help will not come unless there is enough interest in the country about Africa. The paradox of the situation seems to be that unless financial assistance is assured African studies cannot progress; on the other hand, financial assistance will not come unless some studies have already been started to impress the fund-givers !

But this is not the only problem; there are several others. First, unlike some countries of the West, we do not have as yet a trained staff of people who are knowledgeable or well-versed in African affairs. It is interesting to note in this connection that a large number of Africanists in the Western universities came from such expatriate groups as had already been working in some capacity or other in Africa for quite some time. It was these men who provided the core staff to the academic centres for the expansion of African studies. At the same time, the introduction of courses in African subjects at the undergraduate levels was facilitated by the fact that such courses (leading up to a diploma or degree) helped the students to get teaching and other assignments in Africa.<sup>14</sup> By doing so they could earn not only their living but, by continuing research in their respective disciplines, they could further contribute to the total store of knowledge about Africa.

Further, the continuing and intimate connections of the independent African countries with the Western world cannot be over-emphasized ; most of their trade and business still flows through traditional channels and the bulk of economic assistance comes from the Western sources. All these make African Governments morally and materially dependent on the developed West for the execution of their domestic and foreign policies. On the other hand, the flow of African visitors — ranging from heads of State to political refugees — to London, Paris, New York, etc., continues all round the year and this further helps the academicians and scholars to know the latest about Africa, to maintain a continuous dialogue with the Africans and to invite them to participate in various seminars. This day-to-day contact intensifies generally the intellectual climate for the furtherance of African studies.

In contrast we have none of these advantages or opportunities. Our contacts with the Africans are so nominal that for most of us Africa hardly exists excepting as a geographical entity. The African students who come to our universities for higher education live generally in their isolated groves ; each year they come and go back with a number of right or wrong impressions in their minds, but they hardly leave any impression behind. Similarly, a few dignitaries from the African States visit India, meet our officials and ministers, sign joint-communiqués and then go back without even creating a ripple of interest in the public mind. Our national newspapers, on the other hand, remain almost indifferent to the African continent excepting when a dramatic event in Africa hits world headlines.<sup>15</sup>

Under such circumstances it is indeed difficult to create an intellec-

tual atmosphere for African studies unless we keep in mind two basic facts. First, whatever steps are being taken to promote African studies either as a disciplinary branch of university education or as an area study, they should be taken in co-ordination with important policy-making bodies of the Government and with such other private organizations as are interested in financing projects connected with Africa. In other words, there should be a blending of academic interests with the *pragmatic utilitarian* approach of the Government and other bodies. This may not necessarily lead to interference with academic works, while it will at least guarantee financial assistance from such sources as are already convinced that such work will be of some value from their point of view. Secondly, until a crop of specialists in the African field is raised, it would be premature to introduce the study of Africa as a degree or diploma course in the universities. The effort, to begin with, should be exclusively concentrated on training up a cadre of specialists in some selected institutions.

### Some Suggestions

On the basis of the above we can now make a few suggestions :

(a) That, instead of having more departments of African studies, the attempt should be to open units in a few selected universities with not more than two to three trained persons who have substantial knowledge and research experience in Africa. These units should organize specific projects on different aspects concerning Africa but with the view that the projects do not overlap, or that they do not tend to become, as usual with many academic projects, either obtuse or expensive. Every such project should receive the approval of the University Grants Commission or such other fund-giving concerns as will make available the finance necessary for the completion of a particular project.

(b) An all-India advisory centre should be set up to help co-ordinate these projects, assist if possible in meeting part of the finance and also in publishing the results of these projects when complete. In this regard the Department at the Delhi University and the Indian Council for Africa can do great service.

(c) Since each research programme would need (though not necessarily) the service of various disciplines, the units should try to co-opt members from other departments such as history, politics, government, sociology, etc. As noted before, the indispensable feature of any such programme will be to secure enough funds for sending one or two scholars to Africa on a regular basis so that they can gain first-hand knowledge and also keep themselves abreast with the latest developments in their respective areas. It would be worth while in this connection to find out, as the Americans do, if a scholar can work in Africa on a teaching assignment as part of his field-work project which would thus lessen the financial burden.

(d) More than anything, the advisory centre should assist and advise in building library resources and, in this respect, a working understanding should be arrived at among the various units. The Delhi University Department and the Indian School of International Studies,

for instance, have been collecting library materials on Africa for quite some time and now, perhaps, the effort should not be to needlessly duplicate materials but to select particular areas or regions and build library resources accordingly.<sup>16</sup> Similarly if, as reported, the Bombay University decides to have an African studies programme, it should consult the advisory centre as to what aspects or areas of African subjects it should select for the building of library materials. While this would give each centre a distinctive character, it will also help in facilitating exchange and inter-communications among scholars in different universities.

(e) In more than one sense it has now become necessary that the Indian Council for Africa should start a research unit of its own with, as a start, two or three trained people. With its years of experience, organizing capacity, and extensive contacts both at home and abroad, the Council is now in a unique position to undertake some specific research projects on its own or pass them on to some other specialized units. The mechanics can be simple: from time to time demands come from official sources, private concerns, or institutions or individual industrialists to know all aspects of a particular problem in Africa in which they are immediately interested. In such cases, finance would be readily available while the Council can help in providing or mobilizing the necessary expertise. From the point of view of pure academics this may appear somewhat mercenary, but, as we have said before, unless African studies prove to have a *pragmatic* value, its promotion in India cannot be easily achieved.

(f) Finally, when these units in various universities begin functioning, it would be useful to introduce optional papers in African subjects in various disciplines at the post-graduate level. It is a sheer wastage to have courses in Africa at the under-graduate level. We have neither the requisite resources nor the expertise to administer such courses efficiently. On the other hand, at the post-graduate level the student who is inclined to pursue further research in the African field will find such a course both useful and remunerative and at the same time it will be within available resources to give him all possible guidance.

We may now conclude with a word of request to our national newspapers. In a democracy like ours the press and its comments on international affairs have a tremendously educative value, and unless the newspapers show a somewhat more genuine interest in Africa it would be difficult to create an intellectual climate for African studies. More than any other institutions, perhaps, it is the press which can tell that the age of "sensationalism" about Afro-Asia is over and now is the time to know what it is all about against the background of concrete facts.

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# Africa in the Indian Press

MADAN M. SAULDIE

THE continent of Africa, with 41 independent national entities, now making up about one-third of the total United Nations membership, is no longer a "dark" continent. As African territories surged to independence in the 1950's and 1960's, the international focus also underwent a shift from Asia, a region which experienced swift winds of change immediately after World War II, to the young nations of Africa. The international press, which had hitherto treated news about Africa with callous indifference, suddenly found itself obsessed with a flood of stories emanating from the continent. Furthermore, as African diplomatic missions began springing up in important world capitals, realization dawned that Africans, having come into their own, should be taken more seriously. Almost simultaneously, numerous African-oriented research institutions, associations and voluntary organizations mushroomed all over the world. Thus, from the "darkness" of centuries, Africa suddenly jumped into the international arena to steal the "limelight".

Sensitive to these historic developments, press correspondents, historians and authors from all corners of the world swarmed into Africa, to explore the past and assess the future of the continent. As a result, huge volumes of material on Africa started pouring into the wider world anxious to know what lay behind the artificial walls of darkness.

This new craze of the world was marked as much by the lack of knowledge about the lands, peoples and cultures of Africa as by the historic crumbling down of long-established colonial empires like those of Britain, France, Belgium, Italy and Spain. The peak years of Africa in the world press were, therefore, the early 1960's—when almost the whole of French-speaking Africa shook off the colonial yoke and most of the British territories became free entities. The process, however, continued till recently, the only serious disruption having been caused by the rebellion of Rhodesian white rulers against British sovereignty when they declared their independence unilaterally in defiance of London.

However, except for crisis news, by 1968 Africa had ceased to make headlines and much of it had already been probed into by press correspondents and researchers in almost every aspect of life ranging from its folk-lore to foreign policy determinants. Recent years have been marked by press concentration only on stories about Rhodesia, South Africa, South-West Africa, the Nigerian civil war and,

to a lesser extent, coups d'état, and freedom struggles in Portuguese Africa. Congo, which once made big headlines, having become stable after General Mobutu came to power, is no longer heard of.

In India, events in Africa have always aroused an unusual interest, primarily because of the age-old links existing between the African continent and the Indian sub-continent. But there are some other reasons too. In the first instance, there are a large number of Indians who have settled down in Africa, particularly in countries on or near the Eastern seaboard. Even though their settlement has sometimes been a cause of misunderstanding and embarrassment between India and these African countries, their presence has undoubtedly enabled India to maintain a line of communication with Africa. Their problems, like their achievements, have always been a matter of concern in India.

Secondly, India has been in the forefront of independence struggles in African and Asian countries. It has been realized more than once, by some African leaders specially, that had India not gained independence as she did in 1947, the independence of other Afro-Asian countries would not have been possible so soon.

Lastly, India, as a developing country, has much to share with and offer to African countries in their own task of economic development. Indeed, there exists a community of interest, in the economic sphere, particularly between India and Africa, which is reflected in their common cause at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and at other international forums.

In addition to these factors, the interest taken by Indian leaders in developments in Africa also contributed a great deal to the understanding of African problems in our country. Mahatma Gandhi's role in fighting against South Africa's segregationist and oppressive racial policies in the early part of this century had impressed many an African mind. His later writings stimulated a still greater interest in India about African affairs. Jawaharlal Nehru significantly added to the tide through his philosophical approach to the cause of human rights and self-determination for the peoples of colonial Africa. Earlier, the great Indian poet, Rabindranath Tagore, when Mussolini's forces invaded Ethiopia in 1936, was so deeply moved that he composed the historic poem entitled "Africa" in which he expressed Indian indignation over the fascist invasion.

It is against this background that coverage of Africa in the Indian press needs to be assessed. Despite so much closeness between Africa and India, it appears strange that the coverage is generally inadequate and casual. An "Africa desk" is hardly ever heard of in a newspaper office in India. Why is this so and what can be done to improve the situation?

In seeking an answer to these questions, let us first analyse the causes underlying the present state of affairs. In the first instance, one must point to the continuing shortage of newsprint which limits the capacity

of the newspapers to accommodate a wide variety of news and features. This limitation is felt both for foreign and Indian news, but more so in the case of the former.

Then, facing as India does an acute foreign exchange shortage, newspapers are impelled to cut down costs in foreign currencies and depend on reports from international news agencies rather than appoint correspondents everywhere. Leading Indian newspapers, which had staffers and stringers throughout major capitals of Africa in the early 1960's, gradually withdrew them in the later part of the 1960's. Although this is an economical alternative, it naturally does not allow for analysis of news. Agencies generally provide cold objective (?) news and that too about critical situations. Normal developments, which matter a lot to a country, are almost blacked out.

Another reason for the withdrawal of correspondents is the super-sensitive nature of some African governments, who can, generally speaking, accommodate a correspondent only till he uses the necessary constraints in his reporting, which should without exception be pro-government. Once he begins exercising the liberties of analysis in reporting, he is summarily deported. The Kenya Government's recent action in deporting some foreign correspondents is a case in point. Even where a correspondent has been retained, his reporting has gradually become dull and insipid, hardly exciting any interest among the readers.

Thirdly, India herself has numerous problems which must get a place in the press in order to cater to the local interests which is naturally what every newspaper aims at. Such coverage, therefore, always takes a major chunk of the gradually shrinking space left for news after devoting a sizable part of it to advertisements.

Fourthly, there is a general lack of interest on the part of editors which is sometimes reflected not only in very faulty editing of news-stories, but also in their being mercilessly trimmed so much so that only the headlines and leads are available to the reader. True, every newspaper tries to offer what the reader wants, but to educate the reader about what he is normally not interested in should also be one of the functions of the press. In that respect, one would agree, Africa has not been even adequately "introduced" so far, not to talk of having been adequately "analysed" for the Indian reader. This is evident from the fact that hardly any letters to editor about Africa appear in Indian newspapers. (see Table).

Fifthly, the African embassies in India are not as active as they should normally be in feeding the Indian press about developments in Africa. Out of 11 African embassies based in New Delhi only three or four issue regular material. But even this material generally contains lengthy speeches of their Heads of Government or State, rather than something which can make news.

## Africa in the Indian Press (A Sample Survey)

Four political and two economic dailies have been chosen to assess their coverage of African affairs in the month of October 1968. The month has been selected at random. Except for the Rhodesian issue and Nigerian civil war, which dominated the total coverage, it was a normal month.

Newspaper	Circulation	No. of issues	Total No. of Pages*	News items	Feature articles		Indo-African Relations	Editorials	Letters to the Editor	Total	Average coverage per day
					No.	Col. inches					
Political											
THE HINDUSTAN TIMES	1,11,156	31	474	278	9	173	56	32	—	539	17
THE STATESMAN (Combined for all editions)	1,49,672	31	442	223	—	—	7	15	—	245	8
THE TIMES OF INDIA (Combined for all editions)	2,01,621	30	428	253	—	—	32	14	3	302	10
THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Combined for all editions)	3,56,828	30	340	180	4	82	22	16	—	302	10
Economic											
THE ECONOMIC TIMES	15,192	30	242	117	5	140	18	—	—	275	9
THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS	9,919	30	248	140	1	18	37	—	—	195	6

\*One page contains eight columns and each column contains 21 inches of printed matter including advertisements. As no fixed amount of advertisements appears, it has not been possible to collect data regarding the total reading matter in an issue.

And, lastly, Indians do not feel directly interested in Africa because they have no immediate stakes there. Perhaps, as an elder Indian statesman put it: "It is no good taking sides on issues (like Rhodesia, Nigeria etc.) wherein our opinions cannot help one or the other."

In view of these factors, it is not surprising that despite India's historical interest in Africa, the coverage of Africa has remained limited and the priorities in foreign coverage have remained almost unchanged. These priorities, with the exception of crisis news coverage, roughly work out to be :

- First : the two super-powers, the U.S. and USSR and India's relations with them.
- Second : China and Pakistan (particularly after the India-China conflict of 1962 and Indo-Pak war of 1965).
- Third : South-east Asia—mainly Vietnam.
- Fourth : Europe (East and West).
- Fifth : Africa and Middle East.
- Sixth : Latin America.

How can Africa be elevated to a better position, say, that of South-east Asia, taking for granted that the first priority can never, and the second for many years cannot, be altered? Some effort can certainly be made with profit. For instance, if editors of newspapers or the staff working under them could be associated with the activities undertaken on political and economic levels in the country by voluntary associations, research institutions and business federations dealing with Africa, the coverage of Africa can be improved a great deal. On their part, the editors should try to build up a few specialists on Africa among their staffs.

Further, voluntary organizations connected with Africa should try to educate Indian masses and develop interest in African affairs. The Indian Council for Africa is doing the right thing by opening regional branches and organizing lectures, seminars and other functions. But this activity can be further extended with profit. The universities by starting departments of African studies can also play a meaningful role. So far out of over 50 universities in India, only Delhi University has a Department of African Studies. But unfortunately even that is not functioning very actively, if judged from the very small number of students at the Department and the Department's failure to turn out even a single scholar of distinction despite its existence for over a decade.

The African embassies in India can also help in cultivating an African image in India. They can do so by building up a line of communication with the press as well as the public, more importantly the latter, because once public interest is aroused, the press is bound to respond spontaneously by providing news of their interest.

It is, however, gratifying to note that while the political coverage of Africa in the Indian press is only keeping pace with critical developments in the continent, the economic coverage has received a boost. Two economic dailies from Bombay now carry a number of features and news items pertaining to economic developments in Africa. Even though some of these features are reproductions from the Western press, none the less they certainly contribute to a wider coverage of the subject. Reproductions of this nature are inevitable since the sources of information available in India are very scant. Newspapers apart, there is now a growing awareness of the importance of Africa among various political and economic journals and periodicals as well.

In conclusion one can say that although at present Africa is not getting its due share of space in the Indian press, the current trend is for a better coverage. But this, undoubtedly, would call for a co-ordinated effort on all fronts if a proper "African image" is to be built up in India.

# Africa's Role at UNCTAD

SUMAN DUBEY

IN November 1968 the world received the unexpected news of the resignation of the Argentinean Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Dr. Raul Prebisch. Dr. Prebisch, who has long been the messiah of the 'Third World', said he had resigned because he was tired of the years of frustration that have marked his crusade against world poverty, echoing his words earlier when he described the UN's Development Decade as "a decade of frustration" and a "development decade without a development policy".

In a nutshell he thus expressed the feelings of the poor countries and his resignation indicates that the last sitting of UNCTAD at New Delhi in February and March 1967—at a cost of \$10 million—has produced no appreciable change in the depressing situation. The world's economic structure is heavily biased in favour of the rich countries who have added, on an average, nearly \$60 to their per capita incomes annually, in stark contrast with the poor countries who have scrapped through with less than \$2 annually. And, as Dr. Prebisch has frequently pointed out, it is an ever improving technology that has permitted the developed world to raise production while using its resources more economically.

The developing nations, on the other hand, who constitute the large mass of humanity have suffered from excessive population growth, lack of savings and capital, lack of appropriate and modern technology, of adequate markets and, above all, an extreme dependence on foreign assistance. Compared with the achievements of the developed world, or with the progress that would be possible under more enlightened international policies, the economies of the 'Third World' have been stagnating. It was to redress this appalling state of affairs that UNCTAD was set up amidst such fanfare five years ago.

The poor countries of the world generally seem to be characterized by their proximity to the equator. A casual glance at the world map is enough to reveal the importance of Africa\* in this club of nations. A continent of recent emergence, Africa undoubtedly occupies a central position on the stage of world events. The spate of determined nation-

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\*Africa throughout refers to only African members of the Group of 77 unless the context signifies otherwise.

alist movements witnessed in Africa in recent years has illuminated the fact that the continent was the world's last region to embark on the tortuous road to economic salvation.

One reason for this is that when the European nations reached Africa on their colonizing ventures they encountered no developed societies and none of the exploitation of natural resources encountered in India and Indonesia. Africa undoubtedly boasted of the great Egyptian civilization, the empires of Ghana and Mali, the entrepot settlements of the East coast, but there was little evidence of deliberate capital accumulation. As with economic development, so with political identity. It was left to European rulers to carve cohesive political structures out of isolated federations and concentrations of population. Nationalism in Africa is of very recent origin.

None of this development effort was spread uniformly or, for that matter, over this whole continent. Minerals were the only industry that attracted the European investor and even these, before 1930, were limited to diamonds and gold dug up in South Africa. Copper from Zambia (erstwhile Northern Rhodesia) and the Congo was added in the thirties. Admittedly, plantation agriculture gained ground as the continent was 'opened up', but apart from coffee, cocoa, sisal and cotton, progress was not impressive.

European nations exploited only those raw materials in Africa that were immediately useful to them. This encouraged single-crop economies, and resulted in concentration in exports. The chief problem, therefore, with which African members of the 'Third World' came to UNCTAD was that of commodities and the growth of their trade.

As may be expected, the development of African economies in the manner described above led to close contacts between the imperial powers and the colonies. These extended themselves to create very powerful so-called north-south economic ties which, with the gathering momentum of independence movements, resulted in formal trade agreements—the Commonwealth and the Yaounde Convention. The latter has singled out 18 nations of Africa from the rest of the Group of '77' and has been a factor of fundamental importance in UNCTAD-II.

The problem of commodity exports and of north-south economic ties formed the basis of the stands taken by African countries at UNCTAD—II as the conference wound its way through heavy and, finally, meaningless negotiations. It is worth while to examine these aspects more closely.

With the problem of commodity trade we notice two important facts. The first is the high degree of concentration in primary commodities. For example, more than 95 per cent of Gambia's export earnings come from groundnuts, over 98 per cent of Libya's foreign exchange from oil and over 90 per cent of Zambia's export earnings from copper. Others only slightly better placed are Chad exporting cotton (77 per cent), Ghana—cocoa (75 per cent), Reunion—sugar (85



per cent), Zanzibar—cloves (71 per cent), Dahomey—oilseeds (64 per cent), Niger—groundnuts (66 per cent), Sierra Leone—diamonds (64 per cent) and Sudan—cotton (60 per cent). Of over forty African members of the Group of '77', only four have their lead export accounting for less than 30 per cent of the total.

Concentration *per se* is not necessarily harmful as the case of oil (Libya and Venezuela, for example) has amply demonstrated. In fact concentration is in keeping with the Law of Comparative Advantage. But the extreme specialization of most African countries renders them prone to fluctuations in price that characterise these commodities in the world markets, and to a secular decline in the relative demand for some of these products. Price instability has heavily affected commodities like cocoa, coffee, sugar, sisal oilseeds, and copper, all of which are important in the African context. Cotton and bauxite have also been dogged by price uncertainty, though to a lesser extent.

The slow growth of commodity exports has also worried African exporters. Access to markets is denied except in the case of countries that have negotiated special agreements. Thus the market for cotton and textiles and certain processed foods like sugar and other primary products in the developed countries is restricted. The rapid emergence of synthetics, developed and consumed almost exclusively in the rich and advanced countries, has acted as a damper on the growth of traditional exports from African and other developing countries. This problem is reaching formidable proportions—the share of synthetic rubber in the world's rubber consumption has increased by over 60 per cent in the last 15 years and the share, in value, of all apparel fibres (cotton, silk etc.) has nearly doubled.

The harmful effects of these factors have been somewhat minimized in those countries fortunate enough to belong to either the Commonwealth or the Yaounde Convention, the African and Malagasy States (EAMA), mainly consisting of France's ex-colonies.

The Commonwealth, which has a dozen African members belonging also to the 'Third World', has caused the trade of a number of countries to be directed principally with Britain—for historical reasons already discussed—despite the fact that the world's faster-growing markets do not include Britain, or the Commonwealth. Britain is normally the largest single export market for Zambia (copper), Nigeria (oil seeds), Malawi (tea and tobacco), Tanzania (sisal and cotton) and Kenya. Membership of the Commonwealth provides preferential duty-free entry for most of these goods, the exceptions being refined sugar, which is covered by quota agreements, soluble coffee and tea; and certain manufactures like cotton textiles and man-made fibres.

While it is easy to overestimate the value of the Commonwealth to African countries, the value of the Yaounde Convention of Association between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the EAMA resulting from the Treaty of Rome is far greater. Thus Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, Chad,

Congo (Brazzaville and Kinshasa), Gabon, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Burundi, Cameroon, Rwanda, Somalia and Togo enjoy a special relationship with the EEC around which their economies have developed. Nigeria has also managed to acquire preference entry for most of its products into the EEC getting the best of both worlds.

The Yaounde Convention, which grew around the so-called franc zone (14 of the EAMA members were France's colonies whose currencies are freely exchangeable with the franc), envisages a series of free trade areas between the 18 EAMA countries and the EEC in which goods, services and capital will move freely and competitively. At present EAMA goods enter EEC countries freely and in reverse. Except for Togo, all EAMA countries permit preferential entry of EEC goods (Nigeria permits only a few goods to enter in this manner), with a few exceptions provided for revenue tariffs. The principal architect to this north-south preferential system was France which felt itself responsible for the future development of its former wards. It has carried these countries into an association with the Common Market with the result that they find themselves linked with the world's most rapidly growing markets, to the exclusion of competitors from the 'Third World'.

It seems fairly clear that most African members of the Group of '77' came to UNCTAD with their interests limited to the factors we have been discussing. There were exceptions like the UAR and Algeria who found their interest closer to the countries of Latin America and Asia, but the others had little to contribute, for example, to the questions of shipping and the vital question of general preference for industrial manufactures of the 'Third World'.

This did not prevent African delegates from fighting as hard as the next man over the question of developed countries giving one per cent of their GDP in aid, on bargaining with the rich over commodity agreements primarily for cocoa, sugar, coffee and oilseeds, and pressing the buffer stocks. In fact, in almost every aspect of UNCTAD African nations were solidly with the Group of '77'. Having paid the price of disunity at UNCTAD-I in Geneva four years ago, the developing nations were determined to avoid intra-group disputes. The Algiers Charter climaxed their efforts in this direction.

The major drawback at UNCTAD-II was, however, the fact that the Charter of Algiers encompassed the proliferating demands of all members of the Group of '77' despite the vastly differing economic structures and priorities. It was an exercise not in outlining the feasible but laying down the desirable in its entirety. And by the time it became clear that the poor were, after all, going to be fed with the crumb it was too late for any real negotiation on a reduced priority system. As far as African nations were concerned this element was of pivotal importance in the negotiations for a generalized preference system.

Before seeing what happened in that sphere it is perhaps worth pointing out that it was not the efforts or the lack of them, on the part of the poor, that led to such an anti-climax in this ultimate working of

UNCTAD. It was the system, the sheer size of the conference, of the participating delegations and the time-wasting character of the negotiating process coupled with the recalcitrance of the rich nations that led UNCTAD-II to its insipid end. The temptation to blame a group of African countries for taking a hard line and "sabotaging" the possible progress on preferences has to be avoided despite the fact that the unity of the '77' suffered. What it undoubtedly did was to prevent agreement in principle, but it is difficult to hazard what the developed nations may have conceded under different circumstances.

African countries split with the rest on two important points—on dismantling north-south preferences, and the commodity pattern in the general preferences scheme. The French, the principal spokesmen for the EEC countries, frequently stated that the EEC would surrender the special arrangements and opt for a generalized system of preferences provided the EAMA countries agreed unanimously to such an arrangement, and that the new system was at least as beneficial to the EAMA countries as the current north-south preference system. The French were able to take up this 'reasonable' stand knowing full well that the 18 EAMA countries would not agree to a dismantling of their special links with the EEC in favour of, as they saw it, a vague and uncertain general preference system. It is openly admitted that the French also told their associate countries that they could not guarantee that financial aid would be maintained at the substantial current level if they withdrew from the Yaounde Convention (which was soon coming up for re-negotiation). The question of compensation also became prominent as Nigeria joined Ceylon in sponsoring a motion seeking adequate compensation for the dismantling of the commodity preferences.

When the OECD countries began to insist on an item-by-item and country-by-country examination of commodities to be covered by the general preference system and proposed, as an alternative to the Charter of Algiers, to consider only non-agricultural manufactures (itemized as Chapters 25 to 99 in the OECD nomenclature) some African nations, with their interest concentrated in processed agricultural goods (Chapters 1 to 24) accused the more industrialized of the developing nations of following a partisan approach. Finally, within the Group of '77' a bargain was struck between the protesting Africans and the rest. The '77' insisted on the inclusion of all goods covered by the 99 chapters as a part of the generalized preference system in return for a promise by those countries enjoying north-south preferences that they would consider abandoning these privileges five years after the setting up of a generalized system of preferences.

As a result, of course, the whole facade crumbled and nothing was achieved; but not before a select negotiating group, the 'Everest' group, worked out the areas of agreement and difference. This was supposed to form the groundwork for any agreement—but the African members objected to this paper on the ground that it compromised the Algiers stand which was, in any case, admitted to be unattainable.

UNCTAD-II undoubtedly met at an unpropitious time for the

world economy. The Vietnam war and the world's worst gold and currency crises cast their shadows over Vigyan Bhawan. The developing countries who wound their despondent ways home can only reflect on how meaningless were the buoyant and co-operative statements made by Ministers of the rich countries at the plenary session at the beginning of the conference. For the delegations from the continent which played host to the aspiring '77' when they met in Algiers a few months before the encounter at New Delhi the blow must have been all the more felling, poised as they are at the start of their most difficult task of putting their economies out of a timeless stagnation.

# India's Role in Economic Development of Africa

J. C. SRIVASTAVA

THE U. N. Economic Commission for Africa in one of its reports<sup>1</sup> has observed, and rightly so, "that if political independence has been the watchword in Africa for the last ten years, rapid economic growth will no doubt be the overriding preoccupation for the years to come." Naturally enough, after liberating themselves from foreign domination or colonial rule, the newly independent nations of Africa (now numbering 42) are engaged in fighting the inevitable and continuing battle of poverty and underdevelopment. The urge for lessening the gulf separating the rich from the poor nations, which has become a tragic fact of international life<sup>2</sup>, is sweeping the entire continent. Every country of this part of the world is eager for economic development. The leadership in these countries is not unaware of the aspirations of the masses. They are keen to bring about rapid "transition from poverty to relative well-being"<sup>3</sup>. They are increasingly undertaking the responsibility of shaping the future of their economies. The course of economic development in these, as in many other developing countries, is no longer left to be determined by the "invisible hand" or free operation of the market mechanism as underlined by Adam Smith in his classical treatise "Wealth of Nations."

Development plans and programmes are being formulated in almost all African countries to chart in advance the course to eliminate poverty and economic backwardness. The successful execution or implementation of their plans and projects is, however, limited as much to the availability of adequate capital investment and technical know-how as of a constant flow of skilled labour and managerial personnel. In view of scarcity of these important factors of production or pre-conditions of economic growth, the new nations of the continent are eagerly looking forward to their developed counterparts for necessary help and co-operation. It is recognized and accepted today, more than ever before, that without closer co-operation with other nations the formidable obstacles to economic advancement cannot be surmounted within a given period of time; that none of the African countries can develop its potential in isolation. Pooling of production capacity, of technical and scientific experiences and of joint harnessing of natural resources are not only desirable but have come to be accepted as an economic necessity. It is these imperatives that underline the need for international co-operation.

India, the next-shore neighbour of the continent, has the capacity and capability of extending technical assistance and economic co-operation to Africa in the diverse fields of economic activity. The geographical proximity and long historical links between them give India an edge over many other countries in undertaking this difficult but rewarding task. Our struggle for independence has inspired the "Uhuru" (freedom) movement in many of the African countries. India's post-independence policies of non-alignment and experience in planning for the realization of economic and social goals have had an impact on the formulation of plans and programmes in the continent. Our economic relations have much deeper roots. Many of our nationals who migrated and settled in African countries since time immemorial have played a prominent part in the development of trade and commerce, roads and railways and a number of enterprises. These are doing so even today. Indians in Kenya, for example, despite the Kenyanization policies of the Government, are working for Indo-African 'Harambee' (co-operation). The AFRICINDO Industrial Corporation, established by them in July, 1966, is doing a great deal in promoting the economic and industrial development of Kenya.

It is against this background that there is need to determine what role India should play in the economic development of the continent. Moreover, the process of economic development in Africa is such that the Indian experience would be more relevant to the conditions obtaining there. It would be useful to get to know the plans and programmes of African countries.

### **Plans for Economic Development**

Africa is a vast continent embracing as much as one-fourth of the world's land surface and one-tenth of the human race. In terms of economic potential, it is second to none. Its abundantly rich resources—both human as well as material—however remain either unexploited or unexplored. Poverty and underdevelopment inherited from colonial rule confront one and all alike. The emphasis, therefore, in their plans on improvement of the standard of living of the masses by providing them with the basic necessities of life, such as education, health, housing, is inevitable. In order to realize these objectives, the need for industrialization has been accepted and accorded a high priority. The economic development plans of African countries reflect their zeal for an "industrial revolution".

Most African countries, in their plans, have naturally underlined the paramount importance of creating the necessary pre-conditions for industrialization, such as "improvement and expansion of transport facilities, power and water utilities, communication systems and other infrastructures required for removal of the existing bottlenecks in the growth of the manufacturing, mining and other commodity producing sectors.<sup>47</sup>" Allocations of planned investment for the development of these basic facilities have been large, often larger than the share of manufacturing in the total plan outlay as shown in the following table :—

TABLE<sup>5</sup>

Share of basic facilities and industries in total planned investment to some African countries

Countries	Plan period	Percentage of the total planned outlay	
		Basic facilities	Industry
Cameroon	1961-65	10	41
Ethiopia	1963-67	35	28
Ghana	1963-70	23	20
Kenya	1964-70	23	20
Libya	1963-68	38	4
Morocco	1957-65	10	23
Malawi	1965-69	33	24
Malagasy (Republic)	1964-71	50	16
Mauritania	1963-66	50	30
Sierra Leone	1962-67	37	9
Sudan	1961-70	40	—
Tanzania	1967-69	37	16
Uganda	1961-66	17	21
UAR	1960-70	28	29
Upper Volta	1963-67	28	22
Zambia	1966-70	40	17

In their industrialization programmes, the majority of African countries are motivated by the desire to turn out "domestic substitutes for many of the imported products, increase the value of their exports by processing those primary products—both agricultural and minerals—which till now used to be exported in crude raw material form and expand employment opportunities"<sup>6</sup> at a higher rate than the growth rate of the labour force.

These objectives of industrial growth and the limitations inherent in the economies of African countries, such as scarcity of capital *vis-a-vis* labour, small size of the market and inadequacy of technical know-how have led many of them to concentrate on or emphasize the establishment of small and medium-scale industries producing, in the main, consumer goods such as "food, beverages and tobacco products, clothing, apparel and footwear, leather products, rubber products, printing and publishing." These products constitute as much as 75 per cent or more of the total industrial output in a majority of African countries. In some countries, such as Burundi, Niger, Rwanda, the Sudan and Somalia, the share of light manufacturing industries is as much as 90 per cent or even more. In some other countries, however, increasing importance has been attached to the development of such industries as cement, metallic

products, fertilizers and chemical products as well as a wide range of engineering items like simple tools and implements, durable domestic appliances, assembly of transport equipment, refrigeration units and other electrical goods. Planned growth of such industries is under way in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, the Sudan, Tunisia and the UAR. Iron and steel complexes and heavy industries have also been visualized in countries like Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Mauritania, Liberia, Tunisia, the UAR and others. Thus, in a number of countries, development is going apace in such manufacturing industries as produce intermediate goods and capital goods.

This development has given rise in many African countries to incremental rates of imports of machinery and other capital goods. It has set forth a shift in the pattern of import demand—from consumer goods to machinery and equipment as also primary raw materials, etc. Thus Africa's balance of payments problems are, by and large, a symptom of economic growth. The success of their economic development programmes depends to a large extent upon the constant flow of "foreign resources of capital skills and know-how".

### **Scope for Indian Economic Co-operation**

India has covered the various stages of economic growth the African countries are at present passing through. "Today India produces not only pins, pens and hand tools but also ocean going ships, aeroplanes, locomotives, railway wagons and coaches, automobiles, machine tools and a vast array of industrial machinery"<sup>8</sup>. Her image as a purely recipient country of foreign collaboration is being gradually transformed into that of a resurgent nation capable of promoting a variety of industries overseas—in both developed and developing countries. India can now be proud of having established industries comparable to those in the most competitive and sophisticated countries of the Western world like the U.K., Canada, West Germany and Ireland.

India can undoubtedly play a more pioneering role in the industrialization of African countries because of the complementary nature of the economies of India and a number of these countries. India can participate and assist in the creation of socio-economic infrastructure as well as for setting up small and medium-scale industries which form a major part of Africa's economic development programme. It is in these fields which require simple techniques that Indian partners would be more acceptable than the entrepreneurs of developed countries who may not find it economic to invest their resources in such labour intensive industries. Highly mechanized and sophisticated plants which they can establish competently would neither be viable nor suited to the economic conditions existing in Africa. In the light of these economic realities, our readiness and willingness to undertake joint industrial ventures has to be demonstrated vigorously.

Some progress has already been made in this direction. Of the 60 industrial collaboration projects that are being processed by our industrialists with the approval of the Government of India, as many as 32, or more than half, are in the continent of Africa. They cover a wide



range of products to be manufactured in partnership with Indian enterprise and entrepreneurship such as textiles, jute goods, paper and pulp, cement, plastics, oil, soap, sugar, printing inks, pharmaceuticals and a large number of engineering items ranging from razor blades to steel re-rolling and small agricultural tractors. The countries where these joint venture projects are being set up are Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

Many of the projects have started operation; some of them have even gone into production on a sizable scale and have acquired considerable importance. The Indo-Ethiopian Textile Co., for example, now accounts for nearly half of Ethiopia's total production of cloth and yarn. Besides, it has opened large and growing employment avenues. Indian collaboration is appreciated. Many foreign concerns have been handed over to Indian managerial and technical personnel with a view to making them a success. In Ethiopia, for instance, a textile mill which was initially operated by a foreign firm and was a losing concern is now a profitable one, thanks to the managerial ability of Indian entrepreneurs.

The progress so far made in setting up joint ventures however is not commensurate with the potential existing in the continent. The tremendous scope for achievement as evident in the economic development plans of a number of African countries remains unexplored. There is, therefore, an urgent need for our industrialists to intensify their efforts. A number of proposals for joint ventures as also Indian co-operation in promoting trade were received from East African countries during the recent Mombasa Exhibition (July 1968) in which a large number of Indian firms participated. Proposals for the establishment of joint ventures include the setting up of a printing press, manufacture of automobile spare parts, aluminium products, steel furniture, pressure stoves, plastic goods, readymade garments, crockery and all types of earthen ware and porcelain, hair dyes and corrugated boxes. The climate for investment is favourable in all East African countries which have enacted laws to protect foreign investments which provide for repatriation of capital and earnings and offer ample safeguards against foreign competition.

During his recent visit to India, His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia, gave a further impetus to economic co-operation between Ethiopia and India. The sectors which call for particular attention from India's viewpoint are those of mining and agriculture. Libya is another country where opportunities for industrial collaboration have increased considerably in the wake of its oil boom and the resultant rise in its national income. The national income of Libya has gone up from £ 52 million in 1958 to as much as £ 410 million in 1965. Thus the problem of scarcity of capital no longer exists in that country. The opportunities for investment created by the Libyan boom in such fields as the creation of basic facilities—water supply, electricity, sewerage, roads and housing and a variety of consumer goods industries—are noteworthy. The opportunities in Libya show the scope that exists for investment in other countries of the African continent.

The various delegations sponsored by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry during the year 1964-65, which visited almost half of the free nations of Africa, have underlined the fact that "opportunities for collaboration exist in abundant measure"<sup>9</sup> in African countries. Many of the countries have "trust and confidence in India's capacity and willingness to give honest and disinterested advice in the many complex tasks of socio-economic development"<sup>10</sup> as well as for "expanding import and export trade".<sup>11</sup> Vigorous efforts, therefore, should be made to study and identify the various possibilities that exist today for economic co-operation between India and Africa. Such an effort on our part will undoubtedly help quicken the pace of industrial development in many of the African countries.

### **India-Africa Development Association**

The India-Africa Development Association, constituted by Indian industrialists with the active support of the Government of India in December 1963, is doing a useful service in this direction. The Association aims at fostering closer economic relations with African countries. It "processes and deals with inquiries received from African countries for collaboration in the different industrial and commercial fields and as a corollary, accepts proposals for imparting technical training to African nations in Indian factories".<sup>12</sup> Since its inception, the Association has helped sponsor many delegations to African countries and arrange a number of scholarships for African technicians for training in industrial plants in India. Many African nationals have already completed their training and are successfully operating industries in their own countries. Some of them are still undergoing in-plant training. Arrangements have also been made to provide on-the-spot training facilities in the various joint venture projects being set up in African countries.

Thus efforts are being made in India as well as in some of the African countries by people of Indian origin to contribute their mite to the process of economic development of the continent. But much remains to be done. Given sincerity and willingness, there is every reason to believe that India and a large number of African countries will derive greater mutual benefits from economic co-operation between them.

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## Documentation

# Report on Discussions held on board Fearless

THE *British Prime Minister made the following statement in the House of Commons on Tuesday 15th October, 1968* :—

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the talks about Rhodesia which were held on board H.M.S. *Fearless* in Gibraltar from 9th—13th October. First, I should like briefly to mention the events which led the Government to conclude that it would be right to have such a meeting.

As my Right Honourable Friend the Commonwealth Secretary and I myself have repeatedly made clear in the House, we were prepared at any time to engage in discussions if it seemed that there might be a chance of a settlement and provided it were understood that such a settlement must fully implement the requirements of the Six Principles\* which have been laid down.

As the House knows, I have more than once before the Recess expressed the doubt whether even if Mr. Smith's position changed sufficiently markedly to make talks worthwhile, there would be any guarantee that any agreement initialled by him could be endorsed by his colleagues. During the Recess there were changes in the membership of his régime, involving the disappearance of intransigent racialists, and we have also had evidence of the firmness with which he dealt with his Party Congress last month. Honourable Members will also have noted the régime's decision to introduce measures designed to end mandatory death sentences for certain offences.

At the same time, reliable reports reached us that Mr. Smith would be prepared to enter into meaningful talks.

Accordingly, an Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Commonwealth Office was sent to Salisbury on 20th September. He had discussions first with His Excellency the Governor of Rhodesia and the Head of the British Residual Mission; and secondly, under the aegis of the Governor, with Mr. Ian Smith. In addition he had discussions with other Rhodesians of different races, occupations and political views who asked to meet him.

On his return to London he reported that he found a widespread

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\*Annex A.

feeling in Salisbury that the recent changes in the political climate there offered some prospect that a fresh attempt to achieve a settlement might be successful. At the same time, however, he reported that Mr. Smith had not given him any indication of a change of position on the fundamental issues which have over these past five years made agreement impossible. This was particularly the case in relation to certain non-negotiable requirements on which any British Government must insist as the condition of a settlement. Mr. Smith had expressed his readiness however for an early meeting.

Further probings were conducted under the Governor's aegis by the Head of the British Residual Mission. We insisted that Mr. Smith should fully understand that, if talks were to be held, there could be no concessions by us which would undermine or weaken the Six Principles. We insisted also that Mr. Smith should confirm that he understood this. He did, in fact, give this confirmation, at the same time indicating that he in turn regarded certain matters as of fundamental importance to himself and to those he represented. Despite this re-affirmation of his own position on the Six Principles, it nevertheless seemed reasonable to assume that he would be unlikely, before coming to the conference table, to show his negotiating hand, and in particular to indicate any concessions he was ready to make.

Accordingly we met at Gibraltar. On the British side I was accompanied by my Right Hon. Friend the Commonwealth Secretary and my Right Hon. and Learned Friend the Attorney-General. On the Rhodesian side were Mr. Ian Smith, Mr. Howman and Mr. Lardner Burke. The Governor of Rhodesia was present in Gibraltar for the duration of the talks.

It would not be helpful to go over the hard-hitting exchanges in 30 hours of talks except to record that they confirmed that there was and remains a deep difference between the two sides, not only on the requirements for a settlement, but even more on the basic political philosophies which underlie the attitudes expressed. At the same time the talks were conducted in a good atmosphere, having regard to all the circumstances, and within the limitations created by the fundamental differences to which I have referred.

By Saturday night, 12th October, it was clear to both sides that it was unlikely that a settlement could be reached on board H.M.S. *Fearless*—and that this would become no more likely if the discussions lasted several more days. I decided, with Mr. Smith's agreement, to prepare a statement setting out our proposals for a settlement of the Rhodesian dispute.

This statement took account so far as was possible of points made in the discussions. I made clear to Mr. Smith that, while there could be no change in the British Government's attitude on the fundamental issues, on other matters there could be further discussion; and that of course we should be ready to consider alternative drafts on these non-fundamental matters.

The Government have set out in a White Paper the text of the British statement\* and the text of the communiqué† which was issued in agreement between the two sides. The White Paper also includes yet again the text of the Six Principles, since we have made it clear before, throughout and since the discussions that there could be no agreement except on the basis of those Principles.

The proposals which I gave to Mr. Smith on 13th October incorporate the changes to the 1961 Constitution which were worked out on board H.M.S. *Tiger*. In certain cases these changes have been set out with greater precision, particularly as regards the powers of the Senate and the circumstances in which appeals would lie to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—the instrument which, in our view, is the best fitted to provide the reinforcement required to guarantee the fulfilment of the second Principle. While no doubt alternative instruments to this end could be proposed and considered, I am sure Hon. Members would agree that the Judicial Committee would provide the most effective guarantee.

The changes suggested in the 1961 Constitution were, and are, designed to meet the first, second, third and sixth Principles. The statement makes clear that, provided that there is at all times a “blocking quarter” of directly and popularly elected Africans as a safeguard against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution, the British Government do not insist on any particular composition for the legislature.

The statement further sets out the basis on which the Government would be prepared to accept, as part of an otherwise satisfactory settlement, new procedures to deal with the problem of the return to legality.

Finally, I would draw attention to three further important features of our proposals. First, and this reinforces the “Tiger” proposals relating to the fourth Principle, is our insistence on the importance of a vigorous and extended programme for African education, particularly in technical education, including agriculture. We have said that we would be prepared to contribute to this programme a sum of up to £50 million spread over ten years on a pound-for-pound basis. We regard this as imperative in the interests of the African population and of Rhodesia: it would also have an important bearing on the number of Africans able to qualify for the “A” Roll franchise. Secondly, arising out of our discussions, we have included the proposal that the Royal Commission to be appointed for testing the acceptability of any settlement to the Rhodesian people as a whole, should be instructed also to enquire in the arrangements for the registration of eligible voters under the widely extended franchise which is proposed, with a view to encouraging greater African participation in Rhodesian political life. Thirdly, the House will note what has been said about the need for a broad-based Government, including Africans, to carry Rhodesia through the whole process of introducing the new Constitution, right up to the election of a new Parliament under that Constitution.

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\*Annex B.

†Annex C.

The House will recognise the relevance of these three proposals, as well as certain other events, to the creation of the "substantial change of circumstances" which repeatedly I have said in this House must exist to justify our raising with our Commonwealth partners the question of "no independence before majority rule".

And the House will recognise too that we will not agree to the implementation of any settlement that has not first been shown to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole—the fifth Principle, on which all else depends.

As was stated in the communique, Mr. Smith said that he would take the British Government's proposals back to Salisbury, without commitment, for consideration with his colleagues there. I said that the Commonwealth Secretary will be available to fly out to Salisbury if Mr. Smith and his colleagues feel that this would assist them in their consideration of the British proposals. Our position at the end of the talks, as throughout these past years, maintains the position repeatedly stated by the Commonwealth Secretary—no sell out, no slamming the door by us.

We have insisted that our proposals have to be taken as a whole. Any concessions we have been prepared to offer on matters which do not involve the safeguards required for the Six Principles are available only as part of an agreement which incorporates the clear guarantees on which we have insisted to safeguard those Principles. Now decisions have to be taken in Salisbury. We for our part are keeping the door open. But the key to a settlement is and must remain the Six Principles, which are cardinal to the future of Rhodesia—the future of Rhodesians of all races for whom the British Parliament stands trustee.



## ANNEX A THE SIX PRINCIPLES

The approach of successive British Governments towards the problem of granting independence to Rhodesia has throughout been governed by certain basic requirements. These have been formulated as five principles, to which the present Government subsequently added a sixth. These are as follows :

(1) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.

(2) There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.

(3) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.

(4) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.

(5) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

(6) It would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

## ANNEX B STATEMENT OF BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT

### I The Constitution

The 1961 Constitution (as amended before November 1965) with the changes outlined below to meet the First, Second, Third and Sixth Principles. Details to be worked out by a joint working party of officials as soon as possible.

#### (1) The Governor

Governor-General to be appointed on the advice of the Rhodesian Government.

#### (2) The Legislature

The composition to be :

##### *Legislative Assembly*

33 "A" Roll seats	}	Each block of seats to cover the whole country.
17 "B" Roll seats		
17 Reserved European seats		



*The Senate*

The composition to be :

- 12 European seats (elected by Europeans on the "A" Roll. Six members to represent Mashonaland and six members to represent Matabeleland).
- 8 African seats (elected by Africans on "A" and "B" Rolls voting together. Four members to represent Mashonaland and four members to represent Matabeleland).
- 6 Chiefs (elected by the Chief's Councils—three to represent Mashonaland and three Matabeleland, elected on a provincial basis).

(The British Government are prepared to consider variations in the composition of the Legislature, including increased Chiefly representation, provided that it secures at all times a "blocking quarter" of directly and popularly elected Africans.)

The qualifications for Senators will be higher than those for members of the Legislative Assembly.

Ministers may be members of either House. A Minister shall have the right to speak but not vote in the House of which he is not a member.

**(3) Franchise**

The "B" Roll franchise to be extended to include all Africans over 30 who satisfy the citizenship and residence qualifications.

Reserved European seats—to be elected by the European electorate.

Cross voting to be retained at 25 per cent and applied to all seats in the Legislative Assembly filled by "A" and "B" Roll elections.

**(4) Delimitation**

Alteration in the composition of both Houses and in number of seats to be effected by special entrenchment procedure. But the terms of reference of the Delimitation Commission are to incorporate a formula as follows :

The overriding objective of the Commission is so to divide the constituencies that the proportion of those with a majority of African voters on the "A" Roll at the time of delimitation is the same as the proportion of African voters then on the "A" Roll for the country as a whole.

Subject to this, the Commission is to take into account the factors specified in section 38.

**(5) Terms of Office of Senators**

20 elected members—as for Legislative Assembly.

6 Chiefs—as for Legislative Assembly although a Chief will vacate his office as a Senator if he ceases to be a Chief.

Chiefs are only to be removed from office on the recommendation of an impartial judicial tribunal.

**(6) Powers of the Senate**

The powers of the Senate will be :

(a) Review of Legislation (but no veto).

(b) Power equally with the Legislative Assembly to initiate legislation, but only in respect of Tribal Land, Law and Custom.

Delaying powers for up to six months in respect of Bills on Tribal Land, Law and Custom sent to it by the Legislative Assembly.

(c) Amendment of Constitution—see below.

**(7) Executive Powers**

The Governor-General will act on Ministers' advice in all matters.

**(8) Amendment of the Constitution**

Ordinary amendments of the Constitution will require, as now, a vote of two-thirds of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly.

A Bill to amend one of the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution will require a vote of at least three-quarters of the total membership of both Houses voting together. In addition there will be a system of appeal against such an amendment either on the ground that it discriminates unjustly, or has the effect of discriminating unjustly, between the races ; or on the ground that it derogates from the principles of the Declaration of Rights contained in the Constitution. Where the Bill has been adversely reported on by the Constitutional Council on either of these grounds, it will be referred by that Council to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and will not come into effect unless and until the Judicial Committee rejects the appeal. Where the Constitutional Council has not made an adverse report, any person who is a citizen of Rhodesia may, within a specified time, ask for a certificate from the Constitutional Council that there is a case for consideration by the Judicial Committee. If the Constitutional Council grants him a certificate, he may himself appeal to the Judicial Committee within a specified time and again the Bill will not come into effect unless and until the Judicial Committee rejects the appeal. If, however, the Constitutional Council refuses to grant a certificate, there can be no appeal to the Judicial Committee unless the Committee itself grants an application for special leave to appeal. In that case the Bill may be brought into effect without waiting for the appeal to be determined. This system of

appeal will be unamendable for fifteen years from the commencement of the new Constitution. Thereafter it can be modified in the same way as the other specially entrenched provisions.

## II

### **Fourth Principle (Progress Towards Ending Racial Discrimination)**

(1) To give effect to the Fourth Principle, a Commission of the necessary independence and high standing will be set up under existing Rhodesian legislation. The terms of reference of this Commission will be agreed with the British Government, who will be consulted on its composition. It will be the Commission's task to study and make recommendations on the problems of racial discrimination, including the Land Apportionment Act, and the possibility of extending the competence of the Constitutional Council to embrace pre-1961 legislation. Thereafter a Standing Commission will be appointed to keep the problems of racial discrimination under regular review.

(2) The Commission will start work as soon as possible after the test of acceptability has been completed and the appropriate legislation passed through the British Parliament (see IV and V below).

## III

### **African Education**

Vigorous further action will be taken to provide such additional facilities for the education and training of Africans in Rhodesia as will enable them to develop their capabilities. This will equip them to take up the greater employment opportunities that will be in prospect and to raise their earning capacities and standards of living, and will enable them to play an increased part in the life and progress of their country. The British Government will provide for this purpose funds of up to £5,000,000 a year for a period of ten years, to be matched against equal sums to be provided by the Rhodesian Government in addition to currently planned annual expenditure for these purposes. These additional funds will be available for capital and/or recurrent expenditure, and will be used for the improvement of facilities for Africans in the field of agricultural and technical training, teacher training and training in administration, and of other facilities for primary, secondary and higher education to be agreed upon between the two Governments. There will be early discussions on the ways and means of giving effect to this offer.

## IV

### **Fifth Principle (Test of Acceptability)**

(1) The British Government will establish a Royal Commission as soon as possible for the purpose of testing the acceptability to the people of Rhodesia as a whole of a new Independence Constitution based on any agreement to be reached.

(2) In the period before and during the test there will be no renewal of censorship; normal political activities, provided they are conducted peacefully and democratically and without intimidation from any quarter, will be permitted. The Commissioners and their staff will enjoy personal inviolability and freedom of movement. There will be complete immunity for the witnesses heard by them. Radio and television facilities will be provided for opposition opinion to the satisfaction of the Commission.

(3) Continued detention and restriction will not be authorised unless the reviewing authorities (see (4) and (5) below) are affirmatively satisfied, having full regard to past activities, that the persons concerned are likely to commit, or incite or conspire to commit, acts of violence or intimidation.

(4) A review of such cases will be completed in the shortest possible time. In the first instance each case will be reviewed in Chambers by a Judge of the Rhodesian High Court. The Judge's decision that a person should be released will be final and the person will be released forthwith.

(5) Cases in which release is not recommended by the Judge will be referred to an impartial judicial tribunal. This will consist of three members, of whom one will be nominated by the Lord Chancellor and two will be Rhodesian nominees. The tribunal will establish its own procedures and will have the power to secure the orderly conduct of its proceedings. In addition it will have the power to sit *in camera* where it is satisfied that this is necessary on the ground of security of evidence and, though the person concerned or his legal representative will normally be present, the tribunal may, where there are security considerations, decide to take evidence from witnesses in his absence and that of his legal representative.

(6) Persons released from detention and restriction will have full liberty to engage in normal political activities on the same conditions as other persons. The Commissioners carrying out the test of acceptability will have access to those not released.

(7) Rhodesian Africans living abroad may apply to the Royal Commission if they wish to return to Rhodesia during the period of the test. The Commission will put these cases to the Rhodesian authorities, who will either provide safe conducts or refer them to the Judicial Tribunal for a decision on whether entry should be allowed. The tribunal will treat these cases on the same basis as cases of detention or restriction inside Rhodesia.

(8) Where a detention or restriction order has been made against a person after the establishment of the tribunal, his case will be referred to the tribunal within 14 days and considered with all possible speed.

(9) As an additional task the Royal Commission will examine the practical working of the existing arrangements for registration of voters, and will make such recommendations as it judges necessary for improving those arrangements, so that as many qualified persons as possible are in fact registered.

## V

### Subsequent Steps

(1) If in the light of the report of the Royal Commission it is established that the proposed constitutional settlement is acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, the following steps will be taken. The British Government will legislate to introduce the Rhodesian Independence Constitution. Complementary measures will be taken in Rhodesia. On the coming into effect of this legislation the British Government will take all action in their power to bring about an immediate discontinuance of the economic and other sanctions at present in force. Arrangements will be put in hand to settle outstanding financial and other issues and to regularise relations between the two sides. Rhodesian public servants who have been accepted under the British Government scheme, and who wish to return, will be reinstated in Rhodesia.

(2) If in the light of the Royal Commission's report on the arrangements for the registration of voters it is established that improvements in those arrangements are desirable, the Rhodesian authorities will take urgent steps to effect them, having regard to the Royal Commission's recommendations.

## VI

### Interim Arrangements

Mr. Smith will form a broad-based administration as soon as possible, including Africans. This will remain in office until the new Constitution has been introduced, elections held under it and a new Parliament convened.

## ANNEX C

### COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT GIBRALTAR ON THE EVENING OF 13th OCTOBER

The British and Rhodesian delegations have ended their Gibraltar talks after four days of intensive discussion.

Both sides came to Gibraltar fully aware of the deep differences that existed between them, deriving from fundamental disagreement on major issues of principle. Nevertheless, both sides came determined to see whether it was possible to reach agreement on a just, honourable and lasting settlement of the problems of Rhodesia.

In the course of over 30 hours of discussions some progress was made, but disagreement on fundamental issues still remains.

The Prime Minister and his colleagues therefore gave to Mr. Smith a document setting out a basis on which, subject to the approval of the British Cabinet, a Rhodesian Independence settlement would be introduced in Parliament.

Mr. Smith and his colleagues have taken the document away for consideration with their colleagues in Salisbury.

It was agreed that adequate time should be allowed for this consideration.

At the end of talks, both sides recognised that a very wide gulf still remains between them on certain issues.

The Prime Minister said that the Commonwealth Secretary would be available to fly out to Salisbury if it was felt by Mr. Smith and his colleagues that this would assist them in their consideration of the document.

H.M.S. FEARLESS  
13th October 1968.

# Union-State Relations

## An Aspect of India's Experiment in Federalism

M. C. JAIN KAGZI

CLOSELY following the Indian Independence many a country of Africa and Asia, namely, Ghana, Nigeria, Ceylon, Malaysia and Pakistan, awoke into freedom. The process and stages of constitutional developments in these countries were often very much similar to those practised in India. Often the change from dependency to independence was brought about non-violently without an open rebellion and without any sharp rupture of legality. The independent Dominions were set up by the British Parliament by law accompanied by no sudden break with the past. With effect from the Independence Day, for instance, 15th August, 1947, for India, the British Parliament ceased to have any authority and the responsibility of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the governance of this country was finally and irretrievably terminated. The necessary omissions were made in the Royal Style and Titles; for instance, the words "Emperor of India" were dropped. The known restrictions and limitations about the legislative powers of the Indian Legislature were abolished. The inauguration of the new era of freedom witnessed the adoption of a new written Constitution. The Constitution of India of the Sovereign Democratic Republic was adopted and enacted for, and given to, "We the people of India" by the Constituent Assembly which met in 1946. The Constitution did not receive the assent of the English King, nor was it promulgated by means of any Order-in-Council. Its adoption and enactment were testified by Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the President of the Constituent Assembly who became the first President of India. It derived its sanction immediately and directly from the people. For the African countries the process followed was often a little different. For instance, the fullest autonomy was given to Ghana, but the constituent power was not immediately passed on from the British Parliament; only a bill for amending the constitution could not be presented for Royal assent unless it had been passed and approved by the Ghanaian Legislature. The new constitution was formally proclaimed in an Order-in-Council. Similar provisions initially made later underwent changes in due course in certain other countries which too became republics.

Similarity in legal and constitutional forms was initially accompanied by similarities in many other matters too. Attempts were made for the creation of emotionally integrated larger political communities in certain of these new States. In various parts of Africa larger unions and federations were attempted and forged. These included the Central

African Federation, and the Nigerian Federation. In many an instance these federal polities formed in the wake of Independence could not stand the stresses and strains of age-old tribal and racial prejudices and rivalries, regional affiliations, and cultural and linguistic affinities. The constitutional federal processes proved too transitional in the absence of any deep seated emotional urge for unity in diversity. Within no time the forces of narrow inter-regional rivalries, tribalism, and racialism assumed alarming proportions and let loose the Frankenstein's monster which brought down the Central African Federation of the (African) Northern and the (White) Southern Rhodesia, because of racial incompatibility, the white intolerance for the black and embittered race relations. The Nigerian Federation seems in the process of disintegration with the yet unended fight for Biafran secession.

This post-Independence spectacle of disintegration and dismemberment of certain Federations in Africa might make our friends in many of these friendly countries turn their eyes to the Union of India which too was formed of different political sub-divisions, and although subjected to the heavy strains and stresses of partition, regionalism, linguisticism, provincialism seems remarkably to have escaped a similar fate. Having completed twenty-one years of the republican era she seems to be able to preserve the sovereignty and integrity of the Union of India. This impels the present writer to treat certain provisions of the Constitution which have a bearing on the establishment and subsequent continual existence of the Union in the context of the developments in certain countries in Africa. Because of the limitation imposed by these pages the treatment can only be brief and sketchy.

## II

The Union of India is composed of seventeen States, namely, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Maharashtra, Mysore, Nagaland, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Their names and territories are specified in a schedular form in the First Schedule to the Constitution. Their names, boundaries and areas cannot be altered by ordinary legislation, although they are neither sacrosanct nor perpetually unalterable. Their several names find no mention in the text of the Constitution, except occasionally under certain provisional and temporary provisions relating to certain States e.g., the States of Jammu and Kashmir, and Nagaland. Subject to the prohibition against cession of the territory of a State to a foreign State their territories can be reorganised *ad modum* the prescribed procedure by Parliament by law.<sup>1</sup> Parliament is given *expressis verbis* an exclusive power subject to the condition of following the prescribed procedure. Its power in this respect is plenary and it can implement a plan for reorganisation involving alteration of areas, delineation of boundaries, or changes in their names. A new State can be established in the territories of an existing State or by reorganisation of any two adjacent States; or territories of one State can be transferred to another State as part of a reorganisation plan. The prescribed procedure for doing this involves formulation of the proposals for reorganisation and necessary "supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions, and their incorporation in a Bill. The Bill is set for



reference to the Legislatures of the concerned States, and on return within "such period as may be specified by the President it is presented for his recommendations in respect of the proposals contained in it. His recommendations are based on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers, that is, the Union Government. The Bill so recommended and, for that matter, approved by the Government is introduced in any of the two Houses of Parliament. If passed by it, it is transmitted to the other House. The legislative procedure in each House is approximated to the normal process for passing the legislative bills, and not to the special procedure for passing a constitutional amendment as prescribed in Article 368 in respect of any provision of the Constitution save the provisions of Part III declared immutable by the Supreme Court in the *Golak Nath's case*<sup>2</sup>. Though not an ordinary legislation, yet a law thus passed is not deemed a constitutional amendment, although it amends the First and Fourth Schedules, and incidentally and consequentially, certain other textual provisions also.

This power of reorganisation of the States has occasionally been used after the commencement of the Constitution. Till November 1, 1956, the Union consisted of the States which territorially preserved the image of the sub-divisions of British India before the Independence and of the old princely States. They were categorised in the unamended First Schedule, respectively, as Part A States and Part B States. The separate category of Part B States was established in the areas of the princely States and it was intended that a plan of reorganisation of the States would be implemented within ten years of the establishment of the Republic. To be able to formulate a reorganisation plan the Government appointed a commission, called the States Reorganisation Commission, in December, 1953, to consider the matter in the context of the historical background, the existing situation and other factors having a bearing on the problem of reorganisation, namely, unity and security of India, language and culture, financial viability, requirements of national development plans, regional planning and a balanced economy. It drew up a plan for the States reorganisation. In doing so it gave effect to all relevant considerations, and to culture and language, in particular. It said: "Culture in its general sense is a social heritage of moral, spiritual and economic values expressing itself in the distinct way of life of a group of people living as an organised community. It covers language, habits, ideas, beliefs and even the vocations pattern of society." The recommendations of the Commission were given effect to under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, supported by the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution. Part of the work that was left out then was carried out by the reorganisation of the States of Bombay and Punjab, respectively, in 1960 and 1967. The near completion of the process of reorganisation marks the achievement of the first stage of the irresistible process of emotional integration and territorial integrity of the Union without sacrificing cultural and linguistic disparities.

Though not guaranteed as perpetually inviolable boundaries, the States of the Union cannot be liquidated. The Constitution makes the Union perpetual, although the existing States can occasionally be reorga-

nised by Parliament by law, subject to its following the prescribed procedural conditions. Nevertheless, at any time the existing States are integral units of the national Union, and subject to any reorganisation their existence cannot ordinarily be terminated. The built-in limitations on the exercise of power by Parliament in this respect imparts the Union its strength so that it may become a more closer Union. The Constitution ensures similar and equal status for all the States. The Union Council of States—the name seems meaningful—is the Upper House of the Union Parliament. The basis of allocation of its seats among the States is not left to be provided by Parliament. It is declared to be “in accordance with the provisions in that behalf contained in the Fourth Schedule. Although they are not given equal representation in it, the basis of representation is constitutionally preserved and cannot be altered by Parliament, except incidentally in a plan of reorganisation, or else by a constitutional amendment. It seems to be based on the population with a federal corrective. The seats are filled by persons chosen by indirect election by the elected members of the States Assemblies<sup>3</sup> in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of single transferable vote.<sup>4</sup> The Council of States so constituted admits only twelve other members nominated by the President on considerations of distinction attained by them in arts, science and literature. It is a permanent House of the Union Parliament and cannot be dissolved.

Not only in the Council of States, but in the House of the People as well the States are accorded uniform representation. The universal franchise bereft of any pattern or practice of discrimination on grounds of race, religion, caste, sex, colour or place of birth, and without any qualification as to property or tax paying capacity (poll tax) provides the double rock foundation of our Democratic Republic. The privilege to participate in decisional political processes by means of direct election is given to all citizens throughout the country equally. The notorious system of communal electorates existing in the pre-Independence days and which sowed the seeds of partition is emphatically rejected. The principle of one man one vote, and the principle that each electoral constituency should have approximately equal representation are accepted and implemented. Any gerrymandering and malapportionment are made next to impossible by the provision that representation of the various States in Parliament should be uniform by ensuring that the ratio between the population of each State and the seats allotted to it in the House of the People is “so far as practicable” the same for the States ; and the population of each single member parliamentary and State Assembly constituency in a State is “so far as practicable” the same throughout the State.<sup>5</sup> The functions of readjustment and delimitation of electoral constituencies, prescription of voters’ qualifications, their registration, preparation of electoral rolls are not entrusted to the States as in the United States of America. The Delimitation Commission which is a statutory body set up by the President under a parliamentary enactment is entrusted with the function of reorganisation of the electoral districts which should be adjusted following changes in patterns of population distribution, and to and fro movement of populations of the various areas and parts of the country evident in the

decennial census. Thus the situation presented in *Baker v. Carr* in the United States of America cannot arise here. The preparation of electoral rolls and conduct of elections are also not a governmental function. They are the responsibility of the Election Commission for which provision is made in the Constitution itself. This is not influenced by either the Union Government, or any, or for that matter, of all of the State Governments. This arrangement of holding the elections provides the double rock bottom popular foundation for the Union by making the people living in its various constituent States participate in the political matters and affairs not only of their respective States of the Union but also at the national level. The States and the people indirectly have an effective voice in the selection and election of the President of India. Taken together the States enjoy parity with the Union, inasmuch as they among themselves possess a block of half the votes cast in a presidential election. The electoral college consists of (i) the elected members of the State Assemblies, and (ii) the elected members of both the Houses of Parliament. The first group of the electoral college members cast half the number of votes. This is ensured by the provision that each elector in the second category of the members of the electoral college "shall have such number of votes as may be obtained by dividing the total number of votes assigned to the members of the Legislative Assemblies of the various States... by the total number of the elected members of both the Houses of Parliament. The uniform pattern of their representation as also the parity enjoyed by their Assemblies in voting in the presidential election cannot be affected by any legislation enacted by Parliament. Any change in them can be made only by means of a constitutional amendment which can be passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article 368, subject to the condition of ratification by the Legislature "of not less than one-half of the States by resolutions to that effect."

None of the States claim any history, or pre-Constitution sovereign status. The transfer of power under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, was made to the Constituent Assembly which represented the People and not any of the Provinces. The States of the Union are accorded a similar and equal status, and are given similar constitutions after the model set out in Part VI of the Constitution, except for well known reasons in the case of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The position of the State of Jammu and Kashmir too is only temporarily special. Because of the continuing aggressions committed by China and Pakistan within its territories and the special socio-economic pattern of its population, the State was provisionally accorded a special position in accordance with the provisions of Article 370. It was accorded the unique privilege to convene a constituent assembly and frame its constitution within the framework of the Indian Constitution the whole of which was not extended to it. The Constituent Assembly met, and after declaring that the State "is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India framed a constitution on November 17, 1956, in the name of "We the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

Under the model constitution each State has a Governor, a Legislature and a High Court. The Governor is not elected by the

inhabitants of the State. Instead he is appointed by the President of India who in this matter acts on the advice of the Union Government. The Home Minister is to hold consultations with the State Government before the selection is made. When appointed the Governor must be received in the State. He is the head of the State Government. *Lex litera* the executive power of the State is vested in him, and is exercised in his name. Nevertheless, he does not act *a discretion*, except in so far as he is by or under the Constitution required to exercise his functions in his discretion. He acts constitutionally on the aid and advice of the State Council of Ministers, and cannot dispense with it except when the Government cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution and consequently is suspended by the President by a Proclamation. In recent months a great debate has taken place in the country on the position, powers and duties of a Governor. These are determined by the provisions of the Constitution and certain not yet firmly established conventions and practices peculiar to the political behaviour patterns witnessed in the various States. Normally a Governor does not have much of a choice in the selection of the State Chief Minister, and should appoint the leader of the majority party, or coalition in the State Assembly. When the party position is confused, because of much too frequent to and fro defections and floor crossings, he can assess the situation for himself and appoint that person the Chief Minister who seems to him to be in the best position to form the Government. Having named the Chief Minister, he appoints other members of the Council of Ministers on his advice.

The State Legislature consists of the Governor, and two Houses, namely, a Legislative Council and a Legislative Assembly for each of the States of Andhra, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Maharashtra, Mysore, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. It is unicameral consisting of the Governor and the Legislative Assembly for other States. The unicameral Legislature can be transformed into a bicameral one if the State Legislative Assembly resolves by an absolute majority of two-thirds of the members present and voting to have a Legislative Council for the State ; and in pursuance thereof Parliament enacts a law providing for its establishment. The law and procedure of election are prescribed by Parliament, subject to the provisions of the Constitution. The preparation of the electoral rolls and conduct of elections are the responsibilities of the Election Commission which is a unified body for the whole of the country.

The Legislature possesses plenary but limited legislative powers. It possesses no power to enact extra-territorial laws, and its laws must stand the test of territorial *nexus*. Its powers are defined by a near exhaustive enumeration of the legislative heads in List II (the State List) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. It is given an exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in that List. It also possesses a concurrent power in respect of subject-matters of the Concurrent List (List III). A law to be valid and *intra vires* its power should in pith and substance be covered by any specific entry in any of the two Lists. In the area of concurrent legislation it is further required to be free of any repugnancy with the parliamentary

legislation, except when the President's assent is obtained for it. Subject to the express constitutional limitations a law operates with full force. It operates even in respect of land and property of the State as also in respect of property owned by the Union and situated within the State<sup>6</sup> or the property of a corporation owned or controlled by the Union if situated within the State. It binds even the instrumentalities of the State and also of the Union operating within the State. The only exception known and recognised is in relation to tax laws. A law impugned as *ultra vires* can in a fit case be judicially reviewed, and can be declared unconstitutional by the State High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against the judgment of the High Court.

#### IV

The Union-State relations under the Constitution are thus determined on the basis of the first principle of federalism. Both the Union of India and the States have been established by the Constitution which is binding on all of them. Under it the powers, legislative and executive, of the Union and each of the States are defined by enumeration and description. The rule of distribution of powers is the basic fundament of the structural framework of the Constitution. The rule cannot be violated, nor can it be given a go-by by either the Union, or any or all the States except under certain special conditions or circumstances recognised *expressis verbis* by the Constitution—conditions of national emergency, or an emergency caused by a breakdown of the constitutional government of a State Legislature and Government. Unless the Council of State has by a resolution passed by a special majority of two-thirds of those present and voting declared it necessary in the national interest, and unless for purposes of the international relations it becomes incumbent upon Parliament it can legislate only in respect of the Union List (List I) and in respect of the residuary matters which fall within its reach. "Notwithstanding anything" in Lists II and III. The *non-obstante* clause does not imply that it can encroach upon the States' powers. The scope of the exclusive legislative powers can finally be determined only by an interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution by the Supreme Court which has the power to enforce the rule of distribution of powers by undertaking the judicial review of the laws enacted either by Parliament or a State Legislature. A law impugned and found *ultra vires* their respective powers of jurisdiction is void *ad initio*. When permitted the Union legislation with respect to any State List matter is generally temporary, except when enacted with the consent of the State. The national interest necessitating the Union legislation in respect of a State List subject should be declared in a resolution passed by a special two-thirds majority of the members present and voting in a sitting of the Council of States.

The matters in respect of which uniformity in legislation is desirable and should be promoted keeping in view the peculiar regional and State interests go to make the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. This is a fairly long List containing, all told, 47 entries covering the increasing area of socio-economic and

social welfare legislation and various heads of the great mass of our *lex loci*. The enumerated heads include criminal law and procedure; property relations and trusts; marriage and divorce and other heads of personal family relations, contracts; economic and social planning; social security. The Union Parliament and the State Legislatures also have the power to legislate with respect of these matters; but the power of the latter is subject to the legislative power of the former in respect of the Union List matters and the condition of non-repugnancy with the parliamentary laws. The national interest in uniformity in respect of certain type of State legislation is also preserved by the requirement of the President's sanction before, or his assent after the enactment of the State laws. Besides the discretion given to the Governor to reserve a State Bill for the President's assent, certain specific provisions also exist in which the President's assent (or sanction) is compulsorily required. Under Article 31(3) a State Bill providing for acquisition or requisition of property should be reserved for his assent. Under Proviso to Article 304 a State Bill providing for any restriction (also a tax) on inter-State commerce should be passed after his sanction. In its absence the State Act when passed shall be invalid. The question of legislative relation is answered unambiguously by the Constitution. The operation of the Union legislation save tax laws against State property was raised in a suit filed by the State of West Bengal against the Union of India. The latter sought to acquire certain land situated within that State and owned by it under a law enacted by the Union Parliament. The plaintiff State contended that the legislation would operate only in respect of private land, and under it the Union Government was not competent to acquire the State-owned land. It further urged that if Parliament conferred such authority the enactment was *ultra vires* its legislative power, because the State was a sovereign constituent of the Union, and as such could not be subject to the ordinary legislative authority of the latter. The defendant Union answered these contentions effectively. It urged that a State was not a sovereign political unit outside the legislative power of the Union Parliament. Any theory of the State rights as spoken of in the United States of America was foreign to our system and was not supported by the constitutional history and constitutional processes under the Constitution.<sup>7</sup> The American precedents in this respect were wholly irrelevant and inadmissible. *Expressio unius exclusio alterius*—the only area in which legislative authority of Parliament could be excluded—was direct taxation, subject to the limitations of Article 289.<sup>7a</sup>

The Union-State administrative relations too are basically built on the basis of distribution of the executive powers on the broad pattern of the distribution of legislative powers. The Union possesses exclusive executive powers in respect of the matters covered by the Union List and matters pertaining to international treaties and agreements. The executive powers pertaining to the Concurrent List matters can be conferred exclusively on the Union Government under the laws of Parliament. Subject to not too frequent a possibility the State executive powers cannot impede the effective functioning of the Union Government. The latter can always give such directions to a State as appear to it necessary in respect of protection of Union property, including railway property, means of communication, national highways, military establishments<sup>7b</sup>.

The federal financial relations are based on the twin principles of distribution of tax power and sharing of the surplus Union revenues with the States. Because of the increased bulk of the Union revenue and limited revenue resources of the States, the latter's dependence upon the former is a practical reality. This fiscal dependence has been accelerated under the impact of planning and growing budgetary deficits. Extraconstitutionally established, the Planning Commission has had a great bearing on the Union-State relations during the last two decades. It has pooled the national resources and determined priorities in development and economic planning after taking an overall general national view. The three Five-Year Plans which have already been implemented have provided a firm basis of interdependence of the Union and the States. The overall economic planning, industrialisation and building up of national highways, development of river valleys and dam construction within the national quasi-federal framework have put meaning and content in the constitutional system.

One of the unique features of the Indian Constitution is the unification, independence and supremacy of the judicature. The Supreme Court and the State High Courts make one unified system of judicature. The judges of these courts are appointed by the President. They hold their respective offices *quam diu se bene gesserit*, and cannot be removed save by an order of the President passed after an inquiry in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Parliament by law and a special resolution passed by a two-thirds majority of one House and accepted similarly by the other House of Parliament.

A decree or writ issued by one High Court can be executed anywhere in any State and Union Territory within the Union. The orders, directions and processes of the Supreme Court cannot be resisted; the Union and State Governments, and all authorities and officers are required to act in accordance with them. They cannot be at war with the Court. No situation can arise as presented in *Cooper v. Aaron* before the U.S. Supreme Court in which one State Governor obstructed the implementation of desegregation of school following the cause celebre decision of *Brown v. Board of Education*. That case presented a situation peculiar to the constitutional developments likely under the American federal system. In the *Brown case* the Supreme Court of the United States declared school segregation forbidden for amounting to denial of *equal protection* of law under the XIV Amendment. The implementation of the decision was impeded by the Arkansas Governor who by use of the State militia put a school out of bounds for Negro children. This the Supreme Court held could not be done.

The inter-State and the Union-State civil disputes arising out of their conflictual governmental powers, claims or interests giving rise to a dispute involving any question relatable to the "existence or extent" of a legal right can be adjudicated by the Supreme Court. The Court is vested for the purpose with an original jurisdiction. A State can sue the Union, and the Union can sue one or more States<sup>8</sup> in the like manner in which a private person can do by as institution of suit proceedings in a civil court of original jurisdiction. The Court can try the

suit in the manner of a civil suit, and decide the question of law or facts or both on the basis of pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties. The final and speedy resolution of the none-too-frequent inter-governmental disputes provides a basis of harmonisation of the Union-States relations in an important way. The Court cannot decide only political questions and matters for which especial provisions of consultation, and arbitration have been made, or for which the President can seek its advice.

The health of the Union is ensured, first, by ensuring non-recurrence of the Union-State conflicts in legislative, executive and fiscal matters; and, secondly, if conflicts do arise, by providing compulsory means of settlement and arbitration of conflictual claims. The first is, as is noted above, realised by a near exhaustive and precise enumeration of their exclusive legislative, executive and tax powers. The second objective is realised by the *non-absente* clauses, a long Concurrent List with a provision for preference of the Union law to a State law, and the machinery of the President's veto implied in his power to give sanction or assent to certain types of State legislation. This arrangement decreases the legalism associated with federalism complained of by Dicey and widely witnessed in the American, Australian and Canadian systems. The provision of arbitration in the administrative relations area through the agency of an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of India and interposition of the Finance Commission in the fiscal matters lessen litigation in some of the most sensitive areas of the Union-State relations. It serves a double purpose. On the one hand, it secures the autonomy of the State against the powerful influences and fiscal coercion to which they would have been subjected to in its absence. On the other hand, it keeps off legalism in the area of federal finance. The Commission is made the umpire of the State's fiscal interests by requiring the President to take its recommendations into consideration, and by providing for placing its report and account of the follow-on action on the tables of the Houses of Parliament.

The State Government, the State Legislature or other authorities are bound by the law declared by the Supreme Court empowered to declare the law of the Constitution. It means what the Court says it means, and thus the powers and the scope and limitation of the powers of the Union and the States, respectively, are determined by it. This aspect of our federal system should never be doubted. A conflict between a State Governor and a State High Court, as also between a State Legislative Assembly and a State High Court due to their conflictual claims for unrestricted powers should be resolved by the authoritative and binding interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and delineation of their respective powers<sup>9</sup>. The general question of law or fact having a bearing on these relations, and questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution assuming public importance by having a bearing on the matters can be brought before the Court. The law declared by the Court and its interpretation of the Constitution binds them. The scope of their legislative powers, the reach of their executive authority, the limits of their tax powers etc., are matters requiring interpretation of the various



provisions of the Constitution. Any assertion of the legislative authority in excess or opposition to the provisions of the Constitution and their binding interpretation vitiates the enactment, statute or statutory instrument, as the case might be. Any person affected by it can challenge its *vires*. The contention that an Act, an Ordinance, or a rule is *ultra vires* the given authority can be raised in the course of judicial proceedings, and the Supreme Court is given a general final appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide it finally. If proved *ultra vires* by evidence and arguments raised before it, the Court declares the impugned piece of legislation unconstitutional. For want of competence it is rendered void *ab initio*. This extraordinary power of judicial review restores the federal principle of distribution of powers when violated by either Parliament or a State Legislature.

## V

The Constitution ensures that functioning of the constitutional governments in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution in the States, and the territorial integrity and security of the Union and the States from external aggression as also from internal disturbance, and their financial stability and credit. It provides the means and measures against subversion in any of the States in its elaborate provisions dealing with various types of emergencies.<sup>10</sup> No one of them can choose a different form of government than that established by the Constitution, conduct its affairs in any manner opposed to the Constitution, or seek to demolish the established basis of the Union-State relationship by defying the authority of the Union and the President. In the event of any such contingency an emergency situation is presumed to arise in which the constitutional government can be deemed to break down in the State.<sup>11</sup> The Governor is obliged to make a report on the political situation, law and order condition and the type of contingency to the President. This report is confidentially prepared behind the back of the State Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers and transmitted to the Union Capital along with other information in the possession of the Governor. After considering the report and other information received by him, the President, or the Vice-President while discharging the functions of the President, if satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, issues a Proclamation in his own name and under his signature. The Proclamation is published for general information in the Gazette of India [Part II Sec. I Sub sec. (1) as a G. S. R.] He, thereby, assumes "all functions of the Government of the said State and all powers vested in, or exercisable by, the Governor." He further declares that the powers of the State Legislature "shall be exercisable by, or under the authority of, Parliament." And, then he makes other incidental and consequential provisions which "appear to me to be necessary or desirable." The withdrawal of one Proclamation may be followed by the issue of another Proclamation reimposing the President's rule. The Proclamation is immediately followed by an order published for general information stating that "all functions of the Government of the State..... which have been assumed" by him "shall" subject to the superinten-

dence, direction and his control be exercisable also by the Governor of the said State." The issuing of the Proclamation is an act of the executive prerogative, and the only condition for its issue is that the President as advised by the Cabinet *is satisfied* as to its necessity. The authority to issue it *a discretion* cannot be questioned. No outgoing State Chief Minister or the members of the disbanded Council of Ministers can challenge the President's action. The recital of the factum of the President's satisfaction cannot be doubted. The Supreme Court, or a State High Court, cannot entertain an argument that the actual or presumed state of affairs cannot make a person feel satisfied as to the necessity of the action. No objective standards or tests of reasonableness can be applied in the matter. Nevertheless, the Central Government cannot act *ad arbitrium*. The Union take-over is *in esse* an act of the Government collectively responsible to the House of the People of the Union Parliament. Though not required to be issued with previous parliamentary sanction, yet the power cannot be abused or used for achieving indirectly what cannot be achieved directly. Neither the existence of the State as a separate political entity and unit of the Union can be terminated, nor can it be transformed into a Union Territory under direct control of the Union. The Proclamation can operate for only two months without any reference to Parliament. For any further operation it must formally be approved by resolutions of both the Houses of Parliament before the expiry of that period. The copies of the Proclamation should be placed on the tables of both the Houses. The Governor's report is not placed along with it. The Government has so far been declining to do so, although the Home Minister makes a statement in justification of the action taken by the President. He moves an official resolution seeking approval of the Houses. If the House of the People is under dissolution the resolution is required to be passed by the Council of States before the expiry of two months followed by another resolution of the House within thirty days following its reconstitution. That done the Proclamation remains in force for six months from the date of the latter of the two resolutions. The position must be reviewed by the Government periodically, and for any further operation of the President's Proclamation the Houses should be approached and be asked to renew their earlier resolution approving the President's action. The repeated renewals can ensure continual President's rule only for an aggregate unbroken period of three years. If not earlier revoked the Proclamation establishing the President's rule must cease to be effective after the expiry of three years. During the President's rule Parliament delegates the legislative power of the State Legislature to the President who in effect acts as a one-man Legislature for the State. He enacts laws (the President's Acts). Whenever he considers it practicable, he may consult a committee constituted of members of the Houses of Parliament. The number of the committee members varies with the strength of representation of the State concerned. For instance, it consisted of 60 members, 40 nominated by the Speaker and 20 nominated by the Chairman of the Council for the State for West Bengal; and forty-five—30 members of the House and 15 of the Council—for Haryana. A President's Act is required to be laid before each House of Parliament, as soon as may be, after it is enacted. The Houses can by resolutions passed by them "direct any modifications to be made in the Act". The

modifications are prospectively given effect to by means of an amending President's Act.

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3. Article 60 (1) (b) (2).
4. Article 80 (4).
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- 7a. *In re Sea Customs Act*, A. I. R. 1963, S. C. 1760.
- 7b. Article 257 (4); and Article 258 (3).
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9. *In re Reference No. 1 of 1964*, A. I. R. 1965, S. C. 745.
10. Part XVIII (Articles 352—360).
11. Article 365.

## Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter :

### Receptions

On October 24 the Council arranged a reception in honour of Mrs. P. Mboya, Mrs. Salome Odeh-Jowi and Mrs. Damar O. Okwanyo, all from Nairobi, Kenya. A dance recital was also arranged on this occasion.

On November 25 the Council organized a reception in honour of H. E. Dr. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, President of Somalia. The Council presented him with an illustrated copy of the Koran. Present among the distinguished gathering were Members of Parliament, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha (Lower House), the Deputy Speakers of both the Houses, the Secretary of the Congress Party and diplomats.

Mr. K. C. Pant, Vice-President of the Council and Minister of State in the Ministry of Finance, presided over a function organized by the African Students' Association to celebrate the independence of Equatorial Guinea and Swaziland.

### Meetings

Speaking on "Mauritius : Rendezvous of East and West" at a meeting organized by the Indian Council for Africa on November 30, the High Commissioner of Mauritius to India, Mr. Rabindrah Ghurburrin, said that little Mauritius, just 720 square miles, with its blend of cultures, religions and languages, offered an example to the world torn by so many dividing loyalties. He added that Hindus, Muslims, Chinese, Creoles, Africans, the English and the French had turned Mauritius into a "miniature U.N." looking for a common destiny. Despite differences of race, religion and culture, the people of Mauritius had managed to live together as a family. No one community had crushed another or attempted to oust it. The many languages instead of turning Mauritius into a Tower of Babel had enriched it. Though Creole was the language of Mauritius Bhojpuri and Hindi were spoken by large sections. Telegu, Tamil and Marathi were taught in schools and English and French were compulsory.

These languages, he continued, had influenced each other. In churches sermons were often read in Hindi and Creole words crept into Bhojpuri. Food habits too had happily got mixed up. Chinese bamboo shoots could be found in curries and the Indian way of prepar-

ing dishes was quite common in the island. Indians were equally adept at making French dishes.

### **Film Show**

The Council screened a film, "Cradle of the Nile", a documentary on Uganda, on December 18. The Uganda High Commissioner in India, Mr. George W. M. Kamba, introduced the film.

On December 28 the Council organised a dinner and music dance in honour of African students in Delhi.

### **Publications**

The Council brought out a new publication, *This is UAR*, in its Independent Africa series.

The Council is thankful to the Ghana High Commission for donating a valuable portfolio of Ghana maps to the Council library.

### **Acknowledgment**

The article "Historic African Cities of Soudanaise Sahara" by Ousmane Silla, published in Vol. 8, No. 2 of this journal, was reproduced from *Le Mois En Afrique*, No. 29, May 1968.

## Book Reviews

### **The Indians in Uganda**

H. S. Morris, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.

THIS is the first detailed sociological study of the Indian community of Uganda about which so little is known. But its other merit lies in the timeliness of its publication although the research was conducted by the author between 1952 and 1955, when he held a senior research fellowship at the East African Institute of Social Research at Makerere College, Kampala. Indians in East Africa have been much in the news lately and their role in the prosperity of their adopted homelands has been alternately lauded and condemned. So one cannot do better than turning to books of this kind to try to get to the roots of the matter to arrive at a rational and more sympathetic appraisal of the current situation.

After describing the Indian community in Uganda, Mr. Morris deals with the institutions of kinship, economics and government which concern Indians as individuals settled in an alien society, more than as members of a community. In the final chapter he discusses the problem of a plural society and the Indians' place in it.

He says that the more thoughtful Indians saw their community and the castes and sects in it as moral aggregates and argues that as long as Uganda itself was not an inclusive moral community, that is, a nation with a common social demand and will, relations between the constituent communities could only be of the most formal kind.

It was partly the wish to help create an inclusive national community in which they could live in comfort and safety that led the Aga Khan to urge his followers to set about becoming citizens of Uganda. Most other Indians, by contrast, took the view that the range of commonly held values needed to bind society together did not have to be very wide. They were not unwilling to be citizens, but ideas of national unity and the place of separate communities in the country were often formulated in terms of mixed marriages and the removal of cultural differences— notions still repugnant to most Indians.

With a few exceptions, the Uganda Indians were little concerned to understand either the processes of social change or their consequences altering the social structure. The education of their children and earning of a living and of suitable marriages occupied much of their attention. The changing patterns of trade and the diminishing opportunities for them was always a latent anxiety occupying their attention. Indian leaders were of course concerned with the new political constitution

inaugurated in 1955, but their concern was practical and political, not analytic.

The author holds that Uganda's Indians were fully aware that their future was likely to be difficult. They knew that their commercial skills and the place they had built for themselves in the civil service and professions laid them open to envy, dislike and possible eviction. Because their numbers were so few and because Africans were being trained to replace them, they could probably hope to influence policy less in an independent state than under European rule.

Seeing the writing on the wall, Mr. Morris says, Indians in the years before independence could be seen gradually closing their lines of communication with British officials and opening new ones with members of the African "upper classes".

There was of course no alternative for them. Indians of East Africa had no obvious allies. Here Mr. Morris draws a comparison with Malaya and South Africa where, he points out, the balance of population and other social forces was different from that in East Africa, ethnic categories became more corporate in nature, either by having closure forced upon them, or by seeking political and cultural safety in separate ethnic blocs.

Even in Kenya, the author says, the Indian Congress decided to withdraw from all public political action after a common political roll had been introduced in 1962. After acting in the political field as a partly corporate community since the end of World War I Kenyan Indians thought it proper to lose their separateness as far as possible and become merely a category of the population.

Mr. Morris regrets that the British rulers seldom considered the task of making a nation of Uganda. Educational systems for the three racial groups remained separate and no attempt was made to follow the example of the U.S. and weld them into some sort of unity by means of a uniform education. There was however one sense in which these ethnic prejudices have served to bring Africans and Indians together, for both adopted very similar attitudes toward European exclusiveness. Had Africans been willing to accept them, the author has no doubt that Indians would have been eager to join with them in constructing an area of resistance to former imperial oppression.

Having conceded this, Mr. Morris admits that the Indians had prospered too well under the colonial regime and the special relationship which they had built up with the civil service was too recent not to provoke envy among the Africans. Moreover, Africans believed that the Indians had exploited them commercially and were nothing but "mischievous foreigners", and the colonial administrators seldom thought it necessary to counteract any of these "misleading and harmful stereotypes".

Mr. Morris thinks that if Uganda had been confronted with external threats, or if a single charismatic leader like Gandhi or Nkrumah

had emerged to catch the imagination of all, Indians and Africans might well have been drawn closer together.

Since the story in this book stops at the time of Uganda's independence in so far as the author's final conjectures go, it might be pertinent to remark that Uganda has not done so badly in the matter of race relations compared with some of its neighbours. But it is highly unlikely that Uganda will not enact Kenyan-type laws to restrict opportunities in service, trade and industry to its own nationals, be they Africans, Indians or Europeans. In the context of the interacting politics of Eastern Africa it is inconceivable that Uganda's leaders will pursue policies towards immigrants which are radically different from those of its neighbours. This is irrespective of whether there is a political federation of East Africa or not.

AJIT GOPAL

### **The Development of Trade Unionism in Uganda**

Roger Scott (East Africa Publishing House, Nairobi, 1966), p. 200.

Books on Africa are no longer rare. Their number and the variety of subjects covered by them are impressive. But scholarly works—and the present book certainly makes the grade—are still too few. The significance of Roger Scott's *The Development of Trade Unionism in Uganda* lies in the manner in which he has dealt with his subject and the excellent information he has presented in a readable style.

The author has covered the subject in three sections. The first five chapters deal with the socio-political setting in which trade unionism in Uganda had to operate. The plural nature of the social composition of Uganda was reflected in the problems confronted by the organizers of trade unions "because all groups in Uganda saw their occupational interests in racial terms, the early unions tended to be racially exclusive. In some cases Asian unions preceded African; in others, the Africans kept out Asians who appeared to be obstacles to their own advancement. A ICFTU mission in 1958 noted that "throughout Africa all three racial groups were suspicious of submerging their identity in a common trade union organization." This brings out clearly the relative ineffectiveness of trade unions in Africa in playing their rightful role in both the political and the economic sphere. Also the parallel and competitive development of various trade unions later created problems for the leaders of the country in their efforts towards unification and nation-building.

The second section (Chapters 6—11) deals with various trade union organizations individually. The final section discusses the place of trade unions in the post-independent period, the positive part they can play in nation-building activities. In the words of Sekou Toure, "the trend toward claim-making trade unionism" contracted in the course of union practice in the fully-developed capitalist countries has no significance in countries where the future of the worker is closely tied to the nation's powers of development....." The book is compact and well-documented.

R. S. RANA



# Quarterly Chronicle (Aug. 15—Oct. 31)

VANITA SABIKI

## INDIA AND AFRICA

**United Nations Seminar Condemns Apartheid :** The United Nations, in co-operation with the Government of India, organized a seminar on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination in New Delhi. Held under the auspices of the UN programme of advisory services in the field of human rights, the seminar started its deliberations on August 27. It was attended by 43 participants from 23 countries and by a large number of observers from non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. In addition, specialized agencies like the FAO, ILO, UNESCO and WHO were represented at the seminar.

The seminar condemned the systematic policy of racial discrimination as exemplified on a State-wide level in the inhuman policy of apartheid in South Africa. There was unanimous agreement that the policies of apartheid violated human rights and constituted a grave offence against civilized standards of conduct and that such policies should not be condoned.

The seminar felt that the matter required action by all concerned at the national and international levels on all aspects of the problem. It emphasized the important role legislation and education could play in the elimination of racial discrimination and prejudice. Law could be used to eliminate manifestations of racial discrimination; education from the very early stages would implement a sense of human dignity and help the progressive forces in society to secure the elimination of all forms of discrimination.

Participants at the seminar supported the activities, recommendations and decisions of the UN and its specialized agencies and the seminars organized by the organization for the elimination of all forms of discrimination. The concluding session expressed general agreement that these international efforts through the UN should be pursued with the greatest urgency.

**Gandhi Birth Anniversary Celebrations :** Mahatma Gandhi's birth anniversary celebrations on October 2, 1968, which also marked the commencement of the Centenary celebrations, were held throughout Africa. Warm tributes were paid to him and exhibitions of photographs commemorating the occasion organized.

In Nigeria the celebrations began with the opening of the Gandhi Library in the University of Lagos by the High Commissioner, Mr. S. G. Ramachandran. Widely attended by diplomats and prominent Nigerians and Indians, the function marked the friendship between the two countries. The same day, inaugurating the first phase of the celebrations programme (October 2—10), Dr. Saburi Biobaku, Vice-

Chancellor of the University of Lagos and Chairman of the National Committee for Gandhi Centenary Celebrations, in an article in the *Daily Times* entitled "Gandhi—Apostle of Non-violence", paid tribute to the "fearless fighter against all forms of oppression and injustice." Dr. Biobaku said: "Winning our own independence without violence was made possible by the example of the Mahatma and the sacrifices which he and other Indian leaders, with Jawaharlal Nehru prominent among them, had made in India. These paved the way for our seemingly effortless success". The National Committee also organized television and radio programmes, including a discussion on "Non-violence—its background, efficacy and prospects."

In Uganda Gandhi Centenary Year was celebrated in the principal towns at largely attended public meetings where representatives of resident communities paid tributes to the revered memory of the Mahatma. At a public meeting in Kampala, the Indian High Commissioner, Mr. R. R. Sinha, called upon the audience to dedicate themselves to truth and to the cause for which this man of God lived and for which he died. The English language daily *Uganda Argus* published a twelve-page supplement, while vernacular newspapers carried articles on the Indian leader. A documentary on Gandhiji was screened by the television network and Radio Uganda broadcast his speeches.

The second phase of the celebrations, according to the recommendations of the Uganda National Commission appointed by UNESCO, included exhibitions of teachings, photographs, literature and films, establishment of a Gandhi Corner in the National Museum and release of commemorative stamps.

In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the Indian Embassy held a meeting to mark the occasion. The function began with music by All India Radio's National Orchestra of New Delhi. Children of the Indian School presented the favourite songs of Mahatma Gandhi and his recorded voice was played to the gathering comprising members of the Indian community and Ethiopians. Later, the Indian Ambassador, Mr. O. V. Algesan, described the life and message of the Mahatma and opened an exhibition of photographs featuring his life and works in the Embassy library. (*Ethiopian Herald*, October 3)

Ghana participated in the celebrations in a big way. The Indian High Commissioner in Ghana, Mr. S. V. Patel, presented five books on Mahatma Gandhi to Let-Gen. J. A. Ankrah, Chairman of the National Liberation Council at Accra. The presentation made on behalf of Dr. Zakir Husain consisted of "The Story of My Experiments with Truth" by M. K. Gandhi; "Mahatma Gandhi" by Romain Rolland; "Mahatma Gandhi" by Vincent Sheean; "Mahatma Gandhi 100 years" by the National Committee for the Gandhi Centenary Celebrations; and "Mahatma Gandhi—His life in Pictures."

The country's leading newspapers, *Ghanaian Times*, the *Evening News* and the *Daily Graphic*, carried tributes and commemorative articles. The *Daily Graphic* began a year of celebrations for "the legend whose philosophy has become a treasured legacy for mankind", by presenting the Indian leader's own article on "Love and Disobedience". The *Evening News* described Gandhi as "one of the greatest statesmen the world ever produced. He derived his inspirations on African soil; an inspiration which later set in motion his philosophy of non-violence which has been of immense benefit to all Afro-Asian countries". The same issue carried a tribute by Emperor Haile Selassie.

The Commissioner of Education, Mr. Modjaben Dowuona, in a nationwide television and radio broadcast from Accra, called on all Ghanaians to derive inspiration from the life of (Mahatma) Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, the Indian patriot, statesman and religious philosopher. Mr. Dowuona said: "Gandhi's fight for freedom, concern for the underprivileged, fight against social injustice, love for fellowmen, positive search for harmony and peace among his people, the avoidance of conflicts, his selfless service in the cause of humanity, were of universal and eternal significance."

In Tanzania, besides a public meeting and an exhibition of photographs on the life and work of Mahatma Gandhi, a centre on the lines of a typical Gandhian Institute was established near Dar-es-Salaam. Planned by the Mahatma Gandhi Foundation and envisaging an expenditure of £50,000 the centre is designed to form a lasting monument to the Mahatma in Tanzania.

The Gandhi birthday centenary celebrations in Kenya were inaugurated with a week-long exhibition at Nairobi by Kenya's Vice-President, Mr. Daniel Arap Moi. "Gandhi's name", the Vice-President said, "stands for all that is good and honourable in political struggles. It renders everlasting his theme of non-violence and love in political emancipation." The exhibition organized by the Nairobi Sevadai, a local Indian organization, and assisted by the Indian High Commission, portrayed through photographs, paintings, books, statues and other items the life story of Mahatma Gandhi and his teachings. A public meeting, widely attended by a distinguished gathering of over 1,000 invitees including Ministers, officials and heads of diplomatic missions, was held to inaugurate the exhibition. Mr. Prem Bhatia, Indian High Commissioner, described Gandhi as "a great man with a great mission" whose message had not been lost in India, Africa and the world.

The country's leading newspapers, *Daily Nation*, *Sunday Post*, and the *East African Standard*, carried supplements on Gandhi's teachings and messages. The *Daily Nation* in an editorial entitled "Gandhi's Message", said, "..... Gandhi's influence has perhaps been greater and what is done in his name more truly reflects his teachings than what is done in the name of Marx ....Not many spiritual leaders and philosophers have the distinction that their teachings are followed in spirit and to the letter. From Christ to Marx most have had unspeakable atrocities committed in their name. This may be a source of Gandhi's greatness and the result of the pure simplicity of his message."

In Algiers the Gandhi Centenary celebrations started with a photographic exhibition depicting the life of Gandhiji. The exhibition opened from October 2, 1968, for ten days. The exhibition drew large crowds from all walks of life including Ministers, diplomats, teachers and students. The exhibition was covered by the local press and television. During the exhibition, films on Gandhiji were shown in the exhibition hall.

In Guinea Mr. R. R. Sinha, Indian Ambassador, during his farewell call on President Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea in August this year, requested him for Guinean co-operation in the Gandhi Centenary functions. President Sekou Toure said Gandhiji was a great moral force in these days of materialism and imperialism, that the Guineans deeply respected Gandhiji and that all facilities would be at the disposal of the National Committee to be formed. President Toure asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was present at this meeting, to keep in touch with the Embassy and to take all appropriate action.

In Tananarive, the inauguration of the Gandhi Centenary Year was marked by a well-attended public meeting held in the Cercle Franco Malgache. A cosmopolitan audience of about 500 attended the function. Malagasy officialdom and the Diplomatic Corps were represented adequately. The conference was presided over by Dr. Paul Radaody Ralarosy, President of the Malagasy Academy, a friend of India, who visited India in 1964 as a guest of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations. Miss Ansouya Mithalal, an Indian girl born in Madagascar, spoke briefly on the life of Mahatma Gandhi, after which Mr. K. P. Fabian, Charge d'Affaires, dealt with the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi and his place in history.

**Visit of the Liberian Vice-President :** Dr. William R. Tolbert Jr., Vice-President of Liberia, was accorded a cordial welcome in Delhi on November 10 during the course of a six-day visit to India. At the ceremonial reception both Dr. Tolbert and the Indian Vice-President, Mr. V. V. Giri, underlined the "common ideals, common objectives and common aspirations" that bound India and Liberia together.

Later at a banquet held in honour of the distinguished visitor Mr. Giri expressed that India would gladly share the technical experience and offer co-operation in the fullest measure of her capacity. Some Indian teachers and technicians were already working in Liberia and "we would like this co-operation to grow further for the mutual advantage of both the countries", he added. Mr. Giri further assured the Liberian statesman of India's consistent and whole-hearted support as to the Organization of African Unity in its efforts to rid the continent of the last vestige of colonialism.

Dr. Tolbert, in his reply invited Indian industrialists to organize joint participation in industrial ventures in Liberia. Fifty-five Indian business enterprises were already present in Liberia, but this figure was small, Dr. Tolbert said. He proposed to ask his Government to send a trade mission to India to effect a greater collaboration between India and Liberia in the economic and commercial fields. The Liberian Vice-President called attention to his country's "incentive code" which he said was often referred to as the open door policy of President Tubman. The open door policy of President Tubman, he said, was an invitation to all men of goodwill in the commercial world to come to Liberia and enjoy her free enterprise system.

Earlier, during his tour of Bombay, Khadakvasala and Aurangabad, the Liberian Vice-President said he had a glimpse of the progress and development free India had been making. His first ever visit also confirmed the common bonds between the two countries and the "magnificent demonstration of affection and care for us."

**Mauritius Information Minister's visit :** Mr. R. Jeetha, Mauritius Minister of Information and Broadcasting, paid a three-week official visit to India in October. Mr. Jeetha visited a number of cities and held discussions with Ministers and senior officials. In New Delhi on October 4, the Information Minister emphasized the old cultural and trade links between the two countries and hoped that the Indian Government would help strengthen this spirit. Mr. Jeetha invited Indian entrepreneurs to start industries (textiles and agriculture) in Mauritius. The Mauritius Government would be only "too happy" to extend all facilities, he said, and this would also provide employment opportunities to peoples of Indian

origin (constituting 68 per cent of the population), who were now being looked down upon by other peoples.

An agreement was concluded with the Indian Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Mr. K. K. Shah, by which India would supply feature films in Indian languages together with their French versions. India will also provide training facilities to Mauritius personnel in the Films Division, Bombay, and the Film Institute at Poona.

**Kenya Women's Visit :** Three distinguished women from Kenya—Mrs. Pamela Mboya, wife of Mr. Tom Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning and Development ; Mrs. Salome Odero Jowi, wife of Mr. Odero Jowi, Minister of the East African Community ; and Mrs. Damar Okanwanyo, wife of a member of the Kenyan Parliament—visited India in October. At a reception held in their honour by the All-India Women's Conference in Delhi, they exchanged views with Indian women on questions of marriage, dowry and women's role in social welfare and politics. Mrs. Mboya praised the activities of women's organizations in India. "Your experience is a great inspiration to us", she said.

**Ethiopian Defence Minister's Visit :** The Ethiopian Defence Minister, Lt-Gen Kebede Guebre, visited India in late September during his tour of India, South Korea and the United States. While in India, the Minister saw places of interest and inspected military installations in the country.

**Nigerian Post for Indian :** Mr. V. M. Sundaram, former Director of Telegraphs in the Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department, was recently appointed by the Government of Nigeria as its Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs.

**Diplomatic Changes and Appointments :** Mr. O. V. Alagesan was appointed India's new Ambassador to Ethiopia in September. Mr. Alagesan replaces Mr. Mehta, who left the country after a two-year tenure for Chile.

Mr. Mohammed Amin Hilny Elthany has been nominated as UAR's next Ambassador to India. Since 1964 Mr. Elthany had been serving as his country's alternate delegate to the UN.

India's new Ambassador to Senegal, Mr. Mallik, presented his credentials to President Senghor on August 29.

Mr. Muni Lal, presently India's High Commissioner to Trinidad and Tobago, has been appointed India's Ambassador to Somalia in succession to Dr. Sumal Sinha. Mr. Muni Lal will take charge of the new assignment in February.

**Senegal Calls for Increased Trade with India :** Mr. M. Tidiane Ly, the Senegalese Government representative to the ILO Conference on Handicrafts, which met in the first week of November in Delhi, called for increased commerce between India and Senegal. India could export imitation jewellery, gold and silver ornaments and ivory pieces to his country and Senegal in turn could export blackwood and crocodile skin for making bags and shoes. Indian craftsmen could also train Senegalese workers in modern methods of production, Mr. Ly said.

**African Students' Conference :** The African Students' Association in India met for its 17th Conference at Poona from November 7 to 9. Mr. K. T. Girmé,

Deputy Speaker of the Maharashtra Assembly, who inaugurated the conference, recalled the friendly relations existing between India and African countries and said developing countries which faced similar problems should join hands and co-operate in safeguarding their freedom. The President of the Association, Mr. C. O. Omch, stressed the urgency of building hostels for foreign students in cities like Bombay.

**Children's Day :** The Indian Association in Khartoum organized a children's get-together on November 14 to mark the Children's Day. The highlights of the function were a fancy-dress competition, sports and musical events. A group of Sudanese and foreign girl students from the Unity High School, Khartoum, gave an Indian dance performance. A trophy, donated jointly by the Ambassador and Dr. G. D. Sharma, an Indian expert working with the United Nations Development Programme in Khartoum, was presented by Mrs. Leela Bhandari, wife of the Ambassador, to the group.

Besides, five sets of books sent by the Indian Council for Africa for presentation to schools on the occasion were distributed.

## ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY

**Assembly of Heads of State at Algiers :** The fifth Assembly of the OAU Heads of State met in Algiers from September 13 to 16. In his opening address President Boumedienne spoke of the need to pool the efforts of African countries to reach the common targets of (i) liquidation of colonialism and imperialism and the destruction of their last "remnants" and (ii) "the development of our continent and overcoming backwardness". The President acknowledged that Africans "cannot but feel deeply grieved" and sympathetic at the ordeals of the peoples in Eastern Nigeria which was the result of a "foreign plot" and colonialism.

President Boumedienne's address was followed by speeches by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, King Hassan of Morocco, President Keita of Mali, the Prime Minister of Mauritius, Mr. Ramgoolam, the Swaziland Prime Minister, Prince Dhlamini, U Thant and President Mobutu. The United Nations' Secretary General made an impassioned plea to end the Nigerian civil war which had "created nothing but obstacles in the relations between the peoples of Africa". He added that its continuance was "bound to affect the badly needed co-operation and unity among African countries".

Delegates from 39 countries who attended the conference approved the main recommendations of the OAU Ministerial Council on September 15 and began discussions on Nigeria. The OAU Council of Ministers, which had been in conference in Algiers from September 5, submitted a general resolution to the Assembly of Heads of State which called for (i) Condemnation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and "financial interests" which hampered the independence of territories under Portuguese control; (ii) "Self-determination and independence" to the peoples of French Comoro Archipelago; (iii) A request to the UN Secretary General to help in the liberation of South-West Africa and the appointment of an African as High Commissioner for Namibia (South-West Africa); (iv) A proposal that 1969 be declared an "international year of struggle against racism and racial discrimination"; (v) Condemnation of Britain for the present situation in Rhodesia and its refusal to employ force against the Ian Smith regime, and praise for ZAPU and

ANC for the creation of their "United Front" in Rhodesia and South Africa. The Governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia were asked to attempt to reconcile the rival Rhodesian nationalist organizations—ZAPU and ZANU; (vi) Recommendation that any aggression by Rhodesia, South Africa or Portugal against any OAU State be considered as aggression against all OAU States; (vii) Establishment of a commission composed of Ghana, Liberia, Dahomey and Sierra Leone to study the functions of the OAU Liberation Committee; (viii) Investigation into "the volume of assistance given by certain African countries to the South African regime"; (ix) Aid to the African liberation movements in the Portuguese territories and Southern Africa to be increased. The delegations agreed that the real struggle was against South Africa rather than Portugal or Rhodesia; (x) A second "Bandung Economic Conference" of developing countries, similar to the one held in Algiers last October, to be organized for 1969, to discuss the deepening economic and financial crisis of the "Third World". Dakar was mentioned as a possible venue; (xi) Increased inter-African co-operation in the judicial, trade union, telecommunication, transport, civil aviation and economic fields; (xii) A single African candidate for the presidency of the 24th session of the UN General Assembly to be presented; (xiii) A call to member-countries to organize nationwide celebrations of Africa Day on May 25, the anniversary of the OAU foundation.

The Algiers Summit Conference also adopted an Arab-Israeli resolution and another on apartheid. The Arab-Israeli resolution, voted on September 16 by 36 votes to nil with 2 abstentions (Lesotho and Swaziland), called for the "withdrawal of all foreign troops from Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967, in accordance with the resolution adopted by the UN Security Council on November 22, 1967." The resolution on apartheid called on the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Japan and Italy, to break all links with South Africa. These countries, the resolution said, were "encouraging and fortifying" South Africa in its racial policy by political, economic and military co-operation. The Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia also came in for "energetic condemnation" for the direct or indirect aid it was giving to South Africa. The resolution also criticized "the manoeuvres by which South Africa is trying to shake energetic opposition to apartheid in independent African States by offering these States economic and financial aid." The conference called for an international campaign to publicize the "inhuman nature of apartheid and its terrible effects".

The conference re-elected M. Diallo Telli of Guinea as Secretary-General of the Organization for another four-year term. Four Deputy Secretaries-General were elected from Algeria, Nigeria, Dahomey and Kenya.

The conference decided by acclamation to hold the OAU's sixth summit meeting at the Organization's headquarters at Addis Ababa in September 1969 and the next session of the OAU Ministerial Council on February 19, 1969, also at Addis Ababa. Based on reports published in the Africa Research Bulletin, Exeter.

**New OAU Member :** Mauritius secured admission to the Organization for African Unity at the Algiers Summit in September. Mauritius is the thirty-ninth member State of the OAU.

## AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

The fourth annual conference of the African Development Bank was held in

Nairobi at the end of August. In his inaugural address, President Kenyatta said that while the political struggle in Africa was well advanced, the battle for economic growth and economic independence had just begun. The African Development Bank was one of the continent's indispensable instruments for bringing forth its capacity for self-help.

The annual report for 1967 said that the continuing vulnerability to unfavourable external influences on trade was probably the main reason for the low growth rates of many African economies. Available indicators portrayed a struggle against persistent balance of trade deficits, declining reserves, rising prices, budget deficits, high levels of domestic consumption and low levels of domestic investment. Though efforts to diversify and industrialize were afoot, almost all member countries' economies were still geared to primary production for export. Agriculture still accounted for over 50 per cent of the gross domestic product, but prices of imports (including equipment needed for development) had steadily increased.

The conference adopted a five-point plan on August 29 aiming at protecting the Bank's 30 member nations from economic vulnerability as a result of their complete dependence on exports of primary products. The plan provided for (i) streamlining of agricultural sectors to maintain export earnings while safeguarding against the need to import food; (ii) diversification in production towards more and more import substitution; (iii) a system of controls on external trade and payments; (iv) development of new methods of earning foreign exchange; and (v) greater economic integration on regional levels.

In its final meeting on August 29, the conference adopted a resolution proposing that the Board of Governors of the African Development Bank should consider the establishment of an African Development Fund. The purpose of the Fund should be to promote economic and social development, increase trade between members and raise the standards of living in the less-developed areas of Africa including those among the members of the Bank, by extending financial help on flexible terms rather than in the form of conventional loans. The establishment of the Fund, the resolution stated, "was primarily intended to constitute an effective instrument of co-operation between the African and non-African Governments, international institutions and regional and national organizations which are interested in African economic development and social progress".

The *Daily Mail* (Freetown) reported on September 6 that the fifth annual conference of the Board of Directors of the African Development Bank would be held at Freetown, Sierra Leone, in August 1969.

## AFRICAN COMMENTS ON CZECH CRISIS

(See last issue of the journal for comments by Ethiopia, Uganda and Ghana.

### KENYA

The Kenya Government on August 22 in a statement condemned "in the strongest possible terms the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and her allies". The Kenya Government, the statement added, "unequivocally believes in the principle of self-determination for all people. In accordance with this



principle, the people of Czechoslovakia should exercise their right to determine their future without any form of pressure from outside. The Kenya Government condemns imperialism in all its forms and regard this aggression as a naked and brutal manifestation of the worst form of imperialism". The statement called for the immediate withdrawal of troops and restoration of Czechoslovak sovereignty. (Radio Nairobi, August 22).

## TANZANIA

A statement by the Tanzania Government on August 21 expressed its "profound shock" at the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It added: "This act constitutes the betrayal of all the principles of self-determination and national sovereignty which the Governments of these countries have claimed to support and uphold". The Soviet Union's action was contrary to the most basic tenets of international law and is in direct contravention of the UN Charter. Tanzania "opposes colonialism of all kinds, whether old or new, in Africa, in Europe or elsewhere".

## ZAMBIA

At Lusaka on August 22 President Kaunda expressed his and his country's condemnation of Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia. He said: "We hope that God will help the Czechoslovak people to fight against Russian imperialism. We find a big power like Russia becoming so childish, so stupid as to bow down to their own selfish aims, to win their selfish aims through aggression. The Russians call themselves Socialists; I do not accept them now as Socialists at all. I know that condemning the Russians like this means a lot, because of the angry attacks ..... We do not even allow aid to deter us from speaking our minds on any subject".

## UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Cairo Radio in a commentary on August 21 reviewed the events in Czechoslovakia leading up to the entry of forces from the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries "following a call by the Czechoslovak Communist Party leaders and the Government". The Socialist States, the commentary said, felt that there had been a serious imperialist reactionary conspiracy to sow division among them, trying to create a gap among their ranks, and eliminating the gains of Socialist society.

Again on August 25, Cairo Radio put out a defence for the Soviet action. It said the USSR had itself not wanted to send troops into Czechoslovakia but had been compelled to do so because of the part played by world Zionism, "the main agent of colonialism and imperialism".

## SOUTH AFRICA

*The Star* in an editorial comment on August 24 noted that the newly independent States of Africa were "not the least interested" in the drama of Czechoslovakia, "but as recipients for years of a good deal of aid and even more, propaganda from Moscow, the lesson of the Communist coup will not be lost on them. The ruthless Russian action against the stirrings of freedom in Czechoslovakia carries a lesson. Prague may be only a name in the capitals of Black Africa, but because the freedom the Czechs sought for is the same freedom Africans so recently

won, they will understand very well what alignment with Russia can really mean".

## UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA

**Sanctions against South Africa voted :** The UN Special Political Committee on November 15 approved a 47-power Afro-Asian resolution renewing its longstanding appeal to the Security Council to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa for its "inhuman" policy of apartheid. Voted by 95 to 1 with 15 abstentions, the resolution met with strong opposition from the Western Powers—USA, Britain and France. The resolution also condemned the main trading partners of South Africa for "encouraging that Government to persist in its racial policies".

**UNESCO Condemns Portugal :** UNESCO's general conference on November 15 condemned as "genocide" and "racial extermination" Portugal's policy in the territories under its control. A resolution adopted by 51 votes to 5 with 24 abstentions called on member States to end all co-operation with Portugal. It said that "by increasing its criminal actions", Portugal was defying the conscience of the world.

**More UNICEF Aid to Nigeria :** The Executive Board of the UN Children's Fund approved on November 14 a new allocation of \$1.5 million for emergency relief to the war-affected Nigerian mothers and children. This brings UNICEF's total allocations to Nigerian emergency to \$ 2.4 million.

An additional \$10.6 million worth of Government contributions in kind—mostly food and drugs—already provided to UNICEF brings the cumulative value of UNICEF's emergency aid for Nigerian mothers and children to \$13 million.

**Resolution on Rhodesia :** The UN Trusteeship Committee on October 25 adopted, by 87 votes to 2 with 16 abstentions, a resolution calling on Britain not to grant independence to Rhodesia until majority rule was established there. The resolution also appealed to member governments to refuse to recognize "any form of independence" for Rhodesia until the terms of the resolution were carried out. South Africa and Portugal voted against the motion, while Malawi, the U.S., Italy, Lebanon, Australia, Belgium and Botswana were among those who abstained. (*Rhodesian Herald*, October 26)

## WORLD BANK

**Aid to African Countries :** Mr. Robert McNamara, new President of the World Bank, in a major policy speech on October 1 said that in the next five years World Bank aid to developing countries in Africa would be increased three-fold. He explained that the Bank's previous emphasis on aid to Asia would shift to a new concentration on Africa and Latin America with a view to checking the growing poverty in developing nations. The population explosion in these regions was "blowing apart the rich and the poor and was widening the already dangerous gap between them". The situation, the World Bank President stated, cried for "a greater and more urgent effort by the richer countries" and they were financially capable of it. Since 1960, rich countries had added to their annual real incomes about \$ 400,000 millions and this was far greater than the total annual incomes of the poor nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. (*Ethiopian Herald*, October 1).

## INTER-WORLD PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

In Lima, Peru, from September 5 to 13, 70 countries participated in the 56th Inter-World Parliamentary Conference. In a special meeting of the African delegates to the conference, agreement was reached in principle to form a union of African Parliaments with its Secretariat at Addis Ababa. The final decision on this point would be taken in Vienna where the next conference is scheduled to take place. (*Ethiopian Herald*, September 24).

## EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

**East African Community :** Presidents Milton Obote of Uganda and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania joined President Jomo Kenyatta at a meeting of the East African Authority in Nairobi on September 6. The three Presidents discussed the progress made by the nine-month-old East African Community linking the three countries and considered the applications for membership of Ethiopia, Somalia and Zambia.

**Currency Remittances to South Africa Banned :** The Governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, in a statement issued jointly, banned all currency remittances and payments to South Africa. Commercial banks of the three countries would suspend the issuance of travellers' cheques to travellers bound for South Africa. (*Nationalist*, Tanzania, September 16).

**East Africa Employers' Federation Meets :** Representatives of Employers' Federations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Swaziland held a two-day meeting in Addis Ababa early in October. Relations and problems between management and labour as well as those between the management, labour and governments were discussed. Other items studied by the conference included labour legislations recently introduced by the various governments, training programmes for employees and trade union movements in the developing countries.

**World Health Organization's Regional Committee Meets in Nairobi :** The World Health Organization's Regional Committee for Africa met in Nairobi in September for ten days. 72 delegates from 29 African and three European countries attended the conference which noted that progress in projects for the development of basic health organizations in different African countries had fallen short of expectation. The report formulated by the conference recommended that this should serve as a stimulus to further effort rather than as a discouragement.

**East African Council Meets at Arusha :** The Economic, Consultative and Planning Council of the East African Community met for the first time at Arusha on October 25, under the chairmanship of the acting Minister for Common Market and Economic Affairs, Mr. Shaffiq Amin. Represented at the meeting were delegations from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The Council, which is one of the five councils established under the treaty of East African Co-operation, is charged with the duty of assisting national planning of partner States by consultative means and advising the East African Authority upon the long-term planning of common services.

The Communications Council of the East African Community concluded its 12th meeting in Arusha, just before the Economic and Planning Council went into conference. The Council discussed matters connected with the East African

Railways and Harbour Administration, the East African Airways Corporation, the East African Posts and Telecommunications Corporation and the Directorate of Civil Aviation. (*East African Standard*, October 24)

## ETHIOPIA

**Standing Committee for Border Problems :** Ethiopia and the Sudan reaffirmed their determination to solve border problems between the two countries after a meeting in the Ethiopian capital. In a joint communique issued simultaneously in both Addis Ababa and Khartoum on August 15, the two countries "expressed their conviction that solving the border problems and eliminating subversive activities would put an end to the prevailing misunderstanding between the two countries." Towards this purpose the two countries agreed to set up "a joint Ethio-Sudanese Standing Committee composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defence to follow up agreements reached". (*Ethiopian Herald*, August 16)

**Talks with Somali Prime Minister :** The Somali Prime Minister, Mr. Mohammed Haji Ibrahim, paid an official visit to Addis Ababa from September 1 to 5, at an invitation by Emperor Haile Selassie, for talks to settle major issues and to secure improved relations between the two countries. The talks held in a "cordial and brotherly atmosphere had opened up a new era between the two countries," the Somali Premier said. A communique issued at the end of the talks declared that the two Governments had reaffirmed previous undertakings to remove all causes of tension and disagreements; agreed to give overflight rights, suspended existing border emergency regulations; finalized settlement of public and private property claims; agreed to establish telecommunication links; agreed to conclude trade agreements and to establish a Joint Ministerial Consultative Committee, which would meet periodically to discuss problems and to submit recommendations. (*Somali News*, September 9).

**Cultural Agreement :** Ethiopia and France signed a Cultural Agreement on August 15, at Addis Ababa. Under the new agreement the teaching of French would be compulsory during the final four years of secondary education from October 1968 at the 22 Government schools. Towards this purpose the French Government agreed to provide teachers and to set up a teacher-training college in the country. (*Le Monde*, Paris, August 17)

**Ethiopia-Yugoslavia Call for a Non-aligned Summit :** Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and President Tito called for a new meeting of the non-aligned countries, after a three-day visit to Belgrade by the Ethiopian Emperor. The joint statement simultaneously issued on September 27 said that the two leaders having noted the present deteriorating international situation were convinced that "the principles of the policy of non-alignment are the only alternative to bloc division and to a renewal of the cold war". They called on "small and medium sized countries, as well as all peace loving forces in the world, to pool their efforts within the framework of the United Nations and outside it in the struggle against all forms of pressure and use of force, for respect for the principles of independence and sovereignty of States....." (*Ethiopian Herald*, September 27).

President Moktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania extended support to the idea and criticized the existence of "blocs", during an official visit to Yugoslavia. In a joint communique issued after talks with President Tito, the two leaders expressed

conviction that a non-aligned conference would strengthen co-operation between developing countries and the struggles for independence and equality of rights of nations. (*Tanjug*, September 27).

**New Link with India :** Air-India opened a new service between Bombay and Addis Ababa in October. On hand to greet the first weekly flight to the Haile Selassie International Airport was an Ethiopian Lion.

## KENYA

**Resignations from the KPU :** The Speaker of the National Assembly announced on September 17 that the Kenya People's Union (KPU), the Opposition Party, could no longer be recognized as a party since its membership in Parliament had dropped to below seven in a 173-seat National Assembly. On September 5, Mr. Simeon Kroko submitted his resignation to Mr. Oginga Odinga, the President of the KPU. His defection to the Kenya African National Union (KANU) considerably reduced the strength of Mr. Odinga's party.

**Kenya to honour constitutional obligations :** Kenya's Finance Minister, Mr. James Gichuru, announced in Parliament on September 18 that the Government would honour its commitments to former Kenya Government and East African Community officers who had left the country. Their pensions, he explained, had been exempted from legislative restrictions. Kenya paid as much 1.6 million sterling annually to European expatriate pensioners.

**President Tubman's visit :** President Tubman of Liberia flew into Nairobi on September 30, for a nine-day State visit. In a joint communique issued on October 7, before Mr. Tubman's departure for Monrovia, the two Heads of State (Presidents Kenyatta and Tubman), condemned the Pretoria-Salisbury-London axis as "an exercise to perpetuate colonialism and racialism in Africa". They resolved "to exert every effort to defeat this despicable collusion, which poses a definite threat to the independence and sovereignty of African States and to international peace and security". On the Rhodesian crisis the two Presidents agreed that force could not be ruled out as an ultimate weapon to bring down the illegal Smith regime. In Nigeria, both Heads of State stood for a peaceful and equitable solution "in the African context and in accordance with the aims and principles enshrined in the OAU Charter". On the issue of Southern Colonial regimes, they reaffirmed their support for the OAU and the UN and called for the adoption of measures "to rid the African continent of the last vestiges of colonialism".

The joint communique also dealt with relations between the two countries and agreed to adopt measures to increase trade and economic co-operation. A trade agreement had been concluded in Nairobi during the State visit. The need to intensify cultural co-operation was stressed and the two leaders approved an exchange of parliamentary missions, students, sportsmen and dancers. (*East African Standard*, October 8).

Commenting editorially on the Kenya-Liberia accord, the *East African Standard* on October 8 stated that President Tubman's highly successful State visit had forged "links between Liberia on the west and Kenya on the east coast of Africa". The "firm outcome of the visit", according to the editorial, lay in "the

conclusion of a trade agreement between the two countries which can be developed to their mutual advantage". Foreseeing the dangers of a serious solution in Rhodesia, and being aware of the logical problems and difficulties the two leaders did not make any outright demand for armed intervention, but, says the *Standard*, "signs of impatience are visible in the warning that the use of force cannot be ruled out as the ultimate weapon".

## MALAWI

**Party Congress :** The Malawi Congress Party met for the Annual Convention at Lilongwe from September 17—22. Delegates to the convention recommended that English and "Chinyanja" henceforth to be known as "Chichewa" be Malawi's official national language ; resolved that "capitalism was the only system feasible in Malawi" and that "the youth of Malawi be brought up in accordance with the ethnics of African traditions". Another resolution thanked the Government of South Africa for extending £4 million loan towards the construction of the new capital city Lilongwe. (*Rhodesia Herald*, September 23).

**South African Foreign Minister in Malawi :** The South African Foreign Minister, Dr. Muller, recently visited Malawi. Speaking at a State banquet in his honour on August 29; President Hastings Banda said that he believed that his policy towards South Africa would help Africans in that country more than the policy of "bluff and bluster" practised by other African leaders. This to him appeared "wrong, utterly wrong". The correct approach to the problem of Black and White in South Africa, of which apartheid is only a facet, "is understanding between African leaders and those in power in South Africa who are willing to listen. The only alternative is a war the African cannot win". He explained South Africa and Rhodesia could conquer Africa as far as Cairo if they wished and the UN would be unable to do a thing.

Dr. Banda further added that it "amused" him to hear African leaders at the OAU and elsewhere denouncing South Africa as "imperialists and colonialists". If the Whites had no right to be in Southern Africa, then the Arabs had no right to be in any part of Africa. (*Nationalist*, Tanzania, August 30).

**New British Loans :** The Finance Minister of Malawi, Mr. Tombo, and the British High Commissioner, Mr. Tull, approved on August 29 two additional interest-free British Government loans to Malawi. The first loan amounting to £180,000 is additional to £7 million made available for general development projects by the British Government for the period January 1966 to December 1968 and will be used for the same purpose. The second loan, a total of £100,000, has been assigned to cover the cost of commutation of pensions for overseas officers.

**Radio Transmitters from Germany :** West Germany has agreed, as part of its aid programme to Malawi, to provide a 100-KW shortwave transmitter for the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation.

**Asian Community Raises Donation :** The Asian Community of the Central Region of Malawi donated a sum of £3,000 to the Malawi Congress Party Convention held on September 16. The theme of the Convention, inaugurated by President Dr. Banda, was "Building the Nation".

## SOMALIA

**Somalia not to interfere in Djibouti :** Speaking to reporters after an hour-long meeting with President De Gaulle in Paris on September 21 Mr. Mohammed Egal, the Somalia Prime Minister, said that Somalia would not interfere in the internal affairs of the neighbouring Djibouti territory. There had been a modification in his country's policy, he said. "We have never advocated any of the violence and the revolutionary attitudes of the last few years". In Paris, for a two day visit, the Prime Minister had talks with French Prime Minister Maurice Couve de Murville and Foreign Minister Michel Debre. (*Ethiopian Herald*, September 22).

On October 14 the Prime Minister, Mr. Egal, in a speech at the headquarters of the major political party spoke about his Government's policy towards neighbouring territories occupied by Somali people. Our policy, he said, quoting a Somali proverb, is to "stand with one leg ready for war and with the other ready for peace".

President Shermake of Somalia visited the Sudan for four days in October. At a banquet in honour of the Sudanese President he reminded his hosts of the "artificial division by the imperialists of Somali territory into five parts" and asked them to support the steps taken by the Somali Government on the "missing lands". Earlier addressing the Constituent Assembly in Khartoum he said that Israel's behaviour was "barbarian". The Sudanese Speaker of the Assembly praised the concern of Somalis with Arab causes.

**Kenya-Somali Border Co-operation Talks :** A spokesman for the Somali Foreign Ministry announced in Mogadishu on August 30, that Kenya and Somali had successfully concluded talks on land communication and security along their common border. The talks were held at the Somali port of Kismayu between Somali regional governors and an eight man Kenyan team led by the North Eastern Provincial Commissioner. (*Daily Nation*, Nairobi, August 31).

## UGANDA

**Chiefs Released :** The brother of the former Kabaka (King) of Buganda, Prince Alexander Simbwa, and three former country chiefs were released from detention by the Uganda Government. Prince Alexander David Simbwa was arrested shortly after the Uganda army took over the Kabaka's palace on the outskirts of Kampala on May 24, 1966. Nine other people were also released including John Okelo, self-styled "Field Marshal" who claimed to have led the Zanzibar revolution in 1964. Ugandan born Okelo was detained last year.

**Agreement on Border Incidents :** A meeting to discuss recent border incidents between the Sudan and Uganda was held in Kampala on August 16.

In a communique issued at the end of the deliberations, the Sudanese assured the Uganda delegation that effective steps would be taken to ensure that similar incidents across the Ugandan border would not occur again. They apologised for the damage caused and agreed to pay compensation for loss of life and damage to property during the recent incidents in Dufile village and Moyo.

In order to strengthen the friendly relations between the two countries and to prevent the recurrence of such other incidents, the delegations agreed to the establi-

shment of a Ministerial Committee, which would bi-annually review the relations between the two countries. The first meeting of this committee, the communique disclosed, was to be held at Khartoum.

**Soviet MiGs Presented :** The Commander of the Uganda Armed Forces, Maj-Gen Idi Amin, in a ceremony at Gulu Airfield on August 16, took delivery of supersonic MiG jet fighters presented to the country by the Soviet Union. The planes were handed over by Colonel M. Nikitin representing the Soviet Ministry of Defence. Colonel Nikitin expressed confidence that the Uganda Air Force would be strong and achieve a high standard of fighting training, creating a force capable of defending the country's independence. (*Ethiopian Herald*, August 17).

**Commonwealth Medical Conference :** The Second Commonwealth Medical Conference concluded deliberations in Kampala on September 13. The Conference attended by a large number of Health Ministers from Commonwealth countries, recommended that regional schemes of co-operation—not necessarily confined to the Commonwealth—should be developed as a means to meeting the needs of developing countries for skilled manpower. It was decided to hold the next conference in 1971.

**Parliament Approves Emergency Powers Bill :** A new Emergency Powers Bill was approved by the Uganda National Assembly in Kampala on October 22. The Bill sought to make better provisions relating to public emergency in the country by giving general powers to the Minister under Emergency Regulations for defence of public safety, public order and other matters. The Bill provided for the prohibition of strikes which could become common during an emergency. Further if the occasion arose, the Government was empowered to declare the whole or a part of the country as an area under emergency.

The Bill, replacing the present Emergency Powers Act drafted in 1963, covered a much wider range of subjects. The Interior Minister, who introduced the Bill in Parliament, declared that the previous act was outdated and not in line with the changes which had taken place in Uganda. (*East African Standard*, October 22).

## CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC)

**Diplomatic Relations Resumed :** The Congo (Kinshasa) Government announced on September 11 that it would resume diplomatic relations with Rwanda, severed earlier this year over the mercenaries affair. The statement issued further stated that "the Government had studied the problem seriously and estimated that the discord is poisoning good relations that have always existed between the Congo and Rwanda".

**Large Number of Political Prisoners Released :** The Congo Government recently announced the release of a large number of political prisoners. It also conveyed to the Algerian Authorities that no objections would be raised if the former Congolese Prime Minister, Mr. Tshombe, was released and expelled from Africa. Mr. Tshombe has been held in Algeria for the past fourteen months, when his plane was hijacked over Spain's Balearic Islands and forced to land there. This Congolese assurance in the form of a message from President Joseph Mobutu to the Algerian President Houari Boumedienne was delivered by the Congolese Ambassador in Algeria.



In Geneva on October 22 Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, disclosed that Mr. Moise Tshombe would not be extradited to Kinshasa. Prince Aga Khan said he had received this assurance during talks with the Algerian Government after the OAU summit in Algiers. The High Commissioner added that after the execution of former rebel leader Reire Mulele, who had voluntarily returned from exile believing he would benefit from an amnesty, it was even less likely that Algeria would agree to the former Premier's extradition. (*Ghanaian Times*, October 24).

**Telex Link with Kenya :** A telex link between Kinshasa and Nairobi was inaugurated in the Congolese Capital in the presence of the Congolese Minister for Posts and Telegraphs.

## TANZANIA

**Religious Leader Expelled :** The Government of Tanzania recently expelled the leader of the Dawoodi Bohra Muslim Sect, Dr. Syedna Mohammed Burhanuddin Sahib, who has followers in many Asian, European and East African countries. Dr. Syedna had arrived in Tanzania in August on a tour of East Africa.

A statement issued by the Government repeated an earlier warning made in the Government press that Tanzania would not allow religious leaders to collect money in the country and transit it "to their celestial seats in foreign countries". The Government statement further added "freedom of religion does not involve freedom to disregard or circumvent the exchange control laws of this country". (*The Standard*, Tanzania, August 15).

On October 25 the Tanzanian Government ordered the opposition Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) of Swaziland to close its office in Dar-es-Salaam. A Government spokesman said this was because Swaziland had become independent and the group could no longer be considered freedom fighters.

**Great North Road to be Reconstructed :** The United States Government has extended a long-term, low interest loan to the Government of Tanzania for reconstruction of 145 miles of the Great North Road, the most hazardous section through Tanzania's Southern Highlands. On October 21, a massive consignment of American road-building equipment was received at Dar-es-Salaam for use in the \$13 million project.

The 1,200-mile Great North Road has been Zambia's major supplier and export channel since Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 interrupted communications through the South.

**Seventeen Deported to Zanzibar :** A Tanzanian Government spokesman announced on October 22 that "a number of mischievous people" had been deported from Dar-es-Salaam to Zanzibar. Though the spokesman gave no details it was the first official backing for reports in Dar-es-Salaam that 17 or more Zanzibaris including several from inert people had been rounded up for plotting against the revolutionary government under cover of religious activity. Reports indicated that one of them was Mr. Rashad Ali, a senior Information Ministry official, who was once Zanzibar's representative in Cairo. Others included an elderly Muslim religious leader, a former Zanzibar police officer and a youth leader from the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, outlawed in the island's January 1964 revolution. (*East African Standard*, October 23).

## CONGO REPUBLIC (BRAZZAVILLE)

**Army Assumes Power :** The Army in Congo assumed power early in September following disturbances which had broken out in the country on August 29, between the regular forces and certain dissident elements of the Civil Militia. These dissident forces rebelled against the July 31 movement, the Joint Civil Militia—National People's Army Committee, the National Revolutionary Council (CNR), and its policies:

In an address to the Congolese people on September 5, Capt. Raoul, the Prime Minister and Head of the Provisional Government since August 21, explained that the CNR had called on him to assume the function of the Head of State "until the establishment of the new institutions", in addition to the powers of the Head of Government. Referring to the establishment of new institutions, the Head of State explained that a "new economic policy which will take into account all the disruptions occurring in the world in general and Africa in particular" would be adopted. In consequence a reorientation of the method of managing State enterprises and a reform of the trade system would be effected.

Commenting on the new military regime in its editorial on September 18, *Afrique Nouvelle* expressed anxiety at no explanations having been advanced for the resignation of M Massemba D'ebat, either by the ex-President himself or the military leaders. The fact that "a large number of his political enemies are in the Government," the editorial said, gives cause for anxiety of his future. Then, again, these were all members of different tribes and "in spite of the severity of the Congolese revolution towards tribal conflicts, these have never been completely eliminated. All disturbances hitherto in the Congo-Brazzaville have been laid down to tribalism. Is this then, it asks, "a settling of tribal disputes?"

Another significant feature of the crisis *Afrique Nouvelle* noted was the hostility between the army and the militia (an armed civilian body established to defend "the achievements of the revolution") (*Afrique Nouvelle*, Dakar, September 18).

**Former Leaders Sentenced :** Goma D'ebat, brother of the deposed President, M Massemba-D'ebat, was sentenced to four years hard labour for illegal possession of arms on September 5. Also sentenced on similar charges were former Information Minister, M Andre Hombessa (3 years) ; M Bemard Matingon, Head of the country's Security Forces (5 years) and Mr. Paul Banthond, Secretary General of the banned Trade Union Confederation (2 years). M Hombessa was charged for forming an opposition movement and distributing arms to supporters whose members were trained in Cuba. The military led, National Council for Revolution banned M Hombessa's South League Movement along with the Trade Union Confederation.

## RHODESIA

**Renewed Negotiations between Premier Wilson and Ian Smith :** British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Rhodesian leader Ian Smith met in Gibraltar in October to make another attempt at a peaceful settlement of the two-year-old rebellion of the white settlers. The meeting took place aboard the Royal Navy's assault ship Fearless, moved in Gibraltar harbour, from October 10—12.

After almost 30 hours of tough negotiations with Mr. Smith, Mr. Wilson on October 15 reported to the House of Commons the results of the confrontation which had not been a "sell-out". His statement contained in a White Paper disclosed that secret proposals for a Rhodesian independence settlement had been made to Premier Ian Smith.

The British terms of settlement, as reported by Mr. Wilson, included the appointment of a Royal Commission to test whether the new independence constitution was acceptable. If it was so, the British Government would take all action to effect an immediate end of economic and other sanctions and set up a broad-based administration, including Africans, to remain in office till the new constitution was introduced, elections held and a new Parliament convened. Terms also included the introduction of educational and training facilities for Africans. According to the White Paper, provided there is at all a "blocking quarter" of directly and popularly elected Africans to safeguard against retrogressive amendments of the constitution, the British Government would not insist on any particular composition for the legislature. Terms regarding the powers of the Rhodesian Senate were also precise. It was proposed that the right of appeal to the Privy Council should be retained for effecting amendments to the constitution's retrenched clauses.

The document of more than a 1,000 words was accompanied by a statement to the Commons from Mr. Wilson which indicated that Mr. Smith and his Cabinet were studying the terms in Salisbury, but prospects for a settlement were dim. "There was", Mr. Wilson told the House, "and still remains a deep difference between the two sides, not only on the requirements for a settlement, but even more on the basic political philosophies which underline the attitudes expressed". Earlier, the joint statement issued by the two sides on October 13, at the conclusion of the Fearless talks, had already admitted that on "fundamental issues", concerning the rights of black Rhodesians, disagreement was still rampant and to make this point more emphatic, it repeated that the gulf remaining is "very wide".

The final lap of the negotiations started in Salisbury on November 4, with a meeting between Mr. Thompson, British Minister Without Portfolio and Prime Minister Wilson's special representative, and Mr. Smith. Hard bargaining discussions between officials of the two sides continued for a week with little or no progress made on basic issues. Mr. Thompson insisted that there must be outside safeguards against any retrospective changes to the Rhodesian Constitution which might erode the principle of a transition to African majority rule. Such safeguards, according to him, could best be provided by the British Privy Council.

The break in the Salisbury talks was utilized by Minister Thompson to visit east and central African Commonwealth capitals to ascertain African opinion outside Rhodesia. Talks were held with Presidents Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Dr. Hastings Banda of Malawi, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Sir Milton Obote of Uganda and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Their potests were definite and they also indicated that they might withdraw from the Commonwealth if the settlement went through on the Fearless basis. In Rhodesia, Mr. Thompson met Mr. Ralph Nilson, Chairman of the White extremist Rhodesian Front, and the national leaders, Joshua Khoma and Rev. Ndabaningi Lithole. These latter demanded immediate Rhodesian independence under an African Government. Talks were once again resumed in Salisbury on Mr. Thompson's return from east and central Africa but deep differences remained. Mr. Smith rejected the British proposal of the Privy Council in

London having the final say in constitutional questions of African rights, though he had given way on the other major principle at issue—Britain's demand that a "blocking-quarter" of popularly elected Africans have veto powers in the Rhodesian Parliament.

On November 16, the talks finally broke up with the deadlock still unresolved. An agreed press statement issued by the Rhodesian Government said: "After nine meetings and a number of formal exchanges of views, it is clear that although some progress has been made on a number of British proposals there remains a fundamental disagreement on several major questions of principle".

**Comments on the Fearless Proposals:** Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, in London on her way from New York to India, on October 16 said that Premier Wilson's dropping of the British pledge on NIBMAR (no independence before majority rule) seemed to have created a rather dangerous position. The Indian stand on Rhodesia, she maintained, remained unchanged. India wanted the NIBMAR pledge made to the Commonwealth by the British Government fulfilled and it was the responsibility of the British Government to make the Smith regime bend from its rigid position, by force if necessary.

African opinion rejected outright the Fearless proposals and believed that what had happened on the Fearless was not a disagreement but a deal. It was a document of surrender to Mr. Smith. It proposed to keep his regime in power and to give Rhodesia independence without majority rule. This conceded, Britain would be powerless to implement its guarantees of unimpeded progress to majority rule and the proposals to dismantle existing racial discrimination. At Lusaka, on October 16, President Kaunda, at a press conference, said that the proposals were a "despicable surrender to racialism", a "sell-out" of four million Africans. Leaders of exiled African nationalist movements rejected the proposals and vowed to continue guerilla warfare. ZAPU and ZANU both condemned the proposals in statements issued in Lusaka and in the UN Trusteeship Committee, the Soviet delegate charged that Britain, the United States, West Germany and other Western countries were locked in a "policy of connivance" to ensure continued white control in Rhodesia.

African mass media also condemned the outcome of the Fearless meet. The *East African Standard* on October 24 said what had "emerged with startling clarity from the Fearless exchanges is that Mr. Wilson is prepared to sacrifice NIBMAR. This being so, the Rhodesians have got the one thing they want". However, the editorial went on to say, "Mr. Wilson will find he still has to deal with the leaders of critical African countries. They will not be placated without NIBMAR. "The *Ghanaian Times* on October 16, commenting on the failure to reach agreement, expressed the hope that Britain would explore "all possible ways to reach an equitable and fair settlement of the crisis".

## ZAMBIA

**Zambia Assembly Dissolved:** President Kenneth Kaunda announced the dissolution of the National Assembly on November 2 and ordered the holding of general elections on December 19—a month earlier than expected.

This would be Zambia's first general election since the country attained independence four years ago. From it will emerge an enlarged parliament with

special reserved seats for White interests abolished.

**President Kaunda Visits France :** President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia had talks with President De Gaulle and the French Premier, M Maurice Couve de Murville, during his four day official visit to France from September 17 to 20. Following the talks, Dr. Kaunda said that Zambia valued General De Gaulle's leadership. Having seen what war meant, he could provide an example of how to use power for the welfare and service of mankind. The President also added that he had invited President and Madame De Gaulle to pay a combined visit to Zambia and Tanzania. (*Daily Nation*, Nairobi, September 19).

In an editorial comment on President Kaunda's visit to Paris *Le Monde* described the Zambian President as "one of the most remarkable African Head of State", who, since the country's independence, had worked with a "real obsession for the defence of Black populations south of the Zambezi. This is a dangerous mission, since South Africa, with Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola, could bring such pressure on the frontiers of Zambia that national liberation movements with their headquarters in Lusaka would rise up and plunge all Central Africa into a blood-bath".

Since this message, the editorial further said, had failed to secure the desired results from the United States, Britain or China (CPR), it was natural for the African leader to turn to France which believed in a policy of non-alignment similar to that of Zambia. (*Le Monde*, Paris, September 17).

**Oil Pipeline Inaugurated :** Presidents Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania, officially inaugurated on September 2 the 1,058-mile Tanzania-Zambia oil pipeline. The opening of the new pipeline between Dar-es-Salaam and Ndolo spelled the end of 32 months of petrol rationing. In 1967, Zambia used about 150,000 tons of fuel. The pipeline is capable of pumping through 450,000 tons a year with the help of five booster stations. Also, henceforth no more diesel fuel would be carried to Zambia through Malawi. The Zambian fuel depot at Salima (Malawi) would however remain operational till early next year when the tanks and other equipment would be sold.

Speaking at the opening ceremony, President Kaunda said that the pipeline would "tremendously influence" the life of Zambia. Its opening formed "a milestone worth remembering". For landlocked Zambia, surrounded on all sides by regimes which were opposed to the fundamental principles of the country's policies, this breakthrough had become necessary. (*Times of Zambia*, September 2 and 9).

**President Kaunda Opens Zambia National Assembly :** Opening a session of the Zambia National Assembly at Lusaka on October 3 President Kenneth Kaunda said that Britain apparently wanted an agreement with Rhodesia which would amount to a legalization of the Smith regime "at any price" before the next Commonwealth Conference. His Government's stand, the President however said, "remains unwavering in condemning any proposals which do not express in full measure the rights of the majority in that country".

Commenting on Portugal and its new administration under Dr. Marcello Caetano, the President called for an immediate conference to determine the final destinies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea. This in his opinion was "the realistic,

honest and honourable course for the new leadership in Lisbon", for, the Portuguese overseas territories could never become integral parts of Portugal and it was impossible to turn more than 13 million Africans into Portuguese. (*The Times*, London, October 3).

## NORTH AFRICA

### LIBYA

**New Government :** King Idris on September 4 accepted the resignation of Mr. Abdul Hamid Bakush from the post of Prime Minister. A new Cabinet has been formed by Mr. Wahis el-Geddafy, the Foreign Minister in the outgoing Cabinet. The new Cabinet is the eleventh since Libya obtained independence on December 24, 1961. The new Government in a statement issued in Tripoli after its first meeting said that it would do all it could to strengthen the army and announced its determination to liquidate foreign military bases in the country. These would, Premier Geddafy said, be converted into national defence units. The military bases in Libya are the United State's Whellus Base, a British staging point in Al Adam and a British garrison near Benghazi. These were built under an agreement which expires in 1974.

### TUNISIA

**Security Trial :** Sentences were passed on September 16 on 33 students and teachers arrested after demonstrations last March at the University of Tunis. Three of the accused received 14 years imprisonment, while other sentences ranged between two and eleven years.

The seven-day trial took place in a specially created State Security Court. The prisoners have been placed in three categories by the Government—the so-called Ba'athists, Communists or those associated with the clandestine Leftist magazine *Perspectives Tunisiennes* and charged with threatening internal and external security, reconstituting the dissolved Communist Party, and threatening and insulting the President, Ministers and a Foreign Head of State. (*The Economist*, September 21).

Commenting on the sentences issued, *Le Monde* said that they could be severed if it could be shown that students and teachers had really conspired to overthrow the State; as it is "the greatest doubt" still remains as to the reality of the charges. (September 18).

**Government Boycotts meetings of the Arab League :** In an official communique released on September 27 the Tunisian Government announced its decision to boycott all meetings of the Arab League. Tunisia had boycotted meetings of the 14-nation Arab League from 1966 until after the Arab-Israeli war in June last. No reasons were assigned to this latest decision but earlier on September 2 the Tunisian delegates had withdrawn from a League conference in Cairo after they had demanded that differences among themselves be sorted out before working plans to deal with Israel. (*Ethiopian Herald*, September 29).

**ASU Congress :** The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) General National Congress held its second session in Cairo from September 14–21. The Congress

approved a series of resolutions on political mobilization and defence, economic mobilization, international mobilization and ASU organizational matters. The resolution on political mobilization and defence provided that armed forces should be supplied with all requirements to increase efficiency and fighting capacity so as to fulfil "the sacred duty of liberating occupied land and defending the nation",

**Soviet Union Proposes Middle East Peace Plan :** In a new Middle East Peace Plan, put forth by the Soviet Union to the United States on September 26, the Soviet Union called for a joint Arab Declaration to end the state of belligerence with Israel. The four main provisions of the plan, as reported in the *Ethiopian Herald*, are : (i) Withdrawal of Israeli troops to the pre-June war frontiers; (ii) setting up of a large UN peace-keeping force to cover the entire length of Israel's border with Arab States; (iii) a declaration by the Big Four (Soviet Union, USA, Britain and France) that they would not tolerate resumption of hostilities; and (iv) a declaration by the Arab nations ending their state of war with Israel.

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### FREEDOM MOVEMENTS

**OAU Report on Liberation Movements :** The OAU Liberation Committee in a report, "the most optimistic ever presented to a Ministerial Council meeting", stated that the African liberation struggles in Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies have now become a direct confrontation between African militants and South Africa. This new situation had developed because of "the grave decision of South Africa to carry its front-line defence to the Zambesi river".

The report praised the increasing efficiency of the organization of liberation movements, their successes on the field and the "high political level" which was developing among African populations. Portugal and the White minority Governments of Southern Africa, surprised by the growth of guerilla movements and feeling the "weakness" of their own forces, had resorted to "pitiless repression", the report stated.

In conclusion, the Liberation Committee called on African countries to provide financial and military assistance to the liberation movements so as to intensify their struggles. At the suggestion of Morocco, the report stated, a special Commission was set up to study the possibilities of reorganizing the Liberation Committee itself in the interests of greater efficiency.

**Call for UN Aid to South African Freedom Fighters :** The Afro-Asian bloc submitted a draft resolution on November 13 to the special Political Committee, calling for more political and material aid to the forces of the South African liberation movements. The resolution, sponsored by 40 countries, goes beyond past resolutions that appealed for such assistance merely to the South African people. It demands that South African "freedom fighters captured by the Government be treated as prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention and calls for the release of apartheid forces imprisoned or under house arrest. Further, the resolution calls on Secretary-General U Thant to compile and publicize a list of persons executed, imprisoned, banished to remote regions or expelled from South Africa because of their opposition to apartheid. The Secretary-General would also, in

accordance with the resolution, be asked to report on "acts of brutality" committed against the South African "freedom fighters".

**New Liberation Party :** A new nationalist party in Dar-es-Salaam, the National Liberation Front of South Africa (NALFSA), recently applied for recognition to the African Liberation Committee of the OAU. The Secretary-General of the new movement, Mr. Joe Kuzawayo, said on September 9 that his organization enjoyed popular support in South Africa.

**First Anniversary of ZAPU-ANC Agreement :** Algiers Radio broadcast on August 19 reports of a press conference held by Mr. Noko of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Mr. Makatini of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, to mark the first anniversary of the ANC-APZU agreement and the start of their joint military action in Rhodesia.

Mr. Noko called on other liberation movements—the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the People's Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO)—to coordinate their political and military actions. Referring to the despatch of South African troops and equipment to Rhodesia and the current "Operation Sibassa", started on August 14, Mr. Noko pointed out that the military map of Southern Africa had been completely changed since the creation of the ANC-ZAPU front. South Africa had openly revealed its policy of military intervention against the Africans in Mozambique, Angola and Rhodesia.

Mr. Noko also stated that Britain must not be called upon to intervene in Rhodesia for the liberation war aimed not to restore the pre-UDI system, but to do away with the seventy-year British regime. The ANC leader, Mr. Makatini, denied South African allegations that the guerillas had been brought in from Zambia.

**FRELIMO Celebrates Fourth Anniversary :** The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) celebrated its fourth anniversary on September 25. In a communique issued to mark the occasion, FRELIMO said that over the last one year its forces had killed more than 1,000 Portuguese troops, shot down 20 aircraft and destroyed more than 100 military vehicles. The Front had also launched new military operations at Tete.

## LESOTHO

**Prime Minister Warns People :** Chief Jonathan warned tribal chiefs and village headmen that they would "suffer ruthless penalties" if they harboured communists, African nationalist guerillas or political refugees from South Africa. "We cannot afford, without serious repercussions, to make our country a springboard for attacks on the Republic of South Africa", Chief Jonathan said on September 14 at a meeting near Maseru. The Prime Minister, who had earlier ordered all political refugees from neighbouring South Africa to leave his country before the end of the month, said that he had proof that most of the refugees had communist affiliations.

## SWAZILAND

**Independence Achieved :** Swaziland, a British protectorate for over sixty-five years in South East Africa, achieved Independence on September 6. By



granting Independence to Swaziland's 400,000 people, Britain severed its last remaining link with 'black' Africa. It would be interesting to recall that at its zenith Britain's African Empire covered an area of 31 million square miles and officials in Whitehall held power over 135 million Africans.

At a ceremony held in the National Stadium near Mbane, the capital, the Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. George Thompson, representing Queen Elizabeth, presented King Sobhuza II with the constitutional instruments of independence. While indicating the various responsibilities and challenges that lay ahead for the country, King Sobhuza expressly noted and emphasized the maintenance of friendly relations with the United Kingdom. After the official ceremony the king joined 4,000 of his warriors in a traditional "spear-shaking" war dance.

The new Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini Dhlathini, in a policy statement on the occasion announced that Swaziland would follow "an external policy based on realities" and denounced the policy of "might is right" in international relations. However this did not mean that Swazi policy would be devoid of ideals and the basic principles of liberal humanism. The Prime Minister said that "our conduct as members of the Commonwealth of Nations, of the United Nations, and of the Organization of African Unity will, I am confident, be such as to rebut any suggestion that Swaziland is a nation content to live in isolation, making no significant contribution to world peace and prosperity". Swaziland believed, and would practise what it believed: "firstly, eschew all forms of religious and racial discrimination, and, secondly, refrain from interference in the affairs of other countries, save in the legitimate cause of maintaining international peace".

## SOUTH AFRICA

**New Racial Legislation :** The Union Government of South Africa on October 16 granted permission to two small towns to remove Africans at dusk and make them "white by night". "White by night" communities are those in which African servants and workers can no longer sleep overnight. They are expected to return to the African township outside the municipal boundaries for the night.

Mr. Piet Koomhof, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, while announcing the opening of this new chapter in racial separation, said that the province north of Johannesburg would be the first to go "white by night". "It is in the interest of Bantu people that they should sleep with their own people in their own township and it is of interest to the Europeans that this should be so", Mr. Koomhof said.

The *Star of Johannesburg* has attacked the idea of White nights. In an editorial it stated, "Apartheid is bad enough for Africans without adding insult to injury".

**Indians Threatened :** South Africa's Community Development Minister, Mr. Blaar Coetsee, announced on October 29 that South Africa's half million Indians would be turned out of commerce if they did not go willingly. "I am sick and tired of seeing young Indians sitting on shop counters as if there were no other occupations open to them", Mr. Coetsee said. He called on them to take to other occupations. "Should they fail to do so willingly, I will be forced to take action. The day will come when we will have to reconsider the whole matter of trading licences", the Minister added.

According to the 1960 census, 28.7 per cent of the Indian population was engaged in commerce. Since then, Indian areas, particularly in Johannesburg, had been cleared for slum clearance and for rezoning as "white" areas. In Johannesburg alone about 700 Indian trading licences were suspended and many Indian traders faced ruin. No new trading licences have been granted to Indians.

Mr. Coetzee's announcement drew an angry and worried response from Indians. They pointed out that many jobs were already banned to them under the race segregation law and even though theoretically no barriers were imposed on their taking up apprenticeship in industry, in actual fact the "White" trade unions, whose sanction had to be secured, usually vetoed the applications of Indians.

The Chairman of the Government-appointed South African Indian Council said, "The Minister's statement has created considerable alarm among the Indian community. They fear that arbitrary powers will be exercised by the authorities. The statement appears to nullify the many promises made to Indian traders that they will not be deprived of their livelihood".

**South Africa to Check Communist Infiltration :** Mr. John Vorster, South Africa's Prime Minister, said on September 12 that he would do his utmost to persuade Zambia to oppose Communist infiltration in Africa. Addressing the annual conference of the Transvaal Nationalist Party, Mr. Vorster said that in the three states to the north and east of Malawi there were no less than 4,000 diplomatic representatives and staff members of communist countries. Mr. Vorster expressed his gratitude to Malawi and South Africa's three immediate neighbours, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, for their assurance to check Communist infiltration.

**"Coloured" Cricketer Excluded :** Basil D' Oliveira, a "coloured" cricketer, was omitted from the list of players to represent England in South Africa by the selection committee of the M.C.C., to avoid objections from racist South Africa.

**International Commission of Jurists Condemns Trial of South Africans :** In a report issued on August 17, the International Commission of Jurists condemned the trial of 35 South West Africans held in Pretoria earlier this year as "part of an overall drift towards totalitarianism in South African society".

The Commission's observer at the trial, Professor Richard A. Falk, in a special report to the Commission said that all prisoners had been subjected to severe tortures involving beating and electric shocks. He further pointed out that as many as 250 more South West Africans were detained incommunicado. Apart from the inhumanity involved, Professor Falk said, this amounted to "extending objectionable security legislation to a foreign country". (*Ethiopian Herald*, August 18).

**Increased Repression in South West Africa :** Eight more Africans were arrested in South West Africa's Caprivi strip on charges of alleged "terrorist" activity in the month of October. This brings to 46 the number of Africans arrested in a continuing police sweep of the Caprivi, a corridor of desolate bushland flanked by Angola, Zambia, Rhodesia and Botswana.

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## Note to Contributors

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## Gandhi—A Life\*

KRISHNA KRIPALANI

NO previous century in the long and eventful history of the Indian sub-continent has witnessed such dynamic change in the political, social and economic life of the people as the century that opened with Gandhi's birth and is now drawing to its close. When he was born British rule had been firmly established in India. The uprising of 1857, variously called the Sepoy Mutiny, the Great Rebellion, or the First War of Independence, had merely served to consolidate a commercial adventure into an empire. The subjection was not merely political. It was so effectively reinforced by intellectual and cultural imitation that the new generation of educated Indians were eager to subject themselves to its 'civilizing mission'. No subjection is so absolute as that which is willingly offered. No chains bind so hard as those which are hugged. So complete was the tutelage and so servile the surrender that it seemed that the British empire in India was divinely ordained and had come to stay.

When Gandhi died, it was as a free nation that India mourned the loss. The dispossessed had recovered the lost heritage and the dumb had found a voice. Those who had shrunk in fear could now hold their heads high. The disarmed had forged a weapon against which the British bayonet was powerless. It was a weapon unique in the world's armoury. It could win without killing.

The story of this miracle is also the story of Gandhi's life, for he more than any other individual was the architect as well as engineer of this historic phenomenon. It is not for nothing that his grateful countrymen have called him the Father of the Nation.

And yet it would be an exaggeration to claim that Gandhi alone wrought this transformation. No individual, however gifted, may claim exclusive credit as sole architect of a historical process. A succession of remarkable predecessors and elder contemporaries had laboured with spade and sword to clear the jungle overgrown with deadly weeds of fear, superstition and lethargy. They had helped to prepare the ground which the genius of Gandhi turned into a mighty battle-field through which he led his countrymen in a grand march to freedom. Had he been born a hundred years earlier he could hardly have been what he became. Nor could India have achieved, but for Gandhi's leadership, her destiny in the way she did—a way so splendid that it brought freedom as well as glory. It was a way so unique that already men are wondering if such an experiment could ever be repeated.

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\* Introductory chapter from "Gandhi—a Life" published by the author on October 2, 1968, on the occasion of the Gandhi Centenary.

Gandhi lived, suffered and died for his people. And yet it is not in relation to his country alone that his life has significance. Nor is it only as a patriot or revolutionary reformer that he will be remembered by future generations. Whatever else Gandhi was, he was essentially a moral force whose appeal to the conscience of man is both universal and lasting. If he worked primarily for his countrymen, it was because he was born among them and because their suffering and humiliation supplied the necessary incentives to his moral sensibility and his political crusade. The lesson of his life is thus for all to read.

Did Gandhi's greatness rest solely on his ardent love of his country and his dynamic leadership? In a successful political struggle, it might be adequate reason for his people's gratitude to the Father of the Nation, but it would hardly explain why the rest of the world should particularly honour his memory or find stimulus in his words. There is no dearth of Fathers of Nations in the world today; indeed, some of them the world could well have done without. But this frail, dark man in loin-cloth was much more than the Father of his Nation.

His achievements were many. Each one of them, judged by the manner of its execution or by its fruit, would have made his name honoured anywhere in the world. He brought liberation from foreign rule to a fifth of the human race. And India's freedom was, in a way, the harbinger of freedom to many countries of South-east Asia and Africa.

Of no less significance was what he did for those who were once despised as 'untouchables'. He broke their centuries-old shackles of caste tyranny and social indignity. By his insistence that freedom was to be measured by the all-round social, moral and economic well-being of the millions who live in the villages, as well as by the means he evolved for achieving such freedom, he showed a way of life which may one day provide an alternative to both a regimented and an acquisitive society.

His very death was an achievement in itself, for the martyrdom shamed his people out of a hysteria of hatred and fratricide, and helped the Union of India to consolidate the secular and democratic character of the new-born State.

But no human achievement, however great, can last for ever or remain static in a changing world. What Gandhi achieved may be wrecked or may go awry or may dissolve into no more than a memory. But Gandhi will live, for the man was greater than his achievements. In him was the universal man in eternal quest of truth and moral perfection. As he himself put it: "I am more concerned in preventing the brutalization of human nature than in the prevention of the suffering of my own people. . . If we are all sons of the same God and partake of the same divine essence, we must partake of the sin of every person whether he belongs to us or to another race.

"There are patriots in India, as indeed among all peoples," wrote Rabindranath Tagore in 1938, "who have sacrificed for their country as much as Gandhiji has done, and some who have had to suffer much worse

penalties than he has had to endure. Even as in the religious sphere there are ascetics in this country compared to the rigours of whose practices Gandhiji's life is one of comparative ease. But these patriots are mere patriots and nothing more and these ascetics are mere spiritual athletes, limited as men by their very virtues; while this man seems greater than his virtues, great as they are."

Gandhi founded no church and though he lived by faith he left behind no dogma for the faithful to quarrel over. Deeply devout and loyal (in his own fashion) to the religion in which he was born, he rejected fearlessly and uncompromisingly any dogma or practice that seemed to negate the law, as he conceived it, of universal morality and charity. As early as 1909 his Baptist friend, Joseph Doke, wrote of him: "I question whether any system of religion can absolutely hold him. His views are too closely allied to Christianity to be entirely Hindu, and too deeply saturated with Hinduism to be called Christian, while his sympathies are so wide and catholic that one would imagine 'he has reached a point where the formulae of sects are meaningless'".

Twenty-seven years later Gandhi warned some of his co-workers who had formed a society named after him to propagate his ideals: "There is no such thing as Gandhism, and I do not want to leave any sect after me. I do not claim to have originated any new principle or doctrine. I have simply tried, in my own way, to apply the eternal truths to our daily life and problems...The opinions I have formed, and the conclusions I have arrived at, are not by any means final. I may change them tomorrow if I find better ones. I have nothing new to teach the world. Truth and non-violence are as old as the hills. All I have done is to try experiments in both, on as vast a scale and as best as I could. In doing so I have sometimes erred and learnt by my errors.....

"Well, my entire philosophy, if it may be called by that pretentious name, is contained in what I have just said. You will not call it Gandhism, for there is no ism about it. And no elaborate literature or propaganda is needed to explain it. The scriptures have been quoted against my postulation but I have held faster than ever to my firm conviction that truth ought not to be sacrificed for anything whatsoever. Those who believe in the elementary truths I have laid down can propagate them only by living them."

Gandhi gave no attributes to God save Truth, and prescribed no ritual for attaining it save honest and unrelenting search through means that harm no living thing. Who dare therefore claim Gandhi for his own except by claiming him for all?

Of no less universal significance is the fact Gandhi was not born as he came to be, and, although he made himself unique, he did not exhibit in early years any such extraordinary faculty as is not shared by the common run of boys of that age. Unlike some of his remarkable contemporaries, no muse inspired him as had possessed young Rabindranath: he was not tormented by the mystic visions of a Ramakrishna, nor driven by the overpowering zeal of a Vivekananda. He was an ordinary child

like most of us. If anything, he was less precocious than many children, less wild than most and was inhibited by more than normal shyness, a handicap from which he suffered a long time.

Timid and diffident, homely in looks, mediocre in studies and undistinguished in general, there was nothing in his physical appearance or mental equipment as a child of young lad to suggest the volcanic potential that lay dormant in him. No muffled rumbling was audible, no flash nor smoke ever escaped from the placid surface to give an inkling of the sword of fire that was being forged within.

It was as if Providence, jealously guarding the rare instrument she was forging in secret and anxious to ward off the evil eye, had kept it hid in a sheath too commonplace to attract notice. Not even the sheath itself had an inkling or premonition of the fire slumbering within or of the destiny that lay in wait ahead, in ambush as it were. No consciousness, not even a vague stirring, of genius haunted the seemingly nondescript lad, no erratic frenzy ruffled the even surface of an uneventful childhood, no passionate longing forced its way out of the deep cavern of the subconscious.

The blissfully unconscious lad was spared all premature strain which has been the making, as also the unmaking, of many a genius and a prophet, till his mind had ripened and matured and was able to bear the stress of the inner explosion, when it came, bravely and lightly, without flinching, without pride, without pugnacity.

It is true that a marked sense of loyalty to parents, of devotion to duty and aversion to untruthfulness were evident in the small schoolboy, but in the social milieu he was brought up in, these qualities were not very extraordinary. What was truly extra ordinary was buried so deep in the spirit that there was hardly a visible evidence of it at that age.

One may therefore derive inspiration and courage from the knowledge that if this commonplace lad made himself into what he later became by a steady exertion of the will, there is no obvious reason why others should not succeed in doing the same. If a timid boy, who dared not go to bed without a light—"I would imagine ghosts coming from one direction, thieves from another, and serpents from a third"—could become the most fearless of men, there is hope for all.

Gandhi's genius, if that word must be used, lay in his persistence, fearless and tireless, in taking pains in obedience to a restless moral urge. His life, after he had crossed the threshold of youth, was one long march of striving without a pause, a quest for truth, "unhasting, unresting", not abstract or metaphysical truth, but such truth as can be realized in human relations. He climbed step by step, each step no bigger than a man's, till when we saw him at the height he seemed more than a man. "Generations to come, it may be," wrote Albert Einstein, himself a towering mind of the century, "will scarce believe that such a one as this ever in flesh and blood walked upon this earth". If at the end Gandhi

seemed like no other man, it is good to remember that when he began he was like any other man.

Therein lies the unique beauty of his life and its lesson. Fortunately, he has himself recorded for us the main incidents until his emergence in the full glory of public limelight when he almost ceased to have any privacy. He has described with meticulous care and uninhibited veracity the evolution of his moral and political consciousness. Had he not done so, there would have been no dearth of devout chroniclers in our credulous land to invent mysterious portents announcing his birth, and to invest him with a divine halo even while he lay as an embryo in the mother's womb. How right Tagore was when he said : "Your speech is simple, my Master, but not theirs who talk of you."

Was Gandhi a politician or a saint? Was he a saint among politicians or a politician among saints? Can one be both? Did he succeed in spiritualizing politics, as has been claimed by his admirers? Does the nation which proclaims him as Father bear witness to this claim? These are questions which posterity will continue to ask.

Meanwhile, all one can say is that whatever he was, he was like no other man of his age. "Perhaps he will not succeed", wrote Tagore ten years before Gandhi's death. "Perhaps he will fail as the Buddha failed, as the Christ failed, to wean men from their iniquities, but he will always be remembered as one who made his life a lesson for all ages to come."



# The Establishment and Maintenance of Centre Rule in Modern Nigeria\*

MICHAEL VICKERS

MAJ.-General Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government in Nigeria, has made it clear during the past year and a half that he intends to return the country to Civil Political rule. Though it would appear these plans have been held up by the prolongation of the war with Biafra, he continues to stress that this return "has only been delayed by the war."<sup>1</sup> Still, while the return to Civil Political rule may, indeed, be imminent, the conditions under which this may be permitted remain unclear.

Reports indicate that the Military Government has gone a long way towards bringing a relaxation of tensions, and indeed towards creating a growing degree of trust among those people living within three of the four former Regions. Further, it is said the Gowon's leadership is "easily accepted in the Executive Council . . ."<sup>2</sup> and that after a serious challenge to his authority in 1966 which resulted from intra-Military impatience with his moderate policy towards conduct of the war with Biafra, that since then, his "stature and authority have markedly increased . . ."<sup>2</sup> On the basis of his performance over the past two and a half years then, it would seem that Gowon's personal authority and that exercised through him by the Supreme Military Council has resulted in stabilizing to a significant degree the violent convulsions with which the country was seized. And yet, while ethnic fears may have been eased through the largely non-coercive activities of the Nigerian Government within more than three-quarters of the old Federation, still these have *only been eased*; it would take little to inflame fear and hostility once again and thus hasten a return of the destructive conditions from which the country is now only slowly recovering.

It is clear, therefore, that Centre rule may well constitute a critical factor in the future political development of the country. In the course of the paper which follows, it is hoped that by considering some of the major strengths and weaknesses of Centre rule as it existed in the pre-coup era, we may gain some insight into the problems it is likely to face in the future.

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### Nature of the Problem

Large-scale corruption and graft would appear to have been cleansed from the political scene<sup>3</sup>; further it would seem that the 12-State formula will sizably reduce the more extreme of ethno-regional strains. Still, though these two leading stumbling-blocks may largely have been cleared away, the path to achieving stable rule under a dominant Centre authority will remain a task requiring the greatest skill and application by all involved. In many ways, Gowon is pushing a very hard bargain, and one which is bound to tax to the utmost and from the very outset, all who will be participating in Centre leadership. For Gowon appears to have shifted very little from his advocacy of a strong Centre and subordinate States.<sup>4</sup> When in November 1966 he declared the opposition of the Federal Military Government to confederation, either as a permanent or temporary solution, and that his Government would use force "to preserve the integrity of Nigeria,"<sup>5</sup> he seems to have outlined in brief the philosophy on which subsequently he has chosen to operate. Thus, even if corruption and graft have been swept aside and the strains of ethno-regionalism largely ameliorated, Gowon's steadfast insistence on a dominant Centre are going to make very large demands on those exercising Centre authority.

While the conditions under which post-Military Civil Political rule may be conducted and the problems it faces found to be considerably different from those under which it operated in the pre-coup era, still the major challenge Centre authority will face will be broadly identical. This challenge will be that of devising *adequate methods* through which the Centre Government may *acquire sufficient consensual backing* to render the legal powers with which it is endowed, effective.<sup>6</sup>

Though during the period of pre-coup Civil Political rule consistent alternations were effected in the legal-constitutional provisions allowing growth in the Political Power<sup>7</sup> of the Centre Government and its respective incumbents, consensual legitimacy continued to lag behind. Thus, while legal provisions endowed the Centre Government with a widening area of discretion in which Political Authority<sup>8</sup> could be exercised backed by legal sanction, the *inability* of the Centre to engender consent and support from members of the National polity for these legally allocated elements of Political Power rendered Centre control from Lagos more and more tenuous.

On the other hand, Political Authority exercised by Regional Governments and their incumbents in the pre-coup era was supported both by legal and a considerable proportion of consensual legitimacy. Indeed, the point to be noted with respect to the exercise of Political Authority at the Regional level, is that consensual backing of legally allocated Regional Political Power was far greater than that backing legal powers of the Centre. This, however, is not to suggest that Regions were able to gain uniform support for the Political Authority which each sought to exercise. In reality there were vast discrepancies as to the nature and degree of support emanating from sub-Regional groupings. In the Regions of the South absence of a uniform system of traditional authority like that which existed within a large proportion of the North made exercise of Regional Political Authority a far more complex activity. And, of course, the fact

that no single pattern of authority, traditional or otherwise, existed within the Regions of the South, permitted and perhaps encouraged what emerged as a chaotic, unstructured and unprincipled struggle for power. While the traditional authority exercised by most Northern Emirs may justifiably be criticized for its incapacity to accommodate pressures for modernization and rapid change, still the persistence of the relatively stereotyped forms of authority the Emirs exerted not only permitted the exercise of Regional Political Authority by Regional incumbents in a relatively straight forward fashion, but also constituted structures within which there might be a relatively orderly competition for power.

### **Personal and Group Influence**

While not denying the considerable influence of Regional interests on the shaping and control of Centre power, still not only were there legal sanctions endowing Centre offices with a considerable degree of Political Power, but also from the waning years of Colonial rule (about 1955—1959) there had existed prominent Nigerians, few in number, who had attempted with some success to exercise a controlling influence on the establishment and growth of Centre power. It is clear that in the late stages before the advent of Civil Political rule each of these men tended to seek largely his own interests and with a shrewd eye to Regional support and loyalties.<sup>9</sup>

Azikiwe, having resigned in 1959 as National President of the NCNC and Premier of the East Region, seemed bent on emerging as a kind of semi-charismatic defender of the peoples of Nigeria<sup>10</sup> through his influence as Governor-General (later to become President on the introduction of the 1963 Republican Constitution). "Marginal Men"<sup>11</sup> like Chief T.O.S. Benson and Chief Festue Okotie-Eboh seemed determined to secure their respective positions within the NCNC while attending to burgeoning business interests. While Benson was to achieve the rank of First National Vice-President of the NCNC and Federal Minister of Information, Chief Okotie-Eboh while managing his Centre Finance portfolio with skill and his parliamentary duties with a flair which rapidly marked him as a valuable man to have behind the NCNC cause, was better known for the energy he put into his widespread business enterprises.<sup>12</sup> As for others, including occupants of important ministerial posts, senior administrators and leading members of the Judiciary, it would seem these individuals played essential support roles for the top Centre politicians; each appearing to gain high office largely on the basis of ability to carry out certain critical functions. While for these latter individuals ethnic qualifications would seem to have been important, it is interesting to note that common educational experience and social expectation which partly derived from the latter gave persons like Federal Justice Minister T.O. Elias; Chief Justice of the Federation, Sir Ade Ademola; and former Chief Justice of the East Region (and now Chief Justice of Biafra), Sir Louis Mbanefo, interests and attitudes which removed many obstacles to future collaborative activity. As for Northerners like the late former Prime Minister of the Federation, Sir Akubakar, and Dipcharima, their objectives would seem to have been simply to establish a position where they might be able to gain the prestige and authority denied them in the North, and where their abilities as statesman and politician might be put to full use.

Enough is known of these early arrivals at the Centre, therefore, to suggest that during the twilight years of Colonial Rule their major efforts were directed to securing their respective positions and attending to personal interests. It was only when the Action Group grew to become a threat to the "co-operative conservative"<sup>13</sup> system which the Centre incumbents at Lagos were evolving, that the latter started to see the advantages of collaborative activity. Having finally disposed of the Action Group and Awolowo<sup>14</sup> and gained the promise of Yoruba allegiance in the West through the controlling influence of Premier Akintola, they were now in a position to exercise a significant degree of influence and authority throughout the Federation. Though there is little to suggest substantial change in the primary objectives of the top politicians and functions of the supporting cast in high office in the Nigerian bureaucracy, none the less in the course of bringing order to the West there is evidence that Centre politicians, senior administrators and key members of the Judiciary, all of whom took a more or less active part in the exercise of Centre authority during the Period of Emergency,<sup>15</sup> and who incidentally became the object of vicious abuse from the remnant of the AG leadership, identified common interests and came to similar conclusions on the advantages of collaborative activity. Major instances of this collaborative behaviour were to be witnessed in a number of legal measures which brought former Regional financial provisions under Centre control in the decisions of the powerful National Economic Council whose membership included most leading members of the National Political Elite Group, including the Prime Minister and Finance Minister Okotie-Eboh; in the decisions on formulation of 1962 Six-Year Development Plan and the allocation of revenue to selected projects. These represent a few of the many instances where joint participation in the decision-shaping, but more importantly in the decision-taking was clearly taken by these entrenched Centre incumbents.

This phase of joint activity would appear to have been short-lived; starting in 1960 it came to an end in the early part of 1964. With the major parties mobilizing for the election campaign, the first Centre men to feel the rude jolt were "Marginal Men" Benson and Okotie-Eboh. The inner enclaves of the NCNC decided to seek alliance with the AG in order to enter the campaign under a common banner. Though the NCNC/AG alliance had been in the air since about September 1963, still the final decision that the party was actually going to effect a firm commitment came as a shock to both the men. Benson, still National First Vice-President of the NCNC at the time was particularly angered by this apparent arbitrary decision on the National Executive Committee of the NCNC. He complained that the regular organs of the party were not made aware of the arrangements being made for the alliance.<sup>16</sup> Okotie-Eboh raised the wrath of party officials by labelling the proposed alliance "a marriage of convenience."<sup>17</sup> In short, both Benson and Okotie-Eboh—each a non-Ibo—found themselves excluded from the inner decision-taking councils of the NCNC. As a result these two were separated from their Ibo colleagues active at the Centre.

However, not only were these two leading Southern Centre politicians excluded from the inner councils of their own party, but links forged

with leading Northerners at the Centre were considerably loosened when the NPC started to mobilize for the election campaign. And, of course, the level of hostility between the two competitors commenced gradually and then sharply to heighten as each sought to cement support in the other's electoral stronghold. Feelings had risen high against the Northern Alliance following on its successful efforts to gain allegiance of the MDF in the Mid-West and then later the NNDP in the West Region. The UPGA, on the other hand, earned the resentment of the NPC through its achievement in gaining the allegiance of the two major opposition parties in the North Region. These two parties, the NEPU and the UMBC, came in behind the NCNC/AG forces through the common front the NPF under the leadership of Joseph Tarka. Then, as election fever mounted, Centre incumbents of different tribe, Region and party were forced further apart, thus continuing to strain the bonds of common interest and attitudes which formerly had joined them. While the post-election jockeying saw a faint attempt to draw together former Centre compatriots, the first round of Cabinet allotments saw only Okotie-Eboh—as one of the two NCNC'ers appointed—getting admission to a key post, his old Finance portfolio. The NPC ensured its safety which appeared none too strong in Lagos by filling the rest of the Centre posts with NPC'ers; further in the second round of Cabinet post allotments, the vast majority were to NPC members.

### Growth of Centre Power

Throughout the period of pre-coup Civil Political rule the Regions retained support for the authority they exercised through a combination of coercive and non-coercive measures. These measures were brought to bear within the Regional polity largely through the controlling influence of the Region's Government party. The Centre Government, however, depended almost solely on the implementation of non-coercive measures to gain its objectives. The reason the Centre was seldom able to implement coercive measures is obvious enough; as those participating (collaborating) in Centre rule were the elected members of Government parties of the respective Regions, it was seldom joint Centre agreement could be reached on action to be taken which might have a punitive effect on the Government of a given Region. The non-coercive measures, however, which the Centre was able to bring to bear, took the form largely of an *extension of legal and economic powers*. Nor were these measures employed so much to gain support from the general body politic, as they were aimed at securing the support of Regional and sub-Regional opinion-leaders. There was, however, one point during the pre-coup era that the National parties which rested on Regional bases, presented a promising picture of acting to reinforce the other measures backing growth of Centre power. This occurred during the preliminaries before the 1964 general election when the major National parties competing evoked a transient image of Centre power emerging based on the support of truly National parties broken from their traditional Regional roots.

The constitutional document which set up the provisions for the operation of the Nigerian Federation in 1954 developed the balance of powers on the three then existing Regions. Important financial provisions resting with the Regions left the burden of pre-Independence economic development on the shoulders of the Regional authorities. Due to a

combination of factors, however, Regional Governments were unable to exploit the advantages which these provisions presented. Decreasing terms of world trade for primary products, with cocoa and groundnuts especially hard hit; recurrent deficits; levels of accustomed services to maintain; and expansion of services, particularly educational, all these factors tended to result in the separate Regional Governments drawing on their monetary reserves, and as these fell lower turning to the Centre Government for assistance. Further, with the Centre gaining sole authority to raise external loans in 1958, and when in 1960 it (the Centre) became the sole regulator for raising internal loans, Regions were faced with further very serious problems in financing their separate development plans.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, with the advent of Independence and full Civil Political rule in 1960, the momentum towards Centre control of critical Regional development had been established. Subsequent events further entrenched Centre control of Regional economic life. The Six-Year Development Plan (National), implemented in 1962, saw the Centre Government playing a dominant part. Sixty-one per cent of the £670 millions expenditure was to come from or through the Federal Government, exclusive of grants, aids and loans to the Regions. The same year (1962) the Banking Amendment Act stated that part of the Regional financial reserves must rest with the Central Bank. The Act also gave the Centre control of liquidity ratio and interest rate structure of the Commercial Banks. To secure these Centre gains, newly instituted co-ordinating agencies like the National Economic Council served a useful purpose. And so, while as B.J.O. Dudley put it "the 'federal principle' was adopted by Nigeria in the attempt to secure equal and co-ordinate jural status for the Regional Governments and the Centre, economic and political factors have conjointly resulted in the subordination of the Regions to the Central authority."<sup>19</sup>

In addition, prior to the establishment of the formula for the transfer of funds from Federal to Regional authorities under the provisions specified in the 1963 Republican Constitution, the Regions were being further burdened with major recurrent expenditures while the Centre was gaining the major tax proceeds from import, export, corporation, excise taxes and control of mineral rights<sup>20</sup>. It can be seen, therefore, that a combination of bad luck with world markets compounded by inadequate financial management, all resulted in playing control of Regional economic affairs into Centre hands. Further, it was evident that once in control, Centre authorities took effective measures to ensure the economic balance of power remained with them.

The political advantages to be gained as a product of this economic imbalance were not lost on Centre Government and its incumbents. The operation of the System of Rewards had afforded the key Centre politicians and their supporting cast of functionaries in high administrative and judicial offices the opportunity to influence significantly the flow of resources to Regional and sub-Regional authorities.<sup>21</sup> Though formal regulations operated to control recurrent allocations—regulations which jointly had been agreed on by the Regions—still decisions on priorities by the National Economic Council, for instance, could have great importance for Regional Governments.

"The Development Plan adopted in 1962 envisaged the expenditure of £676 m., more than £400 of which was to be mobilized by the Federal Government. This was to be divided among the Centre and Regions of the Federation; one of the prizes to be won, for example, was a £30 m. iron and steel mill."<sup>22</sup>

At a lower level, the System of Rewards, and Sub-National lieutenants of the Centre incumbents who manipulated it had the prime opportunity to influence the award of jobs, contracts, licences; indeed, with the rapid expansion of governmental functions at the Centre level, a broad range within which acts of patronage in various forms could be executed, was opened up.

Perhaps the outstanding example of a coercive act carried out by the Centre Government with the joint participation of its incumbents, involved the punitive acts taken against the governing party of the West Region and its leadership. Though it is not necessary to go into the details of this prolonged incident here,<sup>23</sup> it is worthwhile noting a few relevant points. The AG lead by Awolowo had been a constant nettle aggravating the Centre coalition NPC/NCNC Government which had been formed following the 1959 general election. Evidence suggests that the Centre coalition Government sought successfully to undermine Awo and the AG by rendering support to a faction lead by the late Chief S.L. Akintola.<sup>24</sup> In so far as the Centre Government gained the support of Akintola's party, the UPP (later to become the NNDP merger party in the West, in March 1964) in the House of Representatives, and thus nominal support of the West Region, and also in that this action served as an object lesson to other Centre aspirants from the Regions who thought they might challenge for a position within the consolidating group of Centre incumbents, the action was a successful play in favour of the Centre. Short-run tactical advantages, however, were the extent of these Centre gains. Perhaps the fact that these gains were short-run *only* can be better understood in the words of the American Sociologists, Goldhamer and Shils, when they point out that

*"It is sometimes assumed that a person who uses force or is in a position to impose very drastic sanctions . . . is somehow more powerful than one who exercises power without the use of these means. But the amount of power exercised by a legitimate power-holder may be as great or greater than the amount exercised by the coercive power-holder."*<sup>25</sup>

For not only did the Centre Government badly underestimate the amount of support in Yorubaland for Awo and the AG, but their action brought the first serious allegations of power abuse and mismanagement from critics—allegations which were to multiply over the next four years and which tended to have a basis in Centre actions during the 1962 West Region crisis.

Another source through which the Centre was able to build the strength of its position vis-a-vis the Regions was through the symbolic influence it was able to wield. The enhanced economic importance of the Centre in the post-Independence era not only increased the Centre's ability

to control effectively politics at the Regional level, but, in addition, permitted it to emerge symbolically as the body with an increasingly important, if not *the* most important influence in the eyes of the members within the Regional and sub-Regional politics. The major policies of development in a number of important areas were implemented in the name of the Centre Government and, therefore, it was the Centre and its incumbents which tended to rise in prestige in the eyes of the Regional polity members; this gain for the Centre was, of course, at the cost of prestige to the separate Regional authorities.

While we have indicated earlier that the regionally-based National political parties constituted a significant undermining influence against Centre efforts to secure and stabilize its position, it is important now to point out where the activities of these parties, for a short period, took (actions) which served to support Centre aims.

For about a year prior to the 1964 general election, "developments ignited a spark of hope that a contest between two competitors (might) focus on issues extending beyond the interests of a single tribe or Region. Indeed, there was a faint possibility that these competitors might face one another with discernibly different positions on an ideological spectrum."<sup>26</sup> Both major National parties,

*"and the NPC particularly, made attempts as early as 1959 to build effective national support and, therefore, ease towards creating a truly national contra regional electorate . . . . The total effect of these 'integrative advances' on a national scale was to cause political thinking and action by leading parties and leaders to be altered . . . to meet National rather than simply regional-ethnic goals. These parties and their leaders were being forced out from within . . . their bastions of regional security to meet and grapple with extra-regional concerns."<sup>27</sup>*

However, though these early indications suggested promising support for the Centre position, as the campaign progressed and the election drew near, this promise dissipated and with it the last substantial hope for securing an effective Centre authority.

### Centre Rule and Regional Sanctions

One could perhaps summarize the reasons for failure of Centre power by stating that for the majority of those individuals who made up the Centre incumbency, Regional loyalties came first. The two major parties from which the Centre leadership was drawn each had firm roots planted at the Regional level. And as Sklar notes, individuals interested in gaining offices of power "by adopting regionalist principles and tribalist ideologies,"<sup>28</sup> could hope best to further their anticipated careers. We have noted above that there were deviations from this rigid Regional pattern of authority exercise. Not only were there signs of promise prior to the 1964 general election that a more truly national electorate might be developed to support the theoretically National parties, but in addition, the promise of Independence at an earlier stage had served to quell substantially the more extreme forms of Regional rivalry between the mid-1950's and 1962.<sup>29</sup>



Perhaps the most graphic example of the extent to which Centre authority rested on Regional sanction was to be seen in the operation of the Systems of Regional Security. These "Systems" operated to ensure the security of men from the separate Regions who went to the Centre. Once again, we have mentioned the case of Awolowo. Despite the fact that early in 1962 there were indications of considerable dissent within the ranks of the AG and that a discernible challenge to Awo's authority as AG leader was being constructed behind the leadership of the man Awo had been instrumental in selecting as Premier of the West, to act in his absence at Lagos, still he seemed to feel he would remain secure. For this error in his judgment he was, as subsequent events showed, to pay dearly.<sup>30</sup>

His example, however, served as a strong reminder to other contenders from the Regions who were challenging, or thinking of challenging, for Centre power. While there was considerable opportunity for those who secured themselves at the Centre to participate in the allocative functions of the Systems of Rewards—a system with increasingly greater resources under its control—still over-concentration on Centre activity without sufficient concern for the security of the incumbent's Regional support base could prove the undoing of high ambitions. It is interesting to note that while East Region Premier Okpara spent a great deal of time within that Region trying to sort out and arbitrate between intra-Regional groups and Intra-NCNC factions and, therefore, might have found Centre activity less taxing and possibly more rewarding, still he chose to remain at Enugu.<sup>31</sup>

It is debatable, of course, whether the path to Centre power and perhaps a key incumbency there would have brought sizable rewards for all those who reached the Centre and managed to establish themselves there. The Sardauna of Sokoto, Premier of the North Region, is a case in point. Quite clearly, other than the opportunity to exercise greater influence over decision-taking at Lagos, material and status gains afforded little or no attraction to one so well placed within his Regional domain. For others, however, whom either birth or fortune had prevented from establishing a firm and promising Regional position, the attraction of Centre power was considerable. In the North not only were there the men like the late Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar, who came from humble origins to high office at the Centre, but those like former UMBC and NPF leader Tarka achieved a similar, if less-exalted Centre rank through alliance with the NCNC; they permitted greater influence in Lagos than had ever been the case of his and his party in the North. Both the AG and the NCNC, as basically achievement-oriented parties were a far more responsive forum than was ever the case with the ascriptive-oriented NPC in the North. Indeed, Tarka, on the basis of his usefulness at least, gained a position of considerable influence within the alliance hierarchy of the UPGA.

The final blow to prospects for growth of Centre power under National parties occurred with the fragmentation of the Southern Alliance into its regionally-based component parties immediately preceding the balloting for the general election in December 1964. This action which

was effected by the AG candidates in the West and most AG and NCNC candidates in the Mid-West, indicated that politicians, while they might have strong Centre aspirations, in the last analysis sought security of their home Region.<sup>32</sup>

Further indications of the trend towards a full and reinforced return to Regionalist politics were to be seen in the allocation of ministries by the victorious NPC following the election.<sup>33</sup>

### The Future of Centre Rule

In the course of this paper a number of problems faced in attempts to establish and secure Centre rule have been explored. It is clear that while during the era of pre-coup Civil Political rule some positive gains were accomplished by the Centre authority through the strength of its legal position and the efforts of its incumbents, these gains were vastly overshadowed and ultimately cancelled by the persistence of ethno-regional interests and control.

What then are the prospects for the future success of Centre rule under post-coup Civil Political rule? Will pre-coup stumbling-blocks persist? What new obstacles can we anticipate?

Certainly it would appear that a number of the major stumbling-blocks faced during the era of pre-coup Civil Political rule have been sizably reduced, if not eliminated. The more overt forms of corruption have been cleansed by Military rule; further many of these persons who nurtured and sustained these abuses have at least been barred from making an immediate return to politics.<sup>34</sup> In carrying out these acts the Military have taken firm and effective steps in combating one of the major elements sustaining the popular movement of dissent<sup>35</sup> against then-existent conditions in the pre-coup period.

Similarly, ethno-regionalism is not likely to present the same problem. The creation of the 12 new States should serve not so much to dissipate but rather to diversify and thus reduce the unbalancing intensity of ethno-State pressure on the Centre.<sup>36</sup> It is possible that creation of the new States may result in a consistent ethno-State pressure seeking a broader spectrum of more specific concessions,<sup>37</sup> but it is very unlikely that the high level of ethno-Regional fears and suspicions which so seriously undermined Centre participation in the pre-coup era, will again be experienced.

Further, altered financial provisions which followed *per force* on the creation of the new States leave each State with a smaller portion of Centre-allocated revenue to distribute thus encouraging restrictive controls to create essential economies. "Statutory grants (from Centre) to Regional Governments amounted in 1966-'67 to £77m., in 1967-'68 to £67m. Those to States in 1968-'69 are estimated to be £54 m."<sup>38</sup> From these figures it can be seen not only that total revenue available for Centre allocation through the Distributable Pool Account has been reduced by an estimated 30 per cent, but when divided among the 12 States will supply

each with an average of about £4.4m. More comprehensive Centre control resulting from the wider representation of National interests by new State delegates, should serve to restrict Centre abuses in allocation of free-floating non-specified resources.<sup>39</sup> The retention of new administrative officers appointed by the Military Government to fill key positions in the Centre and Regional bureaucracies will help to ensure the continuance of "clean" and efficient execution of public business.

As for leadership, Dent among many other academic observers has noted the degree to which the Military has sought to replace "old boys" of the pre coup regime with "radicals" who have in the past given consistent support to policies seeking the distribution of resources on a broader range and at a lower level within the National polity.<sup>40</sup> The potential for a balanced Centre leadership is considerable, but will depend ultimately on persisting attempts to bar "unsavory characters"<sup>41</sup> of the past, and vigilance among Centre representatives on the Federal Executive Council to ensure inner power cliques do not creep into existence. The importance of maintaining a scrupulous balance among States' power and influence at the Centre cannot be over-stressed. State representatives at the Centre from former minority areas will for the foreseeable future retain their hyper-sensitivity to any signs of exploitation or domination by the big three—Yoruba, Ibo, Hausa—tribes. Indeed, they may even seek additional safeguards enforceable by an impartial Centre authority empowered to act as watch-dog of acts carried out by members of Centre and State executive bodies.<sup>42</sup>

It would seem, therefore, that the major problems with which Civil Political leaders of the future must contend relate fundamentally to questions of *prevention* and *enforcement*. "Old boys" must be kept from key positions; adequate provisions must be made to safeguard a persisting balance among majority and minority ethnic representatives in allocation and distribution of political and economic power at the Centre and States levels respectively; newcomers must be educated to the demands of the "new politics."<sup>43</sup> A slow-phased return to full Civil Political rule may well provide Nigerians—and particularly the many who will be new to their positions—with the opportunity to adjust to the demands and duties of their respective offices. Such an approach might also serve the best method of sifting out "unsavory characters" seeking to return to echelons of high Political power in "new clothes".

Nowhere is the threat of an "old boy" return to power more evident than in the North; especially in the "old North" Emirates of Sokoto, Bornu, Kano. For while appointments of large numbers of former NEPU'ers to posts in the State Executive Councils of the North, there is still a possibility that the "more powerful Emirates may still prove administratively indispensable and politically influential."<sup>44</sup> Indeed, a few Emirs could emerge from the territorial re-shuffle as "Sole State Authorities", one step up from their earlier and inferior positions as "Sole Native Authorities." Panter-Brick suggests that because the traditional authorities in the North "had ceased to tame the Regional Government," they might, however, be more confident of taming "a State Government nearer to home."<sup>45</sup>

Already, of course, the re-appearance of "old boys" of different persuasions is a recognized fact. They have found positions within governmental and administrative spheres from which the Military has now retired.<sup>46</sup> Only the positions of Head of State, State Governor, have been retained by the Military, though the power of Kdm Selem,<sup>47</sup> Inspector-General of the Federal Police Force, as head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, would seem to suggest the continuing control of State and Centre executive bodies which Gowon intends to maintain.<sup>48</sup>

In view of the Nigerian pre-coup experience it would seem risky, to say the least, to permit an unconditional return to Civil Political rule. While it would seem the Military hold the greatest confidence of the majority of the people (excluding Biafra), still if it is Gowon's intention for the Military to retire from the political scene, then surely some other body which may be able to elicit the same support must be endowed with power to ensure that decree (or future constitutional) intent is followed up in practice. Indeed, it is possible that Gowon has envisioned this aspect through the broad powers with which he has invested the Internal Affairs Ministry.

The road ahead for Nigerians is a hard one and smacks of such unsavory but necessary terms as "Guided Democracy." Still while cautious, slow-phased and widely safeguarded return to full Civil Political rule will tax patience as much as skill, it would appear to be the sole safe way that a course can be steered away from "a restoration of the old 'spoils system'"<sup>49</sup> and towards a safe start of truly *National* nation-building. In the process of building the "new Nigeria" Centre rule will play a key part. Success largely will depend on the growth of its political power through a widening and deepening acceptance by the people, their delegates and representatives, and on the skills developed for the exercise of political authority deriving from these powers.<sup>50</sup>

## References

1. "The Road Back to the Barracks," *West Africa*, May 25, 1968, p. 599. Gowon has on a number of occasions during the past year indicated he will return the country to Civil Political rule, "as soon as possible." Indeed, as far back as the Aburi Talks, Gowon claims to have championed this position; for details of Gowon's Aburi position see, "Opening Statement by the Head of the Military Government and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.....January 26, 1967," (Federal Minister of Information, Lagos, mimeo).
2. Martin J. Dent, "The Military and the Politicians," (mimeo.), *Nigeria 1966-1968 Seminar Series*, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, (May-June 1968), p. 9. Indeed, Dent goes on to suggest that because of political as well as military ability Gowon has shown, that it is conceivable "Gowon himself may..... develop into a figure of political leadership." (p. 10)
3. As Sklar has suggested, this house-cleaning has resulted from "widespread revulsion against the sins of the politicians— corruption, maladministration, waste, drift and electoral fraud." Quoted from R.L. Sklar, "Nigerian Politics in Perspective," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (July-October 1967), p. 525.
4. Though technically, *The Constitutional (Suspension and Modification) (No. 8) Decree, 1967*, issued in March 1967 following the Aburi Talks, introduced a "State Veto Clause," which may be exercised by any State Military Governor on the Supreme Mili-

tary Council who does not "concur" with a decision on any of a number of broad matters over which the authority of the Council was re-invested, still, overall authority of the Head of the Federal Military Government over Internal Affairs, through his Internal Affairs Commissioner, Kem Salem, who happens to be head of the Nigerian Federal Police Force, leaves Gowon with manoeuvring space. Further, *Decree No. 1 of 1966*, Sections 7 and 9, leaves Gowon as Head of the Federal Military Government with responsibility to see constitutional provisions are enforced and maintained. If, therefore, "constitutional provisions" were to be threatened, Gowon would be legally empowered to act, whether or not concurrence of Supreme Military Council members was forthcoming. For details see F. Baptiste, 'The Constitutional Conflict in the Nigerian Crisis,' (mimeo.) *Nigeria 1966-1968 Seminar Series*, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, (May-June 1968); see especially pp. 2 and 5.

5. *Africa Report*, January 1967, p. 39.

6. The concept of "consensus" is employed in a rather specialized way here, and throughout the paper. It is used to connote support not so much from the grass-roots members of the National polity, as from the "delegates" (informal representatives) and "representatives" (formally elected) of the people. None the less, the nature of the consensus sought is "substantive" rather than "procedural." For a useful discussion of the consensus concept applied to the developing States of the world, see Dankwart Rustow, 'Democracy, Consensus and New States,' (mimeo.), paper presented to the *International Political Science Association (IPSA)*, Seventh World Congress, Brussels (September 1967), pp. 2-5; for further considerations of the concepts of "delegate" and "representative" in Nigerian context see L. Bohannan, 'Political Aspects of Tiv Social Organization,' in J. Middleton and D. Tait(eds.), *Tribes Without Rulers*, (London, 1958).

7. As the concept is employed in this paper, *Political Power* is possessed; it is possessed by an incumbent and derives from the *legal provisions* with which the incumbent's office is endowed, and from *personal influence* of the incumbent and *symbolic influence* of the office he fills. For further discussion see Richard Schermerhorn, *Society and Power*. (New York; Random House, 1961), especially Chapter III, 'Legitimacy and Power Contests,' pp. 35-52; also Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure* (New York; Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953), pp. 193-195.

8. As the concept is employed in this paper, *Political Authority* is exercised; it is exercised by an incumbent and is based on element(s) of Political Power as outlined above. In addition to seeing the readings suggested above see also Lewis Coser and Bernard Rosenberg, *Sociological Theory*, (New York; MacMillan, 1957), pp. 123-173.

9. These individuals, including Azikiwe, Awolowo, Benson, Okotie-Eboh, key senior administrators and members of the judiciary, together with a few Northerners among whom the late Prime Minister Balewa was the most prominent, rode the crest of the "National Independence wave" into Centre office. The evolution of the careers of these individuals as this affected Centre power is discussed in a forthcoming book by K.W.J. Post and M. Vickers, *Structure and Conflict in an Independent African State: An Analysis of Political Development in Modern Nigeria and the General Election of 1964-'65*, (tentative title).

10. For details of Azikiwe's early business interests see *Report of the Tribunal Appointed to Inquire into Allegations Reflecting on the Official Conduct of the Premier of, and Certain Persons Holding Ministerial and other Public Offices in the Eastern Region of Nigeria*. (London; HMSO, 1957), 2 Vols.; also see R.L. Sklar's excellent summary account "The NCNC and the African Continental Bank," in his *Nigerian Political Parties*, (Princeton: University Press, 1963), especially, pp. 143-189.

11. Both Benson and Okoties-Eboh came *not* from the dominant tribe of the National political party to which they belonged; as leading members of the NCNC since the late 1950's, neither was of Ibo or East Region origin. It is in this sense that these two Centre leaders are designated "Marginal Men" in this paper. For further discussion of the concept of the "Marginal Man," see Post and Vickers, *op. cit.*

12. Okotie-Eboh's best known business enterprise was his shoe manufacturing operation at Ebute-Metta. This enterprise made him the frequent butt of punsters on the Opposition benches at Lagos, who frequently referred to his interest in the welfare of Nigerians, as "caring for the soles of his peoples." See *Debates of the Federal House of Representatives*, (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1964), col. 862.

13. This term is employed by Post and Vickers, *op. cit.*, to describe the system whereby each of the Centre incumbents sought to maximize his share of allocated benefits through co-operation with his fellow incumbents.

14. For an excellent account of the AG and Awolowo crisis, see J.P. Mackintosh, "The Action Group Crisis of 1962 and its Aftermath," in his *Nigerian Government and Politics*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 427-460; for further details of the charges against him, see "Coker Commission Conclusions: 2," *West Africa*, January 19, 1963, p. 63, and "Coker Commission Conclusions: 3," *West Africa* January 26, 1963, pp. 101-103.

15. *Ibid.*

16. See *West African Pilot* (Lagos), December 3, 1963, p. 3 and March 19, 1964, pp. 1 and 4, for details of Benson's response to NCNC/AG alliance overtures.

17. *Daily Express* (Lagos), March 22, 1964, p. 2.

18. See D.B. MacLaughlin and Molly Hazen, "Federal and Regional Roles in Nigerian Economic Development," (unpublished paper) *Graduate Seminar Series on Nigeria*, London School of Economics, (May 1967).

19. "Federalism and the balance of Political Power in Nigeria," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1966), p. 20.

20. See MacLaughlin and Hazen, *op. cit.*; also Victor P. Diejomaoh, *Economic Development in Nigeria*, (Princeton: Industrial Relations Section, University Press, 1965), *passim*.

21. This term is employed by Post and Vickers, *op. cit.* It refers to the system whereby individuals and sections within the National polity were made recipients of resource-rewards allocated by Centre decision-takers. In the book, the system of Rewards is seen as a two-phase operation. The first involves the allocation of resources to the separate Regions and the cut going to the Centre incumbents. The second involves the Distribution of Resources by Regional decision-takers to individuals and sections within their respective areas of authority.

22. *Ibid.*, (draft p: 60).

23. See Mackintosh, *op. cit.*

24. *Ibid.*

25. Herbert Goldhamer and Edward Shils, "Types of Power and Status," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XLV, No. 2 (September 1939), p. 177.

26. M. Vickers, "Background to Breakdown in Nigeria," *Africa Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No. 2, (July, 1967), p. 109.

27. M. Vickers, "Political Disintegration, Political Integration and the Nigerian Federal Election of 1964-'65," (mimeo.), *Graduate Seminar Series on Nigeria*. Centre of West African Studies, University of Birmingham, (November 1967), p. 1.

28. Sklar, "Nigerian Politics in Perspective, *op. cit.* p. 528.

29. See R.L. Sklar, "Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1965), p. 208. While Sklar here is speaking only of the West Region, one can suggest with a good deal of evidence that the breakdown of order in the West Region was the act which triggered the return to dominant Regionalism throughout the Federation. The demise of the AG and the creation of the UPP together with suspicions of Centre meddling tended to turn Regional concerns to questions of territorial sovereignty and political security. This anxiety was not noticeably eased; particularly in the East, Regional anxieties remained high and increased following formation of the Mid-West Region, and later on creation of NPC links with Akintol's NNDP and the MDF (Mid-West Democratic Front).

30. See M. Vickers, "The Nigerian Federal Election of 1964-'65," (unpublished MS), (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1966), p. 69. n. 1.

31. See the *Morning Post* (Lagos), August 16, 1964, p. 2, and *Daily Times* (Lagos), August 18, 1964, p. 1.

32. The "Resignations Issue," involved a technical issue which essentially reflected the unwillingness of AG (and most Mid-West NCNC'ers) to give up their seats in support of the UPGA "Election Nullification Try." See Vickers, "The Nigerian Federal Election....." *op. cit.* pp. 130-135.

33. The first allotment of cabinet posts saw the NPC with 15 of the 17 posts; the second allotment in April following the "Little Elections" saw the NPC receive more than two-thirds of the 76 positions in the "broad-based National Government." See the *Daily Express* (Lagos), January 6, 1965, p. 3 and April 1, 1965, p. 1, for details of first and second rounds of cabinet appointments.

34. There are indications that the "old boys" of the pre-coup Civil Political regime are making progress in efforts to return to high Centre or State offices. Though the returnees tend to have come from the ranks of "moderates" within the old ruling National parties, still there is the danger that in time the way might be paved for the return of the more "reactionary" elements. For further details see footnotes 39, 40 below.

35. Edward Shils notes "there are.....occasions when the prevailing system of authority becomes the object of a widely shared negative consensus....." Shils names this phenomenon "dissensual consensus." In Nigerian context pre-coup politics saw widespread dissatisfaction with the system and the abuses it was permitting; in Shils' terms this brought the development and escalation of "dissensual consensus." For details on development of this useful concept, see E.A. Shils, "Consensus," (mimeo.), paper presented to the *International Political Science Association*, Seventh World Congress, Brussels (September 1967), pp. 6 and 7.

36. S.K. Panter-Brick, however, in his article "The Right to Self-Determination: Its Application to Nigeria," *International Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (April 1968), pp. 263-264, referring only to the ethnic problems within Biafra, indicates how these pressures legitimized by the spate of States creation could bring further disintegrative consequences which might threaten internally Biafran rule. Yet K.W.J. Post, in his article "Is there a Case for Biafra?," *International Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January 1968), indicates that the imposition of the three Centre-proposed States on the former East Region would be likely to cause equally disastrous consequences. "If Port Harcourt is given to the Ijaws, there will be no access to the sea.....(and) a fantastic residue of bitterness bred of the massacres and defeat in battle," will heighten, says Post, already existing anxieties to a dangerous level (p. 35). It is probably fair, however, to consider Biafra a special case with regard to the hypothesized effects of States or "no-States" creation. Within the rest of the Federation there is good reason to believe that the new States creations will serve to keep ethno-regional pressures at a minimum.

37. These specific concessions might relate to the nature of safeguards protecting the exercise of State authority; fuller representation of intra-State ethnic group; clearer definition of State veto and Centre enforcement powers, etc.

38. S.K. Panter-Brick, "States and Native Authorities in Northern Nigeria." (mimeo.), *Nigeria 1966-1968 Seminar Series*, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London (May-June 1968). p. 8.

39. Martin Dent, in this paper "The Military and the Politicians," *op. cit.*, p. 9. has noted the development of one potentially serious source of abuse of Centre power, in the influence which a few of the appointed Commissioners in the Federal Executive Council have already built. While together all the commissioners constitute "an increasingly powerful body," says Dent, a few, namely Awolowo, Enahoro, and Tarka, may be attaining to the status of "first among equals." Dent notes these three are also members of Gowon's "War Cabinet."

40. See *ibid.* Dent states that of the eleven civil commissioners appointed to the Federal Executive Council, "four—Tarka, Aminu Kano, Enahoro and Awolowo—had been radical politicians for many years." Though one might question the extent to which Awolowo and Enahoro can be considered "radical", overall one must face up to the further and more fundamental question: "To what extent were their radical positions spurred by barred access to spoils?" Ken Post, in "Is There a Case for Biafra," *op. cit.*, p. 36, suggests that radical control of the Federal Executive Council is largely superficial and could be shattered by a return of "unsavory characters of the past who remain alive." From these comments then it would seem there must be efforts made to ensure that the "radicals" remain honest to their espoused principles.

41. *Ibid.*, Post.

42. See n. 4 above; consult especially details presented by North in 1966 for the creation of a Central Defence Commission, and Biafra at the Kampala Talks seeking a "Central Defence Council."

43. It is likely the "new politics" in Nigeria will be conducted from a less acquisitive personal power base, and be settled on a more meritocratic-distributive foundation where broad consultation and co-operation will replace unilateral decision-taking by selected isolated individuals and small power cliques.

44. Panter-Brick, "States and Native Authorities in Northern Nigeria," *op. cit.*, p. 9.

45. *Ibid.*

46. Dent, "The Military and the Politicians," *op. cit.* p. 10, states that "some two-thirds" of the positions opened up in the nominally administrative structures, have gone to former politicians; in the State Executive Councils of the North, "the more progressive of the NPC figures were brought.....and worked in amity with former leaders of the NEPU....." (p. 8).

47. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

48. See n. 4 above for discretionary powers still possessed by Gowon as Head of the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

49. Post, "Is There a Case for Biafra," *op. cit.*, p. 36.

50. See Rustow, *op. cit. passim*, and n. 6 above for meaning of consensus in the context of this paper.



## Regroupings in Francophone Africa

(From Nouakchott to Niamey :  
the Itinerary of the OCAM)

MIRLANDE HIPPOLYTE

FEW regional groups could have had, in such a short span of time, a history as complex as the organisation which, in 1960, assembled, under various appellations, a number of Francophone states : the Cameroun, Congo-Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Central African Republic, Senegal and which was joined in 1963 by Ruanda and Togo. It was only in September 1961 however that the charter of the African Union and Malagasy (UAM) was signed at Tananarive (Madagascar). In spirit and its political orientation, which was imprinted at the new gathering, the UAM charter had come to institutionalise on 'etat de fait' : the existence of a political group relatively homogeneous with a common language, similar economic conditions which had made possible in March 1961 the OAMCE (the African and Malagasy Organisation of Economic Co-operation), a certain amount of agreement on world affairs among the heads of state and on African politics (which included the unity of the continent) as also international politics (which included collective diplomacy at the level of the UN).

Moreover, it was not a mere chance that despite the UAM group forming an institution and progressively establishing its own organs, the expression "Brazzaville Group" was still used to describe this group of states. The expression, which originated at the conference of the same name held in December 1960 and during which were discussed major current problems—Congo and Algeria—conveys, better than any other analysis, the outstanding political characteristics of the Union born at Tananarive, but which had its roots in the particular context of the year 1960.

In May 1963 the Organisation of African Unity, which had a continental base, came into existence. The OAU, however, did not render superfluous the existence of a regional groupings, many of which had appeared to be a necessary step in the final construction of pan-African unity. But, in view of the fragile compromise which formed the basis of the new body, it seemed desirable not to allow any other organ to exist which, rightly or wrongly, appeared to be a rival to the OAU. The Francophone states thus sacrificed the UAM "over the altar of pan-Africanism", allowing only economic and technical organisations grouped from now

onwards in the UAMCE, which was created in March 1964, to continue. But the difficulties encountered by the OAU which were found impossible to overcome due to the manner in which it functioned, the cleavages which had divided the member states, the emergence of new problems, the realisation of the futility of the existence of an organisation cemented only by the ideal of pan-Africanism—in brief, a number of negative factors or similar views favoured the resurrection of a Francophone political organisation. And the Nouakchott Conference, where the OCAM was formed, expressed, to a certain extent, the failure of the OAU.

Thus from 1960 to 1965, that is in five years, four Francophone organisations came into being: the OAMCE, UAM, UAMCE, OCAM. Among the four existed a permanent bond: the determination to bring out the distinctive features of the group formed by the member states. Moreover, as analysis discloses, there was in the passage from one to another a pendulous rhythm from the economic to the political. The OCAM thus appeared to mark the triumph of political motivations over economic necessities, the play of forces being commanded by the impulsion of the former.

The reality is certainly more complex and before examining the significance of the OCAM in the history of the Francophone organisations, it would be worthwhile to go back to the origin of the movement in the particular context of its birth.

### **Factors Contributing to the Creation of OCAM**

The mere weaknesses of the OAU were not in themselves sufficient to warrant the creation of a new organisation. Though there was a wide spectrum of opinion, ranging from disillusionment to satisfaction, among those who had already predicted the inevitable character of the OAU in the creation of OCAM divergent factors played a role among the interested states and responsible politicians and observers have advanced a number of arguments to justify its establishment.

### **Nostalgia of the Past**

Some among them expressed the view of those who have never been reconciled to the disappearance of the UAM. This organisation offered to the states grouped within it not only a homogeneous framework but also a means of joint political action. It is equally true that while the political role of the UAM was welcomed and even defended by such protagonists as President Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast there were others like President Tsiranana of Madagascar who openly challenged and opposed it. And it is interesting to recall that in 1963 M. Albert Tevoedjre was compelled to submit his resignation as UAM Secretary-General because the heads of state led by President Tsiranana were of the opinion that he "indulged in too much of politics".

But it was no less true that the UAM, to the extent it represented a certain section of Africa on the continent and also in international organi-

sations, for example, the UN, took a stand, particularly on the Algerian question and the Congo crisis in 1960, which bore the strong identity of a powerful group "with an almost indelible impact", to quote President Diori Hamani of Niger. Integrated with the OAU, dominated by the hardliners who had gained ascendancy incapable of controlling the initiatives at the meetings, feeling out-manoeuvred and least involved by the decisions of the dominant states, the Francophone states developed a sort of inferiority complex. There was a desire to revive an organisation "of which", in the words of President Tsiranana of Madagascar "we would be masters" or, as President Diori Hamani of Niger pointed, out "an organisation in which we would not feel dominated" or, again, in the novel argument advanced by President Maurice Yameogo of Upper Volta on the question of the Nouakchott Conference. "We consider", he declared, "that the sirens of Africa drinking and eating imperialism and neo-colonialism have revolted. The true Africa, that is to say, Africa of the realists, humane, constructive, will listen to its voice. We shall talk, cry, tempt, just as those who call themselves revolutionaries do, but we shall do so in a constructive manner". President Tsiranana, putting it more precisely, said: "We are at the moment rather strong...because now our timidity is over". The OCAM thus appeared to be an affirmation of the desire of moderate Africa, or those who considered themselves as such, not to allow themselves to be over-powered by revolutionary Africa.

### **The Argument of its Defectiveness**

This was expressed at two different levels: the construction of African unity and the defence of common interests.

On the need for achieving continental unity through idealism and political realism, the African states were divided on the question of forms to promote it and the methods to be adopted to realise it. The problem was posed in different ways. Would it, for example, be more effective to build up immediately a structure which would serve as the framework for this unity and burden its authors with the responsibility of incorporating its essential features? Or, would it be more effective and more realistic to build up this unity gradually on the basis of regional regroupings, while keeping intact the unitary ideal, but bearing in mind, at the same time, the special regional and national features—the manner in which independence was achieved and its impact on nationalism, the urgency of solving pressing socio-economic problems—give the responsibility to the leaders to coalesce later all these regional organisations into a larger group and, finally, merge all the states at the continental level? The drawbacks of the OAU, which came into being in an euphoria at the Addis Ababa Conference, furnished these arguments not only to the supporters of the second thesis, who considered the founders of the OAU too ambitious, but also to the protagonists of the former thesis who were of the opinion that only a continental government was capable of maintaining the unity of the continent:

It would of course not be correct to say that all the Francophone states shared the view of the futility of an enlarged union of the continent. Along with President Tsiranana of Madagascar, President Houphouët-Boigny, leader of the Conseil de l'Entente, appeared to be a staunch

champion of the conception of unity "through concentric circles of solidarity." But this was far removed from the more flexible position adopted by other leaders, such as President Senghor of Senegal who agreed with his colleagues that the realism reflected in regional groupings in itself testified to the great desire for co-operation with the OAU.

In another respect, it is necessary to underline that the objective of the Francophone states was not the extinction of the OAU to which they remained attached but its adoption to the African context itself. In brief they were in agreement that the OAU should survive but it should limit its fields of activity. It was this which was underlined in the speech of President Ould Daddah of Mauritania at the opening session of the Nouakchott Conference. "We must," he said, "from now on...reconcile two imperatives which may appear contradictory: not to undertake anything which would bring any harm to the OAU, an organisation to which we all belong, but at the same time to preserve the vitality of our own close and numerous ties. We must not leave, God willing, without having found the necessary solution which would enable us to affirm our ties and without any attempt to restrict the working of the OAU."

Defining the role of the future organisation, he said: "It should rather serve as an intermediary palliative between the OAU and regional economic groupings in which many of our countries participate, such as the Organisation of Rivers of Lake Tchad which includes both the Francophone and English speaking states as also the Organisation of the Senegal River States which unites the member states of the UAMCE and the African states belonging to the extra-African groupings, and who are at the same time members of the OAU. Mauritania herself could tomorrow join a Maghreb economic organisation without ceasing to be a member of the Organisation of Senegal River States and the Customs Union of West African States and the OAU."

Thus the OCAM in the eyes of its originators came into existence as a vehicle for solving certain problems better than the OAU, which was considered too large an organisation, and as a necessary stage in the creation of African unity.

### **The Argument of Defence**

These motivations have an added force when one relates them to the historical context which led to the formation of the OCAM. They were encouraged by the general climate prevailing during this period and which, from the point of view of the Francophone states, posed a triple danger—territorial, ideological and political—due to the initiatives taken by China and her allies in Africa.

The tour undertaken in January 1964 by Mr. Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of China, which covered "32 per cent of the total surface and 41 per cent of the population of Africa", appeared to certain African leaders as a sign heralding a major offensive for the ideological and political conquest of Africa. The revolutionary declarations of the Chinese Prime Minister, specially the word "subversive" which did not escape notice and in particular the sentiment expressed at Mogadiscio on February 3,

1964, that "Africa is ripe for revolution", the regret discernible in his declaration again at Mogadiscio after the revolt of Zanzibar—for which China was held responsible—that China did not need to seek credit for something it did not deserve. As a result these dubious postures and loud statements, for reasons right or wrong, one accused China of complicity in all the political troubles that broke out in Africa in 1963 and 1964 and even of being the main instigator.

Then, the year 1964 witnessed a series of unexpected events almost all over Francophone Africa : the attempt to remove President Leon Mba of Gabon, in February ; dissidence in the province of Kailash in Congo-Leopoldville led by Pierre Mulele, the "spiritual inheritor of Patrice Lumumba"; dissidence by the clandestine "Swaba" party of Niger which was supported by states known for their revolutionary activities and was strongly influenced by leftist ideas, and the whole subversive activity which was denounced by President Diori Hamani as having been financed by China through Ghana ; activities of the UPC which President Ahidjo of Cameroon was certain were supported financially by China ; all these factors were considered sufficient warnings for certain leaders to conclude the existence of the communist menace.

The coincidence of the journey of Mr Chou En-lai, the alleged subversive activities of Chinese travelling in Africa, the political and social upheavals, especially in Francophone Africa, had shaken the continent in 1963 and 1964 ; finally, the change in style of the Chinese communists, which towards the end of 1964 seemed to 'set fire to all the wood' and lend their support to any movement in opposition to the legal governments, in brief a number of designs concealed and apparent, of objectives, real or imaginary, magnified by the leaders and observers, or disclosed in their real proportion—all this created in Francophone Africa a veritable psychosis of a short-cut to communism and Chinese communism in particular. And what further aggravated this phobia was that in 1964, Communist China seemed to have registered a resounding diplomatic success by the official recognition accorded to it by a great Western state—France—and four Francophone African states : Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Central African Republic and Senegal, to be followed in May 1965 by Mauritania.

Imaginary or real, confined to a few individuals or organisations, within a group or a party, the communist menace crystallized into a feeling of insecurity among leaders and led to their approaching each other and co-ordinating their politics to face what they believed to be a common enemy—international communism. The creation of the OCAM appeared thus as a collective reflex action of political and ideological defence.

To this general picture it is necessary to add a few remarks. All the African leaders were not equally conscious of the communist menace. For Congo-Brazzaville "it was not a Chinese problem", a sentiment shared by President David Decko who was personally of the view that "there is no Chinese problem in Africa yet. There is an attempt to create it. The more one creates it, the more it will present difficult solutions". These points of view could hardly find any response among leaders of the

Conseil de l'Entente to which Madagascar, Cameroon and Gabon rallied in their hostility towards Peking. However, despite these differences it seemed appropriate that officially at least the majority of states participating in the Nouakchott Conference denounce the danger of communism and express their collective will to combat it.

It was thus these multiple factors in the particular context of the conditions prevailing at the turn of 1964-65 that led the former member states of the UAM to meet in order to "reconsider the problem of the OAU and its regional organisations". This conference, however, having revealed the divergencies over the means to overcome the superfluities of the OAU and the wish to preserve the special features of the group, it is necessary to study the transition of the UAMCE (an organisation with an economic goal) to the OCAM (an organisation with a political one).

## II. The Nouakchott Conference

At the Nouakchott Conference the heads of state were polarised in two groups. On the one side were the "extremists"—the politicians led by President Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast and the Conseil de l'Entente which, basing its defence on the ineffectiveness of the OAU, the special situation obtaining in Francophone states, culturally, economically and politically, the need to organise a collective defence capable of meeting the threat of subversion, emphasized the logic of the need to create a political organisation.

On the other side were the "moderates" who also called themselves "economists" and considered inopportune the setting up of a political organisation which could appear as a rival to the OAU and suggested instead concentration on economic, cultural and social development. This was the point of view defended in particular by Congo-Brazzaville whose Minister of Interior representing President Massambat Debat at Nouakchott declared before the opening of the conference: "I think we have formed the OAU which unites the African continent, where we have debated political problems and decided, almost two years ago, that our ties, our former political ties of the UAM, must transform themselves into economic and cultural ties. As for going back to the UAM and reverting to political problems, we feel, that at the summit meetings of the OAU we are all present to discuss political problems and as for what concerns the UAMCE I think we must consolidate it, giving it a regional force, an active force to enable us to carry our comprehensive ideas to the OAU." It was thus evident that the states supporting the conception of a strictly economic regional organisation had no fear of a Chinese threat and wanted pan-African political co-operation. On the contrary, those who underlined the imminent danger of the "Yellow Peril" were in favour of a political organisation while accepting loyalty to the OAU, and wanting to limit the powers of the latter. These differences were about the manner of holding the meeting and the level of decisions adopted.

The Nouakchott Conference was, strictly speaking, neither a constituent conference nor a conference of the UAMCE but rather a "meeting of heads of state". Two main reasons explain this subtlety of language. Having inherited "economic and political problems", the only means of

bringing all the states around the conference table, it was felt, was to adopt an official agenda as vague as possible and to discuss possible alternatives to the UAM or the UAMCE. For the same reason, the fact that four heads of state—those of Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, Upper Volta and Niger—did not participate in the constituent conference of the UAMCE at Dakar in March 1964, nor signed the charter of the new organisation, due to their opposition to the transformation of the UAM into the UAMCE, posed a delicate problem of political propriety, even of jurisprudence. The principle of a “meeting of heads of state” thus presented a major advantage in rallying all the votes and in avoiding to hurt the susceptibilities of any one from the outset.

At the level of the decisions adopted, because of the underlying principle which brought the new organisation into existence, there was a fragile synthesis of the positions taken during the conference. Actually, the OCAM presented itself as a political organisation without well-defined political powers, which condemned external subversion, but in practice allowed each one liberty to define it not only ideologically, but also in its attempts to establish or curb its relations with Communist China, which during this period was indulging in the most aggressive and undisguised subversive activities. This difficult compromise is moreover discernible in a number of other ways. In the wording of the final communique which defines laconically the aims of the organisation, within the framework of the OAU, as “reinforcement of co-operation and solidarity between the African states and Malagasy, in order to accelerate their development in the political, economic, social and cultural fields” and again, in the priority accorded to the solution of the Congo problem which constitutes “a permanent danger to the existence of the OAU and the independence of African countries” but without defining officially the collective means—political or military—to be employed to resolve the conflict; or, in the subtle reference to “the intensification of the cold war” without explicitly specifying who are its promoters; or in the illusion made to “Ghana’s activities” and not to those of Communist China which was conspicuous by its absence in the final communique. In brief, all this was summed up in the comment of a daily which regarded the OCAM “as a sort of club whose rather vague phrases brought about unanimity because it enables its adherents to remain uninvolved except to meet from time to time and discuss together, in French, their problems if the organisation falls in line with their political views”.

All the same, it would be unfair to regard the OCAM as a body without any real substance. The very fact that despite the existing differences and the tense atmosphere prevailing during this period, it was possible to organise such a conference—whose objectives, even though impractical for some, underlined the firm position of the participating states or at least the more convinced among them—is creditable for the latter. This element of compromise which formed the basis of the OCAM is indeed a most striking feature hardly found anywhere else in the history of international organisations. At least to begin with, states which did not subscribe to the same ideological, political or economic system and were not equal to the task of straightening out potential differences between nations considered totally independent and equal, could perhaps only bring about institutional ties as a result of compromise.

### III. From Abidjan to Niamey

#### *A period of difficulties*

Three factors dominate this period and these were of such importance that one could describe the conference of Niamey in January 1968 as the crisis of the OCAM: the admission of Congo-Leopoldville to the organisation, the exit of Mauritania and difficulties with Ghana and the OAU. The three were inter-connected chronologically and the first two had an immediate impact as the admission of Congo-Leopoldville was the motive given by Mauritania for leaving the organisation. The three factors were moreover an indication of the climate which contributed to the difficulties, the inadequacy of an institution in its historical context, in brief, of the crisis in general. But each one of these factors had a specific political impact and despite their differing importance from the point of view of the organisation it is not without interest to examine their influence on the evolution of the OCAM.

#### **The Admission of Congo-Leopoldville**

Officially Congo-Leopoldville did not participate in the Nouakchott Conference but her presence was felt in an incredible manner—through the incident created by the presence of two government envoys, M. M. Ngounza and Hazoume, who were sent back from the Nouakchott airport because “they did not furnish any identity”—then to be readmitted to Nouakchott . . . just as the conference had finished. Her presence was again felt indirectly in a rather compromising manner by the presence of M. Rotschild who had been sent by Belgium to persuade the heads of state to grant military aid to Congo-Leopoldville, an initiative considered inopportune by the weekly *Afrique Nouvelle* which regretted “that certain nations do not seem to understand that their fraudulent methods make it very difficult for these countries to live together as their moderate positions vis-a-vis Europe are unfairly quoted by their neighbours to show them as supporters of colonialism”. Finally, in a very reserved manner, the Congolese affair was one of the themes of discussion at the conference. It found mention in the final communique as also in the declarations of the heads of state who frankly admitted that the fate of the Congo remained their major concern. It is therefore not surprising that on its request Congo-Leopoldville was admitted to the OCAM at an “extraordinary conference of heads of state” held at Abidjan on May 26, 1965.

Taking into consideration the unique background of the Congolese drama which goes back to the year 1960 the decision to admit this country reflected a dual political choice. It expressed, first of all, the choice of a man—Moïse Tshombe—a choice especially sensitive, when one takes into account the politics of the Congo. The problem thus posed was undoubtedly one of ideas, political conceptions and even political style, but it was essentially a problem of men. Its significance lay in the overt support that was being given to the adversaries of the Congo Prime Minister—Gaston Soumialot and Pierre Mulele—by the so-called revolutionary African states. It was equally related to the question of attitudes to the Congo crisis with special reference to technical and economic assistance to enable it to recover and to military support which at least some of the



members of the OCAM envisaged as an eventuality. The latter aspect of involvement in the Congo deserves to be specially underlined as the "Mulelists" were being supported financially and militarily not only by certain African states but also by Communist China. Thus, on agreeing to support Tshombe, the OCAM states, as was to be expected, took the risk of a confrontation with the revolutionary African states and to some extent even China itself and the final consideration in admitting the Congo, regardless of the value or relevance of Tshombe's experience, was the desire of these nations or rather governments, who felt threatened by the same menace, to put an end to these initial attempts of communist penetration in Africa. The admission of Congo-Leopoldville thus appeared as a manifestation of solidarity of a group of states with a country confronted by problems.

This isolated fact—banal though it may seem in any other context—of admitting a new member resulted in the clarification of a number of ideological and political implications. And despite the efforts of the heads of states of OCAM to acknowledge the point of view following which their assistance was granted to a country and more precisely to a government legally constituted, it was clear, for the African leaders as also political observers, that in this particular context, it was without doubt the Congo which was being admitted and more so "the Congo of M. Tshombe". This nuance expresses, in itself, the political burden involved in the initiative.

### **The Exit of Mauritania**

This "legalistic" position defended by OCAM was certainly not to be approved by all the member states. It was significant in fact that five countries—Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Mauritania, Central African Republic (with this reservation that even though absent, it had approved the decisions taken at Abidjan) and Ruanda—did not participate in the Abidjan Conference. What is more Congo-Brazzaville did not hesitate to describe the Abidjan meeting as a "fraudulent operation". And if at Yaounde the reaction bore the hall mark of prudence at Nouakchott the reaction was to strengthen their cause rather quickly but at the same time with sufficient delay—nearly two months—to give the impression that it had been considered at length. On July 8, 1965, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah officially announced the exit of his country from OCAM with the clarification that it would maintain its links with the economic and technical institutions set up by OCAM.

Several arguments have been advanced to explain this step. Some observers have put forth the argument according to which Mauritania aligned itself more closely with the member states of the UAM only in 1960-61 because of two overriding factors concerning her future: the Moroccan claims of territory and the veto of the Soviet Union on her admission to the UN at the 15th session of the General Assembly. As a member of the UAM and of its economic and technical organs it derived, besides a considerable advantage in economic and financial terms, the consolation of diplomatic support of its partners. But her admission to the UN and the diminishing virulence of Moroccan claims blunted her interest in the Francophone organisations. According to other observers,

the natural inclination of Mauritania was towards the Arab Maghreb despite the strained relations with Morocco. In addition, her political orientation prompted her to seek aid from the West and friendship with the Eastern countries. Now these fundamental options in international affairs seemed incompatible with collaboration with an institution which included in its programme the struggle against Communist China. Therefore the admission of the Congo provided a pretext for Mauritania's withdrawal.

But why then did Mauritania participate in the conference and cautioned against the setting up of a new organisation? True, it would have been inconceivable for the host country of the conference to endorse decisions adopted there. But was not the main anxiety of the believers in the politics of "expediency" enough to render plausible an adherence which in the final analysis would last but for five months? In any case whether the admission of Congo-Leopoldville was the main factor or simply a pretext, it seems likely that by her withdrawal Mauritania wanted to indicate her reservations regarding the initiative taken by a small section, but which involved the entire group, to indicate its refusal and to caution, in advance, against decisions which did not conform to its fundamental political options.

### **Difficulties with Ghana and the OAU**

The difficulties with Ghana were not only well known but even officially regarded as an open conflict. This was further underlined in the final communique of the Nouakchott Conference. It was thus easy to appreciate the difficulties experienced with the OAU even though they were confined to a minor dispute without realising its full implications. What was however a new development in 1965 was the way in which the former influenced the latter. Thus, one of the decisions adopted at the Abidjan Conference was the refusal of the OCAM states to participate in the OAU summit meeting to be held at Accra in November 1965 because of the attitude of President Nkrumah who gave asylum, protection, arms and money to movements opposed to the governments of neighbouring countries. The decision was ardently defended by the Conseil de l'Entente which gave a veritable ultimatum to the Ghanaian President, stating explicitly that "to the extent he was prepared to part company with men who were attracted towards China" they would agree to reconsider their position.

There existed however some reservation among other Francophone countries though they did not question the well-founded accusations levelled against Ghana—and which the coup against President Diori Hamani of Niger on April 13 confirmed. But they considered in view of the urgent current problems—in particular the likely declaration of independence by Rhodesia—that it was in the interest of all Africa that the conference should take place. It was incontestable that the states of Conseil de l'Entente played the leading role, but to the extent that their initiatives against Ghana were not officially resisted by their colleagues of the OCAM they were free to engage in an open campaign to "curb subversion encouraged from outside". Whether the ultimatum was a concerted move or it was the result of a decision confined only to the states of the Conseil

de l'Entente is of little consequence to this analysis. The fact remains that in inter-linking the initiatives against Ghana and the venue of the OAU Conference the ultimatum implied a passing identification of the pan-African body with the country which was host for one of its meetings, and what gave credence to this attitude towards the OAU was that the reservation of the Francophone states seemed to have anticipated similar reservations on the part of other member countries of the OAM—not with regard to President Nkrumah but with regard to the orientation the latter wanted to give to the OAU. This reservation found expression, for example, in Liberian President Tubman's declaration as he alighted at Accra airport. "An African government," he said, "at present is unrealisable. It would be hell". In contrast, the Ghanaian placards proclaimed: "A continental government now". The attitude of the Francophone states worked as a catalyst in the OAU crisis.

And what ended in making more explicit the political implications of the conflict was that outside the OAU and the politics of revolutionary states of the continent the political leaders of OCAM questioned the whole concept of an Afro-Asian solidarity based on the need to understand the ideological, political and social revolutions of the nations of both continents. For this was the agenda which, according to some states, would have given life to the Afro-Asian Conference scheduled to be held at Algiers, initially in June, then in November and, finally, postponed *sine die* and in which the states of the OCAM refused to participate. The attitude of the OCAM states thus appeared as a counter-thrust to the ambitions of a movement whose ideological and political implications were considered dangerous and against their interests.

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Born in an atmosphere of crisis, of defiance with regard to some countries and with reservations with regard to some ideologies, conceived from the beginning as a "shield" capable of neutralizing in a collective manner the menace of ideological and political subversion, established in its structure, as well as in its objectives, on the basis of a delicate compromise of divergent tendencies, the OCAM did not diminish in stature for its institutional vitality was recognised by all. In many respects it recalls to mind the UAM, may be only because of the flexible mechanism of its functioning. And it is interesting to underline that the reform introduced by doing away with its multiple control (there existed four Secretary-Generals at the time of the UAM, OAMCE, UMAD and UAMB) and the appointment instead of a single secretariat which would bring under its authority all the services—political, economic and technical—of the OCAM had the double advantage of guaranteeing administrative efficiency and preventing, as happened during the time of the NAM, relations among different Secretary-Generals, anxious to preserve the autonomy of their services, from becoming hostile. This flexibility was also perceptible at the political level. Contrary to the UAM the OCAM got rid of some political powers, imprecise, true, but provided constitutionally since the charter indicates that its aim is "in the spirit of the OAU, to reinforce co-operation and solidarity among member states . . . to co-ordinate the development programmes and facilitate among them, with due respect for the sovereignty and fundamental options of each member, consultations in the matter of external politics".

But neither the UAM nor the OCAM were able to take action beyond the examination of problems at ministerial or heads of state meetings. What is more, this refusal to decide political questions was respected to such a point that even the consideration of conflicts between two members of the organisation by the adoption of resolutions was not permitted. This was so, for example, during the conflict between Ruanda and Congo-Kinshasa in 1968, when Ruanda refused to return mercenary refugees back to neighbouring Congo despite her request. Again, it is necessary to note that the OCAM states took independent positions on the civil war in Nigeria and two of them—Ivory Coast and Gabon—recognised Biafra but not the OCAM as far as it was concerned.

This flexibility in its set-up, and especially in its politics, is explained largely when one considers that the OCAM comprises countries which are so different. An insular country like Madagascar, for example, finds a place alongside the countries of West Africa. The Ivory Coast which since 1960 was committed to the West as a profession of its faith expressed by President Houphouët-Boigny at the opening of the Abidjan Conference on October 26, 1960, and Congo-Brazzaville which wanted to follow the path of socialism on the basis of widespread friendship covering all countries including Communist China and Ghana—countries held in disdain by member states of the Conseil de l'Entente. Despite these outstanding differences among each state the OCAM had an image which singled it out by a number of well-defined political features—a tendency towards moderation in world affairs, a varying degree of liberty for member states, friendship and solidarity with Western countries and also with others who were "westernised". In the economic sphere, it preferred a certain type of development, with emphasis on Western sources of economic aid, a fact explained by the innumerable ties which link the Franco-phone states with France and equally with the Common Market.

In external relations the OCAM regarded recognition of her existence as an organisation as important in Africa as in the international sphere. An institution with a political aim, it played a moderate role, as was apparent in its refusal to set up an OCAM group at the UN, unlike at the time of the UAM. The accent was now more on economic and technical co-operation between the members by reviving the activities of former technical organisations (the UAMB, OAMPI, UAMPT) in addition to the creation of other areas of co-operation, such as the agreement on sugar, signed at Tananarive on May 19, 1965, which would lead a common sugar market, and which was welcomed by competent observers.

"A plan without sense" for its detractors, "an organisation dividing Africa" for its adversaries, an organisation founded on political realism, prudence and restraint in the eyes of some observers, the OCAM remained in existence in spite of innumerable difficulties. Above all internal difficulties, such as a succession of military coups which struck some of its members (Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey) created not only the danger of political instability spreading to other neighbouring states, but also was likely to make a dent in the unity of the existing regimes, which with rare exceptions had common features that helped in the formation of organisations which preceded the OCAM and formed a basis

for relations among members. To this was added, moreover, the psychological problems perceptible in differences in age. In most of the countries, for example, the old guard has been replaced by young leaders. True, the new leaders subscribed to the alliances forged earlier by their predecessors and also to the pursuit of regional co-operation, but they remained cut off, as was highlighted by an editor, rather irreverently but not without truth. "In the eyes of the doyen Houphouete-Boigny" he commented, "Bokasso, Eyadema, Bongo are considered street urchins".

External difficulties cropped up again. Even though the conflict with Ghana subsided due to the overthrow of Nkrumah in February 1966, bringing about a change in the regime and its political policies, even though relations with the OAU had lost their former antagonism, as was testified by the presence of Diallo Telli, Secretary-General of the OAU, at the Niamey Conference on January 23, 1968, when in his speech he explained that "the OCAM is well organised in its framework and in accordance with the principles of the OAU", the organisation seemed "threatened" not so much in its existence but in its work due to two opposing trends. The former was expressed by regroupings with a strictly regional base and founded on economic co-operation but with a political bias such as the UDEAC, Organisation of the River States of the Senegal, Union of Central African States. On the other side originated a movement dear to leaders like President Senghor of Senegal, based on the concept of "Francophonie"—an association based on language and common culture but with an undertone of politics which could be defined as "Gaullism" or "Francophile". True, this need not have affected the solidarity of the OCAM. But its ambition to enrol within its fold almost all the French-speaking states, including France, could deprive the OCAM of any real substance and it could hardly be expected to survive in its present form.

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To conclude, the brief existence of the OCAM covering different stages of its development within a limited span of time may perhaps appear a little artificial and lacking in convincing conclusion. But if its development is seen in its historical perspective and in the eight years of independence of its member states who started four international organisations in succession, it would be possible to discover a general tendency on their part of collective diplomacy. This was confined not merely to Africa but was a constant feature in the international sphere. Another characteristic of all these organisations was the quick succession in which they were created and the speed with which each disappeared once its mission was fulfilled or sometimes by the sheer force of circumstances resulting in other forms of collaboration.

It is true that these developments do not necessarily presage an eventual change, much less the final disappearance of the OCAM despite the initial success of organisations with a more restricted regional base, or the voices raised in some quarters as a result of the concerted campaign by those backing a Francophone movement. Three years of existence—the longest among Francophone organisations created since 1960—testifies, on the contrary, to a certain organisational stability acquired on the basis of mutual concessions granted by member states. Is this a sign that the

OCAM, like so many other international organisations, will have a colourless and routine career, without any history? It is difficult to predict from which direction a stimulus will come, for in Africa sometimes the most surprising developments can occur.

It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that the OCAM will endure as long as there exist the permanent factors which led to its foundation (a community of language, culture, similar economic and political conditions, a tradition of solidarity brought about through institutions in the past and present) and the occasional factors (the feeling of insecurity, belief in the real or imaginary threat of a danger of political disturbances) which had influenced the decision to create it. But, above all, it will continue to exist as long as the heads of state have faith in it or appear to believe in it. For an international organisation to take shape and develop it is essential that it has a strong material base. It is equally true that statesmen believe in the soundness of the elements constituting the base.

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*Translated by  
Shanti Sadiq Ali*

OCAM	Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache	Afro-Malagasy Common Organization	(f. Feb. 1965)
UAM	Union Africaine et Malgache	Afro-Malagasy Union	(1961)
UAMCE	Union Africaine et Malgache de Co- operation Economique	Afro-Malagasy Union for Economic Co- operation	(March, 1964)
OAMCE	Organization Africaine et Malgache de Co- operation Economique	Afro-Malagasy Organization for Economic Co- operation	
OUA	Organization de L'Unite Africaine	Organization of African Unity	(1963)
UPC	Union des Populations Camerounaises	Union of Peoples of the Cameroon	(1956)
OAMPI	Office Africain et Malgache des Pro- prieté Industrielle	Afro-Malagasy Industrial Property Office	(1962)

UAMPT	Union Africaine et Malgache des Postes et Telecommunications	Afro-Malagasy Union of Post & Telegraph	(1961)
UDEAC	L'Union Douaniere Economique de l'Afrique Centrale		(Jan. 1966)

David Dacko—President of Central African Republic (1960-66).

## ANNEXE

CONFERENCES	DATE	PLACE	ABSENT	OBJECT
Summit Conference	10-12 Feb 1965	Nouakchott (Mauritania)	Ruanda	Creation of OCAM
Summit Conference	26 May 1965	Abidjan (Ivory Coast)	Cameroon Congo-Brazza Mauritania Central African Republic, Ruanda	Admission of Congo- Leopoldville
Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs	12-18 Jan 1966	Tananarive (Madagascar)	— —	Signing of the Charter of OCAM
Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs	20-24 June 1966	Tananarive	—	Preparation of the Conference of Heads of States
Summit Conference	15-18 June 1966	Tananarive	—	Adoption of the OCAM Charter
Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs	15-20 Jan. 1968	Niamey	—	Preparation of the Conference of Heads of States
Summit Conference	22-23 Jan. 1968	Niamey	—	Consideration of Economic Problems Renegotiation of the agreement of Association with EEC.



## DOCUMENTATION

# **Freedom and Development**

JULIUS K. NYERERE

**F**REEDOM and development are as completely linked together as are chickens and eggs ! Without chickens you get no eggs, and without eggs you soon have no chickens. Similarly, without freedom you get no development, and without development you very soon lose your freedom.

### **Freedom Depends on Development**

For what do we mean when we talk of freedom? First, there is national freedom; that is, the ability of the citizens of Tanzania to determine their own future and to govern themselves without interference from non-Tanzanians. Second, there is freedom from hunger, disease, and poverty. And, third, there is personal freedom for the individual; that is, his right to live in dignity and equality with all others, his right to freedom of speech, freedom to participate in the making of all decisions which affect his life, and freedom from arbitrary arrest because he happens to annoy someone in authority—and so on. All these things are aspects of freedom, and the citizens of Tanzania cannot be said to be truly free until all of them are assured.

Yet it is obvious that these things depend on economic and social development. To the extent that our country remains poor, and its people illiterate and without understanding or strength, then our national freedom can be endangered by any foreign power which is better equipped. This is not simply a question of military armaments—although if these are necessary they have to be paid for out of the wealth of the community. It is a question of consciousness among all the people of the nation that they are free men who have something to defend, whether the appropriate means of defence be by force of arms or by more subtle methods.

Equally obvious is the fact that freedom from hunger, sickness and poverty depends upon an increase in the wealth and the knowledge available in the community; for a group of people can only consume and use the wealth they have already produced. And even personal freedom becomes more real if it is buttressed by development. A man can defend his rights effectively only when he understands what they are, and knows how to use the constitutional machinery which exists for the defence of those rights—and knowledge of this kind is part of development.

For the truth is that development means the development of *people*. Roads, buildings, the increases of crop output, and other things of this nature, are not development : they are only tools of development. A new road extends a man's freedom only if he travels upon it. An increase in

the number of school buildings is development only if those buildings can be, and are being, used to develop the minds and the understanding of people. An increase in the output of wheat, maize, or beans, is only development if it leads to the better nutrition of people. An expansion of the cotton, coffee, or sisal crop is only development if these things can be sold, and the money used for other things which improve the health, comfort, and understanding of the people. Development which is not development of people may be of interest to historians in the year 3000; it is irrelevant to the kind of future which is created. Thus, for example, the pyramids of Egypt, and the Roman roads of Europe, were material developments which still excite our amazement. But because they were only buildings, and the people of those times were not developed, the empires, and the cultures, of which they were a part have long ago collapsed. The Egyptian culture of those days—with all the knowledge and wisdom which it possessed—was quickly overthrown by foreign invasion, because it was a culture of a few; the masses were slaves who simply suffered because of the demands of this material development, and did not benefit from it. Equally, when the Roman Empire was attacked, and its legionnaires retreated to their homeland, the fine roads and buildings were left to rot because they were irrelevant to the people of the occupied areas. Further, it is doubtful whether either the Egyptian pyramids, or the Roman roads have made the slightest difference to the histories of the countries concerned, or the lives of their *peoples*.

Development brings freedom, provided it is development of *people*. But people cannot be developed; they can only develop themselves. For while it is possible for an outsider to build a man's house, an outsider cannot give the man pride and self-confidence in himself as a human being. Those things a man has to create in himself by his own actions. He develops himself by what he does; he develops himself by making his own decisions, by increasing his understanding of what he is doing, and why; by increasing his own knowledge and ability, and by his own full participation—as an equal—in the life of the community he lives in. Thus, for example, a man is developing himself when he grows, or earns, enough to provide decent conditions for himself and his family; he is not being developed if someone gives him these things. A man is developing himself when he improves his education—whatever he learns about; he is not being developed if he simply carries out orders from someone better educated than himself without understanding why those orders have been given. A man develops himself by joining in free discussion of a new venture, and participating in the subsequent decision; he is not being developed if he is herded like an animal into the new venture. Development to a man can, in fact, only be effected by that man; development of the people can only be effected by *the people*.

Finally, if development is to increase people's freedom, it must be development for the people. It must serve them, and their interests. Every proposal must be judged by the criterion of whether it serves the purpose of development—and the purpose of development is the people. Yet if a proposal contributes to the development of people, and if it is being carried out by the people of their own free will, it will automatically be for the people's interests, provided three conditions are fulfilled. First,

if the people understand their own needs; second, if they understand how these needs can be met; and third, if they have the freedom to make their own decisions, and to carry them into effect.

### **Development Depends Upon Freedom**

If the purpose of development is the greater freedom and well-being of the people, it cannot result from force. For the proverb tells the truth in this matter : you can drive a donkey to water, but you cannot make it drink. By orders, or even by slavery, you can build pyramids and magnificent roads, you can achieve expanded acreages of cultivation, and increases in the quantity of goods produced in your factories. All these things, and many more, can be achieved through the use of force; but none of them result in the development of people. Force and deceitful promises can, in fact, only achieve short-term material goals. They cannot bring strength to a nation or a community, and they cannot provide a basis for the freedom of the people, or security for any individual or group of persons.

There is only one way in which you can cause people to undertake their own development. That is by education and leadership. Through these means—and no other—people can be helped to understand both their own needs, and the things which they can do to satisfy these needs. This is the kind of leadership which TANU and Government officials should be giving the people; this is the way in which we can bring development to Tanzania. But, although we must give this leadership, the decisions must come from the people themselves, and they themselves must carry out the programmes they have decided upon.

There are thus two factors which are essential in the development of people. The first is leadership through education, and the second is democracy in decision-making. For leadership does not mean shouting at people; it does not mean abusing individuals or groups of people you disagree with; even less does it mean ordering people to do this or that. Leadership means talking and discussing with the people, explaining and persuading. It means making constructive suggestions, and working with the people to show by actions what it is that you are urging them to do. It means being one of the people, and recognizing your equality with them.

In particular, at this stage in our history we should not be trying to blame particular groups or individuals for things which are not to our liking, or not to the liking of the people. The exploiters, who are now apparently so beloved by our leaders that they spend all their time talking about them, are a negligible factor in our development now. Those few who remain can most effectively be dealt with by constructive development work on the part of the people and their leaders; it is certainly absurd that we leaders should spend all our time abusing exploiters—especially as some of us do not understand the work which is being done by some of the individuals we abuse. Instead we should be providing creative and positive leadership. We should have taken the trouble to understand the development policies our Party is trying to pursue, and we should be explaining these policies to the people. When we have convinced the people that TANU's policies are good and sound, then we should

be working with them to create a society in which exploiters will find no opportunities for their evil doing.

But giving leadership does not mean usurping the role of the people. The people must make the decisions about their own future through democratic procedures. Leadership cannot replace democracy; it must be part of democracy. If the decision relates to national affairs, then the people make it through the National Executive Committee, and Parliament, and through the National Conference of TANU. If it is a decision about district affairs, the people make it through the District Committee and District Council. If it is a question of purely local interest—for example whether to undertake a particular self-help scheme—then the people directly concerned must make the decision following a free debate. There is no other way in which real development can take place. For just as real freedom for the people requires development, so real development of the people requires freedom.

### **Two Essentials of Democracy**

There are, however, two essential elements of democracy without which it cannot work. First, is that everyone must be allowed to speak freely, and everyone must be listened to. It does not matter how unpopular a man's ideas, or how mistaken the majority think him. It does not make any difference whether he is liked or disliked for his personal qualities. Every Tanzanian, every member of a community, every member of a District Council, every Member of Parliament, and so on, must have the freedom to speak without fear of intimidation—either inside or outside the meeting place. The minority in any debate must have the right to speak without fear of persecution; it must be defeated in argument, not by threat of force. The debates leading to a decision must be free debates. And even after a decision has been made, free discussion about it should be allowed to continue. For the minority must know that if it has a good case, and if it argues properly and correctly, it will be able to convert the majority. Similarly, the majority must be willing to maintain the argument until the minority has been convinced of the correctness of the decision which has been made. Free debate must continue. It is an essential element of personal freedom.

But the necessity for continued freedom in discussion must not be allowed to prevent decisions from being made. There comes a point where action must follow discussion, or else we shall do nothing but talk. When there has been adequate discussion of a question, and every point of view has been expressed, then the decision must be reached, and the majority must be allowed to prevail. For just as the minority on any question have a right to be heard, so the majority have the right to be obeyed. Once a decision is reached, it must be accepted as the decision of all. And everyone—including those who were in opposition—have to co-operate in carrying out that decision. Thus, for example, once a law has been passed it must be obeyed by everyone, including those who spoke against it and have not been convinced by the arguments put forward in its support. More than that, once a law has been passed, it must be actively supported by everyone. It should not be merely a matter of acquiescence. It is not enough that a citizen should himself refrain from stealing; he must

co-operate with the police in upholding the law, and must give over to the police those who transgress it.

For democratic decision-making must be followed by discipline in carrying out the decisions. The minority must be allowed to campaign for a change in the law or the decision. But until they have succeeded in getting majority support for a change, they must obey the law or the rule which has been laid down. Without this kind of discipline no development of any kind is possible.

### **Discipline Must Follow Decision**

Discipline must exist in every aspect of our lives. And it must be willingly accepted discipline. For it is an essential part of both freedom and development. The greater freedom which comes from working together, and achieving things by co-operation which none of us could achieve alone, is only possible if there is disciplined acceptance of joint decisions. And this involves the acceptance of lawfully constituted authority. It means that if we work in a factory, we have to accept the discipline of that factory. Whether the factory is privately or publicly owned makes no difference; its rule must be adhered to, and the people who are in charge of particular operations must be obeyed. Similarly, in hospitals, schools, offices, and so on. If the doctor orders certain treatment for the patient, it must be carried out by the nurse without argument, and without carelessness. If the matron lays down rules designed to ensure the smooth operation of the hospital, every nurse must obey these rules. If there are difficulties, representations can be made, but in the meantime the hospital discipline must be maintained or the person must accept dismissal. The same thing is true in our villages and rural communities. Once a community has democratically decided upon a particular self-help scheme, everyone must co-operate in carrying out that decision, or pay the penalty which the village agrees upon.

Yet provided decisions are made after free and friendly discussion, and by majority will, the essential discipline should be freely accepted, and should, in fact, be largely self-discipline. For if our people want freedom for themselves, and if they want development, then they will accept the need for disciplined action. Indeed, the acceptance of community discipline is only a problem in Tanzania when our people do not understand the implications of the changes which we have already effected in our lives. In traditional society we had discipline - often very severe. It was accepted by everyone, and everyone co-operated in imposing it. Our problem now comes not from the discipline itself, but from a lack of understanding about the machinery which is necessary for discipline in a modern state, and from a failure to realize that different kinds of discipline are needed in the organizations of a modern society. Thus, for example, theft was dealt with directly by the community when each village looked after its own peace and security. Now it is essential that suspected thieves should be handed over to the police, and not mishandled by the people themselves. Or again, the simple rules of an isolated village are not enough for the running of a modern factory. In the village it rarely mattered whether a man carried out his task at daybreak or at noon; in a factory hundreds of other people can be made idle just because one man does not do his job at the right time.

These new kinds of discipline must be accepted by our people, and by all our leaders. And if anyone is unwilling to accept his responsibilities in this matter, then he must accept the penalties of his failure. If he disobeys the law, then the courts must punish him. If he fails to observe discipline in his work, then he must be dismissed. For we have to accept that the people in authority in Tanzania now are the agents of the people of Tanzania. If they do their job badly, or if they fail to respect the humanity of every human being, then the Government will replace them, or at an election the people will replace them. But in the meantime they must be upheld while they are carrying out the law, or issuing orders which are in conformity with the law. We must ourselves stop abusing people who are trying to ensure discipline; we must stop calling a man a "Mkoloni" when he demands strict observance of the rules in an office, a factory, a hospital, a school, or any other institution.

If we are to live our lives in peace and harmony, and if we are to achieve our ambitions of improving the conditions under which we live, we must have both freedom and discipline. For freedom without discipline is anarchy : discipline without freedom is tyranny.

Discipline, however, must be a means of implementing decisions. Only in the very limited sense of orderly debate is discipline involved in the making of decisions. And discipline is not another word for force. A meeting must be disciplined if every member is to have an opportunity to be heard, but a disciplined meeting is not one where everyone automatically says "yes" to whatever is suggested. A disciplined meeting is one where the rules which have been accepted as fair are observed by everyone—for example, where every member speaks through the chairman, and where each person is allowed to make his point without being shouted down or abused. For discipline allows the orderly conduct of affairs ; it is the means by which decisions are implemented—not the way they are made.

### **Ujamaa Villages**

It is particularly important that we should now understand the connection between freedom, development and discipline, because our national policy of creating socialist villages throughout the rural areas depends upon it. For we have known for a very long time that development had to go on in the rural areas, and that this required co-operative activities by the people. Ever since 1959, therefore, TANU has encouraged people to go in groups to farm in the rural areas, and our TANU Government has initiated settlement schemes of many kinds. But we can now see that we have committed many mistakes, and it is important that we should learn the right lessons from them.

When we tried to promote rural development in the past, we sometimes spent huge sums of money on establishing a Settlement, and supplying it with modern equipment, and social services, as well as often providing it with a management hierarchy. In other cases, we just encouraged young men to leave the towns for a particular rural area and then left them to their own devices. We did these things because we recognized that the land is important to our economic future, but we acted on the

assumption that there was a shortcut to development in these rural areas. All too often, therefore, we persuaded people to go to new settlements by promising them that they could quickly grow rich there, or that Government would give them services and equipment which they could not hope to receive either in the towns or in their traditional farming places. In very few cases was any ideology involved; we thought and talked in terms of greatly increased output, and of things being provided for the settlers.

What we were doing, in fact, was thinking of development in terms of things, and not of people. Further, we thought in terms of monetary investment in order to achieve the increases in output we were aiming at. In effect, we said that capital equipment, or other forms of investment, would lead to increased output, and this would lead to a transformation in the lives of the people involved. The people were secondary; the first priority was the output. As a result, there have been very many cases where heavy capital investment has resulted in no increase in output—where the investment has been wasted. And in most of the officially sponsored or supported schemes, the majority of the people who went to settle lost their enthusiasm, and either left the scheme altogether, or failed to carry out the orders of the outsiders who were put in charge—and who were not themselves involved in the success or failure of the project.

It is important, therefore, to realize that the policy of Ujamaa Village is not intended to be merely a revival of the old settlement schemes under another name. The Ujamaa village is a new conception, based on the post-Arusha Declaration understanding that what we need to develop is people, not things, and that people can only develop themselves. The policy is, in fact, the result of learning from the failures which we have had, and from the successes of those small groups which began and grew on a different basis.

Ujamaa villages are intended to be socialist organizations created by the people, and governed by those who live and work in them. They cannot be created from outside, nor governed from outside. No one can be forced into an Ujamaa village, and no official—at any level—can go and tell the members of an Ujamaa village what they should do together, and what they should continue to do as individual farmers. No official of the Government or Party can go to an Ujamaa village and tell the members what they must grow. No non-member of the village can go and tell the members to use a tractor, or not to use a tractor. For if these things happen—that is, if an outsider gives such instructions and enforces them—then it will no longer be an Ujamaa village!

An Ujamaa village is a voluntary association of people who decide of their own free will to live together and work together for their common good. They, and no-one else, will decide how much of their land they will cultivate together from the beginning, and how much they will cultivate individually. They, and no-one else, will decide how to use the money they earn jointly—whether to buy an ox-plough, install a water pump, or do something else. They, and no-one else, will make all the decisions about their working and living arrangements.

It is important that these things should be thoroughly understood. It is also important that the people should not be persuaded to start an Ujamaa village by promises of the things which will be given to them if they do so. A group of people must decide to start an Ujamaa village because they have understood that only through this method can they live and develop in dignity and freedom, receiving the full benefits of their co-operative endeavour. They must understand that there will be difficulties, and that the sheer coming together will not bring them prosperity. They must understand that coming together enables their work to be more productive in the long run, but is not a replacement for that work.

Unless the purpose and socialist ideology of Ujamaa village is understood by the members from the beginning—at least to some extent—it will not survive the early difficulties. For no-one can guarantee that there will not be a crop failure in the first or second year—there might be a drought, or floods. And the greater self-discipline which is necessary when working in a community will only be forthcoming if the people understand what they are doing and why. Yet if the purposes, and the potential, are understood and accepted, then the members of an Ujamaa village will be able to surmount such difficulties, and use them to strengthen their organization and determination. The difficulties will help to speed up their development to socialism. But the people have to realize that Ujamaa living does not cause miracles; it only allows them to improve their own lives.

The fact that people cannot be forced into Ujamaa villages, nor told how to run them, does not mean that Government and TANU have just to sit back and hope that people will be inspired to create them on their own. To get Ujamaa villages established, and to help them to succeed, education and leadership are required. These are the things which TANU has to provide. It is our job to explain what an Ujamaa village is, and to keep explaining it until the people understand. But the decision to start must be made by the people themselves—and it must be made by each individual. For if a group of 20 people discuss the idea and only 7 decide to go ahead, then that Ujamaa village will consist of 7 people at the beginning. If 15 decide to start, then it will begin with 15 members—others will join as they are ready. There is no other way forward, because by joining a man has committed himself to a particular kind of life, and five who come in unwillingly can destroy the efforts of the 15 who want to work out a new pattern for themselves.

The decision to join with others in creating an Ujamaa village is an individual one. But once that decision is made, then normal democratic rules will apply to all members. Thus, for example, the 15 people will sit down together and discuss whether to cultivate all their crops together, or whether to begin by jointly cultivating only the cash crops, leaving food crops for individual activity. If they can, they will talk until they agree; but if they cannot come to a unanimous agreement before it is time for work to begin, then they will decide by majority rule. Once this decision has been taken for the forthcoming season, all the members have to accept the discipline of the work which has been made necessary by the majority decision—even if they voted against it. While working hard the minority



can continue to try to persuade the other members to make a change next year, but their talk must not lead to a reduction in the effort they make in carrying out the majority decision.

In fact, once an Ujamaa village is created, it is a democracy at work. For it provides an example of free discussion among equals, leading to their own decision-making ; it shows that when discussion has to give way to action, then the majority will prevail ; and it demonstrates the need for discipline by all members in the implementation of the decisions which the group has made. And in this very process, the people will have begun to develop themselves as dignified and confident human beings, in a way which is impossible if they simply take orders from someone else. The fact that the orders of an "expert" may have led to greater output of a crop if they were fully carried out, does not affect this issue. By debating this matter and then deciding for themselves, the people will be doing real development of themselves. Achieving greater output will come later as they learn from their own experience, and as they are convinced that it would be a good idea to try a new method. Progress may appear to be slower in the sense that statistics of crop output will not increase very fast at the beginning. We should remember, however, that those people who marched hundreds of miles in support of the Arusha Declaration did not break speed records. They plodded steadily on until they reached their objective, suiting both their speed, and their hours of walking, to what they felt they could maintain.

Yet Government and TANU leaders can and should help these Ujamaa villages and their members. Leaders should help people to understand the arguments for and against different methods of organization. We should help a group which decides to start by making sure that they can get adequate land in a convenient parcel. We should help to explain the advantages of working a communal farm, and how the problems can be overcome. We should make sure that the members have agricultural and other advice available to them when they are making their decisions.

Further, Government and Party leaders must make sure that Ujamaa villages get priority in service to back up their own efforts and their own decisions. For example, if the members of an Ujamaa village decide that they have a priority need for water, and that they can dig the ditches and buy the pipes but not the pump, then Government and Party should help them by providing a pump rather than laying on water to some other area. But there must be no question of Government assistance replacing the efforts of the members of an Ujamaa village. Advice must be given, when possible, but it must be help for something the people are already doing for themselves. These villages must start, and must grow, on the basis of self-reliance. For self-reliance is the means by which people develop.

### **Tanzania Is All the People**

By developing the people of Tanzania, we are developing Tanzania. For Tanzania is the people ; and the people means everyone. (Tanzania ni ya Watanzania; na, Watanzania ni wote). No one person has the right to say, "I am the People". No Tanzanian has the right to say "I know what is good for Tanzania and the others must do it".

All Tanzanians have to make the decisions for Tanzania ; all have to work together, and all of us have to accept the discipline we impose upon ourselves. It must be joint discipline—applying to us all equally. But in accepting this discipline we must remain free men, implementing our own decisions. The group involved in any particular decision, and any particular discipline, will vary. Some decisions are national, and the discipline is that of law which we must all obey. Some decisions affect only those who live in a particular town or district, and the discipline is that of by-laws. Some decisions arise out of our own free decision to participate in a particular group—to work in a factory, to live in an Ujamaa village, etc ; and the discipline then applies to us because of our membership of that group. But all of us are Tanzanians. Together we are the people. Our development is our affair ; and it is the development of ourselves as people that we must dedicate ourselves to.

*(By courtesy of Tanzanian High Commission, New Delhi.)*

# **Economic Relations between India and East Africa**

V. SHOBHA CHOPRA

INDIA has since long maintained relations with the African continent. From the political point of view, Africa is playing an active role in world politics, but for its economic role, "it depends on its value as a trade partner, and at present this value is not very great." There are a number of states in the African continent with different political systems. There are wide variations in their per capita incomes, patterns of trade, degrees of industrialization, modes of agriculture, etc. These are to a large extent accounted for by political factors. India has friendly relations with all these states, but our economic relations, particularly trade relations, have been stronger with the Eastern seaboard of Africa than with the rest of Africa. East Africa includes our important trade partners—Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Mauritius, Somali Republic, etc.

Economic relations between India and East Africa were established more than a century ago when Indian settlers in East Africa took up trade and industry. Two decades ago, economic ties meant only trade links, but slowly they were expanded to include other forms of co-operation. They now include Indian participation in the process of industrialization of East Africa through joint ventures and technical collaboration.

In this paper I have dealt with India's economic relations with Africa since 1960—the period during which most of the African countries became independent.

The Indian Ocean has played a significant role in the country's economic relations with Africa as it is bordered by East Africa for about 800 miles. Ocean transport has encouraged a concentration of trade and industry near the ports—Mombassa, Tanga, and Dar-es-Salaam, the three important coastal towns of East Africa through which goods are transported to other countries.

Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania gained much significance when they formed an "East African Common Market" with common tariff and trade regulations. They have inter-territorial trade and exchange manufactured products like beer, petroleum products, chemicals, fabricated metal products, etc. among themselves. All the East African countries have underdeveloped economies with the majority of their populations dependent on agriculture, sometimes supplemented by the exploitation of their mineral resources. Thus, their exports consist mainly of agricultural products, mineral raw materials, some food-stuffs and tea, while their imports

include consumer and capital goods. Trade among the EACM countries is shown in the following table :

**TABLE-I**  
**External and Inter-Territorial Trade in East Africa**  
**(1960-65)**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total External Trade (Million)</i>	<i>Inter-Territorial Trade as a % of External Trade</i>
1960	762	8.4
1961	749	9.4
1962	740	10.1
1963	851	10.2
1964	937	12.7
1965	992	12.7

Apart from this inter-territorial trade, most of East Africa's trade is with the developed countries, namely, the United Kingdom, Japan, the German Democratic Republic, the Netherlands, etc.

India tops the list of underdeveloped countries among the trading partners of East Africa. The reason is that most East African businessmen are of Indian origin who while trading with India have a feeling that they are dealing with their own motherland. Another significant factor responsible for the strong trade links between India and East Africa is the fact that though India is an underdeveloped country, she has a number of light engineering sophisticated products to sell to East Africa. The demand for such products is increasing among East African countries. This peculiar feature of our trade sometimes poses a problem. The chief exports from India are those to which East African governments give protection in order to develop their own industries producing the same products. Textiles is an outstanding example of such manufactured products. But, at the same time, East Africans have to take into consideration the fact that India is an important market for their exports of raw cotton, raw cashew, sisal fibre, and therefore the demand for them will increase only if Indian industries expand. Thus mutual understanding between the two regions is needed.

Indian exports to Africa can be divided into two categories: (1) Cotton piece-goods, jute fibres, sugar, tea, spices, footwear, readymade garments, blankets and other traditional items, and (2) engineering products such as razor blades, bicycles and spare-parts, fans, sewing machines, exposed cinematographic films, toilet articles, etc. Exports of these products began very recently and their rate of increase is higher than that of exports in the first category. Major Indian imports from East Africa are raw cotton, metallic copper, raw cashew, rock phosphate, soda ash, vegetable tanning materials, palm oil, cloves, etc.

A countrywise analysis of our trade with East Africa shows that the bulk of it is with the EACM countries.

## KENYA

Kenya is the most important trading partner of India among the three EACM countries. It has an easy access to the Indian Ocean. Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, is the largest city in East Africa with a population of more than three million, and the most important centre of industry. Though underdeveloped, the country has started manufacturing sugar, beer, cigarettes and soda ash. The United Kingdom, Japan, West Germany, the U.S.A. and India together account for more than 65 per cent of Kenya's imports, and nearly 90 per cent of its exports. Indian exports mainly consist of cotton piece-goods, jute sacking bags, blankets, travelling rugs and coverlets of all materials. Very recently, we have also started exporting exposed cinematographic films. Indian imports from Kenya chiefly consist of raw cotton. Kenya is the third largest supplier of raw cotton to India. In 1961-62, we imported raw cotton worth Rs. 942 lakhs—80 per cent of the total imports in that year. Sisal fibre, wattle bark and wattle extracts are the other major exports to India. An overall picture of our trade with Kenya can be had from the following table :

**TABLE-II**

**India's Trade with Kenya (in Rs. Lakhs)**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Imports from Kenya</i>	<i>Exports to Kenya</i>	<i>Balance of Trade</i>
1960-61	1,236	494	— 742
1961-62	1,163	549	— 614
1962-63	566	563	— 3
1963-64	341	530	— 213
1964-65	743	530	— 213
1965-66	456	488	+ 32
1966-67	503	564	+ 61

The table shows that our imports from Kenya are decreasing. This is a result of the Indian Government's policy of correcting its adverse balance of trade with that country. To promote trade links with Kenya we must increase not only our exports, but also our imports. Kenya offers a growing market for cotton and silk textiles, jute cloth and light engineering products.

## TANZANIA

Tanzania comes next in the list of India's trading partners in East Africa. Tanzania manufactures sugar, beer and lumber. It also mines

gold, diamonds, gems and tin concentrates. India's chief item of import from Tanzania is raw cashew. It imported raw cashew worth Rs. 135 lakhs in 1961-62 and worth Rs. 548 lakhs in 1965-66. Raw cotton, sisal fibre and hemp are some of the other imports from Tanzania. We also import wattle bark and cloves from Zanzibar and Pemba. Tanzania, like Kenya, has an easy access to the Indian Ocean and its coastal zones are highly suitable for growing such crops as cocoanut, sisal fibre etc. Cotton piece-goods and jute sacking bags are our chief exports to Tanzania. Although Tanganyika and Zanzibar were merged in 1964, the trade of Zanzibar is in the hands of the Zanzibar State Trading Corporation which handles the export of cloves, clove oil and chillies. The Government of Zanzibar is interested in importing (a) corrugated iron sheets; (b) wire nails and screws; (c) barbed wires; (d) cotton from India. It is for Indian exporters to avail themselves of opportunities to promote their exports to Zanzibar. The table below shows our trade with Tanzania.

**TABLE-III**  
**India's Trade with Tanzania (in Rs. Lakhs)**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Imports from Tanzania</i>	<i>Exports to Tanzania</i>	<i>Balance of Trade</i>
1960-61	668	231	— 437
1961-62	247	283	+ 36
1962-63	564	285	— 279
1963-64	499	248	— 251
1964-65	673	261	— 412
1965-66	624	435	— 189
1966-67	1,021	390	— 631

India has a deficit in its trade with Tanzania. Recently a trade agreement was signed between India and Tanzania as a result of which trade between the two countries increased but our exports are still lagging behind. The main cause of the widening gap between our exports to and imports from Tanzania is that our prices are not competitive enough to match those offered by other countries. This is a common feature of our exports to all countries of East Africa. Exports of Indian textiles which totalled more than £1.3 million in 1966 went down to just £.6 million in 1967. On the other hand, China has managed to increase its exports of textiles to Tanzania from £1.2 million in 1965 to £17.6 million in 1967. The commodities for which there is a possibility of expanding the market in Tanzania are cotton textiles, bed-sheets, towels, household linen, bicycles and bicycle parts, fans and other light engineering goods.

## UGANDA

The land-locked Ugandan economy has to depend heavily on Kenya for a transport corridor to the Indian Ocean. With a population of more

than 7 million, Uganda has a surplus in its trade with the world. Its main exports are cotton and coffee which fetch more than 80 per cent of the total foreign exchange it earns through exports. India's major imports from Uganda are raw cotton, copper billets, unwrought ingots, slabs, blocks and wattle bark, while Uganda imports from India jute sacking bags, hessian cloth and cotton waste. An overall view of India's trade with Uganda can be had from the following table.

TABLE-IV

## India's Trade with Uganda (Rs. in Lakhs)

<i>Year</i>	<i>India's exports to Uganda</i>	<i>India's imports from Uganda</i>	<i>Balance of Trade</i>
1960-61	59	155	— 96
1961-62	74	160	— 86
1962-63	64	130	— 66
1963-64	66	80	— 14
1964-65	80	220	— 140
1965-66	103	124	— 21
1966-67	162	141	+ 21

It is obvious from Table-IV that there is no clear trend either in our exports to or in our imports from Uganda. Throughout we have had an adverse balance of trade (except in the year 1966-67) with Uganda. The Indian Government should take steps to promote exports to Uganda which offers an expanding market for petroleum products, chemicals and transport equipment.

From the following table we can see the position of India in the total trade of East Africa with the world as a whole.

On an average India has been supplying nearly 4.81 per cent of Africa's total imports and sharing 6.63 per cent of its total exports. China has also entered the East African market with its cheap light engineering goods.

Trade between India and East Africa is only part of the economic relations between them. A number of joint economic ventures entered into between India and East Africa will enlarge this economic relationship. Indian capital has been participating in the process of industrialization of the East African countries. A number of bilateral agreements have been signed by African governments for undertaking joint industrial ventures and for supply of technical know-how by India. Up to June 1967, 23 joint ventures had been either established or were being established. Indian participation in these ventures is limited to the supply of equipment and technical know-how.

Economic aid is another form of economic co-operation. But India is not in a position to give much economic assistance to East Africa.

TABLE-V

## Foreign Trade of East Africa (£ 000)

Countries	Exports					Imports				
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
United Kingdom	32,275	36,026	41,536	39,543	39,798	47,956	45,762	46,947	49,252	57,085
United States of America	15,485	18,077	21,190	28,934	20,536	7,049	9,416	6,704	9,054	13,272
E.C.M.	23,292	20,200	27,371	31,766	28,402	20,472	21,485	25,092	28,721	36,250
Japan	4,090	3,615	4,782	6,102	5,032	13,774	14,839	18,983	19,347	17,848
India	10,658	9,214	6,226	10,335	9,549	6,811	6,404	8,693	6,389	7,541
China	3,402	170	8,066	5,957	11,178	12	58	498	1,259	2,973
TOTAL	89,202	87,302	109,171	122,637	114,495	96,074	97,964	106,917	114,022	134,969
GRAND TOTAL	121,188	126,789	15,866	181,657	172,665	135,170	135,517	145,029	153,376	179,954

Africa Quarterly

Source: *Year Book of International Trade Statistics, 1965*. Published from Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office of the United Nations.



Technical assistance is another form of economic co-operation. The Indian Government has agreed to provide facilities for prospective industrialists in India, and technical experts for industries to be set up in East Africa. In Tanzania, the scope for providing technical assistance and skilled personnel has widened, particularly after the British expatriate staff left the country and the Tanzanian Government took up socialist measures in 1967. Very recently India helped start an industrial estate under the auspices of the Tanzanian National Small-Scale Industries Corporation by donating machinery and four experts. Similarly, India has given assistance for setting up industrial estates in Kenya and Uganda. Thus the prospects of improving economic relations between India and East Africa are bright.

# Aspects of Algeria's Cultural Heritage

BACHIR OULD ROUIS

**P**RESENT-DAY Algerian culture owes most to Arabo-Islamic traditions when considered in the light of personal psychology and social organization. But seen as an aggregate of artistic manifestations, Algeria's cultural heritage presents a more complex picture spanning the ages, as it does, from prehistorical times to the present day in forms as richly variegated, and with geneses and traditions as interestingly disparate as the rock engravings of the Sahara, the murals, mosaics and statuary of the Punic and Roman periods, the music of Andalusia, the miniatures of the school of Omar Racim, the elaborate non-representational decoration of Muslim religious art, the crafts of all periods and present-day painting, writing, theatre and cinema which, in the last decade, have been very much open to international influences.

## The Plastic Arts

The rock engravings of the Sahara, which are interesting from the aesthetic as well as the archeological point of view, were first systematically explored in 1933 and 1936 at Tassili and in the Hoggar region. They date back to between 2,000 and 6,000 years before the Christian era (this has been established by the carbon 14 method) and their long survival, mainly at Tassili, is due to their having been done on sandstone eroded by water in such a way as to provide surfaces completely sheltered from wind and sun. There are fewer to be seen at Hoggar, because the rock formations there being of granite similar erosion could not take place.

The subjects of these rock engravings throw much light on the early history of what is now one of the hottest and driest deserts of the world. Pictures of elephants, rhinoceri, hippopotami and giraffes testify to the climate of the region once having been propitious enough to support varieties of highly developed flora and fauna which now only exist in other parts of Africa. In the treatment of the human form there appears to be a strong affinity with ancient Egyptian art—the heads are shown in profile while the body is shown full face; but it has been scientifically established that they are actually older than the frescoes dating from the time of the Pharaohs. In composition and style they show the same keen sense of linear values and lively grasp of form and proportion that is to be found also in European prehistoric art, but they have the additional attribute of perspective which is totally lacking in other pictorial art forms of the same period.

Still very ancient, but more recent than these rock engravings are the several necropolises and scattered ruins dating back to the Punic and

Roman periods. The most important of these are located at Tipasa, Tebessa and Timgad. They are of such major archaeological interest that in recent years historians have cited them as being comparable to, if not more important than, Pompeii in their size, lay-out and wealth of historically and aesthetically valuable objects. Although pillaged from time to time throughout the ages, they still abound in statuary, mosaics, frescoes, ceramics and jewellery showing Roman provenance and, later, Christian influence.

With the advent of Islam in the seventh century, art began more and more to find expression in the richly decorative inlays, coverings and frescoes on the inner and outer walls, floors, ceilings, staircases, domes, cupolas, archways and colonnades of Muslim architecture. In accordance with religious tenets, the human figure disappeared almost completely, giving way to an intricate blend of floral motifs and geometrical patterns in which the exoticism of nature was subordinate to the rare mathematical precision of the Arab intellect. Pictorial art was mainly confined to miniature paintings and illustrated manuscripts and this art form has flourished up to the present day, the school of Omar Racim being particularly noteworthy. This tradition, incidentally, is being carried on at the present time by Ranem, a student of the late Omar Racim, who not only uses the media of bygone days, but shows a definite preference for the episodes of the past. His students, however, at the School of Fine Arts in Algiers, although well versed in the use of this traditional medium, are naturally more intent upon using these time-honoured skills in depicting contemporary subjects of a more compelling social interest.

The paintings, water-colours and engravings of the present generation of Algerian artists likewise owe little to traditional predilections in subject-matter and are characterized, moreover, by a great diversity of styles and talents and display something of the internationalism of vision and individuality of technique which is typical of the contemporary scene in most of the major art centres of the world. The art exhibition of today in Algeria is in fact a kind of kaleidoscopic assemblage of highly personal variants upon established styles dating from the late 19th century to the present day—neo-classical, impressionist, cubist, abstract, surrealist and naive, if this last can be termed a style. The main difference between the Algerian exponents of these styles and their counterparts elsewhere is that in their representational works they display a greater sense of social commitment in their choice of themes.

Of the representational school, Bouzid, Fares and Houamel have come to the fore as mature exponents of the literal and narrative aspects of pictorial art, and their works have been widely exhibited abroad. Bouzid is concerned with depicting scenes from everyday life, the warmth and luminosity of his colours being reminiscent of the later Van Gogh period. Houamel's work is a kind of testimony in paint to the dramatic moments of life and Fares, while still preoccupied with the problems of Algeria's revolutionary days, has progressed stylistically from a kind of aggressive realism to a "reintegration of light" through the decomposition of his colours, rather in the manner of the impressionists.

Two artists who have distinguished themselves at home and abroad

in the rather more specialized field of engraving are Benanteur and Fiorini, both having evolved new techniques in intaglio and colour reproduction.

Neither entirely representational nor entirely abstract, Baya has a unique place in Algerian painting. Her poetic, semi-literal imagery has a dreamlike, decorative quality not unlike the deliberate primitivism of Le Donanier Rousseau, yet with something of the same exuberance and freshness of approach as one finds in the paintings of Marc Chagall.

Also highly individualistic in style but diametrically opposed to this introspective lyricism is the denunciatory anger of Martinez whose dense and complex agglomerations of symbols and hieroglyphics are an explicit and powerful revelation of his desire for justice in the world.

Of the naive painters, Abdoun possesses the most impressive instinctual talent. His work, with its flair for detail, absence of dramatic focus and indifference to perspective has a compelling visionary quality, and in style is a blend of the symbolic and the abstract. His main concern, as he says himself, is "to paint what I feel, in my own language, with my own means of expression and, if possible, to make it understandable to others." Another artist similarly inspired but more deliberately sophisticated in his manner of presentation is the painter Samsom who is also a poet and a musician.

Farthest from the representational school are the works of Mesli, Saidani, Zerarti, Issakhieff and Khadda whose styles, each one distinctive in its own way, range through varying degrees of surrealism to the totally abstract. Although with their veneer of the European, these painters appear in form to belong more to the occidental mainstream of Kandinsky-inspired abstract art, in essence their works are more in consonance with non-figurative traditions of oriental art than those of their less avant-garde contemporaries.

## Music

The most abstract of all the arts yet the most typically Algerian facet of this complex culture is the classical music of the country which is known from its place of origin as Andalusian.

This musical heritage of long-standing tradition dates back to the time of the great theoretician and innovator, Zyriab, who came to Cordova from Baghdad in the middle of the ninth century. Reared in the oriental classical tradition he was the first to free himself from its influence and to become the creator of a regional music with its own special character. Its modes were properly classified by him and he made an improved version of the lute by adding a fifth string to it. He gave his compositions a formal structure and conceived the notion of the musical suite, or nouba.

These musical forms first came to Algeria with the influx of Arab refugees from Seville in the tenth and twelfth centuries and became thoroughly established in 1236 when 50,000 Muslim refugees from Cordova arrived in Algiers, Constantine and other large towns. They have been orally preserved up to the present day, with all their evocative power in-

## *Aspects of Algeria's Cultural Heritage*

tact, but with the passage of time there have been certain losses to the whole and it is generally felt that a system of musical notation should be evolved, so that the entire repertoire—such as is left of it—may be handed down unimpaired to future generations. At present the Algerian repertoire is composed of twelve complete noubas, seven Istikhbars or preludes, seventeen Touchias or overtures and a collection of short melodies. The interpretation of a nouba follows strict rules and there is a particular order for the developments of the movements, just as in the symphonies of other countries. The scale on which the melodies are based is composed of different notes from the Western one, and various modes of different 7-note combinations are formed from it. The number of modes varies with the region and period. There were formerly 24, each corresponding to one hour of the day.

Since 1966 a government organized Festival of Classical Music has been held annually as a stimulus to the exponents of this art, and in order to give the general public the opportunity to participate in the conservation and revitalizing of a tradition which generations of Algerians have made their very own.

### **Theatre**

A much more recent tradition is that of the theatre. Less abstract and more explicit in its form of expression, it is the perfect vehicle for the playwright's sense of social commitment. It existed in the rudimentary form of the Karakuz—shadow play—from the 17th century onwards and was influenced by the Ta'ziya of Persia, but it was banned in 1843 by the colonialists for political reasons. There had also been popular plays which were performed at the time of religious festivals, marriages and pilgrimages to Holy places. Burlesque had also been quite popular. But it was not until the period of social and political ferment just after World War 1 that the Algerian theatre really came into being.

In 1921, Georges Abiad, an actor of Lebanese and Egyptian extraction, came to Algiers on a tour of the Maghreb and, along with his troupe, performed two historical prose and verse dramas written in classical Arabic. Although they did not win popular acclaim, they encouraged a small intellectual madrasah-trained elite to develop the taste of the public for drama both as a valid art form and as a platform from which to air the grievances of those suffering under colonial domination. But their efforts were only partially successful, for there were major obstacles to be surmounted in even reaching the public. Over and above technical and material difficulties, there was the problem of language. One small section of the public enjoyed only French plays, French being the language which by force of circumstances had supplanted their mother tongue. Another small section appreciated only classical Arabic, and the masses, at whom these early efforts were aimed, could only understand their own dialect. Hence the popularity of plays written in "spoken Arabic", the themes of which, at the outset, were necessarily socio-political.

Attempts were even made to arouse nationalist feelings as with Bachtarzi's play "Awaken". But this genre was considered subversive by the colonial authorities and plays were banned. There still remained a considerable repertory, composed mainly of sketches,

reviews and farces dealing with social and ethical problems; alcoholism and its evil effects, the emancipation of women, family relationships, the selfishness of rich people, etc. This form of theatre was dominated by actors and playwrights such as Allalou, Dahmoun and Rachid Ksentini, who excelled in a style resembling that of the *Commedia dell'Arte* and became very popular with the public. But it was not until after World War II that the Algerian theatre began to acquire a certain degree of sophistication. Shakespeare's and Moliere's plays were translated for the first time into Arab dialect. This was an important period of gestation which brought forth dramatists and directors such as Mustapha Kateb, Abdelhalim Rais, Mohamed Touri, Mustapha Badie, etc. who were to bring even greater vitality and social consciousness to the Algerian stage right up to the time of the national uprising in 1956. There followed a period of complete dislocation during the struggle for liberation, and it was only after independence that the Algerian National Theatre could be formed with the sponsorship of the government. Its repertory includes a wide variety of plays in both French and Arabic and it has been responsible for bringing before the public eye such prestigious dramas as "Le Foehn" by Mouloud Mammeri, "Les Ancêtres Redoublent de Ferocité" and "Le Cadavre Encerclé" by Kateb Yacine and the sharply satirical "Hassen el Terro" and "El Ghoula" by Rouiched. Later in 1966, a new touring company, called the Popular Theatrical Troupe, was launched by a group of actors who had had their training in the Algerian National Theatre. This is a venture which, with the aim of contributing to and developing popular culture, has specialized in bringing completely new productions of urgent social interest to the smaller and, therefore, neglected towns of Algeria.

### Cinema

Yet another artistic medium which appears to have greater potentialities both as a vehicle for personal expression and as a means of communication with the largest cross-section of the public, in Algeria and abroad, is the cinema. And, indeed, "in the course of the last decade, Algerian film production, whether in foreign or Algerian hands, has given the world a series of noteworthy films such as the prizewinning "Battle of Algiers" and the "Wind from the Aures", which, from the standpoint of social and political relevance, as well as aesthetic achievement, have brought Algeria well to the fore amongst the established film producing countries of the world. The distinguishing feature in all of her best productions has been a brand of neo-realism, strongly reminiscent of the "Bicycle Thieves" tradition in modern film-making",\* and ideally adapted to the subject-matter which, as one might expect in a country so recently freed from colonialism, is largely drawn from the harrowing experiences of the seven-year struggle for independence and the social problems of post-independence days. Subjects such as life in internment camps, the day-to-day hardships of the common people during the freedom struggle and the outlawed existence of those who refused to submit to colonial rule, have provided a wealth of dramatic material for the makers of documentaries and feature films. Present-day social problems are also very

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\*Excerpt from an article published in the *Times of India*, Sunday Supplement of February 2, 1969, entitled "The Algerian Cinema Comes of Age" by Anna Khanna.

much the concern of the modern Algerian cinema, and there is a general awareness of the need to break away from the style of Hollywood-inspired commercial films and to evolve a typically Algerian genre. Mohammed Bouamari, who has recently made highly thoughtprovoking social commentaries on the emancipation of women and the changes in relationship between men and women, sums up this freshness of approach when he says, "I believe that it is the content of the film which decides its form. That is what the Italian neo-realists teach us. And also contemporary Brazilian producers. In Algeria we should start with our own sense of reality and then try to express it in a manner which is entirely our own. It is in this way that the Algerian style of conception in cinematography will gradually come into being. To my way of thinking, there is something abnormal in wishing to make films as made in America or anywhere else. We have to find an approach which is original."

And this indeed is the goal which the best of Algeria's contemporary film-makers have set themselves, although hampered by a serious lack of finance and technical infrastructure.

### Conclusion

Only a few of the more important aspects of Algerian culture have been touched on very briefly in this article, since it is virtually impossible to make an exhaustive study of a social phenomenon which has been in so dramatic a state of evolution since the revolution began fourteen years ago. A more elaborate study would have lead us to attempt an evaluation of recent trends in literature and to discuss folk art, popular songs and poetry, which, in expressing the people's frustrations and joys, are the real perpetrators of cultural traditions, though, more often than not, their authors remain anonymous. Algerian intellectuals themselves are in constant debate as to the specific character of their culture. But from the brief review attempted here, two dominant characteristics quite clearly emerge. Firstly, there is the all-pervading influence of Arabo-Islamic civilization, especially on the most popular and traditional art forms, for example, folk art, classical music, poetry, popular plays, etc. Secondly, there is a trend towards new creative goals and the striving for universality which started at the end of World War II and gained momentum with the struggle for political liberation. This is clearly illustrated by modern painting, cinema, theatre and literature. But the actual degree of influence of the first over the second is more difficult to assess. One thing which is certain, however, is that Algerian culture, with its realized sense of social commitment and with its complex patterns of the traditional, the revolutionary and the universal, is passing through one of the most effulgent, dynamic and fruitful phases of its history.

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## African Art Collections in Budapest

RAMESH JAURA

**A**FRICAN art collections are nowadays the pride of museums in London, Paris, Brussels, Leipzig, the Vatican, Dresden, Prague, Budapest and Leningrad. Besides, the ethnographical museums in Dakar and Accra have certain important objects from regions south of the Sahara.

Live interest in African art, however, was aroused only at the beginning of the century. The ethnological works published in the second half of the 19th century made almost no reference to African art. In the last decade of the century, African, Oceanic and American or prehistoric creations had come to be viewed as works of art. But it was still believed that "the sentiments of primitive art are narrower and cruder, its material poorer, its forms simpler and easier."

The decisive change in the then aesthetic approach to primitive art was felt only after World War I. According to Dr. Tibor Bodrogi, an expert on primitive art in the post-war years, "all that was exotic, unusual . . . promised new ventures and stimuli had become interesting, and . . . the general public discovered non-European—in the first place African—art in all its manifestations". African primitive art, like that of Oceania and America, may have some developmental differences within the "universal category of art". But it is now considered a response by the creative individual to questions raised by himself or the world around him.

Dr. Tibor Bodrogi is Director of the Ethnographical Museum in Budapest. An expert on primitive art, he has recently published a book, "Art in Africa". Originally written in the Hungarian language and translated into English and Polish among others, it carries 191 plates representing the objects collected in Western Sudan, the Atlantic Coast and the forest belt civilizations of the Guinea-Coast, from the Niger to the Congo, and the Congo.

The Ethnographical Museum in Budapest has about 11,000 objects from Africa besides a large number of drawings and documents. These objects are being kept in a cellar and only some have been exhibited, twice each in Paris and Budapest, along with some of the 129,000 from Oceania and America.

The first ever African collection in the Budapest Museum came in the early 70s of the last century from East Africa. It was brought from Kenya by a Hungarian expeditioner, Count Teleky. Later, another

Hungarian, Bornemissza, worked in that area at the end of the century among the Oljaya and Massai tribes. His collections from Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda and Malawi arrived in 1903, and account for the largest in the Budapest Ethnographical Museum.

Torday was the third Hungarian to make collections from South Congo in the first decade of the century. A well-known figure in African literature and art, Torday was a Belgian officer towards the close of the last century. The museum in Budapest has only his private collections, while some important ones are in Belgium. The famous King Statues from the 18th century are in the British museum.

The fourth Hungarian, Fuszek, was a physician, and lived in Liberia where he held a government post. A large part of his collections was made in the 1930s from the Dan tribe in North-East Liberia, and reflect the whole life of the people.

In the last decade, no planned expeditions have been made to Africa by the Hungarian ethnologists. Nor has the Budapest Museum acquired any new objects from journalists, diplomats or other collections. Dr. Tibor Bodrogi had planned to go to Mali where a military coup took place in November last. The fears that the new regime, which has pro-Western leanings, may not allow him to continue with his work. Circumstances permitting, he proposes to go to Guinea this year.

So far, however, prominent works of art have been found only in the South African territories inhabited by bushmen. The artistic value of such works (occasionally painted or engraved figurative embellishments of houses or gourds) is not as high as in the other places. According to Dr. Bodrogi, the territorial distribution of works of "plastic art is likewise limited; they have reached a high artistic level among the agricultural population of West and Central Africa, whereas the significance of sculptural creations is minimal among the stock-breeders of East Africa. The majority of the non-European and also the African works of art either have some religious purpose or serve for the embellishment of utilitarian objects, while the concept of *l'art pour l'art* appears in higher civilizations. Although the religious function is linked here to social and political functions to a much greater extent than in the case of sculpturally expressed ideas, cultic motions still play a principal role. It was due to the secret societies that the making of masks had developed."

The sculpturing of masks is almost as significant as—and in some places more important than—the art of figural sculpture. African masks are not used only in order to disguise, conceal or hide the wearer, nor do they serve the purpose of representation. The mask is the supernatural being itself and, apart from initiating new candidates, performs a social function by maintaining public order.

The mask collection in the Budapest Museum compares with that in any other museum in Africa, according to Young Ecsedy Csaba who is the keeper of African art objects. There are about 200 masks, largely from Liberia, Dahomey and Ivory Coast. "Both human and animal heads

are common as masks, and so is their combination in the form of zoo-anthropomorphous masks as well as fantastic masks which can be worn in four different ways; they may cover the face or the entire head (helmet masks), or they may be held before the face or placed on top of the head. The wearers of the masks, nearly always males, have as a rule to don a special garb which covers the whole body," says Dr. Tibor Bodrogi.

The wide-ranging collection of African art in the Budapest Museum includes instruments used for agriculture, fishing, purely mural crafts, ornaments and weapons. Though these are utilitarian objects and have a money value for the artist, his genius and skill renders such pieces of artistic value. The Calabash pots in the Matabele technique, with pearls studded on fine motifs, found in the Zambesi river are an example.

Among the utilitarian objects are also drinking cups—some meant for ordinary use and others for special feasts. The Budapest Museum collections include both types. These are made in the Kuba style (practised in Kongo) from dark brown or hard wood. One of these is the Poison Cup of dark brown hard wood, with a metal plaque in place of eyes. Another drinking cup from the Torday collection, offered to guests, has the lower parts of the two hollow heads connected by a box.

There are, however, objects carved out of wood which are kept in households as symbols by certain tribes even today. One category of these relate to the fertility theme. Though there are variations on this theme, one style is where the breasts are elongated, the skirt of cloth tied with a leather belt and a child carried at the back. Most of such figures are made of brown or dark hard wood. The claim of such objects to "art" pieces arises from the fact that they represent "all that has something to do with the culture of a people", as Dr. Bodrogi puts it.

The African art collections include almost no paintings and sculptures in the modern sense of the word. For, the Africans, unlike Indians, have no traditions as regards these two genres of art. But the other art forms are indigenous and true to the culture and heritage of the different ethnic groups.

Where some Greco-Roman traces or influence of European art is to be seen, Dr. Bodrogi claims, the art objects are second-rate. And, there is in fact a tendency among the present-day African artists to size up traditional themes into modern forms. But more often than not, the result is that the content and form always seem to be irreconcilable.

Dr. Bodrogi, a well-built medium-size gently balding primitive art expert, has a keen eye. His interest in Indian folk art is no less than his continuing explorations into African, Oceanic and American art. He mentioned Amrita Shergil's name to me proudly recalling that her mother was a Hungarian. Dr. Bodrogi has twice visited India—Bombay for three months, and Delhi for a few days. In Bombay he arranged an exhibition of his paintings as well. Besides, his wanderings have taken him to China—much before the Red Guards ran amuck—and Indonesia. His book on the art of Indonesia is under preparation. He is also planning to publish a volume on primitive art with illustrations and original

contributions from experts in the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union.

Most of the primitive art collections in the Budapest Museum, however, would be exposed to the public eye when the ambitious Hungarian open-air Ethnographical Museum representing the different parts of the country is built up in the next ten years. The museum is to be 30 km from Budapest, on its outskirts.

The first museum of this kind was built in Stockholm. It is known as Skansen. Similar museums exist in the Netherlands, the Soviet Union and the Rumanian capital of Bucharest. The Zalaegerszeg county of Hungary has a small museum of this type, exhibiting the rich tradition of the country's art.

# Quarterly Chronicle

VANITA SABIKHI

## INDIA AND AFRICA

**Somali President in India :** The Somali President, Dr. Abdirrashid Ali Shermarke, arrived in Delhi on November 23 on a one-week official visit to India. At a banquet held on the same day by President Dr. Zakir Husain, both leaders pointed out that there were tremendous possibilities for co-operation between the two countries for economic development and reconstruction and expressed the hope that this would strengthen relations to the mutual advantage of both peoples.

In Delhi, the Somali President held talks with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, during which they discussed the means of further collaboration in the technical, economic, trade and commercial fields. President Shermarke stated that Somali would like to have more Indian doctors and teachers to "make this co-operation ever more valid".

At the end of the visit, on November 30, a joint communique was issued. It noted with satisfaction the "increasingly close relations which are developing between Somalia and India in the economic, cultural and political spheres". The two leaders emphasized the imperative need for developing and strengthening the commercial and economic relations between the two countries. They also stated that "greater international efforts should be focussed on the problems of economic growth of underdeveloped countries" and in this context extended support to the resolution of the Second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Discussions on international issues led both leaders to declare that every nation must have the right to pursue its own internal and external policies. "Both India and Somalia reject military alignments and are determined to pursue with vigour the policy of non-alignment based on the principles of peaceful co-existence and positive co-operation among nations", the communique stated. The leaders condemned apartheid in South Africa and the continuance of the minority racist regime in Rhodesia; expressed anxiety over the delay in the implementation of the Security Council resolution on West Asia and welcomed the stoppage of bombing in North Vietnam.

The invitation extended by President Shermarke to President Zakir Husain and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to visit Somalia was accepted.

The *Somali News*, commenting on President Shermarke's visit, said on November 22 : "The ancient bond of friendship between Somalia and India has been increased, first by a similarity of political thinking that extends to many of the problems that beset the modern world, and secondly by our admiration and respect for the way in which the Government and people of India manifest their deep and true love for

those principles which alone can ensure equality and justice for all men—the principles of genuine democracy".

**170,000 Indian Traders May Be Forced to Quit Africa :** Africa's policy of Africanization is likely to force up to 170,000 Indians to leave Africa. People of Indian descent, traditional shopkeepers in many parts of Africa, are being deprived of their trading licences and obliged to hand over their businesses to Africans, or, as in South Africa, moved from their traditional areas as a result of governmental rezoning or slum clearance.

**Kenya Asians' Licences Not Renewed :** Asians in Kenya were informed on January 1 that their licences would not be renewed for 1969 and that they should within one to six months wind up their affairs in the country. The Kenyan Minister for Commerce and Industry, Mr. Mwai Kibaki, at a press conference a day before the new Trade Licensing Laws came into effect, said already 700 non-citizen traders (most of them Asians) had been refused licences to continue their business. "Within the next six months the Government estimates that about 3,000 non-citizen traders will have been refused licences", he added.

The new laws mean that most of the Asian traders who have operated small businesses throughout Kenya for the past 20 or 30 years and their dependents (totalling about 15,000) will be forced out of their premises. African traders have welcomed the new legislation and feel they may be able to take over the small trade market which has been controlled by the Asian "dukawallahs" since the turn of the century. (The London *Times*, January 1)

In its editorial comment on the expected exodus from Kenya, on January 2 the London *Times* said: "The progressive refusal of trading licences to Asians in Kenya who have British (or other foreign) passports is a reminder that in the last resort the Government accepts responsibility for some 150,000 to 200,000 holders of British passports in East Africa and for their future progeny." Though this new Kenyan policy would certainly force pressure against the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of last year, the paper commented, "it does not follow that the refusal of these licences will call for any immediate changes in the Act."

**Asians Under Notice in Uganda :** Dr. Milton Obote, President of Uganda, while in London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, said on January 5 that 40,000 Asians holding British passports in his country would have to leave soon. "We are not going to push anybody out", he assured, "but we will not have foreigners controlling a vital aspect of our economy". (The London *Times*, January 6)

**Commerce to be "Zambianized" :** In Lusaka on January 1 the Trades Licensing Act, designed to increase the number of Zambians participating in commerce, was put into effect. The Act gives expatriate traders, in all but the main centres of cities and towns, until December 31 this year to become citizens, sell their businesses to Zambians or face closure. At the same time they were warned that citizenship applications made only to save businesses would not be accepted.

The London *Times* on January 6 stated that the new measure affected the bulk of the country's 10,000 Asians. Their licences were not renewed since January 1 on Government orders and the police and other local citizens had prevented them

from trading. There was likely to be in the near future an exodus to both India and Britain following the closure of shops, the paper added.

By the middle of January the *Times of Zambia* reported that most shops in the second class trading areas throughout the country were shut. A number of stores in rural areas were being taken over by the state-owned consumer corporations which were also expected to take over some of the urban shops to keep the trade flowing. In Zambia's isolated Eastern Province, the paper said, emergency shuttle services had to be introduced to provide food and supplies to hospitals and schools following the forced closure of most of the shops. Spokesmen of Asian business men had denied accusations of dilatoriness in seeking Zambian buyers and said there were few Zambians with enough capital or security to purchase stores.

**Malawi Closes Border to Asians :** Reports from Blantyre indicate that Malawi has closed its borders to Asians leaving Zambia as a result of the newly imposed restrictions on the renewal of trading licences there. The latest clamp-down is due to Government fears that Asians, ostensibly in transit to India and Pakistan, may stay on and settle in Malawi.

The *Malawi News*, President Banda's official party newspaper, in its editorial stated that the recent restrictions on non-Africans in Zambia and East Africa were the result of expatriates' unwillingness to comply with Government directives. While Malawi did not contemplate such drastic measures, the editorial warned that business men in Malawi who failed to toe the Government line would "find themselves out of business". The paper also urged business men to take the initiative in Africanizing their businesses. It appealed to various Asian and non-Asian traders in rural areas whose licences would not be renewed after the end of this year to make arrangements to transfer their businesses to Africans "harmoniously". (*Financial Times* (London), January 13 and 15.)

**Indian Traders Uprooted in South Africa :** Thousands of Indians in South Africa have been uprooted from their traditional trading areas by Government legislation designed to rezone areas or on the plea of clearing slums. Pageview, an inner suburban area of Johannesburg, South Africa's largest city, was rezoned for whites, and the Indians who had a right to live there since 1885 were sent 32 km away to undeveloped Lenasia. Indian traders are currently being cleared out of such towns as Rustenberg, Lichtenburg, Nylestroom and Ventersdorp and sent to areas several kilometres away from residential areas. The evictions have come two months after Minister of Community Development, Mr. Blaar Coetzee, threatened to turn many Indians out of commerce if they did not leave willingly.

The Chairman of the South African Indian Council, Mr. H.E. Joosub, challenged the Government to make an economic survey to see if Indian businesses moved from the centre of the towns could still exist financially. "It has been proved in Nylestroom and Ventersdorp, where premises for Indians were erected out of town that this theory does not work", he said. "The shops are standing vacant". The *Johannesburg Star* has attacked the Government on these new measures. "The inhumanity of the action ought to stagger anyone who gives it thought. It is not the first time that non-white communities have been uprooted and dumped elsewhere with little or no thought of how they can survive", it said. It added : "... And what leaves an additionally unpleasant taste is that white speculators, active at the forced sales invariably and perfectly legally, reap considerable financial gain."

**UAR Orders Indian Trucks :** The United Arab Republic recently placed an order for 200 Tata-made tipper trucks valued at Rs. 95 lakhs. It has also agreed to buy eight Tata-Mercedes buses valued at Rs. 7 lakhs for its iron and steel factory. Negotiations to buy a substantial number of these buses for Cairo's transport service are reported to be under way. The UAR is also likely to purchase 700,000 books from an Indian publishing house for teaching English. India will for the first time produce all text-books for teaching English in UAR schools. Joint production of several other Indian books is also planned (*The Times of India*, December 24).

**Trade Talks with UAR :** In Cairo on January 8 talks were held for a six-monthly review of India-UAR trade which during 1968 totalled Rs. 650 million. The three-member Indian delegation, led by the Director of Foreign Trade in the Commerce Ministry, Mr. S. K. Singh, reviewed the existing trade protocol and explored possibilities of expansion. In recent months India, exporting several non-traditional items like engineering goods, chemicals, marine engines, buses and text-books, has made a remarkable dent in the UAR market. This year the UAR is likely to import more of Indian aluminium, tyres, special steel and 2,000 tons of lentils. The UAR is the largest single market for Indian exports in the West Asian and African region.

**Indian Industrialist Visits Ethiopia :** An Indian industrialist, Mr. G.D. Birla, accompanied by three other business men, besides his son and grandson, visited Ethiopia towards the end of last year to survey industrial units set up by the House of Birla and to advise Ethiopian leaders on the country's industrial development potentials.

In Addis Ababa on December 30, during a palace audience for Mr. G. D. Birla, Emperor Haile Selassie commended Mr. Birla's interest in the economic development of Ethiopia and said the country welcomed Indian investors who would be given encouragement and assistance. Indian investments, the Emperor added, would also help strengthen friendly relations between the two countries.

Later, addressing a crowded gathering of Ethiopian and foreign industrialists, business men and bankers, at the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Birla said Indian educational institutions would train young Ethiopians in the art of trade. "We are ready to help you with our know-how and experience". He suggested that power and communications should be given top priority in the development of programmes of Ethiopia and other African countries. "To achieve this, African countries must keep in mind the goal of more electricity, more education, greater research and better communications", he said. Mr. Birla disclosed that the Birla Group and several other Indian business men had plans to invest in and expand Ethiopian industrial enterprises. Several Indian investment projects are at present being studied by the Ethiopian Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

**African Road Engineers Attend Seminar on Roads and Bridges :** Five African road engineers attended a Seminar on Roads and Bridges held in Bombay from October 28 to November 2. The team included Ato Tilahun Wubneh, Economic Commission for Africa Transport Specialist as Conducting Officer ; Mr. Isseini Gami from the Chad Basin Commission ; Mr. Bikindou Robert from Brazzaville ; Mr. Leonard W. Turay from Sierra Leone and Ato Adela Lulseged from Ethiopia. A study tour after the Seminar took the African team to Madras to examine the feeder road system developed to open up rural areas, and to New Delhi to visit the Secretariat of the Indian Roads Congress and the Road Research Institute.



**Indian Agricultural Implements for Malawi :** The Indian High Commissioner to Malawi, Mr. M.M. Khurana, in an interview with the official Malawi news agency on December 20 said the Indian Government had offered £300 worth of agricultural implements to Malawi. These would be presented to winners of the 1969 agricultural shows to be organized in the country.

**Indian University College near Durban :** The 400-acre campus of the new Indian University College is likely to be ready by 1971. Situated at Chiltern Hills, about five miles from the centre of Durban, the institution is being built to replace the present temporary campus on Salisbury Island in Durban Bay. The college will enjoy full academic autonomy.

## ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY

**Meeting of Standing Committee on Refugees :** A meeting of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) Standing Committee on Refugees was held in Addis Ababa in November. The Committee studied the activities of the OAU bureau. A statement issued at the end of the conference said the Committee was "highly satisfied with the progress achieved by the OAU bureau in the resettlement and education of refugees as well as the significant contribution from Scandinavian governments and the co-operation of voluntary organizations".

The Standing Committee, established in October 1967 by the International Conference on Refugees to assist the OAU bureau, consists of representatives from the OAU, ECA, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), ILO, UNESCO and the UN Development Programme. (*The Ethiopian Herald*, November 13).

**New Member Opted :** Equatorial Guinea became the 41st member state to be admitted to the Organization for African Unity on November 5.

## UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA

**UNCTAD Resolution Reversed :** The General Assembly in December defeated an Afro-Asian proposal which requested formal approval of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Resolution adopted in March in New Delhi. Lost by a vote of 56 to 48 with 13 abstentions, the proposal called for South Africa's exclusion from the UN.

Commenting on the changed stand of a large number of states, the *Agence France Presse* said what swayed a number of delegations away from the anti-South African vote they made in the committee was the argument that they would be setting a precedent—termed illegal by the UN legal adviser and Secretary General U Thant—that might have an incalculable effect. The hub of the argument, the *Presse* reported, was that if this worked against South Africa it would work against any state which could find itself deprived of its rights without any protection from the UN Charter. (*The Nationalist*, December 14).

**Resolutions Voted Against South Africa's Apartheid Policies :** In the General Assembly, member-states early in December voted a resolution (85 to 2 with 12 abstentions) condemning South Africa's main trading partners. All states and organizations were requested to suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other

exchanges with the "racist regime" and with the "organizations or institutions in South Africa which practise apartheid". The resolution also contained a number of proposals to help the UN to effect "dissemination of information on apartheid" and approved an additional appropriation of \$80,000 for this purpose. The United States, Britain, France, Italy and Japan abstained on the resolution for they did not believe that the South African situation was a threat to world peace. South Africa and Portugal voted against it.

The General Assembly also approved an eight-Power resolution condemning the "torture, inhuman and degrading treatment" of political prisoners held in South Africa for their opposition to apartheid. The resolution called for increased "humanitarian assistance to the victims of apartheid" through the UN Trust Fund for South Africa. Voting on the resolution was 102 in favour to 2 against (South Africa and Portugal).

**General Assembly Calls for South African Withdrawal from South West Africa :** In a resolution tabled by a group of African, Asian and Latin American countries on December 18, the UN General Assembly urged the Security Council to take "effective measures" to ensure South Africa's withdrawal from South West Africa (Namibia) and to grant the territory independence. The Assembly repeated its condemnation of South Africa's "persistent defiance" of UN authority and its policies and activities which were "aimed at destroying the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia" and drew the Council's attention to the "serious situation" created by South Africa's "illegal presence and activities".

Voting on the resolution was 96 in favour, two against and 16 abstentions—South Africa and Portugal voted against while Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, New Zealand, Norway, Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States abstained.

**Spain Called on to Accelerate Decolonization in Africa :** In the Trusteeship Committee on December 16, members requested Spain to "accelerate the decolonization" of Ifni and to "refrain from any action likely to delay the process of decolonization" in Spanish Sahara. The proposals, offered jointly in an Afro-Asian resolution adopted by a vote of 105 to 0 with three abstentions, asked Spain to immediately determine with Morocco the procedures to be adopted for the transfer of power in Ifni.

**FAO African Regional Conference Meets in Kampala :** The fifth regional conference of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) met in Kampala from November 18 to 29. Delegates from all parts of Africa attended the meeting. The conference urged the FAO to adopt a number of new measures to improve agricultural prospects in Africa. Director General A.H. Boerma's five-point plan of concentration for the FAO—in high yield crops, improving supplies of proteins, war on waste, mobilizing human resources and earning and saving foreign exchange—was endorsed by the conference. A new project to provide government development services for rural communities which were expected to be approximately 70 per cent by 1985, was outlined in the report by a team of FAO experts. The proposal, among other things, called for the establishment of agencies to help farmers study modern agriculture, to provide banking, credit and savings services and to encourage self-help groups. Regional co-operation was called for especially in research, seed production, marketing and crop storage. Towards this purpose, the FAO Regional Office at Accra was to be strengthened so as to maintain close co-operation with the UN

Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) as well as other organizations engaged in development. The conference report also warned against the tendency to replace manpower with mechanization in agriculture, for, human resources, capital and institutional requirements were the major basis on which agricultural development must be established. Additional growth could be secured by increased internal trade and exports. Towards this purpose an African regional market was recommended. Since in 1985, the FAO experts reckoned, more than half of the trade exchange would be composed of products of agricultural origin, the conference welcomed four proposals to improve trade in agricultural products. These called for preparation of better data on existing trade flow, analysis of prospects for trading opportunities, provision of assistance to countries wishing to promote agricultural trade between themselves and comparative studies to show the experience of different groups of countries in agricultural trade.

**Refugee Problem Reviewed:** The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, speaking at a press conference in Geneva on November 7, indicated that 900,000 refugees in Africa had been cared for by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Only 70,000 still depended on UN aid, while over 750,000 had been provided with new homes and employment in the host countries. This important task of resettlement, the High Commissioner said, had been made possible by the sympathetic attitude of African Governments to the UNHCR and by the financial and technical assistance extended by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other UN agencies. These latter had helped open up a large number of agricultural development projects in remote areas which had facilitated settlement of refugees. (*The Nationalist*, November 8).

**Security Council Committee Reports on Sanctions Against Rhodesia:** The Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council headed by India reported on December 31 that Rhodesia's trade with the outside world remained "quite substantial" in 1968 in spite of the total trade ban imposed in May. South Africa, the report said, remained "by far the main trading partner" of Rhodesia, with Portugal next on the list followed by several other countries whose names were not mentioned.

The Council first imposed selective sanctions on certain commodities such as tobacco, after Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence in November 1965. The sanctions were broadened later by an oil blockade of the Mozambique Port of Beira in 1966 and finally extended to all trade with Rhodesia last May. (*The London Times*, January 1).

**Equatorial Guinea 126th Member State of the UN:** Equatorial Guinea, formerly under Spain, was admitted to the United Nations Organization as its 126th Member State on November 12. The country which attained independence on October 12 is the first Spanish-speaking African territory to achieve independence. Its admission to the world organization raises the total African membership to 41.

## ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WITH AFRICA

**Economic Commission for Africa Urges Inter-African Trade:** Reviewing the work of the Economic Commission for Africa through 1968, the Executive Secretary, Mr. Robert Gardiner, indicated that future economic progress of the continent depended on the expansion of inter-African trade. "We must try and build up an African economy", he said. "Some 20 to 28 per cent of Africa's economy is depen-

dent on the outside world and this is unhealthy. There must be more inter-African trade so that dependency on the outside can be reduced", Mr. Gardiner added. (*The Nationalist*, December 3).

**Development Planning Seminar Meets in Accra :** A National Seminar on Development Planning opened in Accra on December 4. The Seminar was one of a series on development planning organized annually by the Centre for Development Planning, Projection and Policies of the UN Secretariat in collaboration with the Office of Technical Co-operation and the ECA. The Seminar was attended by delegates from 12 African countries and representatives from the ECA, FAO, ILO and the International Monetary Fund.

The Seminar studied papers submitted by the ECA on 'Industrial Growth in Africa' and 'Power Consumption and Power Needs of Africa'. The first paper indicated trends during 1950-68, stating that the output of manufacturing industries in developing African countries had increased by 170% during the last eighteen years as a result of the advances on the volume of economic activity, higher real incomes, sustained increase in the role of urbanization, import substitution and export of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. The second report based on a survey conducted in 45 African countries revealed that West, Central and East Africa, Mozambique and Angola possess about 95% of Africa's hydro-electric power potentials. Only four of the higher developed countries consumed about 75% of Africa's total energy consumption. These are South Africa, including South West Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; the United Arab Republic, Algeria and Nigeria. The remaining 41 countries consumed only about 25%. Africa would by 1980, the paper said, require 213 million tons of coal equivalent of power to keep her industries and other facilities going.

**FED Grants to African Countries:** The European Development Fund (FED) will finance six new projects in African and Malagasy countries to the tune of more than \$8 million. The projects to be covered are an experimental programme against the tsetse fly in the Central African Republic (\$ 393,000); the installation of a radio telecommunications network in Somalia (\$ 3,275,000); the financing of the fourth annual instalment of aid to agricultural production in Niger (\$ 732,000) and the training of junior executives in the Congo (DR). (These projects are covered by non-repayable aid.) A loan of \$ 2,744,000 was approved for Mauritania for the extension of the Nouakchott wharf, and a sum of \$120,000 to finance an information programme on the activities of the European Fund. (*The Nationalist*, November 11).

## CENTRAL AFRICA

**UDEAC Meets in Yaounde and in Brazzaville :** The heads of state of the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC), Gabon, Cameroon and the Congo Republic, met in Yaounde from November 5 to 6. Matters discussed included customs duties, financial assistance, investments, industrialization and customs and economic relations between UDEAC countries and the Central African Republic and Chad, both formerly members of the Customs Union.

A communique issued at the end of the conference stated that President Bongo (Gabon), President Ahidjo (Cameroon) and Major Raoul (Congo Republic) had discussed the reconstruction of the UDEAC and the reconstitution of the Treaty of Brazzaville. Decisions taken, the communique indicated, would be put into effect when

the resignation of Chad and the Central African Republic became valid. Participants also reiterated their determination to increase co-operation between their countries and agreed to meet again in Brazzaville in December. (*Africa Research Bulletin—Economic Series*, November 30).

The heads of state meetings in Brazzaville held on December 10 and 11 were also attended by President Bokasso of the Central African Republic, who had earlier withdrawn his country's membership from the Union of Central African States (UEAC) of which it was a founder member in February and announced his decision to rejoin the UDEAC. The Central African Republic in April, along with Chad, resigned their membership of the UDEAC.

The Union Council examined and approved the matters studied by the management committee, which concerned, in particular, the modification of the Union's Customs Code and Tariffs, the checking of accounts and the provisional budget of the general secretariat for 1969. The Council also agreed that Bangui should continue to be the headquarters of the UDEAC and that the Secretary General M. Onana Awara's term should be renewed. M. Bongo, the President of Gabon, would continue to be the President of the Council for 1969. (*Africa Research Bulletin—Economic Series*, December 31).

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Foreign Parties Banned :** A Government decree, issued on November 21, banned all foreign political parties from functioning in the country. Any violation of this law, the decree prescribed, would be regarded as an "attempt at aggression and a threat to national security." The Republic's single party is the "Movement of Social Evolution of Black Africa."

**Taipei Envoy at Independent Celebrations :** Admiral Ni Yue Sie, President Chiang Kai-shek's personal Chief of Staff, attended the Republic's eighth anniversary celebrations in Bangui on December 1. Admiral Ni was the Republic of China's special envoy to the independence ceremonies.

## CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

**Presidents Mobutu and Kaunda Exchange Visits :** Presidents Joseph Mobutu of the Congo (DR) and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia exchanged visits from November 13 to 16. A communique issued at Lubumbashi on November 16 said that the two Presidents had the opportunity of reviewing problems of mutual interest and others affecting the African continent today, in particular those of Rhodesia, South Africa, Mozambique and Angola. They reaffirmed their desire that Britain should cease its economic aid to Rhodesia and take necessary effective measures for the restoration of legality in Rhodesia in anticipation of independence under majority rule. The leaders reiterated their condemnation of apartheid in South Africa and the prevailing colonialism in Mozambique and Angola.

The two Presidents also discussed ways and means of establishing and expanding bilateral co-operation between their countries, and to this agreed to keep in constant and permanent contact.

**"Mulelists" Surrender :** *The Times of Zambia* reported on November 11, that nearly 30,000 former "Mulelist" rebels had come out of the forests in the

Province of Kwilu in the Central Congo and appealed to President Mobutu for clemency. This followed the execution of their leader Pierre Mulele in October.

**Central African Republic Withdraws Stopover Rights :** The *Malawi News Bulletin* December 3, reported that the regular air service from Kinshasa to Fort Lamy would hereafter not stop over in Bangui, Capital of the Central African Republic. The Central African Republic, without assigning any reason, the report stated, had withdrawn stopover rights from the Congolese National Airline.

**Japanese Collaboration :** A Japanese-Congolese Development Company will begin mining copper ore and dressing the ore on a full scale by 1971. A new plant capable of processing crude copper ore—a total of 5,000 metric tons a month—will be constructed in the area. This would handle copper ore concentrates with a copper content of 35% to 36%. Copper concentrate production was likely to total about 40,000 tons each year.

## CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)

**Brazzaville Names New President :** News Agency reports of January 1 indicate that Army Chief Manen Ngonali has been named the President of Congo (Brazzaville). He immediately announced in a New Year broadcast that presidential elections would be held this year.

Mr. Ngonali who overthrew President Massemba Debat last summer was named President by the National Council of the Revolution, the country's supreme ruling body which he heads. He is a young officer—a paratroop captain—little known outside his own country.

## BURUNDI

**Former Ministers Imprisoned :** In Bujumbwa on December 26, the Government announced that six former Government Ministers and Parliamentarians were each sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for writing and distributing an open letter against President Micombero. Three others arrested in the case last May were imprisoned for terms ranging from three to seven years. Three were acquitted.

Among those sentenced for ten years was the former President of the Legislative Assembly, M. Thadde Siryuyumusi. (*Daily Nation*, December 27).

## MALAWI

**Budget Presented to Parliament :** Presenting his 1969 Budget to Parliament on December 18, Mr. John Tembo, the Finance Minister, announced that Malawi's total expenditure for 1969 would be £20.95 million. The total public sector investment was to amount to about £18 million, of which £4 million would be financed directly through the statutory bodies—the Railways and Air Malawi. The Minister also revealed that eleven loans totalling £16,900,000 had been granted by West Germany, South Africa and Denmark, while four more agreements, covering loans to the tune of £13,400,000, were to be signed shortly with South Africa, Britain, Denmark and the United States.

Mr. Tembo recalled the difficulties that Malawi's economy encountered in 1968 and the various problems and crises which were faced during the year by the world as a whole, particularly in the international monetary field. The Minister noted with particular regret the delay in the implementation of the scheme for doubling the rate of loans by the International Development Association to the developing countries and the signs of a more protectionist approach to international trade by some major industrialized countries. However, the Finance Minister assured that despite the setbacks resulting from sterling devaluation and the unfavourable rains in the country, the gross domestic product had still shown a small increase of about 2 per cent to just over £ 85 million. The non-agricultural sectors of the economy and investment generally also indicated some increase. (*Malawi News Bulletin*, December 18).

**Labour Statistics Unit Established :** A new labour statistics unit was established in Blantyre in November. The unit, the first of its kind anywhere on the African continent, is a three-year project in which the United Nations Development Programme and the Malawi Government will invest 250,000 dollars and 150,000 dollars respectively.

**Malawi Calls for Increased Trade with South Africa :** Mr. Aleke Banda, the Minister for Industries and Trade, during an official visit to South Africa in the beginning of November, appealed for increased investments and trade by South African industrialists. "With the stable political situation in Malawi and the well-known assurances give by our President, that he will not nationalize private industries, I assure South Africans that their investments in Malawi will be safe", Mr. Banda declared.

In South Africa, Mr. Banda sought assistance for the development of consumer industries, hotel industry and the exploitation of the vast bauxite deposits in the Manje Mountain area. The Minister for Industries also indicated his country's preparedness for the establishment of a common market, including Rhodesia, in Southern Africa. Malawi was fully aware of the possibilities and advantages that such a common market held for the participating countries, Mr. Banda said.

At present South Africa's exports to Malawi amount to £1.5 million and imports from Malawi to just over £ 600,000. With the construction of the new capital city, Lilongwe, exports to Malawi are expected to rise. Malawi is also hopeful of improving her exports of processed tea, groundnuts and tobacco to South Africa.

## ZAMBIA

**UNIP Swept Back to Power :** General elections held on December 19 in Zambia following the dissolution of the National Assembly on November 2, brought back into power the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). UNIP won 81 out of the 105 National Assembly seats and the African National Congress won 23. Mr. Nkumbula, leader of the Opposition African National Congress, won his seat into Parliament with a massive majority, polling 9,395 votes compared with only 481 secured by his UNIP rival. (*The Nationalist*, December 21)

President Kaunda was sworn in as President on December 21. In his first press conference after the elections, the President warned Zambian civil servants that they would be in trouble if they did not toe the UNIP line. Dr. Kaunda also announced

the formation of a new Ministry of Rural Affairs under Mr. Reben Kamanga, to co-ordinate development of the rural areas where 80 per cent of Zambia's population resided. Mr. A. Shapi, former Minister of State in the Eastern Province, was assigned the job of provincial Cabinet Minister in the Province of Barotse. The President said, "We cannot allow that Province exposed to South Africa and Angola to stay in the hands of people who do not know what they are doing". (*The Nationalist*, December 24)

**UNIP National Council Meets :** A four-day meeting of the United National Independence Party's National Council opened on November 9 at Mulungushi. In his address to the delegates President Kaunda outlined the changes and plans for future national developments which would need "serious" attention if UNIP was returned to power in the elections. These, the President said, included a defence system in which Zambia would involve "literally everybody"; participation by civil servants, army and police in cultural and sporting activities; reorganization of party and government administration; development for rural areas; an economic programme for 1969-70; and "humanism" as a basis for party membership. A policy of "participatory democracy" designed for "our people's own active participation in day to day affairs" would also be put into effect, the President pointed out. (*Zambia News*, November 10)

**Zambian and Portuguese Troops Clash :** Radio Lusaka in a report broadcast on November 8 stated that Zambian forces had exchanged fire with Portuguese troops in the Katete district of the Eastern Province of Zambia. One Portuguese Commander was killed and four others were reported to be either killed or wounded. As a result of this clash Zambia reinforced military patrols along its frontier with Mozambique.

Again on December 1, President Kaunda said that 18 incendiary bombs had been dropped by Portuguese aircraft on a village near Chipata. Portugal, the President declared, seemed to be waging an undeclared war against Zambia and he warned that Zambia would retaliate "in no small way". The enemy was attempting to disrupt the country by frustrating the general election and the target for the enemy anger was Zambia's "progressive-cum-humanistic" approach to life, he added. (*Times of Zambia*, December 2)

**President Ould Daddah Visits Lusaka :** The Mauritanian President Moktar Ould Daddah visited Zambia early in November during his tour of East and Central Africa. A joint communique issued after talks with President Kaunda on November 4 called for the use of force against the rebels in Rhodesia. The two Presidents also deplored Britain's reluctance to employ effective measures against the Rhodesian rebels and said that any solution to the Rhodesian problem which failed to safeguard the interests of the majority would not be accepted. (*Times of Zambia*, November 5)

## WEST AFRICA

### CAMEROON

**Parliamentary Mandate Extended :** Late in October, by a law unanimously adopted, the mandate of the deputies to the National Assembly—elected in April 1964 for a period of five years—was extended by 15 months. An announcement in Yaounda said the measure had been adopted not for political reasons but to avoid distrac-



tions from "productive activities", interruptions from the normal duties of the administration and to reduce electoral expenditure.

## GABON

**Common Market Extends Loan :** The Common Market's European Investment Bank announced on November 5 its first loan to Gabon, which has been linked to the community since 1964 under the Yaounde Agreement. The 100 million African francs (about £ 160,000) loan will help finance the building of a textile printing factory in Libreville. The total cost of the factory will be 470 million African francs (about £ 783,000).

**New Broadcasting Centre :** President Bongo on December 21 laid the foundation-stone of a 100-kw broadcasting centre near Libreville, which is being built with French Government aid. The centre is to be completed by 1970. (*The Nationalist*, December 22).

## GAMBIA

**Diplomatic Relations with Nationalist China :** Prime Minister Sir Dawda K. Jawara signed on November 12 a joint communique with the Prime Minister of Nationalist China for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Gambia now is the 21st African country to establish diplomatic ties with the Republic. (*The Nationalist*, November 13).

## GHANA

**Constituent Assembly Set Up :** In Accra on November 7 a decree establishing a Constituent Assembly to discuss Ghana's new Constitution was published. Under the revised arrangement earlier announced by General Ankrah, Chairman of the National Liberation Council (NLC), (that the Constituent Assembly was to be brought together on a partly nominated and partly elective basis to ensure reasonable speed in its formation) the Assembly was to have 10 nominated and 140 indirectly elected members.

The Constituent Assembly will have the power to consider the proposals of the Constitutional Commission as included in the draft Constitution drawn up by it. The Assembly's report, when completed, will be forwarded to the NLC. The target date for return to civilian rule is September 1969 (*West Africa*, November 16).

The Constituent Assembly met for the first time in Parliament House in Accra on December 30. The Assembly was formally opened by Lt-Gen Ankrah on January 6. Gen. Ankrah called for a Constitution reflecting the will of the people, ensuring freedom and liberty and eliminating the possibility of a return to tyranny and dictatorship.

**Armed Forces Chief Arrested :** Ghana's Military Government, in a statement issued on November 20, announced that the chief of the country's armed forces, Air Marshal M.A. Otu, had been relieved of his command for alleged complicity in subversive activities. His aide, Lt. Kwapong, had also been placed under arrest till such time as investigations were made. The announcement also stated that Major

General A.K. Ocran, Commander of the Ghana Army, had been appointed Acting Commander of the Armed Forces. (*Ghanaian Times*, November 21).

The Inspector-General of Police and Commissioner for the Interior and National Security, Mr. John Harley, announcing the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry on December 17 said that investigations had revealed that Air Marshal Otu had held meetings with Kwesi Armah in London and formulated plans for the overthrow of the ruling National Liberation Council and the return of deported President Kwame Nkrumah to power by December 24, 1968. The former Defence Chief had also promised plotters that he would arrange the capture of strategic points and simultaneously there would be an announcement on the Ghana Radio network that Nkrumah had returned and was proceeding to the capital.

**Soviet Trawlers Detained :** The Ghana Government in a statement on November 13 said the continued detention of two Soviet fishing vessels in Takrادی Harbour was due to the "recalcitrant attitude of the crew and captains". The two vessels, the statement added, would therefore continue to be held in Takoradi until such time as the captains and crew "co-operated with the police in completing their investigations."

The Soviet trawlers, alleged to have been found within Ghana's territorial waters, had been held on October 10. Investigations by the Ghanaian authorities led them to conclude that "the excuse by the Soviet Embassy in Accra that the trawlers drifted ashore is absolutely unfounded". The trawlers have a crew of two captains and 50 men.

On December 17 while announcing that the Government was establishing a Commission of Enquiry to ascertain the extent of involvement of Air Marshal Otu and his aide Lt. Kwapong with the proscribed Convention People's Party, Mr. John Harley, Vice-Chairman of the ruling National Liberation Council, said that the detention of the two trawlers was linked with Nkrumah's planned return. "It is believed that the trawlers were on a reconnaissance mission," he added. They had been identified by Ghanaian Security officers as two of the three Soviet trawlers based at Conakry and whose officers were in continuous contact with Nkrumah and his advisers, Mr. Harley said.

## GUINEA

**Administrative Reforms :** The Guinean Government recently announced the introduction of several administrative reforms in the country in order to "further improve the running of the administrative and political machine of the nation." Among the measures announced on December 1, are a Cabinet reshuffle, a diplomatic reshuffle and the dissolution of regional commissions for the distribution of imported goods and the managing bodies of the ruling Party in Guinea's four districts. These measures it was hoped would check "abuse of power by state officials and employees, illicit gaining of wealth through border trade and the growing influence of foreign merchants."

Reforms in the country's army were also introduced with a view to stimulating political commitment. It was announced that the army which performed a social friction and the soldiers should be similar to civil servants with their political rights recognized. Accordingly local PDG (Democratic Party of Guinea) committees

were to be elected in the army. It was also announced that the national militia would not be disbanded, being a "viable and useful institution."

## IVORY COAST

**Coffee Crop Destroyed :** The Ivory Coast destroyed 100,000 tons of coffee in storage centres in order to help in the reduction of world stocks, in accordance with the International Coffee Agreement. Since 1965, coffee plants in the country have been forbidden from extending their plantations or creating new ones.

**Chinese Commercial Mission's Visit :** A nine-man Chinese commercial mission visited the country in November to explore the possibilities of commercial exchanges between the Ivory Coast and the Republic of China.

## MALI

**Army Takes Over :** In Bamako a group of army officers overthrew the regime of Mr. Modibo Keita, the country's founding father, who had led this West African nation since it gained independence eight years ago. The coup was first announced on November 19 by Lt. Moussa Traore in a communique over Mali Radio, which said "the dictatorial regime of Modibo Keita is ended today." The communique repeated at frequent intervals said that the National Liberation Military Committee (CMLN) had taken over until such time as "free and democratic" elections could be held. It also explained that the army had overthrown the Government because it had violated "basic democratic principles and individual freedoms."

Later the armed forces backed by tanks guarded strategic points while the CMLN led by Lt Moussa Traore took the country's affairs in hand. Capt. Yoro Diakite, a member of the military junta, was appointed the First Vice-President and called on to form a provisional government. A wave of arrests preceded and followed the take-over. Members of the Government, members of the Committee for Defence of the Revolution, which had since last August managed the affairs of the country, were arrested. Also detained were several army gendarmerie officials, including the Commander-in-Chief Col. Sekou Traore, who refused to go along with the coup.

Commenting on the military coup in Mali, *Le Monde* said that the news had come as a complete surprise for M. Keita was generally popular. There had however been some indications of tension in the single party, the Union Soudanaise—first the Political Bureau of the party was dissolved and in January 1968 the National Assembly. A conflict of generations in the party, the more dogmatic young wanting the Government to move away from close co-operation with France in favour of ties with particularly China (CPR) was according to *Le Monde* one of the reasons for the overthrow of M. Keita. The same conflict of generations was present in the army also. Economic failure, largely attributable to the creation of a national emergency in 1968, and widespread corruption left the onerous task of government to the army, which *Le Monde* says was the only one that was unaffected. (*Le Monde*, November 21)

The formation of the New Government was followed by an announcement by the Prime Minister, Capt Diakite, on November 25, which emphasized the provisional nature of the Government. He said that all attempts would be made by the CMLN to ensure a rapid return to civilian democracy. The Constitution would be revised, a referendum held in June and general and Presidential elections before the end of 1969,

Capt Diakite explained. On the commercial and economic front, policies would be defined in accordance with the country's national interest. The new leaders would "leave the door open to all countries" whether they be from East or West, he concluded.

**Trade Unions Dissolved :** The National Liberation Military Committee, with effect from November 27, dissolved all trade unions throughout the country. The statement issued indicated that this had been undertaken because the events of November 19 had shown that "candidates elected to the offices of the trade union movement are not the genuine representatives of the workers of the Mali Republic."

## MAURITANIA

**President Daddah Tours East and Central Africa :** President Moktar Ould Daddah toured countries of East and Central Africa late in October and early November. Countries visited during the official tour were Tanzania, Zambia, Somalia and the United Arab Republic.

In Cairo on November 7, the Mauritanian President commenting on his tour impressions of East Africa, said that to achieve African unity, "we must transcend the traditional and classic divisions of English and French speaking Africa and seek to know each other better. In this sense, my trip to Zambia, Tanzania and Somalia has had positive results". Referring to exchanges in technical knowledge he expressed that while in Zambia, his delegation has called on the Zambians to help Mauritania benefit from their experience in copper. President Daddah also pointed that Somalia had requested for his good offices with the French Government for the settlement of the "Jibuti problem," but explained "we are not seeking to play a role in this matter. Nevertheless we have always attempted to bring differing viewpoints closer together on every occasion the circumstances allow it especially when such friendly countries as France and Somalia are involved".

**Visit to Syria :** At the end of his State visit to East and Central Africa, the Mauritanian President paid an official visit to Syria from November 8—13. Talks were held in Damascus with the Syrian Prime Minister, Dr. Nur Atasi. A joint communique issued on November 13, after the talks, pledged the joint and absolute support of both countries for liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America and their condemnation of racial discrimination in South Africa and Rhodesia. Further it affirmed the "Mauritanian people's support for their brothers in the Arab homeland and their struggle to the rights of the Arab people in Palestine".

## NIGERIA

**Reports Submitted by International Observers' Team :** The International Observers Team has submitted an Interim Report on December 5 covering a two-month period of their activities and investigations in Nigeria. The report submitted by observers from the U.K., Canada, Sweden and Poland reiterated that they had neither seen nor heard evidence that Federal troops were pursuing a policy of genocide against the Ibos. Furthermore, there was evidence that the fears of the Ibos were being dispelled by the humanitarian treatment that they had received from the Federal troops. For the future, observers pointed that "change in the form of the war will undoubtedly produce a sudden increase in the number of persons requiring food and medical assistance". This, they observed, would outstrip the available resources unless additional aid was soon obtained.

Earlier reports submitted by the Observers Team also denied the various allegations made against the Federal Government. A report submitted on November 4 derided Canadian press reports that Federal Nigerian soldiers had slaughtered at least 500 civilians on October 4, in the Urua Inyang village, near Ikot Ekpene. The reports of the alleged atrocities had been filed by two Canadian journalists after their visit to the war front. They had said that the slaughter had occurred in the village market place. (*The Nationalist*, November 5).

In another Report submitted on November 6, the team observed that Geneva Convention rules for the welfare of prisoners of war were being observed in the camps. No signs of malnutrition in the camps was noticed, but they added there was room for improvement. They also suggested the setting up of "screening tribunals" to examine cases of individual Biafran prisoners of war held in Lagos. (*The Nationalist*, November 7)

**UN Report :** The representative of the UN Secretary General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities, Mr. Nils Goran Gussing, has submitted his third interim report of observations in the war affected areas of Nigeria on November 21. There were no confirmed cases of ill-treatment of civilians in the period since October 23, he said, and no evidence had been found for the accusation of mass killing at Urua Inyang.

Other points made by the representative were that steps had been taken to organize rudimentary schooling in the Calabar camps for displaced persons; co-operation in relief activities among the army, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other agencies seemed to be good; drugs and additional staff were needed by hospitals; the problem of orphans and children whose parents could not be found was likely to become more serious; prisoners of war were overcrowded in cells and he expressed that if detainees were rapidly released it would be the best answer to relax tensions.

**Red Cross to Launch Massive Air Drops of Relief Supplies :** The International Red Cross announced in Umuahia on November 24, its plans to begin massive air drops of relief supplies to Biafra, as soon as permission was secured. Mr. K.M. Jaggi, the Red Cross representative for Biafra, who made the announcement, said his organization believed air drops would be faster, cheaper and safer than the flights now coming into Uli airstrip. However, Mr. Jaggi cautioned against regarding these plans as absolutely certain until the final permission from Biafra was secured. Then again, military and logistic considerations were also involved, he said.

Mr. Jaggi also pointed that as many as 4.5 million displaced persons had been settled by the Red Cross in Biafra's non-combat areas. Since mercy operations started in July 1967 the Red Cross, he said, had brought 4,633 tons of supplies into Biafra while up to 4,000 tons were stockpiled on Santa Isobel. "The operation is known to be the greatest single action the Red Cross has ever carried out in its hundred years of existence", Mr. Jaggi declared. (*The Nationalist*, November 25)

**Return to Civilian Rule Postponed :** The Head of State, Major General Yakubu Gowon, announced in Zaria on November 30, that Nigeria's return to civilian rule in 1969, as had earlier been promised by the Military Government, was likely to be delayed. The war, he said, had upset the timetable. The Supreme Military Council would accordingly review the political and administrative programme at the end of the war and a new target would be set for the country's return to civilian rule. He

assured that as a soldier, he certainly intended to "go back to barracks when our mission has been accomplished", but warned that power would not be handed to any group or individual except those chosen by the peoples themselves. Accepting the need for constitutional and political reforms, General Gowon further disclosed that a Constituent Assembly would be appointed at the end of the war to pave the way for civilian rule on the basis of the present twelve states. (*Daily Times*, December 1).

**Lord Shepherd Has Discussions with Nigerian Leaders :** The British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Shepherd, visited Lagos for discussions of the Nigerian situation with General Gowon. A joint communique issued at the end of talks on December 17 reported that General Gowon had restated the determination of his Government and the people of Nigeria to continue measures to end Ojukwu's rebellion. Lord Shepherd reaffirmed his Government's support for the Federal Military Government and for an early settlement of the conflict within the framework of a United Nigeria. The British Minister also assured that his country supported the OAU's efforts to effect a settlement.

The communique further expressed that both General Gowon and Lord Shepherd had agreed that the opening of land routes was the only effective means of assuring that supplies would reach the war-affected areas. However, since the Biafran rebel leadership had refused this proposal they called on them not to exploit starvation for political purposes.

Commenting on Lord Shepherd's visit to Lagos, Tanzania's *Nationalist* welcomed the efforts at settlement but pointed : "Surely Lord Shepherd is not so naive as not to realize that the arms Britain is providing for the Federal Forces are a direct means of prolonging the conflict. The West Germans and even Portugal have withdrawn their military aid." Britain, Russia and Egypt were mentioned as the only ones who were through their arms assistance aiding in the killing and maiming of thousands of Biafrans. "Surely it is time for the OAU to step in with more vigour and help bring about a settlement," the *Nationalist* concluded.

**British Labour MPs. Put Forth Four-point Plan :** Two Labour politicians Lord Brockway and Mr. James Griffiths, on their return from Biafra's temporary capital Umnabia, reported on December 13 that Colonel Ojukwu had conditionally accepted the principle of ceasefire within the framework of a four-point plan elaborated by the Peace-in-Nigeria Committee. Lord Brockway is the president of this inter-party committee in the British Parliament.

The peace-plan comprises an immediate cease-fire, the presence of international observers, negotiations after a period of stabilization and a large-scale food relief programme.

**Equatorial Guinea Suspends Flights to Biafra :** The Government of Equatorial Guinea announced the suspension of all flights from Fernando Po to Biafran territory as of December 21. The Island of Fernando Po, a major port of Equatorial Guinea, is alleged to be one of the two main centres from where flights into Nigeria are made under arrangement with the rebels. The other is the Portuguese island of Sao Tome in the Atlantic Ocean.

**Co-operation Agreement with USSR :** A general agreement providing for technical aid and co-operation between Nigeria and the USSR was signed in Lagos on

November 21. Under the terms of the agreement, details of which are to be worked out later, provision is made for the exchange of experts, probationers and trainees in various fields and an extension of credit to finance survey and development projects.

**Trade Agreement with UAR :** The Nigerian Federal Government signed a trade agreement with the UAR on November 16. Under the agreement which aimed at doubling the volume of trade between the two countries, the UAR will export cotton and silk textiles, cement, clothing, shoes, tyres and industrial products to the value of £ 5,800,000. Nigeria will in turn export to the UAR palm oil, raw leather and timber.

## SIERRA LEONE

**Emergency Declared :** Following the army coup d'etat in Mali, the Sierra Leone Government declared a state of emergency throughout the country with effect from November 20. News of this emergency was broadcast to the nation from Free-town by the Prime Minister Mr. Siaka Stevens who said that the action was necessary following an outbreak of violence involving loss of life and property in several districts of the country. Reports also indicate that several people were arrested following the army and police operations.

## SENEGAL

**Soviet Union to Help in the Development of Fisheries :** The Soviet Vice-Minister for Fishing, addressing a press conference on December 10 at the end of four-day talks with Senegal authorities, said that the two countries were to exchange scientific information and details of sea fishing experiments. The Soviet Union had also agreed to supply Senegal with fishing boats. The December conference was the second meeting between Senegalese and Soviet fishing experts and forms part of a programme on sea fishing included in an agreement signed three years ago. (*Malawi News Bulletin*, December 11).

## EAST AFRICA

**East African Community Inaugurates New Flag :** For the first time, on November 5, the East African Community flag was put up at the Community headquarters in Arusha. The blue, green, red, gold, black and white flag combines the main colours of the three national flags of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya and carries three red stars symbolizing the three states. (*The Nationalist*, November 6)

**East African Community Legislative Assembly Meets In Nairobi :** President Kenyatta on November 12 inaugurated the third session of East African Community's Legislative Assembly in Nairobi. In his address to the members, President Kenyatta said that since the formation of the Community co-operation had not been restricted strictly to the Treaty's framework and the partner states acting together had led to the conclusion of the Arusha Convention with the European Economic Community in July 1968. The eventual aim, however, the President emphasized, "must be to establish an East African Common Market free of all restrictions." (*Daily Nation*, November 13).

**Student Unrest in East Africa :** The malaise of student unrest which

started in Tanzania last year is being increasingly felt in the universities and colleges of East Africa. The Kenya Government recently closed down the University College in Nairobi and packed off home its 1,800 inmates, including over 200 of Indian and Pakistani origin. The trouble in Nairobi arose as a result of the Government refusing to allow the Opposition Kenya Peoples Union leader, Mr. Oginga Odinga, to address the students. Soon after, supporting the cause of the Nairobi students, students of Kampala's Makerere College staged a demonstration and organized a twenty-four hour strike. A copy of the *East African Standard*, which had denounced the action of the Nairobi students, was ceremoniously set ablaze. An attempt was also made to send a delegation to Nairobi for talks with President Kenyatta but this was refused entry into Kenya.

The trouble in the University College Dar-es-Salaam last year arose when President Nyerere directed that students should serve in the Tanzania National Youth Service to work on various social projects. The students defied the orders and boycotted lectures.

## ETHIOPIA

**Fourth Parliamentary Elections Scheduled for June-July 1969 :** In Ethiopia, the fourth parliamentary elections for the Chamber of Deputies is due to be held between June 8 and July 7, 1969. Radio Addis Ababa announced on December 10 that about 8 million voters and 2,000 candidates were expected to register their names before the closing date on March 9.

The Director of the Election Administration Department, Mr. A.T. Gebre Yesus, said that correction of errors in the last three general elections and the intensive efforts which had been made by the election board to help people exercise their civil rights were expected to raise the electorate by 30% and candidature by 50% over the 1965 election records. Mr. Gebre Yesus added that the Central Board had been making efforts to encourage people to participate in the elections through programmes, magazines, pamphlets and posters. There would be 1,272 registration centres and 890 polling stations in the 135 electoral districts throughout the country, he added. (*Ethiopian Herald*, December 12)

**International Labour Organization's Seminar in Addis Ababa :** The International Labour Organization held a Seminar on the role of workers' and employers' organizations in the economic and social development in Africa in Addis Ababa early in December. The Seminar was attended by 18 African countries—eight from governments, eight from employers' organizations and eight from workers' organizations together with participants from the African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC), the All-Africa Trade Union Federation (AATUF), and the Pan African Union of Christian Workers. Observers from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the Organization for African Unity (OAU) also attended the Seminar.

The International Labour Organization's working paper tracing the history of trade unionism stated that though, as elsewhere, African trade unions arose as movements of protest against exploitation of workers, trade unionism in Africa was different from its counterpart in industrialized countries, in that, it was organized also as a protest against the position accorded to African workers as compared to those of European origin, who enjoyed considerable privileges as regards wages, working conditions and skills. The paper stated that, with few exceptions, "colonial authorities tried to keep the trade unions within the limits of a strictly economic role." In recent years, however, trade unions in Africa were playing a more active role in the



promotion of institutions such as co-operatives. The paper reported that co-operatives had been established by trade unions in Madagascar in production, marketing consumption and fishing and also on large scales in Kenya and Tunisia. Also a number of economic ventures such as partnership in factories, operation of farms, of restaurants, etc. had been undertaken by the Workers' Development Corporation of the Tanzanian trade union organization. It was recommended that to carry out their developmental activities trade unions in Africa should have a sound financial base.

The Conference Report, adopted on December 11, stated the necessity of political stability and harmonious industrial relations, as the two main conditions, for the development of employer and work organizations and their participation in African development. Employer and work organizations "should now think of themselves as complementary organizations which, independently of the divergent interests of their members, had a common objective to secure social and economic development of their countries", the Report added. To secure industrial harmony and collaboration, the Report said, worker and employer organizations must be fully conscious of their rights and duties and must be able to carry out their responsibilities. The Report also emphasized the need for education and training at all levels of, and for all persons performing tasks with a bearing on development. (*Ethiopian Herald*, December 5 and 12)

## KENYA

**Kenya-Somali Joint Talks :** A Somali delegation led by the Governor of Lower Juba Region, Dr. Abdulla Sheikh Ali, had talks with Kenya Government officials in Mombassa early in November. Matters of mutual interest were discussed and agreement reached on the maintenance of law and order on the common frontiers between the two countries. It was also agreed to maintain regular contacts between the two countries in order to strengthen friendship and goodwill.

Earlier, Mr. Mohammed Haji Ebrahim Egal, the Somali Prime Minister, in Nairobi for the "African-American Dialogues Conference", expressed a sincere hope that there would be "no looking back" on the prevailing good relations between Kenya and Somali. The co-operation existing at both the lower and higher levels in the two countries would, he hoped, lead to a federation.

The Prime Minister also observed that for the first time Kenya had given seats to Somali students at the University College, Nairobi, and there was also a great deal of co-operation in the Desert Locust Control Organization. An agreement had already been reached between the two governments to investigate joint projects along the border for rural development. An inter-territorial highway, initially linking Kisumu to Nairobi and finally Addis Ababa, was also in the making, the Somali Prime Minister added. (*The Standard* (Tanzania), November 25)

**Chinese Protest Note to Kenya :** In a protest note published on October 31, the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi accused the Kenya Government of sabotaging relations between the two countries. The Kenya Press was accused of covering news about "the bogus national day of the Chiang Kai-shek clique". Ministers' wives were said to have visited Taiwan as guests of the Nationalist Government, and the Kenya Government was alleged to be "working in the service of U.S. imperialism". (*East African Standard*, November 1)

The Kenya Ministry of Home Affairs categorically rejected the Chinese (PR) protest note "for its insulting tone and baseless insinuations against the Kenya Government." (*Daily Nation*, November 2)

**Public Offices to Display Portrait of President Kenyatta :** The Kenya Government has warned that steps would be taken against public offices not displaying a portrait of President Jomo Kenyatta. A Ministry of Information statement said that failure to display the portrait would "amount to great disrespect for the Head of the Republic". (News Agency Report, November 29)

**"African-American Dialogues" Conference :** The first annual conference of an "African-American Dialogues" series met in Nairobi from November 19th to 22nd. The conference was attended by twenty leading Africans and Americans. The subjects of the first dialogues were "The Myths and Realities in African-American Understanding" and the problems and prospects of African development.

Both sides unanimously agreed that Southern Africa's racial structure was having "corrosive effects" not only on race relations throughout the world but also on African-American relations.

*Agence France Presse* reported that while there were several areas of agreement, delegates had to acknowledge large areas of genuine misunderstanding. However, the eventual development of African countries and better understanding in Africa, it noted, would go a long way in helping the Negro community in the United States. Conversely, the bettering of race relations in America was regarded as of great benefit to Africa. (*Daily Nation*, November 20).

## SOMALI

**President Daddah Visits Somali :** President Ould Daddah of Mauritania paid a four day official visit to Somali. In Mogadishu, President Daddah was welcomed by the Somali President, Dr. Abdirrahid Ali Shermarke, members of the Government and other officials.

At a banquet on November 14, President Shermarke requested the Mauritanian President to intercede with the French Government to grant the Afar and Issa Territory the right to self-determination and independence. The Afar and Issa Territory was one of the five regions into which colonialism had divided "Greater Somalia." He realized that the incorporation of those regions still under foreign control was written into the Somali Constitution. The Somali Government, President Shermarke added, would, however, spare no efforts to try to solve the problem of Jibuti in conformity with the principle of the right of self-determination. (*Somali News*, November 18).

**Cultural Co-operation with Czechoslovakia :** Somalia and Czechoslovakia signed a cultural co-operation agreement in Mogadishu on November 13. The prescribed plan is a continuation of the cultural agreement which began in 1962 and which has been renewed annually ever since. As in previous agreements, delegations will be exchanged between the two countries and Somalia would receive scholarships and school equipment from Czechoslovakia. There are at present about 40 Somali students in Czechoslovakia. (*Somali News*, November 15).

## TANZANIA

**"Operation Vijana" Launched :** The TANU Youth League (TYL) announced its plans for the launching of "Operation Vijana." The Chairman of the Central Committee of the TYL, Mr. L.N. Sijaona, said that 500 TYL leaders would launch the operation in Dar-es-Salaam at dawn on January 1, 1969, "to wipe out all lumpen and renegade practices, foster national culture, and carry forward the Tanzanian Revolution." He further explained that "Operation Vijana" was a permanent ideological instrument of the Tanzanian cultural revolution, and would wage a "relentless war against all foreign dehumanising practices whose end results are to turn the people into more caricatures." A number of people engaged in these "shameful malpractices" of wearing wigs, tight tubular trousers, mini-skirts and using acidic bleaches on their skins, had responded to the TYL call for cultural emancipation, Mr. Sijaona said. (*The Nationalist*, December 30).

**East African Muslim Society Banned :** The Tanzanian Government declared the Tanzania branch and the Tanzania Council of the East African Muslim Welfare Society to be unlawful societies as of December 19, under the provisions of the Societies Ordinance. At the same time a certificate of exemption was granted to the National Muslim Council of Tanzania, the new body formed as a result of the split in the Society earlier in the month.

The first Vice-President, Sheikh Abeid Karume, a staunch and Quran learned Muslim in his own right, in an opening address to the 13 breakaway branches who met at Iringa on December 13, denounced the East African Muslim Welfare Society. The Society, he said, pursued policies which were antagonistic to the policies of TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party. These "hostile policies" of the Society were started during the first days of the formation of TANU and were intended to "perpetuate capitalistic practices for the benefit of foreigners," at the cost of workers and peasants. The Tanzanian first Vice-President called on the Tanzanian people to undertake the leadership of the Muslims "without any attachment to pretenders from outside." (*The Nationalist*, December 20).

**Former Minister Released :** President Nyerere on December 22 ordered the release of Mr. Abdulla Quasim Hanga, a former Minister responsible for the affairs of Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union and a Vice-President of Zanzibar. Mr. Hanga was alleged to have claimed that the army in Zanzibar wanted him to take over the Island's Government. (*Tass*, December 22).

**U.S. "Peace Corps" to Leave :** According to a report in *The Nationalist* the American "Peace Corps" workers in the country would have to leave by August 1969. The report said that at present there were 75 such workers in Tanzania. (*The Nationalist*, November 25).

**Russians Help in Tanzania Study :** Russia has promised to assist Tanzania in accelerating prospecting and geological studies, which would have priority in the next Five-Year Development Plan to be launched in June. Accordingly about 100 Russian geologists are due to arrive in Tanzania next month. The Tanzanian Cabinet, early in January, completed a study of the main features of the Plan, wherein emphasis is placed on agriculture, but education, tourism, mineral resources and communications would all be given special attention. (*The London Times*, January 6, 1969).

**Border Incident :** The *Times of Zambia* reported that a police spokesman on December 5 said that a Tanzanian policeman had been killed and others injured when Portuguese soldiers opened fire on them while they were fishing in the Rovuma River between Tanzania and Mozambique on December 1.

**Soviet Naval Squadron in Dar-es-Salaam :** A Soviet Naval Squadron on an official visit to Tanzania visited its port capital Dar-es-Salaam on December 16. Another Soviet squadron recently paid a visit to the Kenyan port Mombassa. (*Malawi News*, December 13).

## UGANDA

**"Uganda Will Move to the Left" Says President Obote :** Speaking to a student meeting at his old school, Busoga College, President Obote said that Uganda was looking to the East for development aid and that the country would soon move to the left politically. Uganda was not aligned to either the Western or Eastern blocs, "but you can see signs that Uganda is leaning more towards the East". He added, "Our association of 60 years with Britain cannot be dismissed. But the recent achievements of the eastern countries cannot also be dismissed.....There has been trade with them, student exchanges, and an Eastern country (the Soviet Union) is training the Uganda Air Force." (*East African Standard*, November 4).

**Uganda-Sudan Border Clashes Investigated :** The Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs have denied reports published in the "Uganda Argus" and by foreign news agencies alleging that the Uganda Government had claimed compensation to the value of £ 250,000 from neighbouring Sudan over an incident in May when Sudanese armed forces entered a Ugandan village in pursuit of Southern Sudanese opposed to the Khartoum Government. The story, the statement said, was contrary to the known facts and was "mischievous and malicious." The figures submitted by the Government of Uganda to the Government of Sudan amounted to £ 31,000 and the claim was submitted as a result of the agreement reached at the Uganda-Sudan Ministerial talks in August in Kampala.

An official announcement on December 10 reported that clashes between rival groups of Sudanese on the Uganda-Sudan border had been investigated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Uganda Armed Forces, Major General Idi Amin. The announcement also stressed the Uganda Government's policy of non-interference and that refugees from the Sudan should report themselves immediately to the authorities in Uganda. No refugees would be allowed to enter Uganda carrying weapons of any kind, the announcement added. (*Uganda Argus*, December 7 and 11).

**Ceylon Trade Delegation in Kampala :** A five man delegation from Ceylon headed by the Minister of Commerce and Trade, Mr. Hugh Fernando, studied how trade relations with Uganda could be improved. The delegation also visited Kenya and Malawi. (*East African Standard*, November 6).

## NORTH AFRICA

### ALGERIA

**Former Ministers Released :** Three former members of M. Ben Bella's Government arrested on June 19, 1965, when Colonel Boumedienne came to power,

have been released. These are: M. Ben Alla, the former President of the National Assembly; M. Nekkache, the former Minister of Health; and the former Delegate Minister to the Presidency, M. Abderrahmane Cherif. The former President, M. Ben Bella, however, is still detained in a prison of unknown location.

**"Revolutionary Court" to be Established :** The Algerian Press Service on November 6 announced the setting up of a 'Revolutionary Court', "to defend the state and the Revolution against all the unhealthy forces which wish to hinder the state to build up, and the people to realize the Revolution." (*The Nationalist*, November 6).

**Labour Agreement with France :** Negotiations with France on the question of immigrant labour were concluded with the drawing up of a new agreement. The agreement states that a quota of 35,000 Algerian workers would be admitted to France each year and free circulation between the two countries would be maintained. Algerians resident in France would be given a residence permit valid for either five or ten years, issued and renewable automatically. This new agreement replaces the one of April 1964, by which the number of workers admitted to France was restricted to 12,000.

**Economic and Trade Co-operation with USSR :** In Algiers, after almost six weeks of negotiations, a seven-year economic and trade agreement was concluded with the Soviet Union late in December. Under the agreement which marked a new turn in Algeria-Soviet co-operation, Algeria would export substantial amount of wine and oil to the Soviet Union in exchange for capital goods and technical assistance. Also, Algeria-Soviet trade exchanges were expected to reach an estimated £ 54 million in 1969 as compared to a total of £ 23 million this year. (*Malawi News Bulletin*, December 30).

**Reconciliation with Cuba :** Reporting the visit of M. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Havana on November 4, *Le Monde* commented, that the visit was designed "to wipe out the misunderstanding of the past and open a new era in relations between Cuba and Algeria." *Le Monde* further added that M. Bouteflika had been attacked by Fidel Castro in 1965 on the grounds that he was mainly responsible for the fall of M. Ben Bella. Relations between the two countries had started improving in June 1967 when after the Middle East crisis, a Cuban Ambassador was appointed to replace the Charge d' Affaires. The visit to Algiers of a member of the political bureau of the Cuban Communist Party in July 1968 further helped towards reconciliation, *Le Monde* concluded. (*Le Monde*, November 6).

## LIBYA

**Independence Day Celebrated :** Libya celebrated its 17th Independence anniversary on December 24, with rallies in major cities, a big military parade in Tripoli and the inauguration of Libyan television. Royal decrees were issued promoting nearly 400 officers in the Armed Forces. Prime Minister Gaddafi said in a special address that Libya had developed its defences and equipped its forces with modern weapons, fighter aircraft and naval units. He affirmed that Libya's policy in the Arab world sprang from "our deep belief in our religion and Arabism and in the common interest and destiny we share with our brothers" and that his Government would do everything to resist Zionist aggression.

## SUDAN

**Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference Meets at Khartoum :** An International Conference in support of the peoples of Portuguese colonies in Africa and those of South Africa, South West Africa and Rhodesia, sponsored by the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization and the World Council of Peace met in Khartoum from January 18-20. The Conference attended by 200 delegates from 50 countries adopted resolutions which supported African liberation movements and called for the isolation of South Africa and Rhodesia. The host country Sudan's proposal for the formation of an African army to fight alongside the African freedom fighters was unanimously adopted. The delegates also called for a campaign for captured freedom fighters to be considered as prisoners of war and requested friendly countries to accept or provide travel documents to them. South Africa and Rhodesia, the Conference said, should be isolated by the boycott of their goods. Further, it recommended the launching of a campaign for the release of all political prisoners in these countries.

**Universities Closed :** The Egyptian University in Khartoum was closed indefinitely on November 13 following demonstrations when 19 students were injured and 26 arrested. Students demanded the dissolution of the Moslem Brotherhood, a local political group.

Khartoum University was closed earlier on November 8 following a violent clash between Moslem and Communist students in which 25 were injured. The clash occurred when students affiliated to the Moslem Brotherhood broke into the University's auditorium where the Communist-dominated National Cultural Society was presenting a folklore show.

**Road Link with UAR :** An agreement was drawn up with the UAR for building a road to link Cairo and Khartoum through the New Valley. The 1,050-kilometre road to be constructed at a cost of approximately £11 million is expected to step up trade exchanges between the two countries and to stimulate mutual investment.

**President Azhaki's Talks with West African State Leaders :** President Azhaki paid a state visit to Niger where he held talks with the heads of state of Niger, Mali, Nigeria and Upper Volta and made contact with the Presidents of Togo and Dahomey. On his return to Khartoum on November 6, the President said, "All of them agreed to support the liberation movements and African unity." Further, he added that his visit to the West African countries opened "a new phase in the Sudan's relations with all her African neighbours." The Niger Conference had given him the opportunity to put forward the Arab cause to major African leaders, he said. (*The Nationalist*, November 7).

**Frontier Problems Discussed with Chad :** Delegations from Chad and the Sudan discussed the frontier disputes between the two countries at Fort Lamy (Chad) in the first week of November. The leader of the 10-man Sudanese delegation expressed that the talks between the two countries would "strengthen relations and help solve the development problems of both countries." In August 1966 Chad closed its border with the Sudan, alleging that raiders were operating from the Sudanese territory. The Sudan had also charged that attacks on its border villages were made

by raiders from Chad. Sporadic violence and disputes continued later even though the two countries had concluded agreements in December 1966 and September 1967.

## TUNISIA

**Security Chief Dismissed :** The Director General of National Security, M. Tahar Belkhodja, was dismissed in December and replaced by Mr. Hassan Dabbu. Charges brought against Mr. Belkhodja said that he had indulged in "abuses of authority and had taken on institutional reforms prejudicial to the proper functioning of the services under his care without consultation with his superiors." An enquiry was opened into the matter of his and others dismissed from service.

The International Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in Tunisia, in a communique issued, stated that M. Belkhodja and other officials "were in direct control of the repression.....in March against the University of Tunis. "They allowed and encouraged the use of torture.....during the investigation and trials." The communique called on the Tunisian Government to release all those in prison and to hold a new trial.

**First African Seminar on Business Management :** The first African Seminar on Business Management opened on December 9, in the Tunisian Port Bizerta. Delegates from 26 African countries attended the Seminar. Tunisia's Planning and Finance Minister, M. Ahmed Ben Salah, said that he hoped that the Seminar would demonstrate to rich countries that developing nations had an intellectual, scientific and technical contribution to make to economic development. The Seminar ended on December 20.

## UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

**Elections for National Assembly :** President Nasser on November 14 signed a decree dissolving the country's National Assembly which was elected for a five-year term in March 1964. Radio Cairo which announced this decree reported that new elections would be held on January 8 and 13 to elect a new National Assembly. The new Assembly was to meet on January 20.

The 360-man Assembly was regarded as discredited by most Egyptians because of its failure to keep up with the people's desire for urgent reforms. Then again, it had lost all prestige since Egypt's defeat by Israel in the 1967 June War.

**Popular Defence Army Formed :** On November 3, UAR Information Minister, Mohammed Fayek, announced that subsequent to Israel's raid on October 31 on civil installations along the Upper Nile, recruiting centres for the new "Popular Defence Army" were opened in all parts of Egypt. The Minister stated that the Cabinet had reviewed steps to mobilize the nation's human, political and ideological resources to be prepared for war.

President Nasser soon afterwards on November 15, ordered the formation of a National Defence Council under him, to meet any emergency situation, such as in the event of an outbreak of war.

**Universities Closed :** All Egyptian universities and higher education institutions were closed indefinitely on November 24, following renewed student unrest. The official announcement said the suspension of studies followed demonstrations and a

sit-in by engineering students at Alexandria University "in order to give no opportunity to elements of division and anarchy." The Alexandria demonstrations started after discussions of earlier clashes between students and police at the delta town of Mansura on the issue of new regulations requiring a high pass percentage of marks.

This is the second time in 1968 that the universities have been closed—the first was in February following student and worker demonstration.

Three days after the election for the National Assembly, on December 18, the Minister of National Guidance, Mohammed Fayek announced that Egyptian universities would be reopened on January 11. (*The Nationalist*, December 19).

**Students to Be Tried :** *Al Ahram* reported on December 16, that students and other persons who committed offences during the November demonstrations in Mansura and Alexandria were to be tried by the State Supreme Security Court. No date for the trial was given, but the newspaper said, that the accused would be tried for sabotage, arson and participation in violent demonstrations. These charges, it was reported, were drawn up after an official investigation into the activities of the arrested, believed to number 400.

**ASU Meets in Special Session :** Following the closure of Egyptian universities a special session of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) National Congress was summoned to lay down guarantees to prevent a recurrence of such irresponsibility by students. Their activities, the ASU said, might have been "inspired by others" and "could be exploited by the same elements which exploited the student demonstrations in France."

The National Congress, after deliberations, resolved to pursue a firm policy towards the minority which caused disturbances and thereby apply the principle of the sovereignty of law to safeguard public security and the supreme interests of the country. The Congress, which met in December, also underlined the "importance of consolidating political action among the youth of the universities, higher institutes and schools and that the foundation should be laid for a sound scientific method of effective political schooling in all stages of education."

**Gromyko Visits Cairo :** The USSR Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, visited Cairo from December 21-24 for talks with President Nasser on "questions interesting the Soviet Union and the UAR." A joint communique issued at the end of talks reaffirmed the USSR's "complete support for the just struggle of the UAR and other Arab countries in order to eradicate the consequences of Israeli aggression." Israel's policy of territorial expansion, the two countries agreed, had been responsible for the failure of the establishment of peace in the Middle East. Her refusal to implement the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and her continued occupation of territories in three Arab countries, constituted "a continuous and persistent aggression against the sovereignty and security of the Arab states as well as a serious violation of the basic principles of the UN Charter."

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### FRFEDQM MOVEMENTS

**FRELIMO Guerilla Activity Intensified :** The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), in a communique issued in Dar-es-Salaam, disclosed that 12 Portuguese



military aircraft had been destroyed by FRELIMO freedom fighters at Mued airfield in the Cabo Delgado Province in August. "The attack was launched by our fighters as a reprisal against the intensification of the enemy's air raids," the report said on November 7, and explained that during the last few months the Portuguese being unable to advance on land had intensified their air raids in an attempt to "terrorise the population and to destroy the crops." (*The Nationalist*, November 7).

In December, FRELIMO announced that more than a hundred troops were killed by freedom fighters during encounters in September and October. Nine Portuguese army trucks were also destroyed in eleven ambushes, the report issued in Dar-es-Salaam added. These successes were gained in the Tete Province along the Zambazi River.

*The Nationalist* reported on December 11 that a communique issued on December 10 from the FRELIMO office in Dar-es-Salaam stated that FRELIMO was intensifying its attacks against the Portuguese. These included mine operations, ambushes and assaults against the enemy bases especially in the Cabo Delgado and Nissa provinces. The communique further added, "The Portuguese have been forced to acknowledge the extensive development of our struggle. In the liberated areas, our control is being consolidated by developing production, building more schools and establishing a People's Administration."

**Advance in Angola :** The President of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), M. Neto, in an interview broadcast by the "Voice of Freedom" (Radio Algiers) on November 17 stated that guerillas were now operating in nine of the fifteen districts in Angola. In the areas controlled by his organization—the North and South East—M. Neto claimed that the enemy was now forced to move its troops only by air.

**Swedish Support for Nationalists :** The Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Torsten Nilson, announced recently that Sweden would extend study grants to members of African Liberation Movements. This action was parallel to Sweden's policy of opposition to South Africa's apartheid and Portuguese colonialism.

## BOTSWANA

**President Calls for Settlement of Rhodesian Issue :** Sir Seretse Khama, President of Botswana, in his opening address to the third session of the country's National Assembly appealed to Britain and Rhodesia to settle their independence dispute peacefully. "A negotiated and just settlement between the United Kingdom Government and the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Mr. Smith's illegal regime is in the interests of Botswana," Sir Seretse added. But, he said, the problems of Rhodesia, like that of another Botswana neighbour South West Africa should be solved, "without abandoning the principles of fundamental rights and freedom to which their inhabitants are entitled," so that "Southern Africa will one day consist of an association of states committed to democracy and non-racialism." (*Malawi News Bulletin*, December 10).

## MADAGASCAR

**Women's Congress :** A Women's Congress sponsored by the International Council of Social Democratic Women on "Women's Contribution to Social Development" met in Tananarive on November 16. Representative women from 24 countries

studied women's participation in the union movement, the division of responsibilities in public life, the role of women's organizations in rural districts in developing countries and the outlook for international co-operation by these organizations. Final resolutions adopted, included a call for a women's "statute" to enable women to play their role in modern society.

**Japanese Commercial Mission in Tananarive :** The *Malawi News Bulletin* on December 6 reported that a Japanese commercial mission had visited the country for two weeks. The mission, the second to be sent from Japan and to be followed by a third consisting of representatives from the Japanese Ministries of Agriculture and Health and interested Japanese firms, examined the possibility of importing meat from the Malagasy Republic.

## RHODESIA

**'Fearless' Proposals Rejected by ZANU :** The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), in a "sophisticated and well-phrased analysis" of the 'Fearless' White Paper, prepared by its imprisoned leader, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, unreservedly rejected the proposals as being incompatible with the party principles of self-determination and non-racialism. Referring to the United Nations Resolution 1514, assuring all people the right to self-determination, ZANU declared the proposals to be unacceptable as a basis for the country's Constitution as they were "an attempt to sell the inalienable right to self-determination of the 500,000 Africans of the country to 220,000 white settlers." Britain's grant of independence to South Africa in 1910, before majority rule, the document said, had led to the African majority there becoming slaves to the white minority. In the light of this fact, ZANU refused to allow the creation of a similar situation in Rhodesia.

The ZANU analysis also covered the British Government's list of six principles. The devices supposed to prevent retrogressive amendment of the Independence Constitution—the blocking quarter and the referendum—were merely "paper safeguards", Sithole said. They were "unrealistic and plain hypocrisy on the part of the British Government." Mr. Wilson's "double blocking device", the appeal to Privy Council in London, was to the ZANU leaders "a ridiculous safeguard," in that there was just such a judgment outstanding at the present time—the Madzimbamuto Case—and the local courts and the Rhodesian police in Salisbury had refused to enforce it and set the prisoner free. In view of this situation, Mr. Sithole asked, if an independent regime under Mr. Smith or any future successor should be checked by a Privy Council ruling in London, who will enforce it?

The ZANU document, the *Guardian* reported on December 12, was delivered by the Party's London representative to Mr. George Thompson, the British Minister responsible for Rhodesia, early in December. How it was smuggled out of the Salisbury prison where Mr. Sithole and his colleagues had been held since UDI three years ago, was still a mystery, the *Guardian* commented.

Recent reports from Lusaka indicate that Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole has been removed from the Salisbury prison to a remote prison in the Goromonzi area. ZANU confirmed these reports and said that Mr. Sithole was to face new charges under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. Another African nationalist leader, Mr. Joshua Nkomo of the banned Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), is also believed to have been removed to a remote part of the country and served with new orders restricting him to camp for five years. (*The Nationalist*, December 12).

On February 11, Press Agency reports stated that the African nationalist leader, Ndabaningi Sithole, has been jailed for six years on charges of incitement to

murder Rhodesian Premier Ian Smith and two of his Cabinet Ministers. Mr. Justice John Lewis, who presided over the trial with two assessors, said the finding in the letter smuggled out of Salisbury jail instructing an outside contact to hire paid killers to assassinate the three Ministers was unanimous.

**Rhodesia Celebrates Third Anniversary of UDI:** On November 11, Rhodesia celebrated the third anniversary of "Universal Declaration of Independence." A new Rhodesian flag was introduced to replace the Union Jack and the former Rhodesian flag. Green and white in colour, the flag bears the three emblems significant in Rhodesian history—the Zimbabwe bird, a relic of previous occupation; the lion and thistles from Rhodesia armorial bearings and the golden pick-axe on a green ground representing the country's pioneering prospectors and farmers. Speaking at the ceremony Mr. Dupont the Officer Administering the Government said that "the introduction of the new Rhodesian flag was one method of showing beyond all shadow of doubt that Rhodesia was a free and independent country. UDI, three years ago, was a logical step in view of Rhodesia's conduct of her affairs since she obtained self-government in 1923." (*Rhodesian Herald*, November 11).

**Commonwealth Sanctions Committee Calls for Effective UN Action:** The 20-nation Sanctions Committee of the Commonwealth called for more effective United Nations action to plug breaches in the international ban on trade with Rhodesia. The Committee, composed of London-based High Commissioners, in its report listed violations of embargoes by traders in France, West Germany, Japan and the United States along with Portugal and South Africa. The Committee recommended the sanctions ordered by the Security Council last May to be strengthened. (*Malawi News Bulletin*, December 5).

**Reprieves Granted:** The Rhodesian Executive Council after a meeting in Salisbury on December 10 announced that death sentences passed on 25 Africans were commuted to life imprisonment. The case of the remaining condemned prisoners—totalling 93—the Ministry of Information said, had still to be considered by the Cabinet. Those given mandatory death sentences under the Law and Order Maintenance Act were African guerillas convicted of entering the country with weapons of war. Recently this clause in the Act was withdrawn leaving to judicial discretions the right to impose sentences.

Earlier in 1968 the Executive Council reprieved 44 Africans following the hanging in March of five Africans who had been convicted of murder. They were not involved in guerilla activities. Since March, there have been no executions in Rhodesia. (*The Nationalist*, December 11)

## SOUTH AFRICA

**New Constitutional Arrangements for Bantustan:** The Government of South Africa announced the grant of increased responsibilities to the Tswana Territorial Authority in December. Mr. M.C. Botha, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, while making the new concessions of an African Executive Committee and the Bantustan's own embryo civil service, told the Tswana people, "You are entering a phase of self-government—the reins are now in your hands." Where formerly the control and administration of the Government, M. Botha explained, was arranged in consultation with the Departments of Bantu Administration and Development and Bantu Education, now they would be administered by the Tswana Territorial Authority.

**South Africa Launches Guided Missile :** An entirely indigenously developed and manufactured guided missile was successfully launched by South Africa from the St. Lucia Bay Missile Testing Site on December 17. Mr. Botha, the Minister of Defence said that the projectile base was being developed to ensure that South African fighting forces kept abreast of the most modern techniques in defence weapons. The Minister added the fears that South Africa would expand the base to handle intercontinental rockets were totally unfounded.

**Nuclear Power Station to be Set Up :** The *Financial Gazette* (South Africa) said on November 22, that construction of South Africa's first nuclear power station was expected to start by 1971. The project, to cost an estimated £56 million, would have an initial power output of 400 megawatts and would be set up at a site about 80 miles from Cape Town.

**Japan to Construct New Steel Mill :** Japanese consortium has won a £10.5 million contract for the construction of a steel slabbing and drilling mill. The mill, which is to be among the world's biggest with a production capacity of nearly 1.5 million tons of semi-finished steel plates and slabs a year, is expected to go into production by 1970.

## SOUTH WEST AFRICA

**Extensive Police Sweep of the Caprivi Strip :** Early in December, about 60 people from the South African administered Caprivi Strip fled to Botswana in alarm in a police sweep of the area. A Botswana Government spokesman said the refugees—men, women and children—who had crossed into the north-eastern corner of Botswana were "not political refugees."

The Caprivi Strip, part of the disputed territory of South West Africa, is a corridor of bushland that lies between Angola, Zambia, Rhodesia and Botswana. The South African police started a search for "freedom-fighters" in the Caprivi Strip in October following reports of a guerilla build-up in the area.

## SWAZILAND

**Development Aid from Britain :** Britain has agreed to give Swaziland a £2,950,000 budgetary and economic development aid for the year 1969. The decision was announced in a communique at the end of talks between the two governments in December. It also said that Britain was contemplating a further development aid of £2,400,000 over the following two years. The two governments, the communique added, had agreed to establish a working party to examine Swaziland's claims to compensation from Britain for lands granted to white settlers or companies early this century. Britain earlier has rejected these claims. (*Malawi News Bulletin*, December 11).

**Portugal to be Diplomatically Represented :** A decree published in Lisbon recently announced the establishment of a new diplomatic representation of the rank of an embassy in Swaziland.

# Planning in India

## —Some Problems

D. R. GADGIL

I BEGIN with problems. What are the problems of Indian planning ? What problems has Indian planning been confronted with these many years ? What still remain with us ? Have any of these been solved in any measure ? During the planning process, have some new ones been created ? These are quite obviously very serious queries to which all students of planning must address themselves.

### Initial Problems

Now, if one looks back, say, to 1951 or 1956 when our major planning strategies were formulated, you will find that the problems that confronted planners then were somewhat like this. Of course, there was the basic problem of poverty. Because we were poor, it was difficult to make economic progress. And planning was undertaken because in these conditions of dire poverty, only intelligent, properly directed effort could enable us to make progress at all. That was the justification of planning.

With this poverty, and because of it, there were a number of features that were quite important then and continue to be important today. Just take a single feature, the low rate of savings in the economy, a direct result of poverty. We are a poor nation with poor people whose per capita income is low, with even a low standard of living. The savings potential is not large and the actual effort in savings was at that time, in 1951 or 1956, pretty low. Effort had to be made to see whether you could step it up.

Take any other aspect of planning problems that we then confronted. Take the structure of our economy. Basically we are primary producers, living mainly in villages, in pursuit of agriculture. And this being a rather old country which had been settled upon for centuries, there was not much of virgin land, not much of unutilised, unexploited natural resources. Therefore, the man-land ratio or the man-natural resources ratio was a somewhat adverse ratio—a ratio which was being made still more unfavourable by a fairly rapid growth of population.

We also had to face the problem of our industrial structure, a relatively underdeveloped structure. Though we had some important resources, those resources had not been exploited in order to build up a kind of industrial structure on the basis of which we could grow or diversify in the future.

A set of other problems. We had the problem of employment which was again a factor arising out of the adverse natural-resources-and-

population ratio and the fact that ours was an underdeveloped economy. Therefore, with the given techniques, the given capital investment and the given structure of industry, we could not create employment opportunities enough for the additions to the working force to be absorbed. Then, because of poverty, there was inequality of distribution of wealth among regions, among classes. This became marked to the extent that in some areas modern developments had taken place a little and some classes had benefited from them. To the extent this had happened, the disparity had increased.

These were the major problems when you thought of planning in say 1951 or 1956 in India. And you felt then that if you planned, that if a certain degree of economic development took place consistently over a period, then some things would happen. You could make a dent or begin to make a dent in most of these problems.

### **Strategy**

This was the 1956 strategy: you can hardly say that in the 1951 Plan there was a strategy. But the 1956 strategy was a strategy which thought in terms of increased agricultural production, in terms of certain institutional changes as land reforms and the co-operative structure as a help to agricultural production and structure change. It also laid a great deal of emphasis on such things as irrigation for stepping up agricultural production as such.

That was one aspect of the strategy. The other strategy—I suppose it is true to say that it was a strategy—said we go on to build up the basic industry with which we can build the later industrial progress and that, for the time being, the consumer industry or the consumer goods supply comes from traditional industry and dispersed small-scale industries which is (and that was implicit) being progressively improved technically.

I think in the 1956 Plan we quite clearly said that the employment problem was not going to be solved very early, but that if all these things happen, you could do a great deal in the way of future progress. Once you started really rapidly developing, employment would be there. Without necessarily giving too much thought to it, we also felt that this was a process which, if properly modulated, will not necessarily accentuate disparities. This was roughly the 1956 strategy. Today we have to see to what extent the problems are still there. What has happened in the meantime? What are the sort of failures that we think we now recognize, and what is it that we think we can do in the existing situation?

I shall not go into twelve years of history, but I shall draw your attention to one or two basic points here. One is that the increase in agricultural production, which we then thought would be sufficient, did not prove to be sufficient. Actually, one has to remember that even the people who project are apt to project on somewhat recent experience. It is important to remember that in 1955-56, the recent harvests since 1952-53 had been good. So, I believe it is true to say that in 1954-55 we had the lowest imports of foodgrains in the whole decade. It was thought broadly the increase in agricultural production was such that with the pace

continuing, the problem of food especially was under fair control. It was proved within two years that that was not so. Food has proved to be one of the worst chronic problems that we have had to face from 1956-57 to 1966-67. We have not been able to deal with it in the ordinary fashion, in that old type of approach. That is one.

### **Institutional Aspect**

Let us look at the other aspect of this, the institutional aspect. You will find that in the institutional aspect the basic land reform in the sense of the intermediary abolition was fairly quickly completed. But the land reform which affected the producer as such at the bottom, the position of the tenant and the share cropper, was a thing which was found to be very much more difficult to implement than had been thought earlier. I believe very largely we are more or less still at the same position.

In the co-operative field (looking again to the institutional), we find that in some states the programme that we launched in 1956-57 paid dividends. In those respects there has been a real change, almost a revolutionary change, in basic rural conditions for the middling and the substantial cultivator so far as the availability of credit, the availability of processing and marketing facilities etc., are concerned. But it remains true that perhaps for the larger part of the country the change has been slight, in some areas almost nil, and for most of the country the change for the lowest strata of agricultural producers has not been remarkable. This is for institutional changes.

When you go on to industry, you find two things happening. One is that the initial programme in the public sector succeeded up to a point, and that in the private sector—especially after we went on to massive import restriction quotas so that almost everything that it was supposed could be produced in the country was by quota restrictions prevented from coming in—a considerable diversified though high-cost economy was built up. This has happened especially during the past five or six years. You have in the industrial sector two definite changes coming about : a fairly high investment in the public sector with some extremely important units which may contribute in an important way to future progress being established, and a fairly diversified structure, though a high-cost structure, in the private sector.

These are the results of the last ten years. What I want to draw your attention to is the list of problems and see to what extent we have solved them.

### **Agriculture**

In agriculture, we did not seem to have solved the problems some years ago. But talking only of this year, talking only of events after September last year, there is a possibility of one saying that it may be that the solution of the problem is in sight. Here again, I want you to remember quite clearly that this sort of solution does not come about in a year. If you say the solution is in sight, the solution is in sight largely because in most of the cereal foodgrains—rice, wheat, millets—some new

seed varieties have been established which are extremely responsive. Now let us note that the establishment of these varieties itself has taken a number of years. Some of the millet programmes began almost ten years ago, when the Rockefellers first brought in their maize experience from America and began with millet seeds here. For the Mexican reds and so forth, the material was being collected six or seven years ago, so that the thing has, so to say, come to a head, almost fortuitously in a sense round about this time—a result of effort that had been going on. The important thing to remember is that without these highly responsive seeds, all the other things that went behind, extension programme, programmes of irrigation development, especially minor irrigation development, package programmes in various agricultural practices that were already there, the community development and other staff and structural arrangements that were already there—these did not begin to pay off until the central element of the new responsive seed was found.

This is a commentary, in a sense, on the chance element in some development processes also. Well, of course, it will be wrong to say this is chance element entirely, because deliberately to take the maize experience and apply it to millet is not just depending on chance: it is making a series of calculated attempts. But that the results would be there necessarily in that fashion is not a thing that you can always count on. Therefore, in terms of agricultural productivity, are we near the solution of our problem? That is an important question we are facing today. As a matter of fact, one may say this: so far this year's Plan and the Fourth Five-Year Plan is concerned, we are able to put something around a frame entirely on the assumption that we are near its breakthrough. For the whole of this present stage, the central place of increased agricultural production is extremely important. It is because of this that you are really able to look ahead to something happening in the next five years. Most technicians seem to be agreed that we are near some breakthrough in the sense of being able to get each year a 5 per cent greater production in agriculture for the next five years.

I should make a reservation here: when you are talking of development over a long period, anything like nearly a five per cent growth in agricultural production for five years is not sufficient. You are really postulating that you will be able to keep up some growth rate for some time. This means that our problem is now a problem not of what to do immediately, but of what research lines to lay out so that when the full effect of the new seed is worked out in agricultural production, we will be ready with something else so that we may start another cycle of higher agricultural production. That problem still remains.

Apart from that problem, the agricultural productivity problem is for the moment being broken into. I would like to emphasize that the agricultural organization problem is not being broken into yet. So far as the middling and the substantial producer are concerned, with their base of economic production they will go through most probably with the new seeds. It may happen that somebody who was marginal and less than middling will, because of the new seeds, now move into the middling class. Apart from that marginal adjustment, you still have left with your-



selves the large class of the uneconomic holders, the small producers. Definitely, specifically, the organizational problems of these people have not yet been solved. You have to look into those problems quite seriously in the future. The fact that you have this breakthrough may give you, so to say, a breather, a period during which to look to those problems.

### **Industry**

Now look at industry. Just as in agriculture the breakthrough indicates a period of five years which gives you some relief, in industry, too, you have the established, diversified broad structure of industrial complex. That is an extremely important point. I think it has to be remembered that this is a contribution of whatever planning effort has been put in to change the structure of our economy.

Roughly five years ago, if there was any really major project in modern industry, we used to think in terms of that major project being turned over for project aid as a whole to the World Bank or some donor country. We used largely to think in terms of a turn-key job from that country for establishing the new project, the new industrial base here. Today, to a very considerable extent, we no longer need do that. Whatever the new type of industry we want to establish, a considerable part of the plant and machinery components is being produced or is capable of being produced by the engineering industry in our country. And you have a fair amount of consultancy and design engineering talent so that you need not go in for entirely turn-key jobs. This an extremely important step forward. That we have done this in industrial production is partly a solution of the problem and partly a justification of the strategy adopted in 1956.

On the other hand, if you look at the whole of our approach to traditional industry and the transformation of the traditional industry or the approach to the establishment of dispersed small-scale industry and so forth, the results in those directions are extremely unsatisfactory in terms of any quantitative measure.

### **Population Problem**

Do we have any other directions in which we can claim we have solved our problems partly? We have the problem of population. Can we say we have even partly solved the problem? This is a difficult question to answer at this stage. Unfortunately, we are a set of people who are apt very quickly to think that we have solved our problems. In this population field, there have been announcements made so often in the past that we are at the end of the road, or we are through. That is a little doubtful. At the same time, it does appear in some areas where we have been conducting some demographic survey recently that with intensive effort a fairly rapid change in the net increase in population can come about. There are areas where there are indications that the programme can succeed. But I would be very chary of saying at this stage that on a mass scale or on a country-wide scale we are anywhere near the end of this problem.

Another direction in which I would claim that in part our problems are solved concerns the infrastructure—some of the larger national infrastructure, socio-economic overheads, the larger road-railway-port system.

I say deliberately that the larger infrastructure has been built up to a considerable extent with investments during the past ten years.

### **Land Reform**

When you have set all that, you still have to come back and to realize that many problems which we faced in 1951-56 still remain. Take the tenant's problem: it is not purely a tenancy problem or a tenancy rights problem. It is a problem of tenancy rights plus a problem of economic organization. What does one do with a really small-scale organization? The logical reply was given number of years ago—co-operative farming. But the logical reply, everybody understands now, is merely logical in the sense that it is not feasible. Nothing very much is happening in that direction. Can anything happen? Can you do anything by way of some sort of consolidation, some sort of bringing people together, so that this land which is not fully exploited today can be properly used?

I want you to realize in this context what has been often said by a number of agricultural economists, that the problem is not a big problem in terms of the land surface. If you take the middling and the big landholder, they usually hold between 75 and 80 per cent of the land surface, so that more than 50 per cent of the cultivators hold perhaps 15 per cent or less. So, if it is merely a question of land surface, it is not a major part. But if you go into this a little more, you will find that our failure to solve problems has been more and more on this human side. Whatever has been done is done in a small number of directions where a fairly small number in agriculture with proportionately large resources can go ahead.

So far as the basic problems are concerned—employment or of regional imbalance—we have really not been able to tackle them. Quite frankly, we have to admit that we have in a sense not begun to tackle them. There has been so much emphasis, so to say, on the production aspect that no serious thought so far has been given to these problems. Is it necessary or is it not necessary to tackle them? Has the time not come?

That leads me to another question: what are the problems that have been added to since 1951? It is not some problems which were there in 1951-56 still remain with us. I would draw your attention also to some problems which were not there in 1951-56 but are there today.

### **Metropolitan Growth**

Take, for example, the problem of metropolitan cities—of Calcutta, Bombay and others. We are merely taking the two largest which are now getting near to law-and-order problems. But these are problems which were not there and quite obviously our way of dealing with them and the methods of economic development did not only not contain these problems, but may be said to have accentuated them. The metropolitan problem is a new kind of problem that we have to deal with, and it is a very costly problem. Once you get a very large complex like the Calcutta or the Bombay metropolis, it becomes, for sheer management of the bare necessities of life, an extremely difficult problem. I found only a year or

two ago, when I was working as Chairman of the Bombay Metropolitan Region Committee, that the Maharashtra Government would have to think in terms of spending almost as much on the roads in Bombay as it was thinking of spending in the whole of Maharashtra just to keep the traffic going.

It becomes per unit an extremely costly affair to maintain—the same thing happens with additional units of water, additional units of electricity. I would say public housing is not being looked into altogether in these areas. Now these become very important problems and these are problems that we have really not looked into at all.

### **Foreign Debt**

Let us take another question—that of foreign debt. It is entirely a new problem. In 1956 we had no problem of foreign debt. Today we have a fairly large and growing problem of foreign debt. Now, in a sense, you have to admit that part of what I said regarding our ability to put a diversified industrial structure on the ground is a contribution of foreign aid. Foreign debt that we have contracted is not purely negative. We have built up (whether at a higher cost than necessary, that is another matter) this industrial structure largely with foreign aid. This problem of foreign aid and now of foreign debt is important. It has become so important that whatever may be the feelings of any individual regarding the desirability or otherwise of foreign aid, almost everybody comes to realize that we must begin to lower the extent of foreign aid that we receive.

Not only have we contracted a large foreign debt : in a sense we have played out that card. The foreign aid card and the foreign collaboration card in economic development, so to say, have been played out. We have now to get back on our own resources in both these regards. The servicing and repayment of these debts are problems with which we have to live with in terms of our own balance-of-payments in future years. Our import policy and our export policy will have to be very considerably oriented towards the meeting of the special balance-of-payments difficulties that have been created so far.

We will have to think in terms of unemployment, imbalances, of regional disparities, of growth of disparities and so forth. We do not have much data on this I am afraid. We see growing disparities by a sort of broad evidences, but we have not really a great deal of evidence regarding the extent to which disparities have grown with all this. The disparities have not been modified to an extent to which it should lead people to accept the present order peacefully. So we can say it is the other way round that the disparities have become an economic and political problem. Or it is arguable, as people say, even with some improvement your expectations increase so much more that, even with disparity not increasing, you have a problem.

Whatever that may be, unemployment is a problem, our failure to disperse industry is a problem. All these are really connected problems looked at separately. The landless labour, the unemployment, the very small holder, the lack of industrial dispersal, the lack of non-farm employ-

ment of any sort—all these problems are not separate problems. They are in fact a joint problem which indicates that over a large ground we really haven't succeeded.

### **Nationalization**

In the process, at least for the time being, we have played out yet another card which is the nationalization card. We took two very important and wise decisions—nationalization of the Imperial Bank and of Life Insurance. In retrospect even, one can say they were wise decisions, very important decisions. But these two decisions have also exhibited the limitation of nationalization.

When it was nationalized, the Imperial Bank went into branch-making, opened a large number of branches so that the framework of national remittance facilities, to which the Rural Credit Survey attached great importance, has now come into being. The State has an instrument in its hand of an extremely important commercial bank. If you look at the other side of the picture, that is, to what extent a nationalized bank can really serve certain needs, you see the limitations. I will put it the other way: I think you have played out immediately, at least for the time being, the nationalization card because of our experience of the public sector. A great deal of emphasis was naturally laid on building up the public sector. I don't at all consider that this was wrong. You might differ as to whether one particular big unit or another was necessary. That is another matter, but broadly the steel and machine-manufacturing structure that has been built is for the future an extremely important national asset. So we need not regret it.

At the same time, it has equally brought home to us all that this is not an easy way of making progress. Just look at it the other way round. If instead of our present experience, the public sector had today on its total investment been making anything like a modest return of five and six per cent throughout, the resources that it would have made available and the confidence that they will have given us might have made resources available for and might have created enough opinion for a large programme of extending the public sector. Now, as things are today, neither of those things has happened. You really have come to a position where for the time being you have to say that in this direction your cards are played out. It is in this very peculiar context that we have to look into the future.

### **Socialism**

We talk of socialism. It is there in every Plan. I suppose it should be there. What do you mean by socialism? What exactly is the content of socialism? It is the public ownership of the means of production and some way by which you get greater egalitarianism in the distribution. With our present laws, acquisition means very considerable problems: going to the Supreme Court, the market and so forth. Very considerable expenditure. And we have not the money now to put more and substantially in the public sector.

Then egalitarianism. One should very closely go into this. There

are a number of learned English treatises which go into this dispute as to whether in fact the fiscal policies in first and second world wars England contributed to greater equality or not. But there are certain basic things that have happened where there may not be more equality but insurances, medical help and the like help raise the standard of living of the poor. Therefore, socialism may mean attempting direct transfers one way or the other. Now these are very difficult. As a matter of fact, all those who have made any exercises at all in the sphere of agricultural support prices will have told you that in a country like India even supporting artificially agricultural prices is an impossible thing. You cannot really transfer from a small minority to a majority. These transfers, in the context of a very poor country, become difficult.

The other things are insurances and so forth. And curiously, in a sense naturally, most of our insurance effort has been to protect the standard of living not necessarily of the lowest strata of the country. If you have insurance for industrial workers or medical facilities for government servants and so forth, this is not something that you have got for the aborigines or the scheduled castes or the rural landless labourers or the casual labour in the city. I am not against this. I have in this context always argued for beginning where you can. If you can help the middling farmer, do help him, because he is at the mercy of the money-lender trader. It is a bad thing. So free him from that.

We have not really gone to that very large insurance or medical health approach which can cover the lowest strata. Therefore, you have to think in other terms. What are the other things that you can think of, so that you begin at least to change these aspects a little ?

I have very deliberately emphasized the problems that we have not solved and what might appear to be the almost insoluble nature of the problems. I do not say they are insoluble : they are difficult. You have to admit they are difficult problems and you have to think through them.

#### **Fourth Plan**

So far as the Approach to the Fourth Five-Year Plan is concerned, all that we have done is merely to highlight those problems. All that we have said in the Approach is that there is a problem of the small holder, that there is a problem of the rural landless labourer, that there is a problem of the weaker sections, that in a sense providing more employment is the only kind of insurance that you can give to people in general.

Besides highlighting problems, we are suggesting solutions. Or rather, we are suggesting pilot efforts, experimental efforts so that solutions could be found. Deliberately to put it that way is not an under-statement, it is a correct statement. In fact we don't know the solution, a sort of universal solution for giving employment to everybody. That just cannot be done with our resources. There is no easy solution to the small holder's problem. The whole organization is such that you could say, give them a little animal husbandry and so forth. But that is theoretical. How to do it ? And it is : Which ? When ? And how ? These are the problems which you have to try out.

**Prospects**

On prospects, what do I say? The prospects are good if with anything like a five per cent growth, if we do carry it through. I think this is not unfeasible. Everywhere I go, I inquire about this. I made it a point to talk to officers of the State Government who should know. They are fairly clear in their minds that the five per cent for this State (Kerala) was perfectly feasible. I have made it a point not merely to take it from any agricultural department or one or another expert to see if this is so. Now if we take it through then a part of the problem is solved.

If the economy is activated with the given industrial structure – and activation is fairly easy, the capacity is there already – the prospects are good. If the demand is there and if we get a little more export-oriented, the production should go along.

But these basic problems will remain. In these a careful experimental attitude is needed. These are not the sort of problems which can be brushed under the mat by talking about socialism. You must highlight those problems – problems of various sectors, various sections. They are a series of problems – unemployment, population, the metropolitan complexes, dispersal of industry, the problem of improvement of the technology of traditional craftsmen. The people don't realize that even today in India technological unemployment can take place. It is a continuous thing that has been happening. The number of traditional craftsmen is so large that a single product here or there can cut into their demand and reduce their employment.

These are problems which have to be looked into. If we do look at them and if we make an effort, then I don't despair. I don't want to sound pessimistic, I am a fairly optimistic person. Else, I would not have been accepting this job at this late time of my life. Quite obviously.

**No Magic**

One has to be fairly realistic in these matters. In this business of economic development there is no magic at all. There are no short cuts. It is hard work, self-discipline, a great deal of inputs, and input of intelligence. All these have to be put in and then in a large, poor country like ours you can make a little progress.

Quite a number of people in the world are surprised that we are where we are. Just that we have survived these years is quite a source of amazement to a lot of people. And let us take comfort from the fact that after all, with all these difficulties, we are here. But we must put in more hard work. There is something which I would plainly say. It is this: neither in terms of self-discipline, nor in terms of hard work, nor in terms of intellectual work in depth continuously to solve problems – in none of these terms have our inputs been very remarkable.

If I have accepted this assignment, it is because I want the Fourth Five-Year Plan to have much more input of deep thinking on the part

of a much larger number of people than has happened in the past. I want this problem to be understood by the people at large. I want people to experiment in their own way.

### **Local Solutions**

There is no all-India solution to our problems. You cannot plan for this country now and at this stage from Delhi alone. When you were building a few irrigation works or setting up a few steel plants, solving those problems of industrial diversification or merely experimenting with hybrid seeds, that could be done at few places. But if you are solving problems of local employment or local dispersal of industry or what to do with the small holders, these are local problems and they must be looked at locally by local people.

Planning solutions of these is even more tough than planning at the top. The planning at the top as in the British days—the irrigation projects and the railway works—even the British with a small personnel from abroad could do it. But this planning is very much more difficult. That is why I think it is only when people at large everywhere and in a much more meaningful way participate in this process, begin by understanding the problems that confront them, then apply their minds and experience to their solutions, that we should go somewhere. I feel sure that with a proper response we will go somewhere.

## Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter:

### Reception for Mrs. Coretta King

The Council joined the All-India Women's Conference and other voluntary organisations in giving a reception to Mrs. Coretta King, wife of the late Dr. Martin Luther King, who came to India to receive the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Peace and Understanding, presented to her husband posthumously. The book "Gandhi : A Life" by K.R. Kripalani, brought out on the occasion of the Gandhi Centenary, was presented to Mrs. King by the Council.

### Death of Mondlane Mourned

On February 11 the Council held a condolence meeting to mourn the death of Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, President of the Mozambique Liberation Front, who was killed by an unidentified man in Dar-es Salaam, Tanzania.

Mr. Asoka Mehta, President of the Council who presided over the meeting, said that "freedom is seldom achieved without paying a heavy price." The assassination of Dr. Mondlane was a step towards the freedom of mankind. His sacrifice was yet another offering at the altar of freedom.

The Sudanese Ambassador in India, Mr. Amin Magzoub Abdoun, said that Dr. Mondlane "was a leader who fought for the freedom of his land and his people with both thought and gun. The Portuguese colonialists should know that the death of a leader like Dr. Mondlane adds more brightness to the torch in the hands of those struggling for the freedom and emancipation of mankind."

Mr. Abdoun said that the death of Dr. Mondlane was "one of the many challenges that have to be confronted." The Sudanese Ambassador said he suspected that the killing of the liberation front leader "could be the outcome of a colonialist plan to liquidate the effective leadership of Mozambique."

Mr. Abdoun said that the death of Dr. Mondlane was an occasion for serious thinking. He hoped that those who upheld the principles of racial equality, human dignity and freedom of man, would redouble their efforts to assist their brethren in Mozambique till freedom was won.

Mr. Alfred Nzo, chief representative of the African National Congress in India, said that Dr. Mondlane had begun his movement



with only 8,000 volunteers to liberate his country from colonialism. Among the problems Dr. Mondlane had to deal with were "fictitious organisations manned by dubious characters" claiming to be "real freedom-fighters." "His death has only strengthened the movement and has made people aware that for freedom one must die so that others may live in freedom."

The following resolution was passed at the meeting :

"The brutal assassination of Dr. Mondlane is a grievous loss to the liberation struggle in Mozambique. In his personality the Portuguese found a formidable opponent. In the short period of his able leadership the guerilla struggle had achieved remarkable success. In two provinces of Mozambique—Cabo Delgado and Niassa—Frelimo had completely paralysed the Portuguese administration and replaced it by a nationalist set-up. Frelimo's guerillas recently opened a new front in the strategic province of Tete and Zambezia and are now in direct confrontation with the combined might of Portugal and South Africa. What was perhaps even more alarming for the colonialists was that Frelimo under the leadership of Mondlane had decided to join hands with the African National Congress of South Africa and the Zimbabwe African People's Union of Rhodesia in the armed struggle against these colonial powers.

"But the struggle in Mozambique is too advanced and it would be difficult for any power in the world to put the clock back. The Portuguese must remember also that Frelimo has never nourished any illusions of an easy and quick victory and they are prepared for a long and bitter struggle till the goal is reached. In the death of Dr. Mondlane the Portuguese colonialists should not deceive themselves that they have won final victory. This foul deed presages the doom of the regime for the martyrdom of this great leader will be a torch of inspiration to his many compatriots he has left behind in their onward march to freedom.

"The death of Mondlane is a tragic loss not only to our brothers and sisters in Mozambique. It is a loss shared by freedom loving people everywhere.

"This meeting of the representatives of political parties, trade unions, youth and student organisations, women's associations and welfare agencies condemns this dastardly act and conveys its deep sense of shock and profound grief to Mrs. Janet Mondlane and Mondlane's comrades-in-arms. It appeals to all those who uphold the principles of racial equality, human dignity and freedom of man to redouble their efforts to assist our courageous African brethren in Mozambique till freedom is won. Dr. Mondlane has not died in vain. His cause will triumph."

In a message the Prime Minister said : "Dr. Eduardo Mondlane was an outstanding leader of his people. He was carrying on a valiant struggle in the face of heavy odds. His example and memory will be a source of inspiration and strength to those on whom his mantle will fall. In India we have always given full support to the brave men and women who are sacrificing their life in defence of human liberty. We are confident that repression cannot succeed for long and that Mozambique, Angola and other colonial territories will be liberated before long.

"Dr. Eduardo Mondlane was a man of courage and dedication, and had many years of work and service before him. I extend my condolence and deep sympathy and those of the Government and the people of India to the members of Dr. Mondlane's family and to his comrades in the Mozambique Liberation Front."

Mr. V.V. Giri, the Vice-President, in a message said : "I am very happy the Indian Council for Africa has called a meeting to mourn the death of Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, President of the Mozambique Liberation Front. His monumental contribution towards liberation of the people will be ever a source of encouragement and example to all freedom-loving people and nations. In his tragic and unexpected end, we have lost a great personage and the best way for us to honour such a great citizen of the world is to continue to work for realizing the objective of freedom of one and all from domination."

#### **Dinner in Honour of Mr. Brutus**

On March 20 Mr. I.K. Gujral, Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting and Communications and a Member of the Executive Committee of the Council, gave a dinner at Hyderabad House to meet Mr. Dennis Brutus, Director of the International Defence and Aid Committee and President of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee. Mr. Brutus in a brief talk gave his impressions of his tour of Australia and New Zealand and of the current situation in South Africa.

#### **Lunch for Sayed Abdal Hadi Hamadto**

Mr. Asoka Mehta, President of the Council, was host to Sayed Abdal Hadi Hamadto, Member and Treasurer of the Political Bureau of the ruling National Unionist Party of Sudan and Chairman of the Sudan Railways Corporation, at a luncheon at Parliament House. Dr. Ram Subhag Singh, Minister for Railways, was among the distinguished guests.

#### **International Day for Elimination of Racial Discrimination**

The Council organised a meeting on March 21 to observe International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Mrs. Violet Alva, Deputy Chairman, Rajya Sabha, presided. Among those who addressed the meeting were Mr. Ram Niwas Mirdha, MP and Vice-President, Indian Federation of United Nations Organisations; Professor Hiren Mukerjee, MP; Dr. Gopal Singh, General Secretary, Indian Council for Africa; and Mr. M. Msimang, Representative, African National Congress.

Mr. Mirdha in his speech referred to the resolution of the UN Security Council calling on all governments to apply economic sanctions against the South African racist regime and said that the Big Powers of the Western world, the USA, Britain, West Germany, and their friends were flouting the UN's clear directive on the issue. These Powers were pouring in millions of dollars as investment in South Africa.

There was no reason why the South African regime would not listen to world public opinion urging an end to its policy of discrimination against the coloured people if these Big Powers implemented the sanctions, Mr. Mirdha added.

He said that this was a day of shame as on this day hundreds of peaceful men, women and children asking for their fundamental right of equality were brutally massacred by armed men of the South African racist regime.

Dr. Gopal Singh said that almost all people in the world practised discrimination of one kind or another. The crisis was moral, he said. While even animals practised the rule of not hurting human beings unless they were hurt man did not seem to respect this natural law. Man was thus behaving like his stone-age ancestors despite all the knowledge he had apparently acquired.

Mr. Singh also referred to the economic exploitation of the coloured people by the so-called whites. The coloured people were made to pay more for the produce of the whites while the whites paid less for what the coloured men produced.

Mrs. Violet Alva said that the growth of Afro-Asian solidarity was the only way "of redeeming us from the compulsions of this world and of ending discrimination and exploitation of coloured men."

She said that the martyrs of Sharpeville demanded that "our conscience be roused so that we may fight discrimination of all kinds every day, everywhere." She also referred to the discrimination being practised in India through the caste system. Colour-consciousness was also present among us, she said while referring to "inquiries about brides-to-be or about baby girls."

"Let us not say what we do not mean. Let us not have double-thought and double-talk because the world has a surfeit of it," she said.

Mr. Brutus urged the Indian people to "fight not only the racials but their allies also" who were "fattening themselves and the South African racist regime through trade and economic investment." He warned that "these allies of the racials" might profess to be "your friends" but their hands were dipped in the blood of the people. They were partners and protectors of the racials.

It was ironic that in the town named Vereniging, which in Dutch meant "unity" and where the Africans and the Boers had signed a peace treaty, "men were treated like sub-human beings and killed." Vereniging is the twin-town of Sharpeville where on March 21 armoured vehicles fired on peaceful demonstrators, killing 74 and wounding about 200 others.

"There are no monuments over their graves. They do not ask for it. They only ask us to carry on their battle against racial discrimination. Peace and racial equality are inseparable," he said.

The following message was received from Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India :

"Racial discrimination is a source of continuing discord among nations. Peace cannot be lasting until the world is purged of all forms of open or latent discrimination.

"My best wishes for the success of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination which is being observed by the Indian Council for Africa in New Delhi."

On March 21, 1960, a peaceful campaign was launched in a number of South African towns in protest against the requirement that all Africans carry "reference books" at all times in order to move about in their own country. Many Africans on that day left their passes at home and collected peacefully before the offices of police commissioners to be arrested for failure to carry passes—an offence under South African law. In Sharpeville, the police brought in armoured vehicles which fired at the crowd while fighter planes flew overhead to frighten the demonstrators; 74 were accounted dead and 184 wounded.

### **Farewell Party to Students**

The Executive Secretary represented the Council at a farewell party organised by the African Students Association at Azad Bhawan for outgoing students and members. The following students had completed their studies in Delhi and were returning to their home countries:

Miss Walburga Mbayu, B.A. (Hons), Sociology (Final)  
 Mr. Stephen Hwindingwi, B.A. (Hons), Econ. (Final)  
 Mr. George Ogoro, B.A. (Hons), History, M.A. (Final)  
 Mr. Simon Mwewa, B.A. (Hons), Econ (Final)  
 Dr. Esien, M.B.,B.S.  
 Mr. Peter Ndenye, B.A. (Hons) (Final)  
 Dr. John Katala, M.B.,B.S.  
 Mr. Henry Khamis, B.A. (Hons) Pol. Sc. (Final)  
 Mr. Sylvester, B.A. (Hons), Maths (Final)

### **Bombay Regional Centre**

The Ambassador of Algeria, H.E. Ali Lakhdari, was the guest of the Indian Council for Africa, Bombay Regional Centre, which gave a reception in his honour and screened the film *Battle of Algiers* on the occasion of his visit.

The Executive Secretary gave a tea party in honour of Mrs. Burrenchobay, wife of the Permanent Secretary in the Mauritius Prime Minister's office, on March 28 and to meet Indian women social workers.

### **Executive Committee Meeting**

The Executive Committee of the Council met on March 26.

### **Donations of Books**

The Council expresses its appreciation to the Embassies of Algeria and Congo and Nigerian High Commission for the following:

#### **Algerian Embassy**

*Actualite et Documents*  
 20 November 1961. *Revue*  
*Bimensuelle du Ministere*  
*de L'Information*

**Nigerian High Commission :**

1. *Abubakar Tafawa Balewa  
My Prime Minister*
2. **Lord Hailey.** *Native Administration in the Br. African Territories.  
Vol. 3 & 4 and other pamphlets.*
3. **Congo Embassy**
  1. *Revue Congolaise d'Administration*
  2. *Statute Juridique du fouds Belgo-Congolais D' Amorlissement  
et de gestion. Publication de l' universite officielle du Congo.  
A Lubambashi.*

## Publications Received

**Adedeji, Edebayo (Ed).** *Nigerian Administration and its Political Setting*; London, Hutchinson Educational Ltd., 1968; pp. 162.

**Baleva, Abubakar Tafawa.** *My Prime Minister*; Lagos, 1964; pp. 226.

**Bettini, Emilio.** *Il Trattato Contro la Proliferazione Nucleare Bolgna*, 1968; pp. 216.

**Hailey.** *Native Administration in the Br. African Territories*, Vol. III, pp. 350; Vol. IV, pp. 61; London, H.M.S.O.; 1951.

**Mboya, Tom.** *Development Strategy for Africa: Problems and Proposals*; Kenya 1965; pp. 28.

**Rude Beck.** *Party and People : A Study of Political Change in Tunisia*; Stockholm, 1967; pp. 274.

**Runes, Dagobert D.** *Despotism : A Pictorial History of Tyranny*; New York, Philosophical Library, 1963; pp. 269.

**Tandberg, Olof G.** *Brunmans Afrika*; Stockholm, 1968; pp. 207.

**London, African Bureau.** *Rhodesia : The Fearless Proposals and the Six Principles*, by M.J. Christie.

**Unit of Apartheid Department of Political and Security Council Affairs :** *The Sharpeville Incident and Its International Significance.* 1968.

### Algerian Embassy

*Actuatiteet documents, 20 Nov. 1968 No. III.* Revue Bimensuelle du minis-  
lere de L'information.

### Nigeria High Commission

*Blue Print for Post War Reconstruction*; Federal Ministry of Information.  
*Nigeria 12—State structure : The only way out.*

*Nigeria Answers Questions*; Federal Ministry of Information.

*Soldier of Honour*; Federal Ministry of Information.

*No Genocide : Final Report of the First Phase from 5th Oct. to 10th Dec.*  
by the OAU Observers in Nigeria; Dec. 1968.

*Report on the OAU Consultative Mission to Nigeria.*

*Federal Peace Efforts.*

*Ibos in a United Nigeria.*

*Unity in Diversity.*

*Ending the Fighting.*

*African Conference on International Law and African Problems.* Lagos, 14, 18 March 1967.

*Statement by the Government of Federation of Nigeria on the report of Elias Commission of Inquiry into Administration, Economics and Industrial Relations of the Nigerian Railway Corporation.* Sectional Paper 7, 1960.

*Meeting of the Nigerian Military Leaders held at Peduase Lodge, Aburi, Ghana.* 4th and 5th June, 1967.

*Challenge of Unity.*

*Towards one Nigeria No. 1-4.*

*Annual Report on the Federal Prisons Department of Nigeria for the year 1961-62; 1962-63; 1964-65.*

*Annual Report 1966-67.*

*Annual Report 1966-67.*

*Annual Report—Mines Division.* Federal Ministry of Mines and Powers, Lagos.

#### **UAR Embassy**

*Text of President Nasser's Speech at the Inaugural Meeting of the Palestinian National Council; 1 Feb. 1969.*

#### **BIS**

*Commonwealth in Brief.*

#### **USIS**

*Mr. President Richard M. Nixon.*

#### **UN**

##### **Economic Commission for Africa**

*Economic Commission for Africa. Seminar on Organization and Conduct of Censuses of Population and Housing.* Addis Ababa.

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